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Abstract
Beginning with a definition of "race" as a system of
discourse about human difference sustained by its symbolic
articulations, I approach "race" as analogous to the social
disciplines that Foucault describes as constructing the
modern subject.
Lacan,

Fanon,

discipline

Bringing together certain speculations of
and Morrison,

I suggest that this racial

facilitates a racial

"mirror stage"

through

which "blackness" and "whiteness" are projected as distinct
and unified

conceptions

representative

texts

of

identity.

examine

how

My

readings

such racial

of

identity

patterns are both seductive as resolutions of self-discord
and

destructive

in

tension

with

the

multiple,

interpersonal, and historical determinations of the self.
The

anxieties

of

psychic

and

bodily

disintegration

represented in these texts simultaneously inscribe this
tension and, because they are evoked in overtly racialized
contexts, suggest the uses and effects of "race" in U.S.
culture.

These implications of "race" are quite different

for whites and blacks, but it is precisely the study of
texts by white and black writers together, as a literature
of social racialization,
"whites"

and

rather than as literatures by

"blacks," that reveals the discursivity of

"race" and its role in the construction and destruction of
the self.
vi

Thus,

chapter

"black,"

2

fragmented

reads

Stein's

subjectivity

representation
in

Melanc tha

of

as a

racialized re-presentation of the social disciplines that
circumscribed Stein's own identity and precipitated her
anxieties of disintegration, while also noting how Stein's
compositional approach dramatically illustrates "race" as a
discursive system.
Man evokes the
disciplinary

Chapter 3 shows how Ellison's Invisible

"white" mirror stage,
models

of

"black"

its production of

identity,

and

the

disintegration of the "black" self-experience that results.
Chapter

4

Berryman's

compares
Dream

the

Sonas

minstrelsy,

suggesting

acknowledges

the

blackface
to

the

how

internal

device

function

Berryman

"blackness"

employed

in

of historical
simultaneously

that

structures

normative "white" identity, yet manipulates a carnivalized
"blackness" to allay the moral and organizational anxieties
of “whiteness."

Chapter 5 suggests additional historical

and theoretical directions for this racially politicized
psychoanalytic criticism, applying Kohutian self psychology
to the felt disintegration of the African-American self
that,

in Morrison's Beloved. is the legacy of slavery's

intrapsychic and intrafamilial disruptions.

Chapter One
Introduction: Identity, Race, Fragmentation
In going underground, I whipped it all except the mind,
the mind.
And the mind that has conceived a plan of
living must never lose sight of the chaos against which
that pattern was conceived. That goes for societies as
well as for individuals. (Invisible Man 567)
Near the end of Part Two of his Autobiography. in the
midst of a rare admission of incapacity, Benjamin Franklin
uses

an

intriguing

parable

to

surrender to "faulty character"

illustrate
(82).

his

personal

After outlining his

"bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection"
(75), with its thirteen categories of "virtue," its step-bystep regimen for making virtue habitual, and its reduction
of both moral identity and daily life to a set of visual
grids, Franklin admits that the category he labeled "Order"
was

his

persistent

tripping

stone.

To

illustrate

his

frustrated resignation to disorder, Franklin tells the story
of a man who, given the unendurable difficulty of perfecting
an ax, decides to accept the instrument in its flawed state.
The frank self-ironization of this anecdote is undercut by
an irony Franklin evidently misses--the fact that his bid to
perfectly

organize

and

order

his

identity

is

derailed

precisely by the inability to obtain perfect "Order"--but
what makes the parable most telling, given its location in
this

archetypical

document

of

the

shaping of

"American

identity," is its almost unconscious yoking of the struggle
for self order with a certain semiotics of color.

The anecdote, as Franklin relates it, involves a man so
obsessed with making the "face" of his new ax "bright" that
he is willing to take on the arduous task of turning the
wheel himself while the smith attempts to "grind it bright."
Like Franklin in his struggle to order his life, the poor
fellow

eventually tires of the futile task.

"No, says the

Smith, Turn on, turn on; we shall have it bright by and by;
as yet 'tis only speckled.

Yes, says the Man; but--I think

I like a speckled Ax best" (82, Franklin's emphasis) .

As

Franklin notes, quickly restoring his own upper hand, this
is probably emblematic of other seekers after virtue who,
lacking a systematic and structured approach like his own,
"have given up the Struggle, and concluded that a speckled
Ax was best" (82) . Still, he admits, in that one category-"Order"--he

himself

was

"incorrigible"--speckled,

as

it

were.
As is indicated by the preoccupation with order itself
and by the careful structuring, regimentation, and gridwork
of

"virtue,"

this episode

in The Autobioar achy

is not

merely concerned with moral and ethical perfection, though
that is the overt content.
the

pursuit

categorize,

of

virtue,

define,

Franklin's entire approach to
rather,

structure,

reveals

an

effort

to

and bring into a state of

complete and final order both everyday life

(his scheme

includes a grid for the activities of each day, every day
the

same)

and

iden*~ ity

itself.

Having

developed

a

comprehensive

schema

of

"character"

and

its

component

categories, and specifications of what constitutes proper
behavior in each category, Franklin embarks on a program of
complete definition and control of his own identity--his own
"self."

The brief admission of failure, of course, is what

is intriguing in a text that was destined to become the
gospel of the pre-eminent myth of "American identity": the
self-made,

self-reliant,

individual.1

Here,

from

autonomous,
the

father

independent
of

American

individualism, is the confession that his most conspicuous
attempt to put his "self" in order was utterly frustrated by
disorder.

What

I

am

most

interested

in,

however,

is

Franklin's selection of a metaphor of light and dark to
illustrate

his

thwarted

struggle

to

bring

subjective

coherence out of incoherence: the effort to brighten the ax
is a struggle to secure brightness and clarity from darkness
and chaos.

Franklin's italicized moral, a speckled Ax was

best. refers then not only to the distasteful

flecks of

color which remain on the face of the ax, not only to the
dirty "little black spots" which signify moral failures and
speckle

the

examination

would-be
grids

identity itself.

clean

(78) , but

slate
also

of
to

Franklin's
the

order

daily
of

his

The effort to create an orderly, coherent,

and structured self is figured here as a struggle to remove
dark

"speckles"

surface.

of

discoloration

from

a

shiny,

clean

I open with the "speckled Ax" not because this book will
be extensively concerned with Benjamin Franklin, or with the
American ideal, so prevalent during the nineteenth century
and

so

dependent

inspiration,
success.

on

the

Franklin

of self-reliant

archetype

for

its

individualism and self-made

Nor do I intend a detailed analysis of the models

of society and identity Franklin is working with--the extent
of his essentialism and his attitude toward social context
and historical process,

for example.

Rather,

I open with

the ax anecdote because it is suggestive of many of the
concerns

of

the

study

at

hand

and

because

Franklin's

Autobiography seems to be the document which initiates many
of those concerns for a cultural tradition of which I will
study only the most recent epoch.
concerns

are

the

ideal of

Foremost among those

individualism itself

and the

development of race and racism in the United States, ideas
which,

as theorists of race,

culture,

and identity have

begun only recently to realize, are inextricably linked in
a complex and vicious circle of codependence.
moment

in

which

Franklin

posits

his

most

That the
audacious

conception of the perfectly ordered, defined, and controlled
subject is also the moment in which he begins to think in
terms

of

eradicating

"little

black

spots"

(78),

is

illustrative of the entire history of the relationship of
subjectivity and race in America which this book takes as
its central theme.

Franklin's "Art of Virtue," which is

really an art of self-ordering, and his parable of the ax,
which is really a parable of the self, stand as the preface
to a history of which this book will study only the most
recent chapters.

The making of "subjectivity" in America,

the forging of both an "American identity" and the "American
culture" which determines it, has been a process of constant
wheel turning,

constant grinding, constant effort to make

the face of the ax bright and pure; always, the struggle has
foundered on the ineradicable speckling of the ax.

This

book is about the presence, the meaning, and the denial of
those speckles, and the realization, suppressed by Franklin
even as he suggests it, that, perhaps,

"a speckled Ax is

best."
Of course, Franklin's story refers neither to racially
typed

human beings

nor

to

the

concept

of

race

itself.

Nevertheless, the "little black spots" of which the perfect
self must be cleansed are immensely suggestive of what Toni
Morrison has recently analyzed as the necessary presence of
darkness

in

opposition

to

which

continually staged and restaged.

white

subjectivity

is

In her brief but crucial

new rationale for American literary criticism,

Playing in

the Dark. Morrison argues that the pre-eminent concern of
literature
architecture

in
of

the

United

States

a new white

man"

has

always

(14-15) .

been

"the

Though

she

focuses on other texts and on the wide discursive field she
calls "Africanism" as the darkness in opposition to which

6

the

new,

white,

characteristics
American

male American
she attributes

selfhood

are

in

fact

identity was

forged,

to this dominant
those

of

the

idea of

Franklin,

the

archetypical new American white man: freedom, independence,
individualism, autonomy, authority, power (Morrison, Playing
38-45).

As Morrison details, most vividly by referring to

the experience of the Scottish-American frontiersman William
Dunbar, the identity of this new white man was established
in contradistinction to a dark-skinned savage "other" that
was

positioned

"out

there."2

That

savage

other

was

eventually elaborated most fully as the Negro slave and the
entire complex of terms, images, metaphors, and stereotypes
that soon congealed around the black man in America:

an

entire discursive field that Morrison terms "Africanism."3
The

initial

discourse,

instance
according

of

this

vast

to

Morrison,

network

of

is

"repressed

the

racial

darkness" onto which "artists--and the society that bred
them--transferred internal conflicts" (38-39).

The anecdote

with which Franklin illustrates the tale of his own struggle
with disorder is an exemplar of just this process, including
as it does the sense of both repression and darkness (the ax
must be "bright," the speckles must be ground out) .4
would seem to be no accident,

then,

It

that such an image

appears in connection with what may have been the first
formalized "architecture of the new white man" in American
literature.

7

If this segment of the Autobiography is not the first
such blueprint for American manhood,
most

obsessed

increases

its

with

order

relevance

and

it is surely the one

structure,

a

fact

that

to the particularly Foucauldian

analysis of subjectivity and race which I intend.

The

rather remarkable attempt to reduce identity to an ordered
set of procedures and categories (one of which is concerned
with

enforcing

reduce

"order"

identity

to

an

itself), the

related

attempt

objectified

visual

or

to

spatial

presentation (grids on a page), the internalization of the
codes of virtuous behavior--all seem to exemplify Michel
Foucault's assumptions about the nature of the Western world
which was emerging at this time.

Franklin's methods exhibit

both the increasing obsession with order and the increasing
concern

with

"subjectification"

through

means

of

objectification that Foucault links to the Enlightenment and
the end of the eighteenth century.5

Briefly, this was the

historical moment that saw the emergence of what Foucault
would

call

systematized
constantly
normativity,

the

"modern

according
examined
and

to

and

a

subject"--the

individual:

fixed

categories,

evaluated

constituted

by

the

set

of

against
written

a

code

of

record

of

itself.
Using Foucault's genealogy of the modern subject as part
of its groundwork,

the present study will concern itself

with the anxiety about disorder that surfaces in Franklin's

account--almost

against

relation to the

his

"ordering"

will--and
of

life,

with

its

complex

to the creation of

"subjectivity, " and to the development of race and racism in
America.

By examining twentieth-century literary texts that

persistently link the anxiety of psychic disorder to issues
of

racist

practice

and

racial

identity--often

within

contexts of near or outright psychopathology--we can trace
in this century the effects of the kind of obsession with
order

and

subjectification

of which

Franklin's

Virtue" represents only one of the first instances.

"Art

of

When we

examine literary representations of both race and identity,
and

especially

issues,

we

racial

can

begin

identity,
to

see

in

where

the
we

light
are

of

today

these
as

a

racialized society, why we are here, and where we might be
able to go both socially and culturally by taking a full
accounting of how we got here.
Specifically, I want to examine why and how, as Morrison
asserts, race "functions as a metaphor so necessary to the
construction of Americanness" (47), why and how "Africanism"
itself,

as she also suggests,

"ego-reinforcement" for white
specifically,
prevalence

in

manifestation
metaphors

of

I

will
the

of

use

the

twentieth

this

psychic

anxiety
and

had and has the effect of
subjects

(8) .

peculiar
century
about

bodily

of

Even

more

and

increasing

a

particular

disorder--literary

disintegration--as

the

problematic through which I engage such questions of self

formation and race.

The central question of this study will

be: what is the role of the U.S.

concept of race in the

fragmentation of subjectivities, both white and nonwhite?
For example, what cultural dynamics are in play when race,
or

"blackness,"

to

use

our

culture's

most

common

codification of racial difference, becomes a crucial aspect
of

the

"white"

psychic
writers?

fragmentation

depicted

Following Morrison,

by

we

what

might

we

call

ask

what

"white" writers are trying to accomplish when they write
about race, when they deploy "Africanism."

It is with such

concerns in mind that this study will try to open up new
perspectives on the art of Gertrude Stein and John Berryman,
both of whom deploy a distinctive "Africanist" presence in
their work.

Significantly, as I discuss in chapters 2 and

4, both also depict characters who are tragically unable to
piece together a disintegrating sense of identity.
same

time,

we

need

to

ask

why

At the

"self-disintegration, "

especially (but not only) since the advent of postmodernism,
is such an apt metaphor for the psychological experiences of
members of social minorities, like African Americans, that
are marginalized by racial definitions.

Why have writers

from backgrounds as divergent as those of Frantz Fanon,
Salman Rushdie, Gloria Anzaldua, and Toni Morrison found the
language and themes of psychic and physical disintegration
useful

for describing

experiences

of

racial

their historically very different
oppression?

By

analyzing

the

10

disintegration motif
Morrison herself
present

study

in novels by Ralph Ellison and by

in chapters 3 and 5, respectively,

seeks

to

understand

precisely in relationship to and,

such

the

fragmentation

in specific ways,

as a

result of the kinds of psychologically motivated racial
definitions deployed by Stein and Berryman.

As we shall

see, psychic disorder, the persistent speckling of the "ax,"
continued to be a preoccupation of U.S. literature into and
throughout the twentieth century.
that disorder

relates to the

My concern is with how

fact that citizens of the

United States, like no other people in history and no other
people on earth, from Philadelphia in 1787 to Gettysburg in
1863 to Birmingham in 1963 to Los Angeles in 1993, have had
one consistent and obsessive ax to grind: the presence of
race in our society.

Some critical premises: transgressing boundaries
The extent

to which Benjamin

ordered and autonomous

subject,

Franklin's
implicit

ideal

of

throughout

an
the

Autobiography. continues to function as one of the central
assumptions, guiding myths, and accepted "truths" of U.S.
society is a direct measure of the political urgency of this
book.
on

the

Taking my impulse from Fredric Jameson's insistence
general

priority

of

"political

interpretation,"

combined with what Henry Louis Gates Jr. has called the
tendency of a "new black aesthetic movement" to read "the

social

aspects

of

literature,

the

larger

dynamics

of

subjection and incorporation through which the subject is
produced"

(Gates,

"Criticism"

309),

I

want to begin by

politicizing the strategies of order, isolation, and selfsufficiency that Franklin idealizes in his construction of
a self.6 One of the fundamental political messages of this
inquiry,
are

then,

rooted

in

is that Franklin's ontological assumptions
a wider

epistemology

of

order

that

has

potentially falsifying, potentially pernicious consequences
for the many aspects of human culture to which it has been
applied.

The ideals of individualistic order and autonomy

became standards in U.S.

society

(and, as Foucault would

argue, in Western society as a whole) for organizing ideas
about

everything

from

human

identities

to

cultural

identities to economic entities to physical and biological
quantities

to nations

themselves.

Indeed,

and

states

to

literary

artefacts

the critical formalism of twentieth

century "well wrought urn-ers," with its emphasis on the
perfectly

crafted

and

autonomous

text,

bears

an

almost

geneaological resemblance to Franklin's formalized outline
of the well-crafted (and self-crafted) moral and economic
"subject"--the "well wrought earner."
the impulse to draw boundaries,
define

and

discursive

divide
(urns

isolated
can

be

The common thread is

to create categories,

entities--be

the

conceptual

they

to

human

or

containers

of

psychic, as well as written matter). It is this conceptual

12

mode,

and

its

implications

for

human

lives

and

human

interaction, on which this book will focus its oppositional
politics.
delimit

Such boundary fixation, I will argue, be it to
persons,

texts,

nations,

races,

cultures,

or

academic disciplines, precludes or inhibits those kinds of
bonding, interaction, and community which are most human-and most democratic.
My contention is that this philosophy that divides and
isolates

is

an

aspect

of

what

Foucault

calls

the

"objectivizing" of the sciences and the "dividing practices"
of the various social institutions that manage human life,
the first two of his three primary "modes of objectification
which transform human beings into subjects"
The

"dividing practices," in particular,

("Power" 208).
are methods of

defining and categorizing human beings, processes through
which

"the

divided

subject

from

is either divided

others.

This

inside himself

process

objectivizes

or

him.

Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy,
the

criminals

and

the

'good

boys'"

("Power"

208) .

Franklin's self-conception, which reduces him to an ethical
subject

made

up of

thirteen categories

and an economic

subject capable of absolute self-dependence, both divides
him within and partitions him from others.

Indeed, it is

the attachment of the "speckling" metaphor to such modes of
subject production that suggests we conceptualize "race" as

13

another, and, in the U.S., particularly pervasive "mode of
objectification" that divides and categorizes.7
My concern with the problematic ramifications of thinking
that rigidifies categories and boundaries, then, determines
the basic philosophical and critical stance of this study.
To the extent that the aforementioned principles of order
and autonomy have been normalized and idealized

in our

society, this book must define itself as oppositional and,
in the sense outlined by Frank Lentricchia, "radical": aimed
at questioning both the assumed normalcy of society and its
methods

of

sustaining

that

assumption,

its

methods

of

"normalization."8 As Edward Said and, more comprehensively,
Jim

Merod

have

pointed

out,

however,

there

criticism and there is radical criticism.

is

radical

The skeptical

quotation marks Said places around the term "left" in his
essay "Reflections on American 'Left' Literary Criticism"
ironize both post-structuralist

"textual"

criticisms and

Marxist analyses that, despite pretenses of subversion, do
little to engage with the society in which they are situated
and even less to question its basic assumptions.
too easily lapse into new formalisms

The former

(the "urn" they deal

with is an expanded one, but an "urn" nonetheless) , and both
tend to foster the continued isolation of intellectuals
within a cult of specialized expertise that operates around
entirely traditional models of authority.

This is a problem

I

many

recognize,

as

does

Merod,

with

ostensibly

14

oppositional intellectuals, including Foucault himself.

It

is on precisely such grounds that Merod questions the social
relevance of both Foucauldian analysis and Jameson's brand
of academic Marxism:
Both Jameson and Foucault accept the authoritative role
of the professional intellectual without finding any need
to specify how, precisely, that authority supports or can
be brought into relation with the victims of power each
wants to champion... The threat to Jameson's avowed
Marxist ambition is his own substitution of verbal
dexterity for the thankless job of building class
consciousness: of arousing among students an awareness of
the dominance of capital formation and its ability to
direct or merely to pervert intellectual clarity and
political reality.
(149-50)
Without entering the debate that Merod examines about how
various

progressive

immobilized

by their

complicity,I would
arguing

social

that

a

critiques

own

simply

are undermined

degrees

of institutional

add my voice to Merod's

"politically

and

responsible"

criticism

in
is

possible--one that maintains a vigilant attention to the
"politics" of context, community, and, most importantly for
the present study, personality (specifically, in this case,
psychology).9
In other words,
radicalism,
precisely

themselves,
itself.
critical

derived

on

boundaries

my own formula for effective critical

a

from both Said and Merod,

willingness to

thatliterary
the

texts

that

critics

they work

Politicization
precept

transgress the

demands

begins

for

often
with,

is based
arbitrary

place
and

the

around
academy

contextualization,
me

with

two

a

guiding

15

attitudes.
maintain

First, a politically responsible criticism must
an

discourse

awareness

undergoing

of

the cultural contexts

analysis and

consequences of all discourse.

the material

of

the

social

As Said puts it in trying to

formulate a critical significance beyond mere "appreciative
technical reading methods," critical consciousness
should begin its meaningful cognitive activity in
attempting to account for, and rationally to discover and
know, the force of statements in texts, that is, as doing
something more or less effective, with consequences that
criticism
should
make it
its
business
to
reveal... Criticism cannot assume that its province is
merely the text, not even the great literary text.
It
must see itself, with other discourse,inhabiting a much
contested cultural space, in which what has counted in
the continuity and transmission of knowledge has been the
signifier, as an event that has left lasting traces upon
the human subject.10
(World 224-25)
Said's sensitivity to context and his wariness of arbitrary
boundaries here are appropriate:

he is not merely expanding

the "urn" of the literary object, nor even breaking it open;
he is denying that the urn ever existed in the first place-or

at

least

pointing

constructedness.

out

Moreover,

its

provisional

this

refusal

status,
of

its

boundaries

renders neither a larger "playground" for critical sport,
nor a bottomless and ruleless interpretive activity, but a
"political"

imperative:

the

creation,

transmission,

utilization of texts is always political,
gain and loss in specifically human terms.

and

always entails
As Foucault

would add, such creation and transmission of words is always
done for some reason and for some purpose, and it is that
utility which can be most revealing; the Foucauldian critic
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is

more

interested

in

determining

the

uses

to

which

discourse is put--the effectivity referred to by Said--than
in pursuing the significations of authorial intention or
reader perception.

Most importantly, Said directs critical

attention not merely to the elucidation of abstract and
hidden political "content" which inheres in the text

(cf.

Jameson), but to the area of "effect" most relevant to my
inquiry:

that

is,

to

the

potential

and,

to

him,

more

significant, effects of the text on the human subject.

It

is this attention not only to the political aspects of the
text, but also to the psychological aspects of its politics,
that informs my own approach.
The second important sense of context for a criticism
that

hopes

Merod's

to

avoid

formulation,

intellectual
to

bring

isolation

critical

and,

using

authority

into

relation with "victims of power," is the critic's context:
who is our audience?

what communities are we a part of?

how does our location in an academic institution affect our
work?

Critical work,

transformation

of

if it is to have any sway in the

social

structures,

must

pedagogical and a wider, more public agenda.
students

have

both

a

Challenging

to think critically about how various powerful

influences shape thought patterns, identities, and consensus
is a logical first step, as Merod suggests in the passage on
Jameson I cited above.
worth noting,

Far too little criticism,

it is

is of direct application to how students--

particularly
themselves,

undergraduates--conceptualize
and

their

social

the

world,

responsibilities.11

In

a

broader sense, though, expanding the critic's context means
making

the

habits

received knowledge,

of

critical

thinking,

of

questioning

accessible to a society that extends

beyond the classroom and the university.

Such accessibility

involves rethinking critical authority itself in ways that
are often difficult

for intellectuals who are paid,

and

frequently privileged, precisely because of their status as
expert

authorities.

Again,

as Merod makes

very

clear,

fulfilling this wider community role is a matter of crossing
the

arbitrary

boundaries--motivated

by

attitudes

of

authority, order, knowledge and self-interest--that separate
students and teachers, academics and nonacademics, critics
and physicists.

As he notes,

"The effort of criticism is

always, if it is committed to public welfare, a public act"
(Merod 187) .12
This has implications for the substance, the style, and
the forums we choose for critical discourse, but I think the
most

generalizable

use

of

a

public

criticism

is

the

establishment of a certain skeptical approach to "knowledge"
itself.
enable

I have in mind a mentality of skepticism that would
critics,

students,

interrogate

every

stereotype,

belief,

posture

and
of

the

general

public

to

knowledge--assumption,

cultural/media representation,

"consensus," received "truth," history,

social

scientific fact--
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with some form of the question,

"How do you/I/we know?"13

What are the contexts in which such "truths" were formed and
what are their consequences in the real human communities
which they affect?
students,

Teaching such a questioning mentality to

especially as it applies to assumptions

about

human identity, and making one's own criticism an example of
it for both students and the citizenry of which academics
themselves are members, may be the most basic task of the
political critic and of the responsible humanist.
In the following pages, as I outline my own approach to
the convergence of race and identity in twentieth-century
literature,
cultural

I will draw theoretical support from several

analysts

who

I think

context-conscious,

and

truth-questioning

described.

share

the

transgressive,
mindset

I have

Foucault has used a Nietzschean genealogical

method to study the historical processes by which various
types of human "subjects" were produced and to show how the
"truths" we revere emerge at specific historical moments
from specific

historical

circumstances,

a methodology

I

adapt to the study of the racial subject and our accepted
racial paradigms. Said, as already mentioned, has commented
extensively on the need to pursue

criticism outside

of

traditional limitations, and his thorough analysis of how
one particular type of racialism evolved and functioned-Orientalism--provides a close and instructive parallel to
the U.S. versions of racialism that interest me here.

So

too, bell hooks has formulated her critiques of raced and
gendered patterns of thinking with particular attention to
how subjects are formed, defined, isolated, and constrained.
Moreover, her efforts to forge a criticism of both popular
culture and literary "art," using principles attentive to
both politics and aesthetics, and engaging the intellectual
community while

remaining

accessible

to

a wider

public

audience, make her a model of the politically responsible
critic I described above.

Each of these cultural theorists

challenges us to question accepted chronological,

social,

and interpersonal boundaries when we approach human beings
and human culture.

Just as importantly,

they call us to

think about human beings when we think about human culture,
and that is the real political imperative of both their work
and mine.

Like hooks,

I am "most excited by writing and

reading cultural criticism that is linked with a concern for
transforming oppressive structures of domination"

(hooks

12) .

Politicizing identity
For

both

hooks

and

Foucault,

as

for

many

cultural

theorists since Frantz Fanon's groundbreaking psychocultural
critique of the postcolonial situation, it is clear that the
focal point for such transformative criticisms must be the
question of personal

identity or subjectivity.14

In his

late essay, "Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject,"
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Foucault pointed out that one of the defining impulses of
struggles against oppression is precisely such a questioning
of "the status of the individual":
on the one hand, they assert the right to be different
and they underline everything which makes individuals
truly individual.
On the other hand, they attack
everything which separates the individual, breaks his
links with others, splits up community life, forces the
individual back on himself and ties him to his own
identity in a constraining way. These struggles are not
exactly for or against the "individual," but rather they
are
struggles
against
the
"government
of
individualization."
("Power" 211-12)
Foucault

is referring here to various other

against power,
parallel

to

"struggles"

but the concerns he expresses are exactly
those

that

hooks

identifies

for

African

Americans.

Although she notes that the theoretical distance

of

postmodern

some

problematic

for

the

approaches
struggle

makes

against

them

racism,

somewhat
hooks

is

nevertheless interested in making postmodern critiques of
"essentialism" a part of the "identity politics" she views
as

central

interested

to

black

in

formulating

subjectivity"

and

liberation.

making

a
it

Specifically,

liberated,
a valid

"radical

self

she

is

black

paradigm

for

African Americans, a sense of self which must be fought for
against a "pervasive politic of white supremacy"
seeks to maintain pre-existing,
black identity,

(26) which

stereotypical patterns of

hooks sees a basic challenge to racism in

reformulating such outmoded notions of identity. We have
too long had imposed upon us from both the outside and
the inside a narrow, constricting notion of blackness.
Postmodern critiques of essentialism which challenge
notions of universality and static over-determined
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identity within mass culture and mass consciousness can
open up new possibilities for the construction of self
and the assertion of agency.
(28)
The radicalized identity politics hooks is interested in
pursuing demands the recognition of the multiple and diverse
aspects of identity, a multiplicity and diversity that are
exigencies

of

the

self's

experiential process.
can

stereotypical

identity

be

emergence

from

a

historical,

Only by repressing that historicity

and

one-dimensional

sustained.

For

notions

hooks,

of

"radical

black
black

subjectivity" is actively resistant to such notions, be they
enforced by white culture or the black community itself.
The radicalized identity she posits--historical, diverse,
nonessentialized, complex--is committed to the exploration
of marginal spaces "where we can best become whatever we
want to be" (20) ,15
Indeed,
identity

the

significance

politics

anticipated,

prior

to

of

such

liberatory

to

the

a

complication

racial

emergence

struggle
of

of
was

postmodern

theorizations of the decentered subject, in the thought of
writers like Ellison, whose fictional meditation on racial
identity politics I will examine in chapter 3, Fanon, whose
theorization of racial "narcissism" appeared the same year
(1952) as Ellison's novel, and Albert Memmi, whose language
of colonization hooks often applies to the constriction of
African American identity.

Like Memmi, hooks is insisting

that a crucial step in the effort by colonized subjects to

decolonize themselves is, beyond the seizure of political
power,

to

"cease

[themselves]

through

categories of the colonizers"

(Memmi 152).

Similarly,

central

critical

theme

in

autobiographical

defining

Ellison's

remarks

is

the

the

observations

assertion

of

a

and

his

own

eloquent version of "radical subjectivity"--self-experience
viewed as a "sensitively focused process of opposites," a
"delicately

poised

cultural

imposition

identity

(Shadow

unity
of

26) .

of

divergencies"--against

one-dimensional
For Memmi,

too,

the

definitions

of

conceptualizing

freedom for colonized peoples like African Americans

(the

American edition of The Colonizer and the Colonized was
dedicated to "the American Negro, also colonized") focuses
not only on the eradication of the colonial system, but also
on

recovering

all

the

historically dynamic,
Homi

Bhabha

identity"

of

puts
"the

"dimensions"

"whole" self

it,

stresses

liberatory

of

a

(153).
the

people

nonessential,
And Fanon,

necessary
who

as

"hybrid

initiate

the

productive instability of revolutionary cultural change" in
the postcolonial moment (Culture 38).
Foucault's

analysis

of

"subjectification"

provides

a

specific framework for understanding the "colonization" of
subjectivity

that

concerns

these

writers.

Such

"colonization," I argue, can often be read as a process of
subjectification, a process, that is, in which defined and
ordered "subjects" are produced through the application of
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models of unified identity that are both individualizing,
like Franklin's,

and racially essentializing,

that concern hooks.

like those

Foucault has suggested that both ethnic

and feminist struggles against oppression are, like Fanon's
version of postcolonial liberation, above all struggles for
new

formulations

individuality,

of

subjectivity,

against

this

new

types

"government

of
of

individualization" that attempts to tie the individual to a
particular,

externally

defined

identity

and

to

thereby

"submit him to others":
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday
life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his
own individuality, attaches him to his own identity,
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and
which others have to recognize in him.
It is a form of
power which makes individuals subjects. ("Power" 212)
For Foucault,

then,

the focal point of the operations of

power--and the point of application for oppression--is the
category of subjectivity.
not power itself but

Hence, his insistent interest was

the creation of

"a history of the

different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are
made

subjects"

question

is,

(208) .

We

might

say

that

for both Foucault and hooks,

the

crucial

"How are the

potentially unlimited identities of human beings made into
certain types of finite and constrained subiects?" That is,
how

(and why)

do plural,

contradictory,

and indefinable

potentialities of self experience get reduced to ordered,
defined

identities?

How

do

hyperstructured

and

hypermoralized psychic models (like Franklin's, for example)
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come to dominate our culture's attitudes toward identity?
How

and

why

do

experientially

plural

psyches

"blacks," "women," "criminals," "sexual deviants"?

become
Just as

importantly, how and why do plural psyches become "whites,"
"men," "normal individuals"?
By applying Foucault's theorizations of the

"modes of

objectification" to literary texts which depict characters
struggling with repressive, limited notions of identity, I
hope to reveal the relations of such subj ectif ication of
human beings to the kinds of psychic fragmentation evoked in
the literature of the U.S.
Most of all,

experience of racialization.

by doing so I hope to show the urgency of

hooks' agenda for rethinking, for "decolonizing" (hooks 28),
the frameworks of subjectivity by which we conceptualize
ourselves as individuals; for creating the spaces "where we
can best become whatever we want to be" (hooks 20) . Such an
agenda

was

explicitly

shared

by

Foucault,

who,

in

a

statement that comes as close as anything he ever wrote to
formulating

the

political

significance

of

his

work,

observed,
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are,
but to refuse what we are.
We have to imagine and to
build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of
political "double bind," which is the simultaneous
individualization and totalization of modern power
structures.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical,
social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try
to liberate the individual from the state, and from the
state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the
state and the type of individualization which is linked
to the state.
We have to promote new forms of
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subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of
individuality which has been imposed on us for several
centuries.
("Power" 216, emphasis mine)
The

following

Morrison will
approach

to

studies
make

explore

of

use

Berryman

and

of a Foucauldian vocabulary

and

the

Stein,

Ellison,

horrors

of

the

"government

of

individualization" in our society, while keeping the more
radical and liberatory possibilities of human identity that
Foucault alludes to here always in mind.

Learning how modes

of subjectification, particularly racial subjectification,
have divided us from each other and within ourselves can be
a step toward challenging how racism functions in the United
States only if its ultimate goal is to overturn such modes,
reestablish the forms of internal and interpersonal bonding
they

inhibit,

and promote

an entirely different

way of

imagining who I/you/we are.
Let me begin to make this reassessment of subjectivity
more specific than the idea of a radicalized or hybridized
cultural identity suggests, both by clarifying the terms I
will

apply

to

identity

and

by

placing

explicitly psychological framework.

them

within

an

I will use the terms

"psyche" and "subjectivity" more or less interchangeably for
the

totality

of

possible

psychic

experience

(memories,

emotions, thoughts, aptitudes, sensory experiences, desires,
etc.)

that might potentially contribute

"sense of self."

to any person's

Correlatively, I will use "self" to refer

to whatever self-conception of personal identity prevails

for a person at a given time.

Following certain bodies of

psychoanalytic thought, this "self" might be conceptualized
as a "container" for some limited, but flexible, portion of
the wider psychic content mentioned above.

In the post-

Jungian depth psychology of Andrew Samuels, for example, the
self is a temporarily structured sense of personality which
changes interminably based on the interactions of a fluid
infinitude of psychic components (drives, complexes, partselves,

self-objects, sectors, etc.), a conglomeration of

psychic

potentialities

that

Samuels

terms

the

"plural

psyche" (2-12) . Even more useful to my analysis will be the
post-Freudian self psychology of Heinz

Kohut,

similarly,

the self is

universe"

(Restoration xv) , an experiential

flexibly

structured

aptitudes,

ideals,

by

in which,

"the center of the psychological

the

psyche's

identifications

various

and,

most

focal point
ambitions,
crucially,

ongoing interactions with environmental "self-objects."
While the term "subject" has passed into common critical
usage as part of a Lacanian parlance for this self-function
or "I," it will function as one of the central ideas in my
discussion in a more Foucauldian sense, connoting a certain
type of self: one which has been objectified and thereby
delimited or defined according
constraints.

Often

this

to some

subject

is

set of

external

formulated as

some

specific type of "identity"--the externally imposed notions
of

"black

identity"

critiqued

by

hooks,

"masculine

identity," "criminal
argues,

however,

identity," and so on.

the

most

powerful

As Foucault

effect

of

such

"identities" is there tendency to become "internalized" and
thus to function as the self-monitored self-conceptions of
the psyches they subjectify.16
Franklin,

We might say that Benjamin

for example, is engaged in transforming his own

subjectivity, with all its potentiality for contradiction
and

change,

components

into
and

a

particular

objectifying

subject

it

by

on paper.

defining
The

"Art

its
of

Virtue" is a formula for the self-government of a sort of
Kantian

ethical

subject,

in

the

sense

suggested

by

Foucault's observation that "Kant introduces one more way in
our tradition whereby the self is not merely given but is
constituted in relationship to itself as subject" ("Ethics"
371-72).
While I rely on a Foucauldian approach to the subject as
a framework

for discussing what

is done to the

"plural

psyche" in racialized societies, then, it is by means of a
complementary psychoanalytic perspective that I attempt an
understanding of what happens to the self in a racialized
context.

I

will

use

several

recent

psychological

approaches, which loosely overlap with one another and, in
some instances, with Foucault's study of subjectification,
to

provide

both

a background

of

clinical

discourse

on

psychic problems like the ones which interest me here and a
set of more specific models for what hooks, Ellison,

and

Fanon variously allude to as a hybrid subjectivity.

Indeed,

these writers share a common interest in psychologizing the
study of racism.

Ellison, who once worked in the office of

the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan

(a critical early

voice in pushing ego psychology toward a more interpersonal
paradigm), articulated the need to address the psychology of
race in his 1948 essay "Harlem is Nowhere," which deals with
the psychiatric needs of black Harlemites suffering from
"personality
psychiatrist,

damage"

(Shadow

301) .

that

"only

insisted

Fanon,
a

himself

a

psychoanalytical

interpretation" could "lay bare the anomalies of affect"
associated with the "complexes" of what he called racial
"narcissism" (10) . And hooks pushes the problematization of
identity in precisely this direction when she calls for more
literature that "addresses the psychological impact" of the
holocausts

of

racism

and

slavery

in

this

country--a

direction, as she notes, that Toni Morrison has already been
pursuing in her fiction

(216).

The psychological damage

caused by racism and the need for what hooks calls "selfrecovery"

of

the

"colonized"

indeed

demand

the

politicization of mental health," as hooks puts it

"racial
(220).

Psychoanalysis and mental health, she argues, are "a central
revolutionary frontier for black folks" (218) . My readings
of twentieth century representations of both "Africanism"
and the black experience are intended as a critical gesture,
from my own necessarily "white" cultural position,

toward
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"the production of a body of work on psychoanalysis and
black experience" for which she calls (226) .
My own "racially politicized" version of psychoanalytic
criticism will proceed from a model of subjectivity I derive
from

various

structuralist,

poststructuralist,

existentialist, psychoanalytic, object relations, and depth
psychology approaches to identity, though it is perhaps more
accurate to say that I will be employing several different,
though correlative, models according to their explanatory
value in different situations.

I am particularly interested

in theories of identity that have redefined both romanticist
notions

of

the

autonomous

subject

"drive/structure"

or

subjectivity that

is destabilized,

and

the

Freudian

"ego" models in the direction of a
open-ended,

multiple,

environmentally constituted (culturally, linguistically, and
historically),

and,

finally,

intersubjective.

The

philosophy of my approach is aligned with the "anti-ego" and
"anti-oedipal" position taken up by Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari, though I have synthesized my own conception of an
"ego-less"

self

from

other

psychological

frameworks.

Samuels' conception of a "plural psyche" provided a critical
starting point,
structure

suggesting how the

of psychic

agencies might

traditional
be

Freudian

superseded by a

broader definition of the "psyche" as a radically plural and
fluid totality of psychological processes and phenomena.
The

plural

psyche

consists,

according

to

the

various
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schemata that Samuels finds to be compatible, of conflicts,
complexes, attitudes, functions, self-objects, part-selves,
roles, sectors, and developmental phases.
of this psychic makeup,

he suggests,

Discrete portions

are

"in a state of

competition between themselves," and " [p]ersonality, at any
one

moment,

is

the

of

(i.e., there is no "subject" or "ego"), yet is.

interactions--at

any

by

given

its

moment

psyche

has

(2) .

structure

centered

the

competition"

to

and

conception,

such

According

structured

this

outcome

no

fixed

contents--and

their

(hence,

is

there

a

"self").
The model Samuels develops is admirable for its pluralism
and

its

destigmatization

contradiction.
Jungian

of

psychic

multiplicity

and

It is also infused, however, with a modified

conception

components

of

of

the

subjectivity

"synchronous"
(archetypes,

and

gods,

innate

permanent

features), elements which are extremely problematic for a
concept of the self that emphasizes historical specificity
and

cultural

context

as

construction of identity.

determining

factors

in

the

Hence my model of identity will

be centered on theories that have sought explanations for
the multiplicitous and indefinite nature of the self more
exclusively

in

the

social

and

cultural

contexts

that

constitute it. The post-Freudian linguistic psychoanalysis
of Jacques Lacan, for example, articulates the importance of
social

and

linguistic

"others"

in the

formation of

the
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(Lacanian)

"subject."

Similarly, the post-Freudian "self

psychology" of Heinz Kohut focuses on the "self" not as an
agency (like the "ego") of a Freudian "mental apparatus" but
as

an

irreducible

fundamentally
objects"

"center"

dependent

on

of

experience

social

and

that

cultural

is

"self-

(Restoration xv).

Lacan's model of a linguistically structured unconscious,
the

potentially

self-alienating

plurality

and

differentiality of which is kept at bay by a fiction of ego
unity,

was

sources

one

of

of

first

self-difference

multiplicity.

down

linguistic

"Other"

for understanding

and internal

whose

the

"otherness"

"presence"

a multidirectional

signification,

instability

keys

and

For Lacan, the unconscious is manifested as

a language-based
"fading"

my

of

the

chain

resulting

fiction

of

is constantly

of

in

"unified"

differential

the

perpetual

identity--the

Lacanian subject--whose roots extend into the depths of that
very unconscious

(Ecrits 299).17

Indeed,

because of its

dependence on the signifier, the constitution of personality
in

the

Lacanian

Samuels's

system

conception

of

bears

a

identity

certain
as

resemblance

determined

by

to
the

interaction and competition between discrete elements which
reside within the psyche: for Lacan, "the signifier [and the
subject

dependent

on

it]

is

constituted

only

from

a

synchronic and enumerable collection of elements in which
each is sustained only by the principle of its opposition to
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each of the others"
of

this

(Ecrits 304).

"linguistic"

Finally, Lacan's posing

structure

is

broad

enough

to

incorporate an entire spectrum of the subject's languagebased connections with its ostensibly external environment,
making his model adaptable to conceptions of identity as
culturally

based,

intersubjective

or

interpersonal,

and

derived from interaction with parental figures.18
Perhaps

the

most

useful

of

recent

psychological

approaches that focus on the radical contextuality of the
self

and

on

identity

as

process,

rather

than

on

the

coherence and autonomy of the traditional "subject," is the
self psychology of Heinz Kohut.
what

I view

as

a more

Self psychology provides

realistic

framework

for healthy

subjectivity and a more realistic approach to fragmented
self-experiences
Kohut,

traditional

ego-based conceptions.

in addition to formulating a reassessment of the

Freudian

emphasis

interpretations,
psychic

than

on

"drive"

exhibits

experience

that

a

and

consistent

would

lead

him

"structural"
optimism
to

eschew

about
both

Samuels's rhetoric of conflict and domination among the
various part selves and Lacan's irrecoverably disintegrated
and alienated subjectivity.
relations-based schema,
construct

According to Kohut's object-

the self is a fluid and evolving

determined by the

interaction between various

portions of the psyche, usually figured as self-images or
part-selves

which

can be,

as

for

Samuels,

internalized

images of other people (the salient example is the parental
"selfobject"), societal or cultural identity constructs, and
various

developmental

Kohutian

versions

subjectivity,

agglomeration

of

a

of

the

self.

fragmented

coexistent

versions

of

Indeed,

yet
the

unified

self

whose

interactions shape the overall sense of identity, is one of
the models Samuels incorporates in the plural psyche, though
one

that

has

little

place

versions of the self.19

for either

Kohut,

inborn

or

static

similarly, would probably

dismiss Samuels's Jungian idea of "conflict" between these
fragments in favor of his postulation of a potential healthy
and

working

balance

or

equilibrium

historically determined part selves,

among

the

various

an equilibrium that

entails full recognition of all the phases within as healthy
and as fully "self."
As with Lacan, moreover, the self for Kohut is multiple
and

destabilized

because

it

is

fundamentally

external elements of its experience,

based

on

a sort of internal

otherness evoked by the concept of the "linguistic Other"
for Lacan and by the importance of the "self-object" for
Kohut,

who

defines

the

latter

as

an

object

or

image

(developmentally, the parents) experienced as external to,
yet incompletely separated from,
important

contribution

of

the self.

Indeed,

the

object-relations-based

psychoanalysts like Kohut is, as Henry Sussman puts it, "the
reinscription of the constitutive role of the object (or the

other)

in the primal scene of psychoanalysis"

this may already be seen to imply,

(50).20

As

the Kohutian self is

defined not merely as a discrete entity which interacts with
"others," but as a fundamentally intersubjective experience.
Like Lacan,

Kohut

is less

interested

in the

idea of a

unified, essential, or structured identity than he is in a
self-in-process that is multiple and mutable because it is
an intersubjective or relational process.21
fact,

praises

Kohut

for

envisioning

Samuels,

identity,

and

in
the

psychoanalytic process itself, as enmeshed in a fabric of
relationship.

Perhaps

no

theorist,

however,

has

more

usefully outlined the intersubjective aspects of the plural
self than Jessica Benjamin, particularly insomuch as she
asks us to consider the explicitly political implications of
neglecting them.
structures

of

For Benjamin, an analysis of the social
(particularly

sexist)

domination

and

oppression is predicated on the conceptual move from an
intrapsychic apparatus to an interpsychic matrix: "Whereas
the intrapsychic perspective conceives of the person as a
discrete

unit

with

a

complex

internal

structure,

intersubjective theory describes capacities that emerge in
the interaction between self and others"

(20).

Kohut and Lacan are particularly useful for the study at
hand

because

disintegrative

both

have

traced

personalities

the
and

psychopathology
their

of

typical

symptomologies (as exhibited in dreams, imagery, enactments,

delusions, and anxieties), to the overly rigid fictions of
ego unity that displace the relational features of the self.
It is precisely such experiences of self-fragmentation, a
feature of narcissistic personality disorder Kohut termed
"disintegration anxiety," brought on by social

codes of

normative behavior and identity, that are most symptomatic
of the representations created at the intersection of race
and

identity,

Using

which

Benjamin's

depoliticized

I study

work

as

in the

a

psychologies

crucial
like

following

chapters.

precedent

both

the

for

how

theoretical

formulations of Lacan and the clinical observations of Kohut
might

be

deployed

psychoanalytic

within

criticism,

a

I will,

racially

politicized

like her,

explore how

cultural and social modes of domination might be linked to
our insufficiently intersubj ective conceptualizations of the
self.
In

summarizing

a

"liberatory"

reformulation

of

subjectivity, I should note that, though I posit a self that
is

fluid

and

multiple

because

constituted by otherness,

it

is

this does not

fundamentally

imply the utter

dispersal of the self that often marks poststructural or
postmodern approaches.
kinds

of

redefinition

As Henry Sussman has noted,
of

the

self

which

I

have

the
been

describing problematize the unity and consistency of the
self's

structure,

disintegration

but

they need not

(152-53).

imply its

Indeed,

complete

disintegrative

personalities

should direct

us

to a questioning of

the

constricting models of singular and integrated selfhood that
produced them, not to a pessimistic assumption that such
fragmentation

is

a

universal

principle

experience.

As Sussman points out,

concepts

of

contemporary

presence

and

identity

critical

can be

of

the

human

the terminology and
theory's

"readily

critique

interjected

of

into

descriptions by object-relations theorists of the clinical
conditions

facing

them"

(153),

but

I have

deliberately

avoided reference to the postmodern critique in the above
discussion,

primarily

because

I

want

to

preserve

considerable validity for the term "self" and maintain a
conception of it that holds diversity and unity in balance.
For Samuels,

this "singular" sense of self is merely the

temporarily

dominant

part-self

or

self-image,

the

impermanent point of an extended triangle which contains the
many other possible

versions

of and parts

of

identity.

According to this model, the self has a structure in the
sense of a temporary,

"ad hoc hierarchy," one of many, and

changeable

over

hierarchy"

(subject) which mandates a permanent structure

and identity (13).

time,

as

opposed

to

a

"preconceived

As Samuels admits, this model of self

structure is derived from the fact that, regardless of what
postmodern theory might tell us about identity, all of us
need and experience a "sense of self, " a structure in the
psyche, of some kind (14).

Sussman articulates a parallel
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response to the postmodern decentering of the subject when
he argues, in preparation for his literary applications of
Kohut and other object-relations theorists, that
With all the qualifications regarding unity, identity,
certainty, and essence that can be applied to it the
notion of the self hovers about us, as, if nothing else,
a perspectual framework, in a state of constant revision,
through which we apprehend and articulate the world.
(152)
It is

in a similar vein,

and in a similar response

to

postmodernism, that Ihab Hassan has posited what he calls
"virtual subjectivity"
may

at

the very

least

(12).

Speculating that "identity"

cohere

around

an

ongoing unique

"style," Hassan suggests that our mere tendency to believe
in an "identity"
elements:

"Such

is enough to hold together its diverse
an

identity

need

not

presume

unity

or

coherence; nor does ego integrity preclude the linguistic
qualities of the self"

(12) .22

Expanding our notion of

"identity" so that it can include all our diverse elements
was precisely Kohut's clinical approach to psychological
health.23
Like Kohut, the psychophilosophers Deleuze and Guattari
posit the possibility of a psychoanalytic field in which the
traditional Freudian discourse of the "absolute primacy of
the value system correlated to the model of unconscious and
conscious"
discourse

(Kohut, Restoration 176) has been replaced by a
of

reestablishing

contacts

and

relationships

between different, including previously stigmatized, sectors
of the self.

Though Deleuze and Guattari do not refer to

Kohut (they are more interested in an earlier critic of the
autonomous ego,
share

a

R.D.

distaste

Laing), their respective approaches

for

Freud's

pseudomoral

(Deleuze

and

Guattari characterize it as fascistic)

superstructure of

virtue,

the

normalcy,

and

through which such

valuation,

social

codes

and

contrivances

are applied to psychic

experience: the ego, the drives, the Oedipal configurations,
and the analyst's role as "interpreter."

For Kohut, as for

Deleuze and Guattari, the purpose of analysis would not be
to determine

and interpret

the corrupt and guilt-ridden

elements of the isolated ego's history and unconscious in
order to effect a cure,
acceptance

of

the

enrichment

For

and

interpretive,
of

organization
manifestations

and

to facilitate the

psyche's

intersubjectivity.
therapeutic

but

inherent

Kohut,

the

facilitative,
the

goal

emotional
and

life

than

an

analyst's

through
of

role

educative

psychoanalysis

acceptance

rather

multiplicity

not

of

salutary

the

of

is
and
the

functional

multiple

exorcism

is

and

psychic

stigmatized

portions of the psychic makeup.24

Like self psychology,

the

Deleuze

"schizoanalysis"

outlined

by

and

Guattari

suggests that overcoming the tyranny of the ego will allow
a reassemblage of the plural psyche:
...it is certain that neither men nor women are clearly
defined personalities, but rather vibrations, flows,
schizzes, and "knots."...The task of schizoanalysis is
that
of tirelessly taking apart
egos and their
presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities
they enclose and repress... establishing always further
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and more sharply the schizzes and breaks well below
conditions of identity; and assembling the desiringmachines that countersect everyone and group everyone
with others.
For everyone is a little group and must
live as such.
(Deleuze and Guattari 3 62)
For

both

Kohut

and

Deleuze

and

Guattari,

the

psychic

miseries of modern times have much to do with the artificial
imposition

of

the

concept

personality"--the autonomous
that

are

constantly

of

the

"clearly

ego--on psychic

changing,

multiply

defined

experiences

determined,

and

profoundly interpersonal.
These theorists are trying to liberate us,
exactly the kind of overly structured,
approach

to

idealized,

identity

so

effectively

then,

from

overly moralized
illustrated,

and

by the literary Benjamin Franklin with whom I

began.

But they have also provided a specific and,

Kohut's

case at least,

in

a clinical model of the kind of

"radical subjectivity" called for as an imperative of racial
empowerment by bell hooks: de-essentialized, desire-based,
contextual,

historical,

multiple,

interpersonal.

By

returning to Foucault, I want to now develop an argument for
the direct relationship between the Franklinian moment of
conservative and repressive identity management, on the one
hand, and the need for our contemporary moment of liberatory
reformulation

of

identity

as

violence of race, on the other.

a

means

to

confront

the

I am suggesting that the

speckles of disorder and moral failure which subtly slip
into Franklin's conceptualization of the virtuous self are

illustrative of what

"race" is, where it comes from,

what it is used for.

and

As Franklin's anecdote suggests,

it

requires an agonizing and grinding effort of removal

to

shore

up

the

boundaries

and

definitions

of

such

a

concretized individuality against the seeping, relentless,
anxiety-producing presence of disorder, multiplicity,
otherness within.
argued,

History, however, as Toni Morrison has
secure

those

boundaries, and that tool was the concept of "race."

It is

to

the

provided

and

a powerful

functioning

and

tool

nature

to

of

help

that

tool,

and

to

hypotheses about its relation to both tentatively secured
identities
identities

like
like

representations

Franklin's
those
of

and

to be

race,

violently

found

that

I

in
now

discomposed

twentieth-century
want

to

turn

my

attention.

"Race" as discursive discipline
The plural psyche model of identity which I have sketched
presents the "individual" as a hybrid and relational entity
that would, for obvious reasons, escape rigid definition and
thwart effective categorization,
It

is

easy

to

imagine,

sociological

analysis,

governmental

management

easily

typed

class,

citizenship,

for

the
of

control,

and management.

example,

even

difficulties
a population

and enumerated according
ethnicity,

without

involved

that

cannot

to race,

health and so on.

in
be

gender,
Or to

imagine the problems involved in corporate management of a
consumer-base (or a labor-base) that cannot be divided and
targeted according to distinctive
tendencies,

aptitudes,

attitudes,

income-levels, tastes,
and,

again,

races.

Indeed, Foucault has commented extensively on the ways in
which the evolution of the modern, manageable subject was
concomitant

with

the

modern capitalism.

evolution of

the modern

state

and

As such, Foucault's historical studies

provide a conceptual framework for the ways in which the
plural psyche might be restricted, defined, and subjectified
(in both the sense of being "made subject to," and made into
a

"subject")

by

what

he

referred

to

generally

as

the

"disciplinarity" of society and, later, as the "government
of individualization."

As Foucault detailed in Madness and

Civilization. Discipline and Punish, and The History of
Sexuality, it is in the interests of state power and order,
and their procurement of public and personal welfare,

to

have a populace made up of subjects who are clearly and
concretely identified as specific types of personalities
with particular--and documented--sets of characteristics.
Foucault variously referred to this superimposed personality
structure--fabricated and nonessential, yet brutally real in
its effects--as the "subject," "individuality," or "soul."
It is further in the interests of power, Foucault surmised,
to have this identificatory process of "subjectification"
carried out by the

individuals

themselves.

To cite my

earlier example,

the consolidation of capitalism and the

organization of the state and its power are facilitated by
the creation of subject-citizens--well-wrought earners--like
Franklin

who

have

characteristics,

a

clearly

defined

set

of

traits,

and identity categories--so defined that

they can be outlined on paper--and who have so internalized
the

codes

categories

of
are

virtue

and

organized

normalcy
that

they

around
can

which

carry

those

out

the

"government" of their identities themselves (including, as
in

Franklin's

case,

careful

self-examination

normativity and eradicate improper behavior).25

to

ensure

Indeed, my

juxtaposition of the plural psyche with such "disciplinary
technologies" which imprison it within a moral individual is
not entirely whimsical: Foucault credits none other than
Deleuze and Guattari for preceding him in the study of such
"modes of subjection"
In what follows,

(Discipline 309, n.2).

I want to suggest that "race" can be

treated as one of the disciplinary categories of identity,
one

which

ostensibly

was

critical

"American,"

to
but

the

establishment

implicitly

of

the

"white-male-

capitalist -individualist, " subject which came to prominence
in U.S.

culture in the years following,

and partly as a

result of, Franklin's mythologization of the type.

Although

"race" emerges in Franklin's framing of his own identity
only

subtextually

(his

include the question,

daily

self-examination

does

not

"Did I avoid acting like an African

today?"), and although the concept of "race" is a marginal
and

troubled

one

in

Foucault's

discussions

of

the

disciplines of subjectification, "race" can be productively
viewed

as

functioning

in

the

U.S.

"government

of

individualization" much like the categories of personality
that Foucault does engage: criminality,
sexuality,

hygiene,

sanity,

productivity.26

Each

sanctity,
of

these

categories served as a disciplinary mode for the development
of a given type of "subject" or "individuality," an- entity
to which could be ascribed distinct characteristics,

and

allowed the distribution of the affected populace along a
continuum of normalcy/deviancy.
penal

system,

"delinquency"

for

example,

and

In the same way as the

"fabricated"

attached

a

the

"delinquent

idea

of

subject"--a

"biographical unity" with a defined essence, character, set
of traits, and life history--to what before had been only a
human being accused of

a crime,

we might

say that

the

American system of chattel slavery fabricated the concept of
"race"

and developed a

"racial

subject"

which

could be

attached to the generally darker skinned human beings it was
victimizing.27
racial

(i.e.,

Like

the delinquent,

nonwhite)

subject

was

deviance from an established norm
delinquency,

"race"

converted

the

the

essence

of

its

abnormality

(whiteness) , and,
complex,

the
or

like

historically

specific psyche into a "biographical unity" and a "type of
anomaly"

to which

could be

attached

a whole

bundle

of
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essential traits: "instincts, drives, tendencies, character"
(Discipline 252-55) .
"Race," then, might be said to create a certain type of
essentialized,

unified

and

permanent

identity,

Foucault's "subject" or "soul"

(criminal,

perverted,

be

etc.)

which

could

sinful,

carefully

like

insane,

managed

and

manipulated by defining its relationship to the "norm" and
its distinctive and static characteristics.
very telling
analyzes

in

fact

that

this

way

each of
overlaps

the

Aside from the

categories

significantly

Foucault

with

some

specific aspect of the traditional U.S. racial stereotype,
several intriguing similarities support such a comparison,
similarities that also begin to suggest a broader definition
of

what

"race"

actually

"black personality"

is,

is--and

what

it

isn't.28

as Foucault says of the

The

"soul,"

"noncorporal" and nonessential, yet considerably more real
than illusionary:

"On the contrary,

it exists;

it has a

reality; it is produced permanently around, on, within the
body by the functioning of a power that is exercised" on
those

who

are

(Discipline

29).

delinquency,

was

punished,

supervised

"Blackness,"
fabricated

I

or

would

precisely

as

"colonized"
argue,
"a

point

like
of

application of the power to punish" (Discipline 255), or in
this case, enslave.

And just as the delinquent "soul" was

not born criminal and subject to punishment, but rather was
born

out

of

"methods

of

punishment,

supervision,

and
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constraint" (Discipline 29), the "black" individual was not
born in "blackness" and hence subject to enslavement, as the
racial mythology later argued,

but rather was a product

itself

that

of

an

economic

system

needed

cheap

labor.

"Blackness," like "delinquency," is a "reality reference,"
a construct of discourse and history.

This "soul" is

the element in which are articulated the effects of a
certain type of power and the reference of a certain type
of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations
give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this
power. On this reality reference, various concepts have
been constructed and domains of analysis carved out;
psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.
(Discipline 29)
By viewing racialized identity as one particularly useful
type of "soul" or "personality," through which a complex
self is turned into an object and a subject, we can begin to
understand the elaboration of a whole body of knowledge-both

folk

concept

knowledge

that

importantly

has

for

and

no

the

scientific

innate

knowledge--around

basis

in

reality.

hand,

we

can

study at

analyze

a

More
the

psychological consequences of having a racialized society in
terms of

the plural psyche that

is imprisoned within a

unitary, essentializing "personality" type like "blackness,"
and the superstructure of morality that such typing entails-in

terms,

that

individualization."

is,

it,

the

"government

of

We can see how the "black soul," like

the criminal delinquent,
pervert before

of

the moral soul,

and the sexual

is only a creation and an effect of
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political power; and how it therefore functions, like them,
as "the prison of the body"
This

formulation

(Discipline 30).

is commensurate with

several

recent

theoretical approaches to the origin and nature of "race."
For the balance of this study,
discursive,

symbolic,

and

I will treat

historical

"race" as a

construct

with

no

coherent biological or essential substrate which emerged
during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
as

a

function

of

the

increasing

commodification,

individualization, and moralization of the human subject.29
While it is not my purpose here to create a comprehensive
historical theory of "race," nor to evaluate the attempts of
others to do so, I do want to elaborate briefly on two of
the fundamental points I have drawn from such theories to
establish

a

working

definition

of

"race"

facilitate my readings in U.S. literature.

that

will

In addition to

treating "race" as a category analogous to the categories of
subjectification discussed by Foucault, my definition will
be

underpinned

by

two

basic

assumptions.

I

contend,

following historical investigations like Thomas Gossett's
and Stephen Jay Gould's, that neither "race," nor any of its
signified categories

like

"black," "white, " "Caucasian, "

etc., has any supportable genetic, physiognomical, or other
biological basis or scientific validity,
attempts to establish such a material
concepts.

Secondly,

this

complete

despite arduous

reference for the
lack

of

empirical

47

grounding

enables

flexible,

"race"

to

self-contained,

function

and

as

an

circular

arbitrary,

signifying

or

discursive structure: an elaborate network of signifiers,
metaphors

and

linguistically

based

assumptions

with

an

endless intrareferentiality.
Gossett's searching history of "race" in America supports
the argument

that the concept itself and its supporting

theory did not even emerge and begin to solidify until well
into the

colonial period,

probably not until

after

the

institution of slavery had been 1) attacked as inhumane, and
2)

formally

codified

(1660-1680).

Moreover,

Gossett

suggests that the theories of separate human races and the
innate

inferiority of some of those races did not gain

scientific or general consensual credibility in the U.S.
until

the

century,

nineteenth
then,

anthropological

century.30

that
and

saw

It
a

sociological

was

the

massive
effort

nineteenth
biological,

to

establish

validity for the doctrines of "race" difference and white
superiority.

As both Gould and Gossett have documented,

neither evidence nor even satisfactory criteria for either
of

these

were

ever

found.

More

than

anything

else,

Gossett's history gives us the almost incredible story of a
colossal effort to pin a linguistic chimera to the bedrock
of fact--or, to cite the individual instance and borrow a
term from Foucault,

to pin a "soul"

to flesh.

All the

"scientists" and theorists Gossett describes were trying to

explain and define something that literally did not exist
(or rather, that only literally existed): the presence of
three or five or eight or a dozen different "races."

No

grounds for defining these "races," or even for properly
numbering them,
establish

could be made to hold water:

different

human

groups

on

the

efforts to
bases

of

geographical origin, climactic influence, skin color, crania
form, hair type, language use, cultural style, nationality,
and psychological character have all been attempted with
equal futility.

Always such attempts have foundered on the

inability to draw any but arbitrary lines between groups and
on the unmanageable diversity within any proposed group.31
Paradoxically,

the

inability

to

ground

"race"

in

"reality" facilitated, rather than impeded, its ability to
function as a "reality reference," its role as "the element
in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of
power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge" and
as

the

machinery

by

which

the

"knowledge

reinforces the effects of this power"

extends

(Discipline 29).

and
As

Gossett argues, "The fact that race has no precise meaning
has made it a powerful tool for the most diverse purposes"
(118), allowing its exclusionary and identificatory force to
be

deployed

politically,

scientifically.

Indeed,

rather
the

most

than

empirically

stunning

aspect

or
of

Gossett's study is the fact that the failure to find any
scientific basis for "race" never really mattered (83): it

was nevertheless sustained and "supported" by other theories
and concepts, utilized to prove still other theories and
explain

social

phenomena,

and

extended

throughout

an

enormous corpus of intellectual and popular discourse and
knowledge, precisely as if it actually referred to something
concrete.

In short, "race" developed and (still) functions

solely as a set of discursively transmitted assumptions and
agreements, a linguistic structure in which any one term,
from "black" to "white" to "nigger, " has meaning only in
reference to, and is literally supported by, the rest of the
structure.

Said's encyclopedic treatment of the particular

version of racism he calls

"orientalism" elucidates--and

perhaps initiates--such a discursive definition of "race,"
though the discursive paradigm has also recently gained
considerable legitimacy among theorists of "race" in general
and

African-American

particular.32

theorists

Henry

Louis

of

Gates

American
Jr.,

most

racism

in

notably,

observing that biological categories of race have "long been
recognized to be a fiction," has argued that, when we speak
of

"the white

metaphors"

race"

or

"the black

race, " we

speak

"in

(Gates, "Writing" 4).

Said, drawing his notion of discursive formations from
Foucault, approaches an entire body of writings, scholarly
and

popular,

idioms,

and

assumptions

stereotypes),

(definitions,

scientific

and

metaphors,

folkloric,

as

a

discursive field that is not merely about the "orient" but

is in fact constitutive of it.
to

the

"orient"

and

to

"Orientalism"

definition of the former,
existing discursively,

While Said refers explicitly
(the

study

and

but also a type of racism)

as

the critical difference or "race"

they create is also fundamentally a discursive structure.
Indeed,

Said later pointed out that European writers had

discursively constituted not only a "geographical entity
called the Orient" and a field of study devoted to it-"Orientalism"--but also "subject races" that emerged in the
writings
century

of

Orientalists

(World 222) .

conceptualization of

at

the

end

of

the

nineteenth

It is certainly significant for my
"race"

that

Said defines

"Oriental

races" as a later product of an entire discursive discipline
of "Orientalism," and not vice versa--"race," he argues, was
produced historically and discursively as a function of the
needs

of

European

power

(imperialist,

cultural,

and

economic).
Moreover,

the extension of this line of analysis into

another category which Said does not discuss in detail is
critical to my argument.

This category is, of course, the

"racial subject" itself, which I want to treat not only as
a discursive structure but as an entity fabricated by the
"disciplinary technologies" of racism and attached to human
beings to provide a point of application for these same
disciplines.
the

As Said observes, one of the important uses of

"Orientalist"

discipline

was

the

power

to

make

statements about "the Oriental mentality," but I also want
to extend this idea in the direction of his comment that
"The

parallel

Orientalism

between

is

Foucault's

striking"

(World

carceral

223,

system

222) .

The

and

penal

discipline, for Foucault, produced the "criminal soul" and
the law-abiding subject.
Said,

produced

the

"European/Occidental"
approach

American

The Orientalist discipline,
"Oriental"

subject.

white/black

constitutive of racial

subject

and

In the same way,
racism

(black/white)

as

a

for
the

I will

discipline

difference and, more

importantly, of a thoroughly racialized "soul" for everyone:
a racial prison not only for the body, but for the psyche
itself.
racial

Ralph Ellison's acute observations of the U.S.
scene provide

a succinct

discursive structure.

summary of

"race"

as a

"Perhaps the most insidious and least

understood segregation is that of the word," he noted in
1953.
us

"For if the word has the potency to revive and make

free,

destroy"

it has

also

the power to blind,

imprison and

(Shadow 24).

Indeed, the U.S. racial discourse Ellison here intends-"by this I mean the word in all its complex formulations,
from the proverb to the novel and stage play" (Shadow 24) -might also be most usefully elaborated through comparison to
the

"discursive

network

of

"internally

field"

of

"Orientalism"
consistent"

"Orientalism. 1,33
is

a

discursive

The semantic

self-referential
structure.

and
This

52

structure is the source of whatever meaning any one of its
terms (or texts) might have, making it a closed "system of
ideas" or "system of representations" on whigh the "real"
has little influence:
the Orient was a word which later accrued to it a wide
field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and
...these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but
to the field surrounding the word.
(Orientalism 2 03)
Said's emphasis on the always repeated idioms,

thoughts,

imagery, "representative figures," and "tropes" that are the
basis of the "orientalist" discursive structure34--that are
the basis, in fact, of a ridiculously broad and homogenized
"race"--highlights the parallels between "Orientalism" and
recent formulations of the black/white "race" difference in
America,
"race"

beginning with Gates'
as

metaphorical:

"Race

insightful
has

definition

become

a

trope

of
of

ultimate, irreducible differences" between groups ("Writing"
5) .

Not only is the word

"race"

itself a metaphor for

supposed difference, but any of its proposed categories is
built out of a hidden structure of metaphors, figures, and
tropes--all

frozen

into

self-evident

truths

through

linguistic circulation and constant reproduction.

I began

this essay with reference to just such a metaphorical system
of "race": Toni Morrison's "Africanism," a term she uses to
refer

not

to

the

characteristics

or

culture

of

any

particular group of African people nor to the "study" of
Africa

per

se,

but

to

the

"denotative

and

connotative

blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as well

as the entire range of views,

assumptions,

readings,

and

misreadings that accompany Eurocentric learning about these
people"

(6-7) .

A crucial distinction must be made here

between the possible existence of any real "black" community
in America, which it is not Morrison's purpose either to
deny

or

to

literarily,

define,

and

created

"black

"Sometimes allegorical,

the

discursively,
race"

she

and

is

mainly

discussing.

sometimes metaphorical"

(Morrison

17) , Africanism suggests the linguistic production of a new
"race" which could be attached to the victims of American
slavery and its descendants: a "trope" of blackness

(7).

Aldon Lynn Nielsen has elaborated in slightly greater detail
a similarly based description of the American white/nonwhite
racial

distinction

within culture"
(5)

in terms

Like

a

"discursive

structure

(3), a "self-contained sphere of ideation"

revolving around

"race."

of

a set of

Morrison's

"frozen metaphors"

"Africanism,"

the

about

"blackness"

Nielsen refers to is a "structure of meanings,

composed

entirely out of language, which, like the elements of the
phonetic system, have significance only in relationship to
one another"
Treating
"black"

(6) .
"race"--and

identity--as

"Orientalism"
politicized

a

specifically,
discursive

is absolutely
psychoanalytic

related reasons.

"blackness"

system

fundamental
criticism"

like

to my
for

a

and

Said's

"racially
number

of

The first is implicit throughout Said's

entire

study

and

explicit

in the

remarks

made

by both

Morrison and Nielsen as they outline their own versions of
such a discursive structure: talking about the linguistic
generation of "race difference" and its subset "races" is a
means of focusing attention not on the supposed referents of
such a signifying system but on its producers.

In studying

"race" as a discourse and a "discipline"--as a discursive
discipline--we do not dismiss it as a fiction but insist on
its

importance

as

a

social

and

psychological

reality

utilized by some human beings and inflicted on others for a
purpose.

That,

as Morrison and Nielsen argue, makes the

real object of study "whiteness," and my own inquiry, like
theirs, involves an investigation of the manipulation of the
racial discourse, the deployment of Africanism, by those who
are able to designate themselves as "white."
does

"whiteness"

have

in the

literary,

linguistic creation of "blackness"?

What interests
scientific,

and

"What Africanism became

for, and how it functioned in, the literary imagination is
of

paramount

interest

because

it

may

be

possible

to

discover, through a close look at literary 'blackness,' the
nature--even the cause--of literary 'whiteness'" (Morrison,
Playing 9).
My second motivation for studying "race" as a discursive
discipline involves my interest in transforming oppressive
social structures.

While valid cases might be made,

and

have been made, for affirming "blackness" in the sense of a

"black" community with a shared cultural heritage, a shared
"black" ethnicity, and/or a shared geopolitical history, the
privileging of such "positive" black-authored re-versions of
"blackness" to the exclusion of the study of the "white"
discourse of "race" and "racism" is counterproductive on at
least two levels.

First, such definitions of "blackness"

share the same tendencies toward separatism and essentialism
that

were

the

basis

of

the

"race"

system,

leaving

the

"manichean allegory" that structures violence in place (even
if reversed), rather than denaturalized.
shared

cultural

attending

to

experience

the

fiction

of
of

Focusing on the

being
"race"

"black"
that

without

historically

produced the former category can lead to overlooking the
diversity within any formulation of "blackness" and to an
unintended
spurious

reinscription
biological

of

a

"black"

signifier.35

essence

Talking

onto

its

about

the

positive aspects of ethnic culture is productive, that is,
but not if it is merely a way of avoiding discussion of a
history of "race" and racism, or, worse yet, ignoring the
practice

of

experienced

"race"

and

racism

"blackness," ethnicity,

multiracial culture must not be,
"neatly

today.

divorced

from

a

and

Discussions
the

value

of

of

a

as bell hooks puts it,

recognition

of

racism,

continuing domination of blacks by whites,
continued suffering and pain in black life"

of

the

and...of the
(52) .

Ultimately,

then,

I

am

interested

in

studying

the

discursive discipline of "race" in its function as a "white"
political strategy,

a study that facilitates the crucial

task of "interrogating whiteness"
essentiality

of

"race, "

(hooks 54).

however,

is

not

Denying the
to

deny

the

possibility of a lived experience of "blackness"--another
potential object of study, literary and otherwise--any more
than my theorization of the linguistic and deterritorialized
"self" precludes the possibility of a lived experience of
"selfness."

On the contrary, though my interest here is in

the tragic psychological effects produced by the spurious
racialization of society which I have sketched, there is an
identifiable,

experiential

"African-American

albeit one that is necessarily provisional,
produced, nonessential, and contradictory.

culture,"

historically

I believe that

Ralph Ellison had such a lived "African Americanness"

in

mind when he commented that
It is not skin color which makes the Negro American but
cultural heritage as shaped by the American experience,
the social and political predicament; a sharing of that
"concord of sensibilities" which the group expressed
through historical circumstance.
(Shadow 131)
As Ellison's definition implies, such a "cultural heritage"
acknowledges, rather than denies, the way it has been shaped
by

a

racism.

"political
More

predicament"

recently,

Hazel

that

includes

Carby has

"race"

and

summarized the

distinction I am making with remarkable precision:
Though we can delineate the racialized structuring of
society in terms of which there is an Afro-American
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culture that has been racialized and defined as
black...neither its rhetoric nor its boundaries are
strictly of "race."
Afro-American culture is not
completely autonomous...[and] it is always subject to the
influence and power of the dominant culture.
(43)
Taken together with the fact that the dominant culture is
also always subject to the influence and subversion of the
marginalized

culture,

this

definition

directs

us

to

a

recognition that any culture is the "terrain of struggle
between groups"

(Carby 43) .

Like identities,

we should

approach cultures as intertextual, plural and provisional,
never as essential,
project

to

join

autonomous and timeless.

Carby

in

insisting

that,

It

is my

"instead

of

searching for cultural purity"--black, white, American, or
whatever--"we

acknowledge

cultural

complexity"

(42).

Neither "American culture" nor any particular subculture
belongs to any particular melanin-content based grouping;
together, all of us make cultures.
To put this another way,

"race" does not inhere in the

difference between distinct cultures or groups--it is itself
the establishment and hierarchization of that difference.
As

such,

it conceals

differentiates

and,

the complexity of the
in

the

individual

cultures

instance,

it
of

identities, and idealizes purity on all fronts--the concept
of

"race"

is

difference.

dependent
Defining

on

"race"

the

establishment

of

pure

as a trope of difference--

really an elaborate network of tropes of difference--should
turn

our

attention

from

determining

the

accuracy

or

authenticity

of

the

overall

trope,

or

of

any

of

the

component tropes, to an analysis of these "purity" effects.
As I have been suggesting, analyzing "race" as a cultural
practice puts the focus on the more politically engaged and
socially useful questions of what it is being used for, and
by whom.
culture

According to Foucault, the function of the entire
of

discipline

was

precisely

this:

to

manage

multiplicity by reducing it to a set of definable unities,
and to hierarchize those unities evaluatively: "Generally
speaking,
techniques

it

might
for

be

said

assuring

multiplicities... the

that

the

the

disciplines

disciplines

ordering

of

characterize,

are
human

classify,

specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm,
hierarchize
(Discipline

individuals
218,

223) .

in

relation

Foucault

to

does

one

not

another"

analyze

the

racialization of society as a discipline, but he does hint
occasionally at their similarity in function, particularly
as a technique for forging a cultural illusion of purity out
of a reality of disorder and multiplicity.
Nietzschean

genealogy,

for

example,

he

In his essay on
alludes

to

the

fictions about "German" identity to which the Germans were
forced to resort in defending the idea of a pure German
"race" against the anxieties of a felt complexity.

Such

fictions, Foucault comments, were simply the ideas by which
they tried to "master the racial disorder from which they
had formed themselves" as a pure "race"

("Nietzsche" 81).

The genealogist's task is to disintegrate such fictions of
unity and purity by unearthing the complexity and disorder
at their point of origin--the multiplicity which they are
meant to cover up.

This example is particularly relevant to

my own purposes because Foucault is speaking of "race" here
specifically as a category of identity or "soul," and he
immediately translates his point about a national culture
into a point about the individual: "Where the soul pretends
unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the
genealogist

sets

beginnings,

whose

out

to study the beginning--numberless

faint

traces

readily seen by a historical eye"

and

hints

of

color

are

("Nietzsche" 81).

Fragmentation and the racial mirror stage
As I have suggested, in turning a genealogical eye on the
central myth of the white American individualist--the selfmade Ben Franklin--we find precisely the "faint traces and
hints

of

category

color"
of

that

"race"

mark

into

the

the

unspoken

project

"coherent identity" or "unified soul."

of

entrance

of

a

fabricating

a

Franklin provides

for us a convenient illustration of the genealogical moment
at which a culture of "race" and a psychology of unified
individuality

emerge

symbiotically.

In

other

words,

defining "race" as a discursive discipline and focusing on
what

it is being used for encourages us to explore the

psychology of "race" because, as both Morrison and Nielsen

insist, what is most urgently at stake in the production of
the racial

signifying system is the concretization of a

"white subject"--by way of describing and reifying a "black
subject"

whose qualities

can be removed from,

from, and opposed to the "white."

separated

The "dark speckles" on

Franklin's diagram of his own soul might be considered to be
a formative instance of the elaborate significatory system
attached

to dark-skinned Americans,

an

instance

of

the

repressed darkness onto which "artists--and the society that
bred them--transferred internal conflicts"
That process of psychological projection,

(Playing 38).
of

"othering,"

enabled the concretization of what Morrison calls the "new
white man" in America, an identity construct that included
all

of

the

isolation,

Franklinian

independence,

vigor--and

quickly

identity" in general.
white

subjectivity

traits--autonomy,

freedom,

became

authority,

individualism,

synonymous

with

economic
"American

As Morrison argues, that construct of
was,

from

the

very

beginning

and

throughout its history of literary representations, staged
against a backdrop of darkness, disorder, and contradiction
that

became

metaphors,

discursively

images,

elaborated

as

the

network

of

stereotypes and idioms associated with

darker-skinned Americans: the extended trope of difference
she calls "Africanism."
ever

structured

in

The unified white ego, that is, was

opposition

to

the

"ego-reinforcing

presence of an Africanist population" (45)--onto which could

be transferred, and distanced from the self, the internal
disorder the ego denies: "It was this Africanism, deployed
as rawness and savagery, that provided the staging ground
and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American
identity....This population is convenient in every way, not
the least of which is self-definition.
can now persuade

himself

that

This new white male

savagery

is

'out

there'"

(Playing 44-45) . "Race" is a tool for ego construction, for
imaginatively banishing the disorder and multiplicity within
to a locus safely outside the bounds of the self.
Nielsen has helpfully described this cultural process,
the self-constitution of "whiteness" through a discursive
creation of "blackness," in explicitly psychological terms,
as a sort of Lacanian "racial mirror stage."

For Lacan, the

"mirror stage" is that point when the developing subject,
cognizant for the first time of its own image reflected in
a mirror or in the shape of other human beings, initiates an
illusion of unity and autonomy.
bodily

unity

suppression

of
of

undifferentiated
Ecrits 1-7).

this
the

Ego formation, based on the

reflected
fragmented,

psychic

experience

image,

occurs

as

multiplicitous,
of

infancy

a
and

(Lacan,

Nielsen suggests that the "white" subject in

America was constituted through a similar process:

"The

language of white thought has had to create the boundaries
of its existence and to determine what will not be allowed
inside.

The white subject has spoken to itself, and in so

speaking has created its own racial consciousness" (5) . The
point is, of course,
which

that this process of ego-formation,

can be considered as occuring

in both

psychic and collective cultural instances,

individual

is carried out

not only in discursive, but also largely in negative, terms.
As Nielsen puts it, "The ability to constitute a structure
of whiteness assumes, more often than not, the form of the
constitution of antiwhiteness,

the creation of some bad,

other thing out of the mass of humanity" (5) . For Foucault,
the disciplinary creation of madmen, criminals, and perverts
had little to do with discovering truths about humanity gone
wrong and everything to do with defining,

securing,

and

managing normalcy. Said has made exactly this connection in
discussing the literary creation of the "white subject" in
another context:
If we believe that Kipling's jingoistic White Man was
simply an aberration, then we cannot see the extent to
which the White Man was merely one expression of a
science--like that of penal discipline--whose goal was to
understand and to confine non-Whites in their status as
non-Whites, in order to make the notion of Whiteness
clearer, purer, and stronger.
(World 224, emphasis mine)
The constitution of the
Nielsen observes,

"white"

subject is not only,

"a literary project"

(10),

as

but also a

disciplinary one.
The

theorizations

of

"race"

I have

outlined,

then,

provide a framework for analyzing two distinct types of
"individual":

"black"

and

"white."

Specifically,

they

provide means for understanding how "race" functions as a

particular category of "personality" in the "government of
individualization" which characterizes our culture.

"Race"

works to reify and secure well-managed subjective structures
for those who are self-authorized and self-constituted by
identifying its negative terms as "other," on the one hand,
and

by

providing

an

externally

imposed

and

coercive

subjective structure for those who are so identified, on the
other.

For the latter, "blackness" becomes a binding sheath

of identity behind which the real person cannot be seen--the
"narrow, constricting notion of blackness" referred to by
hooks

(28),

Nielsen.
about

the

but also the discursive

"veil" described by

Because of this "veil" of discursive agreements
"black"

other,

its

"white"

clearly see who or what is within"

creators

"cannot

(Nielsen 2), a variant

description of the operation of Africanism that will be most
resonant when I turn my attention to the experience of
"black" (non)identity as one of "invisibility" in chapter 3.
This "black subject" or "black soul," then, so similar in
derivation and function to the Foucauldian

"subject"

of

discipline, represents the "black object not as itself but
in its status as fictive signifier of the nonwhite" (Nielsen
10) :

That is to say quite simply that we are unlikely to find
many actual black people who correspond at all closely to
that image system known popularly as the stex'eotype. In
this sense Felix Guattari is quite right to assert as "an
example of a structure functioning as a subject...the
fact that the black community in the United States
represents an identification imposed by the white
order."
(Nielsen 6)
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This is subjectivity imprisoned within a structure: more
precisely,

within

the

"black

subject"

as

discursive

structure.

Such a subject, such a "soul," imposed in every

crack of society where the racial discipline reaches, leaves
the plural,
have

contradictory, historically produced psyche I

described

violently

unified,

essentialized beyond recognition.

dehistoricized,

and

Hortense J. Spillers,

using perhaps the most influential literary deployment of
Africanism of all time as her example,

describes how the

"telos of African persons in the United States" has been
precisely this conversion from real person into "the negro,"
...as Tom becomes in Stowe's text the negro--this
existence of a him/her in a subject-position that unfolds
according to a transparent, self-evidentiary motif.
In
other words, to rob the subject of its dynamic character,
to captivate it in a fictionalized scheme whose outcome
is already inscribed by a higher, different, other,
power, freezes it in the ahistorical.
(29)
"The negro," in Spillers' politicized sense, is the prison
of

the African American plural psyche,

imprisonment
maintenance

is

a

forceful

is ever tenuous,

and

and though

effective

ever productive

that

one,

its

of psychic

stresses and anxieties of the most chronic variety.

It is

to the form of these resistances that I now wish to turn my
attention.
To

a very

large

extent,

the

focus

of my

succeeding

chapters will be on the literary response, in the twentieth
century, to the articulation of Africanism of which Harriet
Beecher Stowe's depiction of

"blackness"

is perhaps

the

signal moment.

Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man is certainly-

responding,

for example,

search

an

for

in his

authentic

fruitless,

identity,

to

structuring of the "negro subject."
precisely

because

the

discursive

boomeranging

the

discursive

His search is futile
racialization

of

U.S.

society is so complete and the veil is so impenetrable: no
matter what identity he authors for himself, no person on
the other side of the veil--the "white" side of the v e i l wili ever see him, will ever see anything but the veil of
assumptions about "blackness."
and

the

imagery by which

Intriguingly, the anxieties

the

Invisible

Man

evokes

his

psychic experience within this "prison" are reminiscent of
the

key

feature

of

Franklin's

psychic

discomfort:

register an encroaching sense of a disordered identity.

they
The

Invisible Man's persistent anxiety is not merely one of
invisibility but of the dissonance and contradiction among
the

multiple

voices

within

his

head:

"If

only all

the

contradictory voices shouting inside my head would calm down
and sing a song in unison"
forces
"black"

him to grasp
roles,

like

(253).

at the
that

His quest for identity

concreteness
offered

to

of

traditional

him

by

"the

Brotherhood," because, as he intones, "How else could I save
myself from disintegration?"

(345).

This anxiety of self

disintegration, so typical of ,the literature of the racial
experience that I will comment on in the chapters to follow,
is a direct result, I argue, of the disciplinary conversion
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of plural psyches into unified subjects.

Moreover,

the

disciplinary

"structure

as

enforcement

of

the

racial

subject" has effects on the "white" subject that are the
tell-tale reflection of its effects on the "black" subject,
a phenomenon covertly suggested by Franklin's Autobiography
and deeply inscribed in the poetry of John Berryman, as I
argue in chapter 4.
Berryman's poetry instances one of the primary thematics
of

modernity:

it

chronicles

the

complexity--even

the

multiplicity and alienation--of experience and identity, in
opposition to the autonomy and power of the traditional
Enlightenment

and

Romantic

subject

position.

The

representations of this type of experience that concern me
here, however, emphasize the point at which the modern mode
of experiencing environmental and psychic reality,
disconcerting,
psychic

crosses

crisis,

over

into

precipitating

the
a

realm

of

always

outright

psychopathology

of

alienation and disintegration that is shared by numerous
literary

personalities.36

perceived

They

inability to connect

are

characterized

by

a

authentically with other

people; a sense of internal confusion and contradiction; a
disconcerting awareness
that,

if chronic enough,

of multiple

aspects

of

identity

borders on a fear of having no

identity at all; a sense of identity fragmentation that, if
chronic

enough,

merges

with neurotic

visions

of

bodily
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disintegration

and mutilation.

As

Berryman's

glibly puts it, "things are going to pieces"

Henry

so

(Song 137).

Such psychopathologies, I argue, result not directly from
the complexity of experience but from the massive disparity
between internalized ideals of unified identity,

like the

disciplinarily produced ones I have been describing,
that

complexity--the

emissions,

contradictory

if you will,

and

and

multiplicitous

of the plural psyche.

I would

formulate the following initial diagnosis for victims of
race-based

anxieties

Invisible Man:

of

self-disintegration,

like

the

they have so internalized the ideal of a

unified racial identity that they are terrorized by their
own

lived

dissonance.

experience

of

multiplicity

and

internal

Moreover, this diagnosis is the beginning of an

explanation for a phenomenon my literary investigations-particularly my comparison of Berryman and Morrison--will
engage:

the

fact that the codes of

"black"

and

"white"

identity have similar disintegrative effects for both the
denigrated

"black" victims of the racial system and its

privileged

"white"

perpetrators.

The

imposition

of

a

unified "white" subject structure requires the suppression
of daily "disorder" for the individualistic Franklin, just
as surely as the imposition of the

"nigger with rhythm"

persona demands that a plethora of dissonant internal voices
be shouted down for the Invisible Man.

What Morrison calls

the "effect of racist inflection on the subject"

(Playing
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11) can be as psychically disturbing as the effect of "race"
on its inflected objects.
The psychocultural diagnosis I am suggesting takes on
particular resonance within the psychoanalytic context that
has framed my discussion of "race" and fragmentation.

If we

follow Nielsen's conception of a racial mirror stage--both
cultural and personal --through which an illusory "white" ego
structure

was

concretized

out

of

its primordial

racial

disorder by defining the disorder as "non-white" and other,
we can think of the importance of the disintegration motif
of "racialized" literature in terms of the Lacanian mirror
stage and its consequences.

The mirror stage is not merely

a discrete moment in infantile development but also has a
certain

metaphorical

valence

for

ongoing

processes

of

identity formation and, indeed, initiates "the assumption of
the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with
its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development"
(Lacan, Ecrits 4).
in

Lacan's

The primordial "I" of the mirror stage,

formulation,

is

the

"phantasy"

of

power,

totality, and coherence by which the individual emerges from
"primordial

Discord"

(4) , inaugurating a

"succession of

phantasies" of unity that eventuates in the "subject."
fiction

of

unity,

however,

is

ever

subject

to

This
the

encroachment of the multiplicities of psychic experience
which it only tenuously masks.
that

encroachment

can

erupt

In cases of psychopathology,
as

"a

certain

level

of
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aggressive disintegration in the individual" and even as
horrific visions of bodily disintegration and mutilation
(4) .

As Anthony Wilden has remarked,

perhaps

the most

interesting aspect of Lacan's enigmatic theory of the mirror
stage is that it suggests a dramatic explanation for the
widespread

literary

motif

of

emotional

and

physical

disintegration:
...Lacan regards the stade du miroir...as at the origin
of the phantasy or dream of the corps morcele. The image
of the "body in bits and pieces," or as put together like
a mismatched jigsaw puzzle, is one of the most common
phenomena in our normal dreams and phantasies, and also
in certain forms of schizophrenia and of course in the
LSD
"trip, " to
say nothing of
literature,
from
Romanticism to existentialism. For Lacan, the paranoid
twist of the moi [at the mirror stage] is directly
related to the peculiar twists we give to our own body
image.
(174)
The prominence of the corps morcele at the intersection of
"race" and identity in the writing of Berryman and Morrison,
as well as in other artistic evocations of the experience of
racial oppression, is perhaps the most provocative evidence
for the idea, first introduced by Fanon in Black Skin. White
Masks. that one of the "mirror stages" that contribute to
identity formation in a racialized society must, inevitably,
be

a racial mirror

constitution

of

the

stage.

Indeed,

"white"

it

subject,

is

the paranoid

suggested by both

Morrison and Nielsen and so vividly illustrated by Franklin
at

the

outset

of our

literature,

that

precipitates

the

twisted legacy of emotional fragmentation and dismemberment
images we are about to sample.

The violent eruption of what Kohut called "disintegration
anxiety" and its associated visions of bodily fragmentation
at

the

intersection

of

"race"

and

identity

is

not

inexplicable, nor is it an aberration of a few obscure texts
or the postmodern moment.

As Toni Morrison has observed,

the vast canon of U.S. literature can be read as a legacy to
this country's efforts to quell its internal discord--both
as individuals and as a "unified" culture--by creating a
continuing, distanced Africanist presence and constituting
in opposition to it a privileged "whiteness" made up of pure
"white" subjects.

The hierarchized dichotomy will not hold,

however, without considerable propping up, a sustenance that
involves the insistent violence of social subjection and
separation,

to be sure, but also the constant discursive

reiteration of the "white" subject and the "black" subject.
The literary project

of subject

formation that

concerns

Morrison is a function of that discursivity. And while that
literature repeatedly records the "successful" architectures
of

the

represses

"white"

subject,

the moments

twisted consequences
assertion

of

of

like

Franklin's

(even

failure), it also

records

of the racial mirror stage,

hierarchy,

and

of

its

as

it
the

of its

production

of

"whiteness."
As Morrison has insightfully observed,

this hierarchy

based on "white" and "black," this ideology of "whiteness"
with which we have for so long combatted our psychological

and cultural doubts, was a concept distinctly original to
the first fifty years of our nation's history.
a context,

Within such

she urges, we can hardly miss the allegorical

significance of the most imposing symbol of "whiteness" in
U.S. literature: Melville's whale.
Morrison

finds

in

Mobv-Dick--a

Indeed, the symbology

dismembered

human

being

obsessed with the force that has mutilated him--forms a
central motif in the twentieth century tradition of which
her own work
understand,

is exemplary.

That

force,

we are led to

is not Nature or God or Fate or even social

violence: it is "whiteness;" it is "whiteness as ideology;"
it is the ideology of "race" itself.

Ultimately, it is with

Morrison's own hypothesis about "race" and psychology always
in mind that I want to present the following readings of
texts that connect our persistent psychic traumas to the
nature of our life in a violently racialized society:
...if the white whale is the ideology of race, what Ahab
has lost to it is personal dismemberment and family and
society and his own place as a human in the world. The
trauma of racism is. for the racist and the victim, the
severe fragmentation of the self, and has always seemed
to me a cause (not a symptom) of psychosis.
("Unspeakable" 15-16, emphasis mine)
Here, Morrison fuses into a single psychology of "race" the
dynamic I have tried to illustrate by employing a series of
psychoanalytic and genealogical paradigms.

But whether we

consider "race," finally, as a discipline, a discourse, an
ideology,

or

a psychological

category,

studying

how

it

originated and what it is used for is the most effective
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strategy we have as, Ahab-like, we seek to destroy it.

Such

study is the most effective strategy we have, that is, as we
seek to undermine the dynamics of the racial mirror stage
and subvert the disciplinary enforcement of its "white" and
"black" personality constructs by radically reformulating
the "government of individualization" in this country.

What

is at stake for such a racially politicized psychoanalytic
criticism,

finally,

is nothing

less

than

the

continued

dismemberment of our "selves" and our society.
Notes
1. For the importance of this particular cult of the
individual to American culture, and Franklin's centrality to
its origin and his inspiration of its nineteenth-century
devotees, see Cawelti and Wyllie.
As Cawelti argues,
"Franklin was not the first self-made man, but certainly he
was the archetypal self-made man for Americans" (9) , and the
self-made man soon became "an archetype of American society"
(1 2 ) .

2. See
diaries
Voyages
the Eve

Playing in the Dark 39-47. Morrison cites Dunbar's
and the commentary Bernard Bailyn makes on them in
to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on
of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1986) .

3. Morrison uses "Africanism" as "a term for the denotative
and connotative blackness that African peoples have come to
signify, as well as the entire range of views, assumptions,
readings,
and misreadings that accompany Eurocentric
learning about these people" (Playing 6-7).
4. One might note in passing that there is certainly no
shortage of references to the more overtly racialized savage
"other"/"out there"
in Franklin's writing.
In the
Autobiography. see his horrified description of the drunken,
"disorderly," "dark-coloured"
and demonic
Indians at
Carlisle (112-13), including his meditation on God's plan to
"extirpate these savages" to make room for civilization, and
his later anecdote about governing "blacks," where he poses
the very condition of "blackness" as the difference in
opposition to which the use of power itself is possible
(123) . Carla Mulford has analyzed Franklin's "Narrative of
the Late Massacres" as a discourse which similarly, despite
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its overt sympathizing with Native Americans, reinforces
Franklin's white bourgeois identity--specifically by posing
Native Americans in the position of socially subordinated,
politically and economically inactive "subject-receiver [sj
of the beneficence" of moral, economically and politically
active white gentlemen (Mulford 353).
5. This summation refers generally to a set of concerns
delineated in The Order of Things (1966), Madness and
Civilization (1961), Discipline and Punish (1975), and The
History of Sexuality (1977): namely, the new ways in which
human beings began to be studied and manipulated as
"subjects" and the evolution of what Foucault calls "bio
power, " a set of procedures for ordering and controlling
virtually every aspect of human life in the name of both
individual and state welfare. Franklin's exacting attempt
at self-definition and self-control is symptomatic of an era
that presided over the emergence of bio-power and the
disciplinary technologies through which it functions. These
technologies, as Foucault details them in the aforementioned
studies, are devoted to ordering and systematizing human
life, isolating and normalizing individuals, and ensuring
the
internalization
of
the
principles
of
order,
individuality, and normalcy.
The "Art of Virtue" is an
exemplary instance of such disciplinary technology at work.
Foucault's description of the "examination" as one of these
technologies provides a pointed comparison:
"These small
techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting
files, of arranging facts in columns and tables that are so
familiar to us now, were of decisive importance in the
epistemological 'thaw' of the sciences of the individual."
See Discipline and Punish 19 0-91.
6. I would argue that all writing, including all statements
about writing, has "political" ramifications. My conviction
in this regard, though not my particular politicized
approach, follows Jameson, who "conceives of the political
perspective not as some supplementary method, not as an
optional auxiliary to other interpretive methods current
today...but rather as the absolute horizon of all reading
and all interpretation.... [T]here is nothing that is not
social and historical--indeed, ... everything is 'in the last
analysis' political" (17-20).
7. Moreover, Franklin's case is equally representative of
the third "mode of objectification" mentioned by Foucault,
the process of internalization of this very objectification-"the way a human being turns him- or herself into a
subject" ("Power" 208) . Both the dividing practices and the
internalization of subjectification are extremely useful
concepts for exploring the way in which racial subjects are
produced and the psychopathologies such a process involves.
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8. Lentricchia distinguishes the conservative from the
radical critic along the lines of a distinction made by
Kenneth Burke: the conservative is at home in the normalcy
of society and views "education as a function of society";
the radical feels alienated by the "unreasonableness" of
society and views "society as a function of education."
Like Lentricchia, my hope is that education, and criticism,
can remake society along more "reasonable, " and more humane,
lines.
According to Burke's formulation, "To say that
'society' should be a function of 'education' is to say, in
effect, that the principles and directives of the prevailing
society are radically askew (that the society has been
despoiled of its reasonableness) and that education must
serve to remake it accordingly" (332) .
9.
See
especially
Chapters
5-7
of
The
Political
Responsibility of the Critic for Merod's analyses of the
relative
social
effectiveness
of
various
"left"
intellectuals, including Stanley Fish, Paul de Man, Jacques
Derrida, Noam Chomsky, Jameson, Foucault and Said.
The
oppositionality of each of these writers is compromised to
some extent, Merod argues, but he is quite discerning about
finding the elements in the thought of each that are still
of use to the politically engaged critic. Perhaps Merod's
critique of Fish is most relevant to the issues of context
and community I am about to discuss.
The social value of
Fish's "interpretive community," Merod points out, though it
has liberating implications for the idea of textual meaning
and interpretive interaction, tends to be liquidated by its
dependence on a traditional and elitist model of authority
and intellectual expertise, on the "priestly function of the
authoritative interpreter" (109). Still, it is an expanded
idea of community that
is most central to Merod's own
conception of critical radicalism (see, for example, 11617) .
10. Said takes as his point of departure for these remarks
Foucault's problematization of the question "What is a
text?" in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
11. Merod argues that
in large measure the humanities
teacher's mission is to counteract the disabling forces that
produce helplessness,
apathy, and homogeneity in our
society: "The teacher's job is to breed the kind of critical
capacities that allow students to resist such disabling
forces," leading them
to "the process of questioning
received
assumptions
and
conventional
practices,
to
challenge authority not by temporary (and mostly futile)
rebellion but by working wherever they work in the longdrawn-out effort to create resistance to domination and
cultural indoctrination" (128-29). Developing this critical
mindset in students involves teaching them both how to
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question "truth" and consensus and how, as Lentricchia puts
it, to "spot, confront and work against the political
horrors of one's time" (12).
12. This line of thought also owes much to Said, who asks us
"to consider that the audience for literacy is not a closed
circle of three thousand professional critics but the
community of human beings living in society."
Addressing
such an audience and making critical work socially relevant
will thus entail "a crossing of borders and obstacles, a
determined attempt to generalize exactly at those points
where generalizations seem impossible to make."
See Said
("Opponents" 24) and Merod 193-95.
13. This may be an important qualification of Lentricchia's
injunction to "work against the political horrors of one's
time, " if for no other reason than that there may be
disagreements about what constitute the "political horrors"
of our time. Different students may find different problems
to "confront, " but if we have fostered this stance of
aggressive critical thinking, we are already on the road to
a more informed, and more humane, society.
As Merod
comments, "The job of the radical critic is not so much to
make [particular] realities known as to challenge the
conceptual basis for maintaining such ignorance.
The
radical's job is to prepare intellectual access for anyone
who wants to comprehend the actual conditions... that
separate people from the democratic control of their
environments" (188).
14. Fanon's theorization of the psychology of colonialist
racism is articulated in Black Skin. White Masks (1952).
For an insightful perspective on the significance of Fanon's
ideas, see Homi K. Bhabha's "Interrogating Identity: The
Postcolonial Prerogative," in Goldberg.
As Bhabha notes,
"In shifting the focus of cultural racism from the politics
of nationalism to the politics of narcissism, Fanon opens up
a margin of interrogation that causes a subversive slippage
of identity and authority" (206).
15. See hooks 19-20 and 27-29. As hooks notes, referring to
Linda Alcoff's discussion, the importance of this version of
identity politics to black liberation struggle is similar to
its importance within feminist theory, where a conception of
the subject as nonessentialized and emergent from a
historical experience has also been emphasized.
In a
prominent example outlined by Rachel Blau DuPlessis,
Virginia Woolf began "reevaluating the canons of...proper
subject" in "Professions for Women" by overturning narrow
definitions of female identity like the "Angel in the House"
and creating a self more true to the "contradictions of
consciousness"
(123).
Blau
DuPlessis
traces
this
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redefinition of the subject through the work of several
later woman poets.
16. The terms of this discussion are at best slippery and,
partly because of their simultaneous use in different
theoretical frameworks, partly because of their cultural
manipulation, can have meanings that diverge to the point of
direct contradiction.
The term "identity," for example,
might refer to either a specific type of "subjectified"
identity or to the more fluid, more individuated "hybrid"
sense of self which is possible in the absence of any
externally defined type. And as this description suggests,
the term "individualize," which Foucault applies (very
usefully, I think) to the definition and typing of a
"subject," might also be recovered to speak of the true,
untypeable individuality of the historically situated,
socially determined self. The term "subject" is similarly
vexed, especially since Foucault is using it here for a
version of what, in another philosophical framework, would
be called "object." Indeed, in Jessica Benjamin's adaptation
of the subject/object dichotomy, the position of "subject"
corresponds to the fullness of intersubjective experience
possible for those who are not objectified by others.
I
will try to note the occasional shifts in such usages that
facilitate my discussion, as when I take up Benjamin's
empowering version of the "subject" in chapter 5.
17. My summary is based particularly on Lacan's essays "The
mirror stage as formative of the function of the I," "The
agency of the letter in the unconscious," "The subversion of
the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian
unconscious," and "The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalysis," all in Ecrits: A Selection. My
reading of the Lacanian self is also indebted to Gallop's,
Brivic's, and Bannet's instructive commentaries.
18. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, for example, argues that the
Lacanian Other on which identity depends can be defined as
"the discourse of the mother, father, culture and language
itself" (191), while Sheldon Brivic notes that "Lacan
maintains that the unconscious is generated by an interplay
of the situations of personal relations, culture, and
language and cannot have any inherent content" (62).
19. My description is indebted to Henry Sussman's succint
and evocative summary of the Kohutian model: "In the
universe of Kohutian psychoanalysis, the subject is a
palimpsest, a stuck-together agglomeration of more and less
recent versions of a draft in progress,
the self.
Psychological experience for Kohut is a slippage or
'snapping in' and 'out' of these prose versions of the self
in response to a variety of stressors" (65).
Kohut's own
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most detailed formulations of his approach, difficult to
encapsulate because they are conscientiously empirical and
descriptive, are contained in The Analysis of the Self
(1971) and The Restoration of the Self (1977).
20. Kohut himself was aware of many of the similarities
between Lacan's ideas and his own.
He acknowledged, for
example, that the self-object concept, along with the ideas
of mirroring and mirror transference, were paralleled by
Lacan's conceptualization of the developmental "mirror
stage" (Analysis 123-24, Restoration xx). Joseph H. Smith
has also remarked on the connections between Lacan and
Kohut, due perhaps to their mutual Freudian roots (Smith 49,
66, 70, 110) .
Sussman, meanwhile, has elucidated the
extensive and intriguing similarities between Kohut's ideas
and those of Otto Kernberg, placing those similarities in
the context of a post-Freudian object-relations emphasis
that encompasses Lacan, Winnicott, Klein, and Sullivan,
among others.
21. The Kohutian clinician, for example, does not treat a
patient per se so much as he or she engages in an ongoing
process of analyst/analysand empathic intersubjectivity, in
which neither "self" is wholly distinct from the other.
Jane Gallop has summarized the similar Lacanian critique:
"Through his emphasis on the intersubjective dialogue of the
analytic experience as well as his discovery that the ego
itself is constituted in an intersubjective relation, Lacan
has shifted the object of psychoanalysis from the individual
person taken as a separate monad to the intersubjective
dialectic" (117).
22. The mediation I am suggesting here is similar to the one
discussed recently by Fabienne Worth, derived from Gramsci's
theorization of a historical process which deposits an
infinite number of traces within the developing self. The
historical process is then erased from awareness, leaving an
externally derived, but internally autonomous construct of
identity.
The process of reconstructing one's subjective
position, creating an "inventory" of the historical traces,
then, is a mediation "between a humanistic identity (in
which the subject signifies the object) and a postmodernist
identity (in which the subject is constructed by the
signifying object)" (Worth 7).
23. Even in the decentered, infinitely multiplicitous,
object-desiring consciousness theorized by Deleuze and
Guattari there is room for a "peripheral totality, " a unity
which exists along with all the fragments of the self, but
does not "unify" them (42). While this description sounds
much like the "perspectual unity" proposed by Sussman, at
other places in The Anti-Oedipus this "subject" resembles
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Samuels' self-structure based on its own changing phases:
"This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied
by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed
identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through
which it passes" (20) .
24. " [I]t is not the aim of analysis to confront the patient
with a now supposedly fully uncovered drive so that he can
learn to suppress it, to sublimate it, or to integrate it in
other ways with his total personality. The deepest level to
be reached is not the drive, but the threat to the
organization of the self" (Kohut, Restoration 123).
25. These aspects of the "disciplinary" production of the
"subject," and how they relate to Franklin's proclivities
for self-examination and self-writing, are captured with
particular succinctness in the following passage: "Thanks to
the whole apparatus of writing that accompanied it, the
examination opened up two correlative possibilities: first
the constitution of the individual as a describable,
analyzable object...in order to maintain him in his
individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own
aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus
of knowledge; and, second, the constitution of a comparative
system that made possible the measurement of overall
phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization
of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between
individuals, their distribution in a given 'population'"
(Discipline 190).
26. As Homi Bhabha points out, Foucault tends to treat
"race" as an anomaly on the historical scene, ignoring the
impact it surely had in the intercultural deployment of
colonial "bio-power": "Foucault's spatial notion of the
conceptual contemporaneity of power-as-sexuality limits him
from seeing the double and overdetermined structure of race
and sexuality that has a long history in the peuplement
(politics of settlement) of colonial societies" (Bhabha,
Culture 248).
27. I refer specifically to Foucault's discussion of
"delinquency" and its fabrication as a method of making an
object and, hence, an "individual" and a "subject," of the
offender (Discipline 251-256). The entire discussion of the
structure and function of penality in the sections
"Panopticism" and "Complete and austere institutions" is
also relevant to my argument.
28. I refer to the traditional attribution of such qualities
as
criminality,
immorality,
lunacy,
hypersexuality,
dirtiness, and laziness to the "black" personality construct
in America.
The evolution of these stereotypical image
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structures, as David R. Roediger has detailed, took place in
the context of a consolidation of "whiteness" in terms of
the disciplines of the body and the workplace.
See
especially Roediger's discussion of the mid-nineteenthcentury Irish-American working class, which defined itself
as "white" by projecting the negative terms of precisely
these disciplinary categories onto the "black" "other" (15056) .
29. Important support for such a summation can be found in
David Theo Goldberg's "Introduction" and "The Social
Formation of Racist Discourse" in Goldberg, ed. , Anatomy of
Racism, and his "Modernity, Race, and Morality"; Michael Omi
and Howard Winant's "By the Rivers of Babylon: Race in the
United States (Part One)"; Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s "Writing
'Race' and the Difference it Makes"; and in Gossett.
30. Even the earliest formulations of anything that could be
called "racial" distinctions among classes of human beings
date back only to the middle of the eighteenth century. The
taxonomical classifications of Linnaeus (1758) were perhaps
the first attempt to formalize "race" scientifically, while
the philosopher David Hume attempted to naturalize the
theories of "race" differentiation and "Negro" inferiority
in 1753: "I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general
all the other species of men (for there are four or five
different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites"
(from "Of National Characters"; quoted in Gates, "Writing").
31. "The nineteenth century was a period of exhaustive and-as it turned out--futile search for criteria to define and
describe race difference" (Gossett 69) . See also Gossett
62, 77, 82, 125, and 140.
Chapters III and IV in Gossett
are particularly informative about the "scientific" and
anthropological efforts to validate "race," as is chapter 2
in Gould.
See also Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in
Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1982) and "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in
Science" in Goldberg, ed.
32. David Theo Goldberg makes the argument for viewing
racism as a "field of discourse" in his 1990 essay "The
Social Formation of Racist Discourse," citing Said's
Orientalism and Cornel West's Prophecy Deliverance! An AfroAmerican
Revolutionary
Christianity
(Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1982) as his antecedents. Both West and
Said draw on Foucault for their basic definitions of what
such a "discursive field" might be and how it might operate.
Gates presented a convincing argument for the discursivity
of "race" from a specifically African-American perspective
in his important 1985 essay, "Writing 'Race' and the
Difference it Makes." More relevant to the present inquiry
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are the literary applications that Aldon Lynn Nielsen and
Toni Morrison have made of such a theorization of "race."
Cf. Morrison's "Africanism," discussed above and below.
33. My use of Said's analysis of "Orientalism" as a model
for an analysis of American "Africanism" gains considerable
credence
from
the
fact
that,
at
certain
points,
"Orientalism" not only parallels but intersects with the
discursive construction of "blackness" in America. Hortense
J. Spillers, for example, has noted how Harriet Beecher
Stowe quite deliberately and unselfconsciously conflated
what it means to be "oriental" with what it means to be
"African," hopelessly complicating the possibility of any
distinctive meaning for either term but making the utility
of both abundantly clear: whatever they signified could be
starkly opposed to what they did not--Anglo-European
whiteness (Spillers, "Changing" 26-27) .
34. "Underlying all the different units of Orientalist
discourse--by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed
whenever the Orient is spoken or written about--is a set of
representative figures, or tropes" (Said, Orientalism 71).
Elsewhere,
Said
stresses
the
"idiomatic"
nature
of
"orientalism," of "orientalness," and of the "oriental"
person:
"For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these
idioms took firm hold in European discourse.
Beneath the
idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this
doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many
Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential
aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental
despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like" (203).
35. Three stories that surfaced in the news in late 1993 are
suggestive
of
the
pernicious
extremes
to
which
essentialism, even if based on "black" pride and ethnicity,
can quickly escalate: the first involved an organized
movement by members of the "black" community to ban "white"
parents from adopting and raising "black" children; the
second involved the ejection from a Kwanzaa celebration of
a "white" mother who had brought her "white/black" children
to the event, on the grounds that Kwanzaa was for "blacks"
only; the third involved protests by "black" students
against the teaching of African-American history by "white"
university professors (see Pope). All three actions are
based on the assumption that "black" and "white" people can
be defined, not merely that certain features of behavior or
culture can be experientially characterized as "black."
Such definitions must be rooted in the original system of
"race" and "racism," with all its concern for exclusion and
its blindness
to both
intragroup
and
intrapersonal
diversity.
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36.
The
self
became
an
increasingly
problematic,
increasingly contested idea with the "end" of romanticism
and the advent of modernism.
I am thinking primarily of
fiction, like that of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, in
which
identity
is
represented
as
fluctuating,
multiplicitous,
intersubjective,
and,
perhaps
most
significantly, constituted by a surrounding cultural and
material substrate. For Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus,
as Sheldon Brivic has commented, the self is not only
materially based but takes the form of a continuous loop or
spiral: identity is an ongoing process of perception moving
outward to engulf the "Other" and self-consciousness moving
inward to sense its (constantly renewed) self, a dynamic
that Brivic connects to both Hegel and Lacan. For Joyce, as
for Hegel and Lacan, identity was a "succession of phases"
(Brivic 48) . Similarly,
Woolf explored the tenuous,
environmentally constituted nature of identity in novels
like Mrs. Dallowav and The Waves, and in fact extended her
exploration to its psychopathological implications with her
creation of the character Rhoda, who cannot see her face in
the mirror and laments, "I am broken into separate pieces;
I am no longer one" (Waves 106) . For discussions of similar
literary identities from a distinctly Kohutian perspective,
see Sussman and Bouson.
A broader discussion of this
"modernist" self in literature can be found, for example, in
Sypher.

Chapter Two
Proper Conduct and Negro Sunshine:
Disciplines of Self and Text in Stein's Melanctha
Approached from almost every angle,

Gertrude Stein's

Melanctha seems to reflect a fundamental concern with the
clarification of identity.

Within the text,

characters

struggle to quell internal discord by asserting,
and coming to

"know"

the

inside other characters.

"real"

fixing,

selves inside them and

As a representation, the text has

been read as a mimetic icon of consciousness in process, as
an artistically coherent

depiction of the conflictual,

repetitive, disordered elements of unfolding identity.
a text about Americans of African descent,

As

Stein's story

has been read as an attempt at psychological realism that
seeks

to define racial identities according to a crude

schema of skin color and blood mix.

Finally,

the way

Melanctha inscribes elements of Stein's own life suggests
possible readings of the story as an artistic exorcism of
demonized anxieties about Stein's own social and emotional
identity.
These related concerns with clarifying identity share a
significant common thread: each develops around issues of
morality, conformity, and propriety.

Individual identity

is managed, in Melanctha. through the management of proper
conduct: applying the rule of "the right way to do"

(235)

to the verbal or observable record of what has been done,
determines who and what one

"really"
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is.

The rules of
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rectitude, however, are insistently referenced to codes of
sexuality, race, and class, so that constructs of coherent
identity are always built out of a compound of conformity
and category.

Hence, Melanctha's romantic interest, Dr.

Jefferson Campbell,

is preoccupied with outlining what

living "regular" means for working class "colored people"
(117) .
The tragic proportions of Melanctha's life, conversely,
are

a product

of

her

socially defined role.

inability

to

fit

into

any

such

Taken in this light, Stein's story

reads as an explication of the violence of constricting the
contradiction and complexity of the plural psyche within
simplistic, superficial constructs of race, sexuality, and
propriety.

Melanctha

is

a

character

whose

yearning,

noncomformity, and discontent expose the inadequacy of the
identity roles available within a society which manages
individuality by managing conduct and conformity.
interests me particularly,

however,

What

is the exaggerated

emphasis this concern places on both morality and race.
Indeed,

if one

sets

aside

the stylistic

and aesthetic

innovations which have traditionally riveted the attention
of Stein critics,

these topical elements may be the two

most dramatic features of Melanctha: the seemingly clumsy
and contrived structure of race and color which governs the
narrative commentary and the character descriptions;

and

the remarkably extended depiction of the interpersonal
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operations

of what Michel Foucault would analyze

as a

"disciplinary society," obsessed with the normalization of
behavior.

I want to suggest that this intersection of

themes is not incidental, but can be traced to the intimate
relationship of "race" and morality alluded to in recent
cultural analyses like David Theo Goldberg's study of the
racial subtext of Enlightenment moral philosophy (Goldberg,
"Modernity"), and David Roediger1s and Eric Lott's studies
of

the

moral

subtext

of

the

nineteenth-century

racialization of U.S. society (Roediger 95-97, 133-63; Lott
67-71) .
Placing Melanctha in the context of that relationship
between "race," morality, and identity,

I think, can help

us to understand why the racial code embedded in Melanctha
has inspired such contradictory responses.

Richard Wright

pronounced the story a profoundly realistic rendering of
African American life and speech, claiming that he had read
Melanctha

aloud

to

"a

group

of

semi-literate

Negro

stockyard workers," who were delighted, understanding, and
"enthralled."-*-

James Weldon Johnson and Nella Larsen were

also among the African American writers who praised the
text for its humane and realistic depiction of African
Americans

(Brinnin 121).

In contrast, other commentators

have found the portrayal of "blacks"

in Melanctha to be

utterly generic, if not patently demeaning and racist.

"I

found nothing striking and informative about Negro life,"
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wrote the African American poet Claude McKay.
the mulatress,

might

Richard Bridgman,

have been

"Melanctha,

a Jewess"

(248) .

And

correcting numerous instances of blind

appreciation of the realism of the portrayals by white
critics,

has

"blacks"

as

bluntly

described

condescending,

Stein's

false,

treatment

and

stereotyped (Pieces 52, "Melanctha" 352).

of

thoroughly

All too often,

however, the potential political issues raised by Stein's
language of race have been largely slighted or ignored in
favor

of

analyses

of

more

aesthetic

or

"universal"

concerns: the text as an example of modernism,
stylistic

experimentation,

romantic

realism,

narrative,

epistemological inquiry, or psychological analysis.

Even

explicitly politicized approaches to Melanctha. like those
which have sought to elucidate the latent feminism of the
narrative, have only cursorily engaged the racial discourse
and imagery, when they engage it at all.2
Sonia

Saldivar-Hull

points

out,

in

Such critics, as

their

efforts

to

establish Stein as a legitimate force within the received
modernist canon, or to install her as one of the feminist
matriarchs of an alternative canon, have sidestepped the
upper-class, white supremacism that Melanctha might be seen
to exhibit.
I want
aspect

to redirect

of Melanctha

attention
by placing

to this
it

often

ignored

in a context

that

complicates the strict dualism of this realism-or-racism
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debate.

A reading

of

the elaborate

system of racial

discourse and imagery in the story certainly needs to take
into account how that system insistently tries to pin the
behavioral

and

psychological

characteristics

it

is

describing to racial identity, an effect that must at least
be defined as racializing,

if not implicitly racist.

In

this aspect, the narrative functions as an instance of what
Toni Morrison
"blackness"

calls

"Africanism," a representation

of

that underwrites both cultural and personal

definitions of "white"

(in this case Stein's)

identity.

But the potentially racist implications of this deployment
of rhetoric and stereotypes is extensively complicated by
two crucial aspects of Stein's creative method: first, the
"realism" of an artistic mode that apparently drew at least
some of this material from a genuinely African American
cultural milieu; and, second, her self-conscious intention
to represent not "real" "blacks," but the very discursive
system, including its Africanism, in which her own identity
was constructed.

Taking such features of Stein's creative

process into account does not mean dismissing either the
psychological function the text might have had for her as
Africanism

or

the contribution

the

text makes

to the

extension of such symbolic racialization, but it does mean
positioning

Melanctha

statement about "race."

as

an

irresolvably

ambivalent

Derived in part from the hugely

influential cultural structure of the minstrel show, as I
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suggest

below,

Stein's

discourse

of

"race"

exhibits

precisely the kind of complex mix of "contradictory racial
impulses" that Eric Lott has recently attributed to that
most popular of all nineteenth-century entertainments (Lott
4).

Stein's ventriloquization of "blackness,"

like the

minstrel show's, cannot be categorized as "inauthentic" or
"racist" in any simple way, both because some elements of
her text derive from a cultural discourse that was already
interracial in its own right and because her art was rooted
in what Lott has called a

"contradictory structure"

of

racial feeling in nineteenth-century U.S. society.
We

can

begin

to

read

this

political

ambivalence

precisely in Stein's representation of Melanctha's struggle
against

the

"government"

of

racial

and

moral

"individualization." In the first section of my argument, I
assess this "intratextual" dimension of the text--the plot
itself--as radical or liberatory in that it encourages
readers to question the normalizing strategies, centered on
codes of both "race" and conformity, that radiate through
the social structure it represents.
"race"

and morality,

characters

struggle

intelligible subjects,
might

both be

indeed,
to

in

"know"

The dual emphasis on
a

each

text

in which

other

"truly"

the
as

suggests that "race" and morality

categories

of

identity within

a

larger

project of disciplinary "government of individualization,"
using

"discipline"

especially in its sense of

"making"
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individuals (Foucault, Discipline 170).
about

racial

natures

and

the

Both the discourse

continuing

surveillance,

comparative assessment, and categorization of characters'
sexual and/or moral "identities," in other words,

depict

the specific mechanisms through which discipline operates,
an operation implicitly challenged by the trajectory of
Melanctha's

life.

Insomuch as

the story analyzes

the

disciplinary effects of the characters' discourse, then, it
bears a certain progressive political

effectivity.

If, by reading with the grain of the text, so to speak,
we can see Stein critiquing a disciplinary society that
deploys such codes of individualization, by reading against
the grain of the text--reading the text as Africanist--we
can also

see the important ways

that

Stein herself

is

contradictorily enmeshed in such a disciplinary society, as
both subject and agent of discipline.
segment of my reading,

Thus, in the second

I suggest how Stein was using her

writing during this early phase of her career to work out
profound anxieties about her own sense of self.
anxieties

are

precipitated

by

the

normalizing

These
and

individualizing strictures of "white," middle-class moral
conformity, I argue, and are exorcized in Melanctha through
a process of self-fortification that projects the psychic
disorder Stein was feeling onto a thoroughly racialized
other.

If the extended thematization in the story of how

disciplinary sexual and moral individuality are enforced at
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the microsocial level indicates what was "eating" Stein as
she made her expatriacy permanent and began her artistic
career, her method of encoding that concern nevertheless
witnesses the reproduction of disciplinary tendencies in
her own text.
It is this secondary dimension of Melanctha. then, that
reads as an elaborate instance of the ego-reinforcing and
chaos-exorcising Africanism to which Morrison has ascribed
a key role in the structuring of "whiteness" and "white"
identity.

Drawing on a culturally established network of

discursive agreements about "blackness," Stein was working
out the disorder of her own identity--and most prevalently
its

sexual

"disorder"--by

projecting

sexuality itself, onto a racialized other.
this perspective,

disorder,

and

Melanctha. from

can be productively read as a metaphor

for Stein's own psychological alienation during the first
few years of the twentieth century--Melanctha's "blueness,"
but also her

"blackness,"

which

externalized

Stein

incoherence and moral

providing a metaphor
experiences

i m p r o p r i e t y .3

of

through

disorder,

in its dimension as

text. then, Melanctha provides a signal twentieth-century
example of the racial mirror stage in which a culturally
dominating

"white"

identity is established and reified

through the cultural creation of a degraded "blackness."
If we

attend

discourse,

to

that

the
is,

disciplinary
Melanc tha

effects

carries

a

of

Stein 's

politically
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regressive and racially reactionary symbolic valence that
distinctly problematizes the potential radicalism of the
content.
In my concluding remarks, however, I want to present the
text in a third,
dimension,
particular

a

more contextualized or

reading

that,

compositional

by

focusing

technique,

contradictory impulses in tension.
recent

attempt

to historicize

"extratextual"
on

Stein's

leaves

these

As Carla Peterson's

the

story

suggests,

the

racial rhetoric in Melanctha is realistic to the extent
that

Stein drew at least part of

minstrelsy,

it

from elements

of

"coon" songs, and blues music that she heard in

the African

American

communities

Baltimore during the late 1890s.4
even consider

she

lived

near

in

These forms, before we

the complexities of intention and desire

Stein may have brought to them,

were already radically

interracial in usage and deeply conflicted in political
inflection

(compromised

by

their

racist

origins,

yet

subversively reappropriated).5 ultimately, however, it is
by complicating the idea of "realism"

itself that Stein

most profoundly inflects her story with such conflicted
elements of the symbolic order. In formulating Melanctha as
a

"realism

of

the

composition,"

a

"realism

of

the

composition of [her] thoughts," rather than as a "realism"
of objects, events, or characters, Stein problematizes the
very distinctions between textual content, textual surface,
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and textual context on which a totalizing interpretation of
the story might depend.
composition,

the

In Stein's metarepresentational

material

surface

of

the

surrounding

discursive system itself is incorporated directly into the
"realism" of the representation.

Instead of representing

"black" Americans, as I argue in my conclusion, the story
literally represents how culture trains "whites" to think
about "black" Americans.

Or, more accurately, in addition

to representing "blackness," the story represents how the
representation of "blackness" takes place.

Insomuch as the

text thus thematizes what we might call the disciplinarity
of culture1s racial discourse,

it remains an irresolvably

ambivalent

"race"

statement

about

that

holds

both

liberatory and oppressive significations in tension.

The

sense

of proper

conduct

The obsession with moral propriety in Melanctha might be
read as a direct response to the emergent,

oppressively

disciplinary U.S. middle-class atmosphere in which Stein
grew up.

I am referring to what Lott has called, drawing

on the work of historians like Roediger, Mary Ryan,

and

Paul Boyer, the emergence of a "rationalized society" with
a "new moral order" of both bourgeois and working-class
"respectability" between about 1830 and 1860

(Lott 148).

The formation of a U.S. class hierarchy during this period,
Lott

observes,

was

accompanied

and

managed

by

the

development of a "culture of moral reform" and other "fresh
repertoires of domination," including new social discourses
of

"criminality"

and

"race"

(69-70).

Moreover,

the

cultural production of "blackness" in nineteenth-century
minstrelsy tended to both encode these social formations
and to symbolically resolve the tensions and anxieties they
created. ^

it is in this context that

Stein's later production of a related,

I want

to read

though different

version of "blackness," eventually treating Melanctha as a
sort

of

racialized projection

disciplinarity.

of

"white"

middle-class

I begin, however, by examining it as an

illustration of what we might think of,

in Foucauldian

terms, as the intensive "formalization of the individual
within power relations"

(Discipline 190) and the networks

of petty disciplinarians
levels

and

sectors

of

that radiated through various
society

during

the

nineteenth

century.7
The "race" and morality that pervade Stein's story, I am
suggesting,

might

"disciplinary

be most productively

technologies"

interpreted

through which,

as

as Foucault

argues, disciplinary power
applies itself to immediate everyday life which
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes
a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which
others have to recognize in him.
It is the form of
power which makes individuals subjects.
("Power" 212)
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As this passage suggests, the discipline Foucault theorizes
is not confined merely to operation as a corrective or
formative device

in the prisons,

asylums,

schools,

and

clinics which form the heart of his historical inquiries,
but also "applies itself to immediate everyday life."
fact,

he

hypothesizes

the

infinite

generalized disciplinary power

extension

throughout

In

of

a

a network or

continuum of relations that affects every member of society
and

penetrates

interpersonal

to

the

behavior,

most

and

it

miniscule
is

this

prospect

"disciplinary regime" or "disciplinary society"
193, 209)

of

a

(Discipline

Melanctha. and in a similar way the other two

in Three

portrayal

of

that I find most interesting for my reading of

Melanctha.
stories

levels

Lives. might be read as an extended

of a society characterized by

"the universal

reign of the normative": a social structure in which "the
judges of normality" and the "mechanisms of discipline" are
omnipresent and subtly exert their coercive force on "each
individual,

wherever he may

find himself"

(Discipline

304).8
In Three Lives. this disciplinary power is represented
as being transmitted through the capillaries of everyday
life by every person who has internalized the codes of
conduct,
judgmental

class,

and

functions

"race"--by
of

an

the

entire

"supervisors, perpetually supervised"

evaluative

social

fabric

(Discipline

177

and
of
).9
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Each of the stories depicts a microsociety riddled with
moral monitoring,

chastising,

focuses on characters,

and petty penality.

Stein

like Melanctha's friend Rose, who

are not only supervised by the rules of regularity and
rectitude,

but also participate in supervising, managing

the compliance of both themselves and others.

Thus the

"good" Anna, who "had always a firm old world sense of what
was

the right way

monitors
Sallie,

the

for a girl

sexual

behavior

to do"
of

her

(24),

constantly

young

co-worker,

insistently "scolding" her and even resorting to

surveillance.

"Sallie is a good girl but I got to watch

her all the time," says Anna
aunt, Mrs. Haydon,

(20).

The "gentle" Lena's

carefully manages Lena's leisure time

and administrates a proper marriage for her,

a marriage

motivated not by desire but by Mrs. Haydon's conception of
"decent" identity for a working girl.

"I do whatever you

tell me it's right for me to do," says the compliant Lena
to her moral supervisor
Jeff and Rose monitor,

(253). Similarly,
categorize,

in Melanctha.

and ultimately censor

Melanctha for her failures in the "right way to do" and for
acting like a "common nigger,"

(86) a classification I take

to have both a class and a racial dimension.
respect,

Three

Lives

incisively

illustrates

In this
an almost

comprehensive supervision of conformity, by which, through
a "micro-physics of power"

(Discipline 26-27),

individual

identities are created, insisted upon, and constrained.

The management of proper conduct,
primary

"ritual of truth"

then, represents the

and objectification by which

characters in Stein's story attempt to reduce identity to a
manageable, individualistic,

"fictitious atom" attached to

human self-experience--it is the basic instrument by which
"discipline 'makes' individuals" in Melanctha.10

Through

the strict application of a moral code--often,

but not

always,

a code of sexual morality--to observed behavior,

characters like Rose and Jeff seek to define each person's
individuality,
so created,

to evaluate hierarchically the individuals

and in so doing to enforce normativity and

conformity.H

Melanctha's friend Rose exemplifies this

dynamic

of the moral

story:

she

is

code in the opening pages

described

as

"promiscuous, "

of the
but

as

maintaining her place--and her secure identity--in the
social order by being properly engaged to each of the men
she "keeps company" with, "for Rose had strong the sense of
proper conduct"

(88).

While Rose's maneuver might seem to

make a mockery of sexual morality, it is clear that, within
the code of conduct

and identity that

obtains

in this

society, she is on solid ground: she is able to avoid being
categorized as a "common nigger"

(88) and, because she has

observed the rules of social propriety,
advance

to

the next

stage

of

decency

deciding to become "regularly married"

she is able to
and

conformity,

(88).

Indeed, we

might be tempted to assess this merely as hypocrisy on

Rose's part, and as her clever ability to slip through the
code of proper conduct, were it not for the fact that the
text has already tagged Melanctha's social shortcoming in
precisely this respect and, hence, her social identity: her
distinguishing

feature

in terms

of

the code of proper

conduct is that she "had not yet been really married"

(85,

86), a tag that will be reiterated throughout the story.
Rose

may

indeed

be

immoral

by

a

strictly

religious

standard, but she is operating within the framework of her
society's

regulations

about

decency

and

conformity.

Indeed, she is herself one of the arbiters of the code of
conduct, evaluating Melanctha's position in relationship to
the code (she is "not a common nigger either") and serving
as a counselor to Melanctha,

in these opening pages,

on

"what was the right way for her to do" (88).
The recurrence of the "right way to do" as a refrain
that governs both the behavior and the self-images of the
characters

in

each

of

the

stories

of

Three

Lives

accentuates its importance to Stein's conception of the
oppression of the working-class lives she represents.

I

have suggested, in defining "race" in chapter 1, that one
of

the

vehicles

disciplines

is

of

the

their

microsocial
linguistic

racialization of society sustains,
itself

to

d i s c u r s ive

its

subjects

discipline.

is

of

circulation:

the
the

extends and applies

effectively
It

extension

because

always

it

is

a

transmitted,
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elaborated,

and rehearsed

by

the

linguistic

acts

and

concepts that become the vocabulary and self-concepts that
organize the subjectivities that communicate with the given
linguistic circuit.

David Theo Goldberg describes

the

operation of social normativity and morality in similar
terms, concisely summarizing the identity management that
such codes entail as well:
The social formation of the subject involves, in large
part, thinking (of) oneself in terms of--literally as-the image projected in prevailing concepts of the
discursive order.
These concepts incorporate norms of
behavior, rules of interaction, and principles of social
organization.
The values inherent in these norms,
rules,
and principles exercise
themselves upon
individual and social being as they are assumed, molded,
indeed sometimes transformed in their individual and
social articulation.
("Modernity" 193)
Following Goldberg's analysis,
as

the

key

example

in

"the right way to do" serves

Melanctha

of

a

discursive

encapsulation of social norms that, in turn, provides the
basis

for

"the social

formation of the subject."

The

phrase "right way to do" literally becomes a linguistically
communicated self-image that particular subjects attempt to
conform to or,

at the risk of considerable anxiety and

social censure,

as we shall see, resist.

This reductive

and normative discursive structuring of the subject,

as

Jayne Walker suggests in her insightful reading of Stein,
supplies much of the tragic undertone of the "three lives":
the

"repetition

morality

of

the

and character

same
are

judgmental

the key

words"

feature

about

in Stein's
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creation of what amounts to a "story of victimization by
language and the social conventions it enforces"

(Walker

26, 27).
In what follows,

I want to extend Walker's intriguing

emphasis on the reductive function of compartmentalized
social discourse in Melanctha--the inadequacy of Jeff's
"rigid

set

of

moral

labels"

experience or personality,

for

describing

either

for example (Walker 33)--to an

engagement with the distinctly racial language that forms a
part of this discourse but that,
Walker

ignores.

Like

Rose,

like many commentators,
Jeff

has

thoroughly

internalized the "norm" that governs social behavior in the
"black," working-class culture Stein depicts, and he is an
ardent and vocal supporter of the "regularity" and "quiet"
living it dictates.
explicitly

For Jeff,

referenced

to

his

this behavioral code is
racial

identity,

and

conformity to it is a crucial component in his program for
improving the life of "the colored people":
"I am a colored man and I ain't sorry, and I want to see
the colored people like what is good and what I want
them to have, and that's to live regular and work hard
and understand things, and that's enough to keep any
decent man excited"....It was the life he wanted that he
spoke to, and the way he wanted things to be with the
colored people.
(117, emphasis mine)
According to this reductive linguistic grid, Jeff initially
defines Melanctha as a type.

That type is clearly "bad,"

for we learn that "he did not like Melanctha's ways and he
did not think that she would ever come to any good" (112,

99

emphasis mine).
subsequent

We might conceptualize the two lovers'

interaction

in

terms

of

J e f f 's

continuing

efforts to secure not only the semantic and moral, but also
the racial
"bad,"

integrity of his

and,

terminology of

simultaneously,

identity

within

his

"decent"

behavior

to

linguistic
for

position
grid

"colored

and

"good"

and

Melanctha's
his

people."

code
The

of

wild

vicissitudes of Jeff's frustrated, repetitive involvement
with Melanctha, then, correspond to his movements between
brief periods of sharing in the semantic,
psychological
represents,

and

psychological,
is

defined

and

renewed

"wandering"
efforts

to

that

Melanctha

restore

semantic,

and moral "regularity," where "regularity"

within

"blackness."

sexual

experiential,

a

socially

dominant

conception

of

(I will return below to the complex influence

of "white" ideas of "blackness" on that conception.)

Which

is the wav that

Above all,

is vou really?

Jeff manipulates the linguistic units and

self-images circulating through the codes of "regularity"
and "good" in order to secure and define subjectivity, an
insistence on essentialized individuality most prominently
thematized by his enduring rhetoric of
both his and Melanctha's identities.

"really knowing"

Melanctha, in simply

struggling for a social and psychological existence that
respects the various emotional and intellectual impulses
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she

feels,

is

"government

of

unconsciously

struggling

individualization"

toward a unified,

static,

that

against

ever pulls

a
her

and describable individuality.

Her tendency to "wander" away from the socially constructed
identities

available

to her--like

the social positions

reverenced by her friend Rose--is, indeed, what initially
seems to attract Jeff, the young, upstanding doctor, but he
is eventually repulsed by the threat such "freedom" entails
and moves violently back toward a reassertion of the moral
code

and,

significantly,

a

strict

doctrine

of

individualism.
Throughout Jeff's repetitive cycle from strict "decency"
to brief dalliances with wandering and back to a sense of
rigid individualism, a romantic journey that consumes the
central 100 pages of the 150-page narrative, Melanctha and
Jeff

link

management

their

contrasting

concerns

to a specifically linguistic

constitution

and

to

their

differing

with

identity

sense of self
epistemological

orientations--their different ways of knowing the world.
When Melanctha meets the young "mulatto"
her mother's deathbed,

(108) doctor at

he is a man with a rigid,

simply

defined self-conception committed to an austere lifestyle
(no "excitements") and a carefully defined existence.

He

is given to long, elaborate sessions of "thinking" things
through and talking things out.

He believes

in always

learning to know his world through careful thought, and, as

101

Melanctha puts it later, in "always wanting to have it all
clear out in words always" (171).
In contrast to this existence based on definition and
rigid security, Melanctha has a "complex,
identity,
and

(87)

"always full with mystery and subtle movements

denials

and

disillusions"

and

vague

(89) .

counterpoint,
clarity

desiring"

distrusts

Her

and

complexity

complicated

and

vagueness

but also counteract, Jeff's propensity for
definition.

talking and thinking;

Melanctha

has

little

use

for

her mode of interacting with the

world and with other people is both material and affective.
"Melanctha always had strong the sense for real experience.
Melanctha Herbert did not think much of
coming

to

real

wisdom"

(116) .

[Jeff's] way of

Early

on

in

their

relationship, she condemns Jeff's narrow and quiet approach
to life as an avoidance of "really feeling things way down
in you"

(123),

stressing the characterological dichotomy

between Melanctha's

sensibility

of

feeling

and Jeff's

sensibility of thinking.12
The "thinking" and "feeling" types represented by Jeff
and Melanctha,
dichotomy

of

respectively,

human nature

resemble

that

long

the

poles

occupied

of

a

Stein's

attention, beginning perhaps with the research article she
published as a psychology student at Harvard,
Motor

A u t o m a t i s m . "

argument here,

13

however,

"Cultivated

of more direct relevance

to my

is the connection Lisa Ruddick

convincingly shows between Stein's representation of these
personality types and the work of her college psychology
mentor, William James.

Numerous critics have explored the

influence of Jamesian psychology on Stein's writing, most
notably in terms of her efforts to render in fictional form
the

Jamesian

concept

of

a

"stream

of

consciousness."

Ruddick, by contrast, delineates how James's discussion in
Principles

of

Psychology of what he called

attention"

may have provided

the

conceptual

Stein's personality types in Melanctha.

"habits of
basis

for

Ruddick's focus is

particularly useful here because it elucidates how the
"feeling" and "thinking" types might be related to another
apparent theme in the story: how the words and concepts
available

to

us

limit

experiential world.14

our

interactions

with

the

That is, the concept of "habits of

attention" may have been the model that Stein herself was
working with in creating characters whose language,
Walker puts it,

as

"controls--and impedes--their perceptions

and judgments" (37).
Briefly, James believed that each of us makes sense of,
and limits, the multeity of sensory experience by selecting
what we will
distinctive
selective

actually
"habits

attention,

linguistic

and

theorized,

would

"pay attention"

of

attention."

he

reasoned,

conceptual
be

quite

in

to

These

of

are

nature.

fixed

to according

in

modes

predominantly
Adults,

their

James

habit

of
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attention,

able

to

shut

out

the plethora

of

impressions and limit their actual perceptions

incoming
to data

relevant to a limited set of permanent interests, needs,
and familiar words and concepts.

Children,

on the other

hand, might be more capable of simply "wandering" in the
sensory continuum from one item of immediate excitement to
another,

making

fewer

concepts and personal use

"selections"
v a l u e .

based

on

acquired

^-5 stein's emphasis on the

vague descriptor "wandering" to describe a broad range of
Melanctha's experiential activities

(including,

but not

only, sexual experiences), suggests that we might read the
personality types in Melanctha as an opposition between the
two extremes of the character range suggested by James's
framework.

At

one extreme

is Melanctha*s

"childlike"

"wandering attention," with little concern for practicality
and little limitation by received concepts; at the other is
Jeff's more "adult"--or, to use a phrase more amenable to
the cultural framework of this discussion, more socialized-tendency toward practical perceptual selectivity and the
linguistic encapsulation of experience.
Reformulating the thinking/feeling typology in terms of
the Jamesian habits of attention which Stein may have been
adapting,

of

the

linguistic dimensions of perception and personality.

As

James

then,

suggests,

clarifies

our

her

available

concepts not only limits what

thematization

repertoire

of words

and

sensory data we actually

perceive,

but how we perceive those data that do filter

through our attention.

Thus, our actual perceptual mode is

significantly determined by our previously acquired,
largely linguistic,

consciousness;

or,

and

as James put it,

"whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses
from the object before us, another part (and it may be the
larger part) always comes out of our own

m i n d .

"16

be

to

obsessed with thinking everything out and "having it clear
in words," as Jeff is, is to have a relatively rigid and
selective "habit of attention";
what "excites"
experience"
does

(119),

to be more interested in

to "have strong the sense for real

(116), and to prefer feeling things deeply, as

Melanctha,

is

to

have

a

less

conceptually

linguistically fixed "habit of attention."

and

These, finally,

were the key characteristics defining what Stein apparently
conceived

of

as

observed later,

two basic

"identity"

types.

As

she

"habits of attention are reflexes of the

complete character of the individual."1^

stein's recourse

to the reductive dualism of such a typology,

as I argue

below, might be taken as one indication of her own attempt
at this point in her career to manage anxieties about the
disorder and multiplicity of human behavior and identity.
When Jeff and Melanctha meet, her less fixed habit of
attention immediately begins to expose the inadequacy of
his

linguistic

rigidity.

Most

significantly,

Jeff's

carefully structured sense of self, literally constructed
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out of a set of stock phrases about behavior and morality,
begins

to

deteriorate

influence.

Jeff's

under

Melanctha's

self-image

is

destabilizing

directly

cued by

his

community's behavioral norms as they are communicated in
words

like

"quiet, "

"good, "

"regular, "

excitements." Following Goldberg,
formation

of

Jeff's

"subject"

and

"avoid

we might analyze this
as

his

"thinking

(of)

[him]self in terms of— literally as--the image projected in
prevailing concepts of the discursive order"
193) .

("Modernity"

The text itself seems to focus on how Melanctha's

problematization of the discursive order traumatizes the
subject as cultural structure.

As the two begin to discuss

morality and conduct (116-135), Melanctha repeatedly forces
qualifications

in

the

"meaning"

of

Jeff's

statements,

undercutting both the concepts on which he bases his ideas
and

his

confidence

in

the

transparency

of

semantic

reference, as when she asserts that "it certainly does seem
to me you don't know very well yourself, what you mean,
when you are talking"

(118). Repeatedly Melanctha points

out the shortcomings of Jeff's narrow formulations, finally
observing that Jeff's ideas of goodness and regularity seem
to preclude the possibility of "real" love and of "really
feeling things way down in you," which
really to me being very good"

(122-23).

"certainly ain't
Jeff tries to

retrench by more carefully defining "love," forwarding a
narrow formulation of two possible types of love:

good,
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regular "family" love, on the one hand, and "animal" love,
on the other (124).

With a perceptual grid based on such

narrow concepts, Melanctha observes,
but

has

little

capacity

for

Jeff can "talk big"

"being

really

very

understanding" of the world, and his ethics of "goodness"
"don't amount to very much" (124).
While Melanctha pursues
awareness

that Jeff's

the relationship despite her

"good"

might not be

all

"good,"

Jeff's interest seems contingent on his establishment of a
clearly defined character for Melanctha: he is hesitant to
proceed in the affair until he has pinned down precisely
"who"

she

"is."

Originally,

Jeff had Melanctha neatly

categorized as a type and wanted nothing to do with a
personality "who wandered" and hence "would never come to
any

good"

mentality,

(110).
however,

After

encountering

her

"feeling"

he is beset by by both semantic and

characterological doubt:

"If Jefferson only knew better

just what Melanctha meant by what she said....Now he found
that really he knew nothing.
about Melanctha"
course,

(130).

mere words

are

He did not know the least bit

From Melanctha's perspective,
inadequate

to

of

"what a woman is

really feeling in her," and she urges Jeff to abandon his
talking in favor of "really feeling"

(135).

Jeff admits

that "[pjerhaps what I call my thinking ain't really so
very understanding"
at stake

(135), but there is considerably more

in this realization than a mere

shift

from a
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"thinking" to a "feeling" mentality. Rather, his engagement
with Melanctha's mode of "knowing" precipitates a state of
uncertainty

characterized

by

the

deterioration

of

linguistic integrity and a sense of internal discord:
These months had been an uncertain time for Jeff
Campbell.
He never knew how much he really knew about
Melanctha. ...he did not seem to himself to know very
much about her....He now never thought about all this in
real words any more.
He was always letting it fight
itself out in him. He was now never taking any part in
this fighting that was always going on inside him.
(136)
Significantly, Jeff's loss of a coherent sense of self and
his anxiety that both his and Melanctha's identities may be
complex and contradictory, is linked to an inability to use
"words" to encapsulate experience.

Alerted by Melanctha to

the possibilities of an endless series of qualifications
and nuances that might underlie the surface signification
of words, and aware that the solidity of his identity was
built on the solidity of his language, Jeff slips into a
state of Lacanian alienation, where the contradictions of
his unconscious and the chain of linguistic signification
threaten the ego integrity he had previously assumed.
Indeed,

a few episodes

later this threat of psychic

disintegration becomes even more explicit, as the wandering
habit of attention that characterizes his relationship with
Melanctha begins to threaten the dissolution of both their
"selves" into an intersubjective fabric of "little pieces
all different"

(158).

This disintegration of clear ego
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boundaries is, for Jeff, both a "good big feeling" and a
source

of

immense

anxiety

(158-59),

a

psychological

ambivalence that mirrors the moral ambivalence that leads
to his on-again, off-again involvement in the affair.

The

crisis centers, in either case, around insecurity about the
definition of Melanctha's identity ("I don't know anything
real about you Melanctha") and about the disturbance of his
moral and racial self-conceptions, as is suggested by his
almost desperate rehearsal in this context of the formulaic
linguistic units through which he has internalized these
self-images:

"the right way,"

colored people,"

"live regular,"

"all the

"a bad one," "having excitements"

Representative of what he calls his "old thinking"

(159).
(156,

159), these formulae bespeak both the behavioral code and
the semantic

order on which Jeff's

bounded identity depend.

Without

sense of a clearly
them,

and the clear

definition of Melanctha they enforce, Jeff feels himself to
be

in danger,

like Melanctha's

"wandering,"

friend, Jane, of literally "[going] to pieces"

alcoholic

(1 0 8 ).18

Melanctha immediately reads this individualizing dynamic
in their

first

disagreement,

recognizing

that what

is

really at issue in Jeff's semantic doubt is his attempt to
define her moral identity.

Jeff, who has begun to wonder

if his initial assessment of Melanctha as a "bad" wanderer
is correct, is attempting to bring her "real" self to the
surface by making subtle suggestions about the difficulty
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of knowing "what each other is really thinking" and "what
each other means by what we are always
Instead

of

showing

her

hand,

saying"

Melanctha

(128).

calls

his,

recognizing that he is only trying to get her to speak so
that he can judge her according to the terms he already
believes in:

"That certainly do mean,

by what you say,

that you think I am a bad one, Jeff Campbell"

(128).

Jeff dodges the truth in this assertion this time, but
the cat-and-mouse game between them continues.
encouraging

Melanctha

to

speak

her

Only by

thoughts

can

Jeff

resolve the conundrum that structures their relationship:
is Melanctha "good, " so that he can love her,

or is she

"bad," making his involvement with her an infraction of his
code of "regular" conduct for the "colored people."
course,

Of

Jeff is also flirting with Melanctha's reckless

abandonment

of

the

linguistic

and

moral

code,

but

constantly he returns to the need for judging her moral
identity,
times

and it is her ability to appear "good" at some

and

"bad"

at

others--a

fluctuation

that

is

inconceivable within Jeff's original conceptual framework-that leads to his ambivalence. Frustrated by a woman who is
too

complex

formulations

to
of

fit within
human

any of his

character,

he

available
accuses

stock

her

of

psychological duality:
Sometimes you seem like one kind of a girl to me, and
sometimes you are like a girl that is all different to
me, and the two kinds of girls is certainly very
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different to each other, and I can't see any way they
seem to have much to do, to be together in you.
(138)
While we should reference this anxiety more to Jeff's moral
indivualization than to Melanctha's complexity per se. in
any case the significant issue for Jeff, in the context of
his newly learned doubts about linguistic clarity and his
experimention with Melanctha's mode of
potential
refuses

failure

to

of

resolve

identity

herself

"feeling,"

management.

into

the

is a

Melanctha

unified,

static

individuality that his conceptual framework can make sense
of, and he demands that she clarify her identity by stating
its truth in language so that it can be recognized by
others:

" . . .1

certainly

don't

know

which

is

a

real

Melanctha Herbert, and I certainly don't feel no longer, I
ever want to talk to you.

Tell me honest, Melanctha, which

is the way that is you really,
real, and all honest"

(139).

when you are alone,

and

As an unwitting conduit for

the transmission of "disciplinary individuality" into the
personal interactions of everyday life, Jeff here demands
the easy categorization of individuals,
name

"Melanctha

individuality,
(Foucault,

Herbert"
and

tries

denote
to

a

impose

insists that the

unified,
a

"law

totalized
of

truth"

"Power" 212) on this identity, at once "honest"

and "real."
What is transpiring in these scenes is something very
like Foucault's idea of the "examination,"

in which the

"normalizing
verbal

judgment"

verification

categorization.

searches

for

of behavior

Jeff,

the

confession

that will

or

allow moral

significantly a medical doctor,

deploys a strategy that Foucault argues evolved out of the
medical

procedure

of

the

"examination"

to

become

a

widespread technique within the disciplinary regime for
constituting "the individual as a describable. analysable
object. . .in

order

to

maintain

him

in

his

individual

features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes
or abilities,
knowledge"

under

the gaze of a permanent

(Discipline 190, emphasis mine).

corpus of

It is Jeff's

insistent search for the verbal describability of his lover
that makes his repeated interrogations of her, of what she
is "really thinking," so comparable to the "examination."
Moreover,

Jeff

is not

interested in simply

Melanctha about her past,

her tastes,

talking

to

or her behavioral

patterns; he wants to find out, in what seems to be a very
rigid and simplistic sense,

"who" she is..

describability

is

he

demands

intended

That is, the
to

denote

an

unchangeable, categorizable "individuality," by which Jeff
will be enabled to make the evaluation "good" or "bad" and
thus determine whether to continue his romantic interest.
It

is precisely

in this emphasis

that

the normalizing

procedures represented in Melanctha are so evocative of
disciplinarity itself--in the distinction that Jeff is not
so

interested

in

whether

Melanctha

has

committed

a
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particular "immoral" act, as he is in making a "case" and a
particular type of individual out of her by determining her
acts.

"The

individual

as

case,"
he

as

may be

Foucault

defines

described,

it,

judged,

"is

the

measured,

compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is
also the individual who has to be trained or corrected,
classified, normalized, excluded, etc." (Discipline 191).
While Melanctha herself consistently eludes being pinned
down in any single individuality and avoids giving Jeff the
verbal evidence he needs to establish this describability,
at one point in the romance he thinks he has obtained the
requisite record of her behavior from her old friend Jane
Harden,

who gives Jeff a thorough verbal description of

Melanctha's past activities that includes hints of various
illicit

sexualities--fornicative,

homosexual,

and

interracial:
Jane Harden began to tell how they had wandered.
Jane
began to tell how Melanctha once had loved her, Jane
Harden.
Jane began to tell Jeff of all the bad ways
Melanctha had used with her. Jane began to tell all she
knew of the way Melanctha had gone on, after she had
left her.
Jane began to tell all about the different
men, white ones and blacks, Melanctha never was
particular about things like that.
(143-44)
This

oral

recounting

of Melanctha's historical

record

allows Jeff to "see very clearly" what Melanctha "is," and
what he sees strikes him as "very ugly"

(144).

His sense

of "proper conduct" is aroused, for he now "knew Melanctha
had done many things it was very hard for him to forgive
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her"

(146) . He is willing to give Melanctha a chance to

explain her way to a moral position that refutes the facts
he has

in hand,

however,

so he confronts her with the

evidence--with the record of herself as a moral and racial
subject:
I know [Jane] was talking truth in everything she said
about y o u .
I knew you had been free in your ways,
Melanctha, I knew you liked to get excitement the way I
always hate to see the colored people take it. I didn't
know, till I heard Jane Harden say it, you had done
things so bad, Melanctha.
(151)
More to the point, Jeff vociferously asserts his right to
know this information,
about

Melanctha.

constitutes

the

to constitute a body of knowledge

He

believes

"truth"

not

that

only

of

this

knowledge

Melanctha's past

behavior, but also the "truth" of her identity:

"I had a

good right to know about what vou were and your ways" (152,
emphasis mine).
"The

disciplinary

formulation,

apparatuses,"

"hierarchized

the

'good'

in
and

Foucault's
the

'bad'

subjects in relation to one another.... By assessing acts
with precision, discipline judges individuals

'in truth';

the penality that it implements is integrated into the
cycle
Indeed,

of

knowledge

of

individuals"

(Discipline

181).

Jeff seems obsessed with this verbal record of

identity,

asserting that,

if he had wanted to, he could

have extorted a confession from Melanctha personally--his
mistake was only how he got the information, not that he
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got it.

Melanctha,

for her part,

absolutely rejects the

establishment of this corpus of knowledge,

telling Jeff

flatly that she "never would have told you nothing" if he
had

come

to

her

for

a

confession

(152) .

Jeff's

machinations to determine Melanctha's degree of conformity
to the code of proper conduct, though perhaps more subtle,
are

functionally

equivalent

to

the

"good"

Anna's

surveillance of the servant girl Sallie:

nonconformists

must be observed in their nonconformity,

described and

evaluated, and punished.
Jeff's interest in Melanctha continues intermittently
despite such judgments, both because he holds out hope of
"reforming" her "character" and because of his own furtive
desires

that are aroused by her

"wandering" ways.

His

insistent compliance to the moral code, however, repeatedly
infuses his involvement with guilt and anxiety.
two

lovers

example,
overdrive

seem on

the verge

of

sexual

When the

activity,

for

Jeff's internal moral pilot suddenly goes into
and

he

convulsively

and

Melanctha aside in "strong disgust"

physically
(155).

throws

His agonized

feelings about this behavior are again expressed in the
formulaic idioms of the internalized codes of proper racial
and moral conduct that organize his very sense of self: "he
only had disgust because he never could know really what it
was really right to him to be always doing,
he

had before

believed

in,

the

things

in the things
he

before

had
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believed in for himself and for all the colored people, the
living

regular"

(156).

Melanctha,

more

resistant

to

normalization, recognizes that the problem lies precisely
with the simplistic,

rigid linguistic units out of which

Jeff builds his moral code and, consequently, his unitary
self-conceptions.

Brief formulations like "the right way

to do," she observes, are of little use as abstractions and
must be subject to constant qualification and application
to the particularity of situations:

"You ain't got no way

to understand right, how it depends what way somebody goes
to look for new things, the way it makes it right for them
to get excited" (167).

This statement represents a radical

refusal of normalization--a radical morality.

Melanctha's

perception of the moral universe, indeed, stands in stark
opposition to that of Lena, the paragon of the effectively,
and coercively, normalized individual:

"I do whatever you

tell me it's right for me to do" (253).
While Jeff's reasons for ultimately rejecting Melanctha
are confused and multiplicitous in his own thoughts, hence
confused and multiplicitous in the narrative itself, then,
it seems clear that they relate to Melanctha's failure to
comply with disciplinary individuality and normalization.
It is significant that he upbraids her, near the end, for
failure

to

observe

a

sort

of

traditional,

stoic

individualist ethic, in which each individual is "not for
the other but for ourselves, what we were wanting....Each
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man has

got

to do

trouble"

(178).

it

for himself when he

is

in real

One of Melanctha's shortcomings, as Jeff

tells her, is her willingness to involve other individuals
in her trouble and suffering instead of bearing them on her
own

with

courage

and

fortitude

(179).

Just

as

significantly, in his final tirades against her character
he also scolds her

for what amounts

to her refusal

to

provide the "confession" of her behavior that he has wanted
all along: Melanctha's shortcoming is that she never can
"remember

right,"

at

least

not

in

the

rational,

discursively coherent, and moral sense that Jeff means the
phrase.
precisely

Jeff's

comments

because

subjectivity

she

reveal
cannot

concretely

his

sense

that

it

her

moral

verbalize

that

Melanctha

is

is

without

subjective structure:
...you ain't got down deep loyal feeling, true inside
you....you ain't ever got any way to remember right what
you been doing, or anybody else that has been feeling
with you.
You certainly Melanctha, never can remember
right, when it comes to what you have done and what you
think happens to you.
(180-81, emphasis mine)
"Remembering

ri g h t , "

then,

is

also

code

for

the

presentation of a record of acts committed, which Melanctha
has flatly told Jeff she will never give him.

She has

refused to comply with the examination procedure, refused
to allow a corpus of knowledge about her
established,
identify

and

hence

interfered

evaluate

the

with

"case"

Jeff's

"truth"

of

to be

effort
her

to

moral
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subjectivity.

Though his moral

discourse about

relationship

censure

issues

is coded in a

(like

"trust")

and

profoundly confused in his own mind with his abiding desire
for

Melanctha,

Jeff

imposes

the

severest

punishment

available to him as a judge at the microsocial level: he
rejects her as a lover and friend. ^
It

is

at

narrative

the

juncture

returns

to

of

where

this
it

rejection

began,

to

that

the

Melanctha's

involvement with the even more overt disciplinarian of
rectitude, Rose Johnson.
excited.
right

"Rose never found any way to get

Rose always was telling Melanctha Herbert the

way

she

pronouncements

should

do"

(207).

cross-reference

Moreover,

the

rules

of

conduct" with the racial code that organizes,
and, in fact, moralizes her society.
an

infraction

of

"proper

Rose's
"proper

stratifies,

For Rose, it may be

conduct"

to

pursue

sexual

excitements without the moral endorsement of engagement,
but

it

is

an even greater

excitements

across

racial

understatedly

"colored":

quiet

life

family

people";

are

infraction
lines.

to pursue

Jeff's

regular living,
his

dictates

those

morality was

hard work,

for

the

and

"colored

and he is horrified by Melanctha's history of

illicit sexuality, which includes her "wandering" with both
"white" and "black" men.

Rose is both more clear about

what the code is and more domineering in providing guidance
to Melanctha:
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You better just had stick to black men now, Melanctha,
you hear me what I tell you, just the way you always see
me do it....1 never do say to you Melanctha, you hadn't
never ought to be with white men, though it ain't never
the way I feel it ever real right for a decent colored
girl to be always doing....Now you hear to me Melanctha,
what I tell you.
(207-8)
Like the "good" Anna with her underlings, Rose sets herself
up as moral supervisor for Melanctha, scolding and advising
on points of conduct throughout the remaining pages of the
story, while Melanctha finds security and safety in being
in contact with Rose's more structured self.
text

indicates

on several

occasions,

Rose,

like Jeff,

the

has

a

firmly structured moral subjectivity as a result of having
"strong in her" the "sense of proper/decent conduct"

(200,

210, 215): she has thoroughly internalized the idioms of
both "the right way to do" and "the best way a colored girl
can have to be acting"

(208), providing her self, unlike

the "complex, desiring" Melanctha's, with a set of enduring
parameters.
As

Rose's

ministrations

suggest,

members

of

the

Bridgepoint "black" community think, like Jeff, in terms of
"regularity"

for

"colored people":

the code of proper

conduct is referenced to the code of racial strata.

This

racial/moral cross-referencing of identity constructs is in
evidence,

for example,

when Melanctha is warned of the

potential disasters of running with "white" men and taught
what

is

doing"

"right
(208).

for a decent colored girl
The

racial

category

of

to be always
identity

also

119

operates at a more subtle,
however.

and more pernicious,

level,

An accepted part of the community discourse, as

Stein represents
members

in

it,

terms

specifically,

is in fact the definition of its

of

their

racial

their skin color or

category

or,

"blood" mix,

more

with an

equally accepted privileging of lighter skin and "white"
blood.

Thus,

father,

an

Rose

repetitively refers

extremely

dark-skinned man,

to Melanctha's
with

a

single

epithet that combines his moral and his racial position:
"that awful black man"

(213). The repetition of this color

coding, spoken in the context of an all-black community by
a character who is herself a dark-skinned black woman,
emphasizes

the

significance

of

"race"--but

more

specifically "whiteness"--as a category of identity in the
"black"

community

Stein

represents.

Understanding

"whiteness" as the norm of "black" racialization also helps
us to understand Rose's insistent self-justification,
I was raised by white folks"

(86, 88, 207, 219).

"for

Because

she does have dark skin, Rose must make it clear that she
escapes the lower class and racial position of being what
she calls

a

"common nigger"

(88)

not

only by dint

of

"proper conduct" but by virtue of her strong association to
whites.

Similarly, the fact that Melanctha "had been half

made with real white blood," seems to considerably improve
her chances for achieving the "regularity" of marriage and
a "right position"

(86, 210), and make her failure to do so
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a source of some puzzlement to Rose,

who believes that

Melanctha "ain't no common nigger either" (86).
Finally, however, Melanctha's failure to conform to the
model of identity constructed out of these codes of racial,
moral and class correctness makes her presence a liability
for the properly conducted and decent Rose.

Melanctha's

continuing failure to become "regularly married" leaves her
without

a

"right position"

within

the

code

of proper

conduct for black women of her age and of the class to
which Rose
harshly

for

aspires

(210) .

a particular

Indeed,
behavioral

Rose

condemns

faux pas

in

matter, when Melanctha's engagement to Jem Richards,
gambler,

is spoiled by her acting "mad,"

her
this
the

"foolish," and

"excited," and bragging to everyone about the engagement
(219).

It is significant that Melanctha's infraction in

this instance hinges on a thoroughly technical issue of
misconduct.

To act this way when in love would be fine; to

act so when engaged is a trespass of the microsocial rules
of proper conduct and "middle class" respectability:

she

has embarassed her beau by being too much in love with him
(219).

Such a misstep is not only sure to jeopardize the

engagement (as, evidently, it does), but it also identifies
Melanctha as indecent.

"When she is engaged to him Sam,

she ain't got no right to take on so excited," Rose tells
her husband.

"That ain't no decent kind of a way a girl

ever should be acting"

(219).
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Initially sympathetic, Rose is now building up evidence
of Melanctha's turpitude, making a "case" out of her and
compiling

a record

judgment to be made.

of her behavior

that will

allow a

The evidence becomes overwhelming

when Rose, like Jeff before her, receives information from
secondary sources verifying Melanctha's failure to conduct
herself properly.

With a verbal record of her behavior at

hand, Rose is ready to define Melanctha's moral condition
as not "good" and "never does act real right."

Rose tells

her husband,
sometimes I hear awful kind of things she been doing,
some girls know about her how she does it, and sometimes
they tell me what kind of ways she has to do it, and Sam
it certainly do seem to me like more and more I
certainly am awful afraid Melanctha will never come to
any good. And then, Sam, sometimes, you hear it, she
always talk like she kill herself all the time she is so
blue, and Sam that certainly never is no kind of way any
decent girl ever had ought to do.
(228-29)
Rose

confronts Melanctha with her

sentence with the utmost

finality:

judgment

and passes

their friendship is

over, and Melanctha is never to set foot in Rose's house
again.
Rose's judgment is the normalizing judgment of a society
governed by the rules of proper conduct and an allegiance
to the static individualities that can be determined by
degree of conformity to those rules.
from

Rose's

house

and

Melanctha's expulsion

companionship

literally an expulsion of a

"bad"

is,

therefore,

individual

from the

social order, an individual who has failed to conform, who
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has evaded normalization.

Rose's judgment is thus even

more final than Jeff's, and fitly completes the depiction
of a social order pervaded by the disciplines of conduct,
individuality, and the "norm," where everyone has become a
judge and a punisher--a social order in which
the activity of judging has increased precisely to the
extent that the normalizing power has spread.
Borne
along by the omnipresence of the mechanisms of
discipline... it has become one of the major functions of
our society.
The judges of normality are present
everywhere.
(Discipline 3 04)
It is as one such judge, combining "the art of rectifying
and the right to punish" (Discipline 303), that Rose makes
her final assessment of Melanctha:

"she never no way could

learn, what was the right way she should do" (237) .

Wandering

as

anti-discipline

Melanctha's nonconformity to the strict racial and moral
codes deployed by the discourse of her peers— her lack of a
coherent racial or moral subjectivity--implies a critique
of the disciplinary systems that insist on such normativity
and,

when

normalization

fails,

produce

the

kind

of

emotional devastation that seems to be Melanctha's lot at
the

end

of

her

story.

"intratextual" dimension,

Reading

the

story

in

this

then, presents Melanctha as a

version of the plural and complex psyche in open struggle
with socially imposed, unitary,
identity.

and static constructs of

Stein clearly depicts her main character as more
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plural and more complex than the other characters in the
tale--as desiring, mysterious, and complicated--though she
also reduces this complexity to a crude duality: Melanctha
is

first

desiring

(87),

then

repressing

(89);

first

"seeking rest and quiet," then only finding "new ways to be
in trouble"
laughter,

(89);

first Jeff's bad girl

of cold,

then his flower of beauty and sunshine

hard
(13 8).

Melanctha's cyclical wavering from habits of "wandering" to
the patronage of "solid," rigidly moralistic friends,
similarly

suggestive

of

the

uncertain

is

psychological

character, what Marianne DeKoven describes as Melanctha's
"divided self"

(31),

that Stein tends to represent as a

merely dual nature.
Melanctha's complexity, of course, lies not merely in an
open

rejection

of

relationship to it.

conformity,

but

in

her

uncertain

At times with Jeff she seems a prophet

of the possibilities of "wandering" free of any fixed moral
identity, but she also, we are told,
"peace and quiet" and for "right"

longs for Jeff-like

c o n d u c t .

20

Apparently

incapable of shackling the desires and the mysteries of the
heart within a "strong sense of proper conduct" like Rose
and Jeff, Melanctha allows them more free play, making her
more a reveler than a rebel.

Ruddick has characterized

Melanctha's struggle with the more practical and more rigid
"habit of attention" being imposed upon her by society as a
struggle with a particularly Jamesian doctrine of "success"
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that had influenced Stein's thinking.
doctrine of

"success"

In the story, this

is represented by Jeff.

There is

considerable merit to Ruddick's contention that Melanctha's
relationship to Jeff's conception of successful living is
uncertain and ambiguous largely because Stein herself was,
at the time she composed Melanctha. ambivalent about the
strict

J a mesian

guidelines

for

practical

and

individualistic subjectivity, and was, in fact, beginning
to "strain against James"

(Ruddick, Reading 30).

Jeff's

renewed inner strength and Melanctha's demise in the final
pages might be read as a critique of what James called the
"exuberant

non-egoistic" way

of

being--the

lack

of

selective attention--but it is just as possible, as Ruddick
puts it, to read Melanctha as "a protest against the entire
notion of mental success represented by Jeff" (30).
From the latter perspective, Melanctha's wandering has
the

effect

unified,

of

exposing

the

inadequacy

of

the

simple,

and constrictive subject positions available to

her within what I have sketched as a disciplinary society.
The fact that Jeff can only recognize her as two-girls-inone,

or

as

"too

many

for

him"

(175),

the

extent

of

Melanctha's emotional misery within the system (her "awful
blue" feeling), and the devastating punishment meted out to
her at the end for her nonconformity, all suggest a subtle
critique of disciplinary individuality (as well as Jamesian
individuality,

or

"egoism").

In

this

view,

Stein

is
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artistically

representing

complex

subjectivity

in

aggravated tug-of-war with the moral subjectification of
social discourse, perhaps because she had struggled with
this

kind

of

constrictive

normalization

herself,

particularly as imposed by the sexual mores of her "white"
middle-class upbringing.

We might also note, however, that

her complication of reductive psychic models resorts to
certain

reductive

strategies

of

its

own--like

the

distinctly either-or, binaristic models of identity that I
have alluded to--a "stronger" reading of the text that I
will turn to in my next section.
The moral subjectification deployed by the characters,
as

I have

suggested,

is

deeply

intertwined

with

the

discourse of racial subjectification that they also use to
identify

themselves

and

each

other.

In

this

sense,

Melanctha illustrates the operation of what I have called
the

discursive

psychological
characters

discipline

of

race,

devastation

it

creates.

have

the

option

of

focusing
Put

becoming

numb

on

the

simply,
to

the

contradictory intimations of their psyches, fully accepting
as natural the race/morality constructs available to them,
or

they

can resist

confronting
system.

the

these

intimate

formulations
violence

of

at
the

the

risk of

disciplinary

Melanctha's "blues" mentality, it should be noted,

is not merely directed inward:

"Sometimes the thought of

how all her world was made, filled the complex, desiring
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Melanctha with despair. She wondered, often, how she could
go on living when she was so blue"

(87, emphasis mine).

While one might argue that Melanctha's emotional upheaval
is meant to be merely the result of the abuse inflicted
upon her as a child (to which the text clearly alludes),
or, more vaguely,

of her simple inability to

"fit in,"

there are also indications that Melanctha is tormented by
what she has seen in the world around her.
There are indications, more to the point, that what she
has

seen has had something

to do with the devastating

racialization of her society and the Jim Crow system that
surrounds

and,

I would

suggest,

community of Bridgepoint.
adolescent

structures

the black

During Melanctha's

"wanderings after wisdom"

(97),

formative

part of the

worldly knowledge she obtains is the repeated telling of a
story of racist differentiation and hate, with an explicit
threat

of

"white"

violence

toward

conduct themselves properly.

"blacks"

who do not

A porter at the train yard

tells Melanctha how he evicted from his train a white man
"who called him a damned nigger,
money for his chair to a nigger"

and who refused to pay
(99).

The porter had to

give up going to that part of the south because the white
men involved "swore that if he ever came there again they
would surely kill him" (99).
It

is within

the

dynamics

violent racialization that

and

definitions

"proper conduct"

of

and

such

"quiet

living" did, historically, become the imperatives of black
communities.

In this sense Stein's text illustrates what

Ralph Ellison,

in an essay on Richard Wright's southern

roots, referred to as the process by which southern, black
communities "worked out efficient techniques of behavior
control" as a defense mechanism against "white" violence
(Shadow
words,

90) .

One response to such violence,

is to numb oneself to it by living,

in other

as does Jeff

Campbell, within the identity "patterns" it allows.

Though

characters like Jeff counsel her to do the same, Melanctha
is,

in the end,

too spirited to do so,

and thus she is

fully awake to the horror of "how all her world was made."
Sensing that her self does not fit within any of the rigid
models of identity imposed by the overlapping disciplines
of

race

and

conduct,

Melanctha

is

forced

to

confront

despair and thoughts of self-annihilation, wondering "how
she could go on living when she was so blue"
the

lines

of

Stein's

implication that

text,

(87).

I am suggesting,

Between
runs

the

Melanctha is "awful blue" because of a

world that could combine the conduct, race, and linguistic
elements of individualization in defining her father as an
"awful

black

man"

and

her

friend

the

porter

as

an

improperly conducted "nigger."
Still, Melanctha, having less strongly internalized the
cultural code and having, therefore, a less fixed sense of
self,

fluctuates

for

a

time between periods

of

"free
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enjoying" and these periods of "awful blueness."

She is

briefly able to communicate the possibilities of her more
"feeling"

habit

of

attention

to

Jeff,

forcing

him

to

problematize the vocabulary of stock concepts, words, and
phrases

that

govern

his

own hypersocialized

subject.

Jeff's and Melanctha's "free enjoying" at this point, along
with their translations

from it to conventionality and

social opprobrium, respectively, undermine the normalcy of
the "government of individualization" represented by "the
sense of proper conduct."

Melanctha leads us a tentative

step down the road to reimagining "what we could be" as a
means of subverting "the simultaneous individualization and
totalization of modern power structures"

(Foucault,

"Power"

2 16 ) .

From

interioritv

to

exteriority

We have, then, what looks from the "intratextual" point
of view like a significant critique of the disciplinary and
individualizing methods of society, and perhaps even of the
particular racial and moral disciplinarity that occurs in
certain black communities, and, by extension, of the larger
racialization of society that causes those effects within
its racialized subcultures.

In other words, Melanctha does

in important ways resemble what bell hooks refers to as a
"radical

black

subjectivity"

struggling

against

the

"conservative policing forces" of her black community (20).
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In short, the story's basic structure of plot and character
suggests a sympathetic "white" representation of African
American life.
By

looking

more

closely

now

at

the

exceptionally

racialized textual surface of Melanctha, however, I want to
suggest

how

its potential

subvers ion

of

disciplinary

selfhood is itself subverted by Stein's reproduction of
racial disciplinarity in the very language she deploys to
construct
S t e i n 's

the

narrative.

discourse,

that

The
is,

racialized
instance

elements

the

of

linguistic

discipline of race as I have described it in chapter 1. To
reformulate this point within the Jamesian psychological
framework with which Stein herself may have been working:
if

Melanctha

can

be

read

as

a

personality

with

an

undisciplined, wandering attention, refusing to shape what
she experiences with reductive words, phrases, and concepts
(undermining

the

disciplinarity

of

the

s e l f ),

that

representation is ironically counterpointed by the way the
text

itself

attention,

exhibits

insistently

a

rigidly

forcing

conform to a set of stock words,

selective

its

habit

of

representations

to

phrases,

and concepts

(producing a disciplinarity of the text) .

When we take

this aspect of Melanctha properly into account, we must
add, to the radical signification I have outlined so far, a
second, more regressive dimension of the story.
second perspective,

From this

the story might be more accurately
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characterized as an early example of the "white avantegarde" attempting to "appropriate and usurp radical efforts
to

subvert

static

notions

of black

identity"

for

the

purposes of its own self-definition (hooks 21) . Like the
contemporary avante-garde critics hooks is describing in
this phrase, Stein used what she thought she saw in African
American culture as the starting point for mulling ideas
about her own, "white" identity.
It is precisely by turning critical attention to the
surface of the prose, to the text as representation, that
one also turns critical attention from the "black" subject
matter of the story to the "white" subject position that
created it.
effects

In other words,

of Stein's style,

by looking at the surface

and in this case the racial

surface effects, we perform the project which Toni Morrison
has referred to as the aversion of the "critical gaze from
the racial object to the racial subject" (Plavina 90).

The

approach I am proposing has been aptly described by Edward
Said as the shift from an analysis of "what lies hidden in"
the racist

text

to an

"analysis

rather

of

surface, its exteriority to what it describes"

the

text's

(Orientalism

20).

As Said suggests, the "exteriority" thus analyzed is

both

that

of

the

"style,

figures

of

speech,

setting,

narrative devices, historical and social circumstances" and
that

of

the writer

representation.

By

herself
looking

to
at

the
the

supposed
style,

object

of

figures

of
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speech, and narrative devices of Melanctha. then, I want to
explore

how

Stein

clarifies

herself

as

a

presence

thoroughly "exterior" to African American life, precisely
by manipulating a received set of discursive agreements and
linguistic units like those that make up what Morrison
calls

"Africanism. "

alienation,

we

In her

might

say,

artistic
Stein

effort

grants

to

evoke

herself

the

privilege of translating the mystery and strangeness of a
racial

other,

vocabulary

of

but

it

that

is

precisely

translation

that

the

constricted

reveals

a

second

referent: not any "real" African American presence, but the
"white"

self and its constitutive network of Africanist

d i s c o u r s e .

2 1

When we look at the textual

Melanctha. finally,

surface of

we see a generalized and thoroughly

disciplinary evocation of

"blackness"

that dilutes

the

radical impulse to represent human couplexity.
As Eric Lott argues, new discourses of "race" evolved
during the middle of the nineteenth century as a sort of
social

symbolic,

encoding

and

resolving

crises

of

subjectivity produced by the intensive "culture of moral
reform"

that accompanied the economic stratification of

U.S. society (69-70).

While Lott is most interested in how

blackface minstrelsy functions as one such discourse,

I

want to suggest that Stein's representation of "blackness"
in Melanctha

can be read as a similar response to the

intensively moralized air of her nineteenth-century middle
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class background (a representation itself influenced by the
discourse of minstrelsy) .
Stein does not
preoccupies

represent

Three

It is crucial,
the moral

that is, that

normalization

Lives in the context of the

that

"w h i t e "

middle class milieu she would have been most familiar with
(and that

did become

the context

of her

concern with

conformity in later texts like The Making of Americans) ,
but rather in the context of the working class,
first and last of the Three
"black"

community,

Lives

in M e l a n c t h a .

stories,
Like

in the

and of the

the blackface

participants that Lott describes as "immersing themselves
in 'blackness' to indulge their felt sense of difference"
from the new bourgeois sensibility (51), Stein was using
"race" to stage subjective conflicts precipitated by her
class position,

with its strict edicts about morality,

gender roles, and, most significantly for Stein's emerging
sense of a lesbian sexuality,
issues

insistently

suggesting,

rehearsed

pointedly

"Working-class women

sexual orientation.

support

in

Three

Lott's

(white and black)

The

L i v e s . I am

assessment

that,

and black men in

bourgeois cultural fantasy are figures for a thrilling and
repellent sexual anarchy"
emancipatory

figure

of

(122). As much as she

radical

"black"

is an

subjectivity,

Melanctha is Stein's racialized projection of otherness
itself.
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That

Stein,

in

representing

the

"government

of

individualization" in Melanctha. intermingles the social
codes of "race" and morality is significant, then, not only
because different disciplinary technologies were always
interactive,

overlapping,

also

context

in the

moralism

of

and mutually supportive,22 kut
Goldberg's

is productive

ideology.

of

race

As Goldberg notes,

as

thesis

that

modern

a differentiating

the discourses of race and

morality have been deeply symbiotic since the inception of
racialized thinking in the sixteenth century: "Historically
dominant pictures of moral nature have been keys in forming
both social self-conception and the figure of the Other:
what each agent at a given conjuncture could be, expect,
and achieve"

("Modernity" 198).

The project of carefully

defining one's own identity in moral terms— one's moral
subjectivity--Goldberg implies, has consistently entailed
the formulation of racial subjectivities as well, so that
racial

exclusions

"have

been

legitimated

and

may

disturbingly be justified in terms of the historically
prevailing conception of moral subjectivity"
198).

("Modernity"

Enlightenment philosophers defining their own moral

subjectivity in terms of rationality,

for example, at one

and the same time defined their own racial subjectivity,
and that of the "Other, " by defining that rationality in
opposition to a "manifestly" irrational
African, American Indian, etc.).

"Other"

(savage,

In this sense Melanctha
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reenacts a fundamental dynamic of modern thought, though,
as

Lott

argues

of

the

minstrel

show

and

as

my

multidimensional analysis of Melanctha is meant to suggest,
this moralization of the subject through the racialization
of an

"other"

is deeply ambivalent,

encompassing both

distancing and desire.

The

common phrases
Indeed,

relating

to

negroes

Stein's remarks and attitudes about people of

color as recorded in other contexts are suggestive of this
ambivalence,

articulating in some instances the kind of

cross-racial

fascination

that

George

Fredrickson

characterizes as "romantic racialism" and in others more
overt

versions

described.

of

the projection

of

amorality

I have

Stein's early familiarity with and reiteration

of overly romanticized and traditionally stereotypical
images

of

southern

"blackness"

is

suggested

by

the

description, taken from her undergraduate Radcliffe themes,
of "Baltimore, sunny Baltimore, where no one is in a hurry
and the voices
drowsy reveries"

of the negroes
(Bridgman,

singing... lull you

Pieces 23) .

into

Such a remark

about the city on which the "Bridgepoint" of Melanctha is
ostensibly based might be taken as the precursor to the
narrative descriptions in the story of how "the colored
people came out into the sunshine....And they shone in the
streets and in the fields with their warm joy,

and they
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glistened in their black heat, and they flung themselves
free in their wide abandonment of shouting laughter"
9) .

Claude McKay was certainly correct

(208-

in finding in

Melanctha a reproduction of "the common phrases relating to
Negroes,"

a view that we must set in counterbalance to

Richard Wright's eventual claim that Stein's rendering of
the colloquial language of African Americans made him "hear
the speech of

[his] grandmother,

who spoke a deep, pure

Negro dialect."23
Stein's recorded remarks do suggest that her thoughts
about African Americans were often mediated through the
hackneyed, brief, discrete units of the traditional body of
discursive

agreements

relating to Negroes."
useful

synopsis

about

them--the

"common

phrases

Aldon Lynn Nielsen has provided a

of her seemingly dismissive

about African and African-American culture,

statements

arguing that

Stein seems to have believed that blacks were incapable of
art, originality, and of historical tradition (Nielsen 2127) . Nielsen

cites,

for

example,

Stein's

simple

but

sweeping pronouncement in The Autobiography of Alice B.
Toklas that "Gertrude Stein concluded that negroes were not
suffering

from persecution,

nothingness.

they

were

suffering

from

She always contends that the african is not

primitive, he has a very ancient but a very narrow culture
and there it remains. Consequently nothing does or can
happen"

(Selected Writings 224).

Aside from the simplicity
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and essentialism of the analysis suggested here, we might
note both the social ignorance of the assumption that the
blacks of her time were not suffering from persecution and
the new

light

"nothingness"

that

the imputation of an essentialized

to blacks places on the vagaries of both

speech and behavior in the Jeff and Melanctha relationship.
The view that the social position of American blacks was
attributable not to racism but to a metaphysical black
character is of course one of the most traditional and
stereotypical

of

all

rationalizations

continuing racialization.

for

society's

In fact, Stein's remark fosters

two of the leading stereotypes that justified the dismissal
of race issues as a problem for social attention:
that darker-skinned peoples
intellectual and cultural
character

trait;

and

first,

are somehow suffering

"nothingness"

second,

that

from

as an essential

(because

of

their

essential character) the condition of the race was simply
fated to be a tragic

one,

a status

that

could not be

changed by any manner of social treatment.24
Additional instances of stereotyped images and idiomatic
expressions
writing,

about

"blacks"

particularly

as

surface

she

in

evolved

a

Stein's

later

compositional

technique that allowed her surroundings and the sometimes
whimsical movements of her consciousness to be incorporated
into the fabric of the text.

The phrase

"needless are

niggers" appears in the midst of the associative discourse
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of Tender Buttons (494), while the "stories" in As Fine As
Melanctha incorporate instances of the repeating phrases of
a culture's discourse about the other like "eeney meeney
miney mo catch a nigger by the toe" (275) . Moreover, Stein
was not above applying such idiomatic representations of
"blackness" to herself.

As Lisa Ruddick reports,

in the

notebooks for The Making of Americans Stein referred to her
own

less

rational

side

as

abandonment, Vollard, daddy
suggests

an

easy

her

s i d e .

familiarity

"Rabelaisian,

" 2 5

with

nigger

iphe reference again
the

discursively

circulating stereotypes about blacks, but also indicates a
tendency to project the sensuous aspects of her self in
racial terms.
I am not suggesting that by finding such examples in
Stein's writing we can "catch her out" and expose her for
the racist she really is; on the contrary,

such examples

instance a romanticization of racial difference that can be
both sympathetic and derogatory.

What I am suggesting is

that the recurrence of such formulaic units of Africanist
language in the written record of Stein's consciousness are
indicative
construct
discursive
interest,

of precisely
of

that

culture--as

discipline--to
in other words,

operation of

a microsocially
which

I have

"race"

as a

penetrating,
alluded.

My

is not in the degree to which

Stein was or was not a racist, but the extent to which she
lived in a racialized cultural milieu, and the effects that
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racialization had on her very habits of being.

Stein's own

“habit of attention" was, in part, a racialized habit: as
these examples
words,

suggest,

concepts

and

one of the clusters

labels"

that

of

shaped her

"stock

everyday

perception of reality was that of the Africanist discursive
agreements— the "common phrases relating to Negroes."

Neoro

sunshine

The comprehensive

reiteration of such phrases

about

"black" Americans in the narrative of Melanctha has been
well

noted.

The

"exteriority"

of

the

text

and

the

characterizations it presents fairly drip with the most
deeply

stereotyped,

romanticized
constituted
distilled

cliched,

elements

of

the

Africanism

in

Stein's

into

repeatable

strongly

the

linguistic

same

these

formulas

reproduces

abandonment,"

connecting

spontaneous

"black"

day,

of

that

elsewhere in Stein's discourse.
of

discursive

type

units

and

exotically
field

many

of

formulaic,
I

have

that
them

easily

alluded

to

One of the most insistent
Stein's

it both

laughter

image

to

the

and

to

of

"nigger

stereotype
images

of

that

"naturalize" or biologize "blacks," making them part of the
physical world itself:

the text repeatedly describes its

"black" characters in terms of "the wide abandoned laughter
that gives the broad glow to negro sunshine"

(92, 111).
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This rhetorical figure is representative of the texture
of racial

references

that organizes

characterizations in Melanctha.

the prose

and the

To begin to understand the

scope and significance of this veneer of racial language,
it is necessary to understand how what appears to be a
veneer is actually rooted in the very interior of the text,
being manipulated by the characters themselves.

I have

already noted how Rose and Jeff deploy a "norm" against
which individuals in their community can be evaluated and
distributed along a continuum of normalcy.

The norm they

apply is, moreover, at times moral--involving evaluations
of conduct--and at times racial--involving notations of
skin color. More accurately,

it is a norm in which these

two categories overlap to produce precise clarifications of
individuality: Jeff applies it in his pursuit of "knowing"
the

"real"

Melanctha,

and

Rose

applies

it

in

her

determination that Melanctha's father can be identified as
"that awful black man."

It is precisely this disciplinary

management of the race/conduct norm that is transferred
from these internal operations of the characters to the
"exterior"
speech,

features of the text--its

setting,

style,

figures of

narrative devices-~creating a seamless

fabric of individualizing techniques that are obsessed with
the raciality of moral behavior, and the morality of skin
color.

As Rose chatters along in her efforts to clarify

her racial identity in terms of her proper conduct,

the
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text itself is just as busily clarifying her moral identity
in terms of her skin color.
The connection I am suggesting between the "interior"
and the "exterior" of Melanctha is initially evident in the
fact, noted by other Stein readers, that the norms, values,
and behavioral mandates forwarded by both Jeff and Rose are
neither

their own nor

community.

those of a particularly

"black"

Rather, Jeff's ideas of regular living are the

stuff of a thoroughly middle-class "white" conventionality,
"the voice of the white bourgeoisie coming through a black
manikin," as Milton Cohen has put it (121).
ideal of hard working,

restrained,

Moreover, his

docile,

quiet living

"colored people" closely mimics a typical "white" ideal of
what "properly conducted" black people should be, leading
Cohen to suggest the "Uncle Tom" quality of Jeff's values
(121).

Similarly, Nielsen argues that "Campbell is given

the role of

'race man'

in this book and is constantly

expounding moral observations of the type put forward by
Booker T. Washington"
more

evident when

possess

the

Melanctha

(25).

we

realize

strongest

have

This dynamic becomes all the

derived

sense

that
of

their

the

characters

"proper

norms

and

conduct"
values

who
in
from

"whites": both Jeff and Rose are remarkable for their close
contact with "white" communities.
worked for a wealthy

"white"

Jeff's father and mother

family which,

we are told,

"had been very good to [Jeff] and had helped him on with
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his ambition"

(111)

and education,

while Rose has been

raised and financially assisted by another "white" family
(86, 88).

Rose herself makes it very clear how this white

training

improves

her measurement

against

the

story's

race/conduct norm: despite very black skin, she is able to
assert,

"No, I ain't no common nigger, for I was raised by

white folks" (86).
Thus,

instead

of

problematizing

the

normalizing

disciplinarity of the "white" discursive order, Melanctha
reiterates
conduits,

it,

first portraying characters who are its

then deploying narrative strategies which make

the "exteriority" of the text a disciplinary mechanism in
its

own

right.

If

for example,

identified herself as decent
"proper conduct,"

Rose

according

thinks
to

she

has

the code of

the narrative voice has other

ideas,

assessing her conduct in terms of her white training, but
assigning her a moral identity based on the color of her
skin: "Her white training had only made for habits, not for
nature.

Rose had the simple, promiscuous unmorality of the

black people"

(86). Three significant assumptions of the

racial code entwined in the text are established with this
statement:

1) people can be individualized according to

essential racial and moral "natures"; 2) black skin denotes
essential identity traits like uninhibited sexuality and
unmorality; and 3) though you can curb and shape the actual
behavior of someone with black skin, you cannot alter that
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essential "nature"--the racial/moral individuality is both
definable

and

static.

This

racialization -of morality,

indicative of a common set of racist assumptions of the
1890s,

begins

to

suggest

the

linkage

between

moral

discourse and racial discourse posited by both Lott and
Goldberg.

As Golberg observes,

"the imperatives of race

are inadvertently lent the authority of the moral domain"
("Modernity" 224).26
The assessment of "black"
first pages quickly flowers

"unmorality" in the story's
into a bizarre,

systematic

fetishization of skin color that pervades the entire text,
creating what Milton Cohen has summarized as the "racial
hierarchy" of Melanctha (120).

As Cohen points out, this

categorization of character types by skin color might be
taken

as

fascinated

a

racialized
Stein

version

throughout

of

the

the decade

project

which

1900-1910,

her

effort to categorize individuals according to a relatively
small number of types, or "bottom natures."

I have already

noted the resemblance of the Melanctha/Jeff dyad to one of
those

schemas--the

"thinking"/"feeling"

dichotomy--

suggesting one level on which Stein is expressing anxieties
about managing

the plurality of identity.

The

almost

feverish effort to assign behavioral characteristics and
emotional tendencies to the signifiers of skin color and/or
racial heredity, however, reveals that anxiety working at a
different, and more politically impacted level.
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The

essence

characters,

of

Stein's

racial

descriptions

charted in detail by Cohen,

of

the

follows a simple

principle: the blacker the skin and the less white blood,
the less civilized, less intelligent, less moral, and more
closely linked to "nature" and the body;
skin and the more white blood,
intelligent,

the lighter the

the more civilized, more

more capable of moral discretion,

closely linked to the physical.

Thus,

and less

the "real black"

(86) Rose is identified by a cascade of traditional racist
stereotypes, including laziness and hypersexuality:

"Rose

Johnson was careless and was lazy....Rose had the simple,
promiscuous unmorality of the black people.... this coarse,
decent,

sullen,

promiscuous,
ordinary,

ordinary,

shiftless Rose"

selfish

black
(86);

black girl"

childish... unmoral,
"this

(200).

lazy,
By

stupid,

contrast,

Melanctha, who "had been half made with real white blood"
(86),

is a "subtle,

intelligent,

girl [with] wisdom"(200).

attractive,

(While Rose is

half white

also described

as having "wisdom,"it is crucial that Rose

has

the wisdom

of

the

wisdom of

"common

learning,

sense,"
subtlety,

while Melanctha
and,

has

presumably,

rationality.)

Similarly, Jane Harden, the story's whitest character,
white

that hardly anyone

could guess"

"so

her black blood

(103), is also capable of advanced learning (two years of
college), has a "good mind," and "had much white blood and
that made her see clear" (104).

The color coding applied to the men in the story is
equally telling.
with various

Melanctha's father, James,

strings

of adjectives,

but

is described

those

strings

always include the tag "black." As a black-skinned man, he
takes on all the stereotypical

features of the

"white"

community's most feared vision of the "black" other:
mean,

angry,

violent,

oversized,

the

oversexed male brute.

James is described as "coarse... big black virile...brutal
and rough...powerful, loose built,

hard handed,

angry... fierce and serious...black and evil"

black,

(90-92), and

he is capable of erupting into violent rages at Melanctha,
and at John, the coachman, for showing too much interest in
his

daughter.

By

contrast,

"mulatto," is "pleasant
shows

extraordinary

Melanctha.

So

John,

"light

(and] good natured"

kindness

too,

a

Jeff

and

(94), and he

friendliness

Campbell,

brown"

whose

toward
racial

identification is "mulatto," is, as we have noted, highly
intellectualized, having a doctor's education and a taste
for reading and ratiocination.
towards others,

He is also kind, thoughtful

interested in the advancement of his race

rather than the brute pursuit of bodily pleasures,
and sympathetic,"
uses

"whiteness"

"earnest and joyous"
(both

blood

and

(111).

skin)

as

"good

The text
a

"norm"

according to which its characters can be distributed along
a continuum of both racial and moral subjectivity.

Moreover, it might be observed that the "black" end of
the masculine continuum bifurcates its caricatures into the
dual stereotype of "blackness" so prominent in the "white"
imagination throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries,

most

prominently

in

the

minstrel

show.

According to such Africanist representations, there was the
"black" male that was to be feared because he was violent,
large, brutish, evil, and given to uncontrollable sexuality
(like

James),

and

the

"black"

because he was so childlike,

male

stupid,

that
lazy,

was

harmless

fearful, eye-

rolling, and given to uncontrollable laughter (the cheerful
and docile

"darkie").

Melanctha's acquaintances at the

train and ship yards fulfill the latter role.
the

train

yard

are

portrayed

as

The men at

superstitious

story

tellers, coded by an exaggerated greasy "blackness": "their
round, black,

shining faces would grow solemn,

and their

color would go grey beneath the greasy black,

and their

eyes would roll white in the fear and wonder of the things
they could scare themselves by telling"
shipping docks,

(99) .

At

we meet more minstrel caricatures:

the
"she

would listen with full feeling to the yowling of the free
swinging negroes,

as they ran, with their powerful loose

jointed bodies and their childish savage yelling"

(101).

There are some inconsistencies in Stein's characterizations
by skin color, probably, as Cohen notes, in relation to her
conceptions

of

the

"bottom

natures,"

but

a

basic
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fetishization

of

color

is

rigidly

observed.

characters are persistently tagged as
"yellow"

or

"light-brown"

characters

"Black"

"b l a c k ." whereas
are

identified by color once, or only vaguely.

usually

only

Most pointedly,

intellectuality is reserved for only those characters at
the

lighter

end

of

the

scale,

and

simplicity

and

childishness is reserved for only those at the "black" end.
These caricatures,

as Nielsen observes,

reiterate the

stereotypical "image structures of white discourse" about
the nonwhite that were already in circulation in American
culture.
stupid,

Images of the childlike, libidinous, cultureless,
lazy,

scientific,

and unmoral "black" abound in the popular,
and

academic

writing

by

"whites"

that

is

chronicled in histories of such discourse like Gossett's
Race: The History of an Idea in America and Fredrickson's
The

Black

Image

in

the

representation

of

stereotypical,

further

White

Melanctha's

Mind.

Even

complexity

undercutting

the

is

Stein's
largely

sense

that

Melanctha's multiplicity suggests the humanity of blacks or
critiques

the

individualizing

impulse.

Melanctha's

statedly "complex," but ultimately dual character, first of
all,

seems

to

be

based

on

the

conventional

racist

misconception that the mixture of "white" and "black" blood
would produce a psyche torn between the refined callings of
its

"white"

elements and the sensuous strivings of its

"black" elements. Within the dynamics of the story itself,
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then,

we

can

understand

how

Jeff--also

a mulatto--is

threatened by his licentious side but manages to overcome
it,

having

thoroughly

internalized

guidelines of his "white" training.

the

civilizing

Jeff feels the pull of

his "black" blood but manages to clarify his identity as
fully moral by virtue of "white" blood and "white" social
influence.

Melanctha,

on the other hand,

advantage of "whiteness" by association,

without

the

is projected as

half-and-half by a strict blood-to-nature equation: we know
within the text's racial code that her libidinous impulse
for "wandering" and "trouble" must be the tendency of her
"black" blood, and we can assume that her urges for peace,
quiet, and regularity are the tendency of her "white" side.
We might say, then, that the text's internal fetishization
of racial bloodlines dooms Melanctha

to complexity and

contradiction, but in this respect her representation also
follows

the assumptions already in circulation in U.S.

literature. Stein's stereotypes of black "laughter," on the
one

hand,

melancholy,

but

mu la 11 o

on the other,

intellectual

sensitivity

and

derive from a long fictional

tradition of what Fredrickson terms "romantic racialism"
(110),27

In addition to the racial or skin-color hierarchy which
governs

the characterizations

in Melanctha. there is a

fully developed narrative strategy of Africanism, creating
what Sonia Saldivar-Hull calls the "racist frame" of the

story (193).
characters,

As with the racial individualization of the
this

setting

and

background

reiterates

a

remarkably formulaic set of cliches and stereotypes about
the nature of "blackness," an idea often signified in the
text by the phrase "negro fashion."
repeats

the

association

of

blacks

The text cyclically
with

abandonment,

laughter, nature, and sunshine, usually by replicating some
form of its most idiomatic representation of "blackness":
"the wide,

abandoned laughter that makes the warm broad

glow of negro [southern] sunshine"
195, 209).
of

blacks

(86, 92, 111, 137, 161,

In addition to these traditional associations
with

moral

abandonment,

with

"wide-mouthed

shouting laughter" (209), and with the heat of the tropical
sunshine,
other

"negro fashion"

stereotypical

behaviors:

(94), pious church-going
negligence.

is referenced to a series of
black-on-black

violence

(87), and parental and maternal

In a particularly pernicious instance of this

re-production of white discursive assumptions and formulae,
we are told that Rose Johnson simply forgets about her
newborn baby, but that neither Rose nor her husband mind
the loss for long because, after all, "these things came so
often in the negro world"
its presentation

continue

(85, 225).

This occurence and

a stereotype

that helped

to

impute bestiality to blacks, rationalized the destruction
of black families during slavery, and extends, as Nielsen
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points

out,

all

the

way

back

to

Thomas

Jefferson's

descriptions of the "black" character (Nielsen 25) .
In

the

"negroes"
kingdom

textual
are

that

sunshine but
earth's

background

so connected
they

ecosystem:

in

Melanctha.

to nature

virtually

the natural

of

blend

cycles

spring,

and

into

indeed,

its bestial

not

only

and structures

"the buds

and

the

of the

the

long

earthworms, and the negroes, and all the kinds of children,
were coming out every minute farther into the new spring,
watery,

southern sunshine, " and in summer,

"colored people never get sick so much"

we are told,

(195).

Stein's

evocation of an atmosphere of "blackness" depends, then, on
the rhythmic repetition of certain linguistic units--the
nouns "sunshine," "laughter," "abandon," and the adjectives
"docile, "

"simple, "

"childish/selfish,"

"lazy, 11
and

the

"indolent, "
idioms

noted

"cowardly, "
above.

By

connecting and recombining these elements of the received
discursive

structure

about

"blackness,"

she

creates

a

fabric on which is limned the same representation of the
"black"

subject that had been in circulation since the

earliest pages of American history:

the simple, bestial,

heat-loving, childlike, and unmoral "darky."

That Rose has

the "simple, promiscuous unmorality of the black people"
(86) and the maternal instincts of a "simple beast"
finally,

is an appropriate distillation of the

(85),

"black-

subject-as-structure" that the text not so much creates as
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transmits.

As

Mel anc tha

the

peculiarly

suggests,

racialized

the

language

discipline

of

of

racial

individualization is carried out through the circulation of
repeatable discursive formations.

"White"

anxiety

and

the

racial

mirror

stage

It is in the two significant deaths in Melanctha. those
of Rose's child and the main character, that the cultural
dynamic

I am

suggesting--the

ongoing production

of

a

twisted "black" image to dispel the anxieties of "white"
identity--becomes
nightmare

most

about

evident.

The

uncontrolled

"white"

"black"

fantasy-

virility,

hypersexuality, and proliferation, represented in the text
both by Melanctha's virile,
"promiscuous"

Rose,

was

threatening

matched

at

the

nineteenth century by a second fantasy,
race

so

constitutionally

extinction.

weak

While both of

that

these

father and the
end

of

the

that of a black

it was

doomed

images have

to

subsided

somewhat in the cultural imagination at our end of the
century,
were

during the decade of Stein's college years they

feverishly popular,

fueled by

lynching mania

and

social Darwinist theories of the certain demise of the
"incompetent"

"black"

race,

theories

fatalistic attitudes about blacks

which

led

to

(Fredrickson 228-55).

While the text's repeated assumption that high infant death
rates are endemic to the black community--"but then these
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things

came

so

often

in

the

negro

world"

(85)--is

indicative of the latter fantasy,

the image of parental

negligence

suggestive,

is perhaps

even more

since

it

connects with the perception that blacks are too lacking in
familial sentiment and too beast-like to care for their
children.
Indeed, this sidelight of the text, taken together with
its emphasis on "black" immorality and sexual license and
with Melanctha's despairing melancholy and youthful death
as a result of consumption,

make Melanctha read like a

fictional rendering of the popular fantasy of how black
proliferation would be avoided.

The political effectivity

of Stein's story also needs to be read,

that is,

in the

context of a U.S. culture of racism that had produced, in
1896, the year Stein completed her undergraduate education,
Frederick L. Hoffman's Race Traits and Tendencies of the
American Necrro.

This treatise, which Fredrickson deems

"the most influential discussion of the race question to
appear in the late nineteenth century"

(249), is fatalistic

both in forecasting the demise of the black race and in
assigning

it

a

set

of

essential,

and

degenerate,

characteristics. Hoffman pronounced the physical degeneracy
of the

"negro"

to result from

"the fact of an immense

amount of immorality which is a race trait, and of which
scrofula, syphilis, and even consumption are the inevitable
consequences"

(emphasis mine).28

These factors, combined
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with other innate tendencies

like

"a lower standard of

nurture." Hoffman hypothesized, would "in the end cause the
extinction

of

the

race"

(emphasis

mine) .

I

am not

suggesting that Stein read and agreed with Hoffman;

I am

pointing out that she was telling a story so familiar to
"white" citizens of the U.S. in the opening years of this
century as to give sheer mythology the ring of realism.
Like

other

instances

of

Africanism

ranging

from

pseudoscientific discourse to the songs of the minstrel
stage, then, the textual surface of Melanctha might be read
as a projection of discomforts about sexuality,

social

violence, morality, and even death onto a fantasized racial
other,

a

fantasy

equally

invested

in

the

docility,

harmlessness, and ultimate managability of that projected
other.

As Morrison puts

talking about

it,

Africanism

is

"a way of

and a way of policing matters

of class,

sexual license, and repression, formations and exercises of
power,

and

meditations

on

ethics

and

accountability"

(Plavina 7). Fifty years ago, Ralph Ellison hypothesized
the existence of a similar psychocultural racial mirror
stage:
...it is practically impossible for the white American
to think of sex, of economics, his children or
womenfolk, or of sweeping socio-political changes,
without summoning into consciousness fear-flecked images
of black men. Indeed, it seems that the Negro has become
identified with those unpleasant aspects of conscience
and consciousness which it is part of the American's
character to avoid.
Thus when the literary artist
attempts to tap the charged springs issuing from his
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inner world, up float his misshapen and bloated images
of the Negro.
(Shadow 100)
The

effect

of

"the

racial

situation"--what

I

have

elaborated as a mechanics of discourse and discipline--on
the writer,

Ellison argues,

is not

production of "a deformed progeny"
the

loose-jointed,

sunshine-oozing,

"sterility" but the
(101).

We might take

laughter-shouting,

eye-rolling,

consumptive

"blacks"

of Melanctha as a

signal instance of this deformed literary production.
In another essay written a few years

later

(1953),

Ellison argues that the understated rhetoric, the technical
experimentation,

and

the

focus

on

the

personal

of

twentieth-century U.S. writers--especially the modernists
of the "lost generation"--were artistic maneuvers meant to
occlude their avoidance of the socially significant issues
writers

like

Twain

and

Melville

had

grappled

with:

democracy, morality, and race.

I do not believe, finally,

that

the

Stein

was

engaging

responsibility

that

Hemingway.

do

I

in

Ellison
think,

"evasion"

imputes,

however,

for

that

of

social

example,
the

to

tortured

contradictions of the different social dimensions of her
text can be productively read in terms of what Ellison
identifies,

in the work of the "lost generation" artists,

as the working out of massive personal problems through a
tormented

use

experimentation,

of

stereotyping,

of

technical

and of ritualistic enactments of defeat
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and agony.

His critique provides an insightful formula for

the personal dimension of the racial mirror stage as we see
it functioning in Stein's inflection of Africanism:
the work of art, like the stereotype, is personal;
psychologically it represents the socialization of some
profoundly personal problem involving guilt (often
symbolic
m u r d e r - - p a r r i c i d e , fratricide--incest,
homosexuality, all problems at the base of personality)
from which by expressing them along with other
elements...[the artist] seeks transcendence.
Here is
the literary form by which the personal guilt of the
pulverized individual of our rugged era is expatiated:
...by being gored with a bull, hooked with a fish,
impaled with a grasshopper on a fishhook; not by
identifying himself with human heroes, but with those
who are indeed defeated.
(Shadow 38-40)
The cultural myths
Ellison's
typically

of "white" discourse,

complex formulation
produced

"nigger"

as

the

a means

in this essay correctly,

misshapen
of

if I am reading

stereotypes

transferring

of

the

internal

disorganization and "irrationality" to an external locus.
While it might be possible to isolate the historical moment
at which this psychocultural process
perhaps

more

dimension

accurate
of

to

the mythic

"white" identity.

consider

it

andpsychic

originated,
as

it is

a continuing

fortification

of

The psychological disturbances of our

society's "pulverized individuals," Ellison argues (using
Hemingway as an example), are symbolically resolved by the
morbid identification of "being gored with a bull."

To

Ellison's list of literary identifications with the mauled
and the defeated, I am suggesting, we might add,

"by being

worked to death with the good Anna, by becoming a social
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outcast with Melanctha,

by having the faculty of feeling

exterminated with the gentle Lena."
Having outlined Stein's reproduction and manipulation of
a racialized mythology--the stereotype--and discussed it as
typical of a "white" cultural fantasy, I now want to move
in the second direction Ellison articulates, by discussing
Melanctha as a projection of Stein's personal conflicts and
anxieties.

The clues to what those psychological torments

may have been can be traced in the unique
Stein's evocation of

"the stereotype,"

features of

features which I

have already analyzed in terms of the disciplinarity that
pervades culture:
Stein's

namely,

persistent

anxiety

those features
about

the

that

inscribe

clarification

of

identity and her dissatisfaction with the way her society
managed

"decency"--most

"identity" and sexual

particularly,

"decency."

for

her,

sexual

We may find in Stein's

work of art and in her stereotypes, to paraphrase Ellison,
the externalization of profoundly personal problems that
were causing feelings of guilt and internal pulverization:
disturbances, particularly those linked to homosexuality
and incest,

that lay at the base of her negotiation of

personality (Shadow 39).
I

have

given

psychological

Stein's

types,

obsession

a project

throughout the decade 1900-1910,

that

with

classifying

held her

interest

only ancillary mention

thus far, but it is certainly important to read Melanctha
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in the context of Stein's continuing efforts to develop a
systematic

characterology

psychobiographical

study,

of

human

Gertrude

Bridgman describes a young Stein,

nature.
Stein

from at

In

in

his

Pieces.

least early

adolescence until around the time she met Alice Toklas in
1907, beset by feelings of internal duality,

dissolution

and confusion. Stein expressed the anxieties caused by this
self-conception, Bridgman points out, by repeatedly using
her early college themes to write stories about internally
divided and confused young women and even by identifying
with the story of "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde."29

Behind this

fundamental anxiety, what Stein referred to as her "really
anxious

being"

(Bridgman,

Pieces

13),

Bridgman

finds

lurking a recurrent concern with forbidden sexuality and
with

aggressive male behavior,

n a t u r e .

especially

of

a sexual

30 Bridgman's contention is that Stein's writing--at

least until she was well into The Making of Americans--can
be read as the efforts of someone who "commenced writing in
a state of manifest tumult"--a tumult significantly sexual
in nature--to "purg[e] her psyche of old ghosts"
Indeed,
Stein's

Bridgman insightfully connects
youth

to

her

later

(78-79).

this concern of

artistic

concerns

and

specifically to her eventual technical experimentations:
Throughout her life Gertrude Stein puzzled in her
writing over the phenomenon of a multiple self.
Sometimes identity seemed to her bewilderingly unstable,
likely at any moment to fall to pieces.... She found it
difficult and yet imperative to reconcile the sundered
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parts. A good portion of her stylistic experimentation
can be traced to this effort. The problem was basic.
(Pieces 26-27, emphasis mine)
The disintegration anxiety thematized in Jeff's concern
with the "fighting that was always going on inside him" and
the "little pieces all different" that Melanctha awakens
is, in one sense, the author's (136, 158).

Melanctha's own

crude duality is perhaps the most obvious example in the
text of an attempt by Stein to externalize her discord by
projecting it onto a figuration of otherness, but other,
more coded references to self-fragmentation in the story
tell us even more about the psychology of this projection.
The extremely general level of most of the description
of Melanctha's life should instruct us to take note of
those

rare

moments

incidental detail.

when

we

are

suddenly

given

odd,

I have suggested that one such telling

detail is the story about "white" racism in the south, but
at

least

two

others

are

indicative

of

disintegration

anxiety, the "ill-defined" yet intense awareness of basic
structural deficits of the self (Kohut, Restoration 103-5).
First, in a context that amalgamates images of Melanctha's
forbidden
father's

sexual

flirtations

surveillance,

sexual

with

intimations

control,

and

of

her

violence,

Melanctha suffers a broken arm, which sparks one of her
father's disciplinary and controlling rages.
provides

both

a physical

symbolization

The scene

of Melanctha's

broken self and a suggestion of the psychosexual history of
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that fracture:

her

father's control and physical abuse

(there are strong hints that it is also sexual abuse), and
Melanctha's

compensatory

obsession

with

forbidden

sexuality.
As

a

psychoanalytic

psychology of
fracture,

approach--including

the self--might

suggest,

K o h u t 's

the mutilation,

and/or dismemberment of the body is a common

symbolization of the loss of integrity of the psyche.
threat

of complete

bodily disintegration,

in

fact,

The
is

articulated at the crucial point of Melanctha's wandering
through the work sites of forbidden sexuality,

when the

flirtatious workmen taunt her, "Heh, Sis, look out or that
rock will fall on you and smash you all up into little
pieces"

(102).

The psychosocial dynamics of the situation

are clear: Melanctha may discard the security of the social
laws imposed and monitored by her father, allowing herself
to be "held" in the illicit sexual embrace of the workmen,
but only at the risk of having her sense of identity-written in the terms of those same laws--smashed to pieces.
If

we

follow

Ellison's

eloquent

reading

here,

the

threatened pulverization of Melanctha evokes the racialized
attempt of a "pulverized individual" to identify with, yet
distance herself from, the pulverized.31
Stein's artistic enterprises of the decade 1900-1910 are
not only suggestive of this feeling of self-disintegration;
they are consumed by the depth of the anxieties it caused

her.
in

Like Jefferson Campbell, a derivative of a character
an

earlier

story

who

was,

in

turn,

quite

autobiographically based on Stein herself, Stein literally
felt

the meaning

slipping

away

of

with

thought
the

concrete, unified self.32
desperate attempt,

and

potential

the meaning
subversion

of
of

life
the

This anxiety led to a somewhat

lasting at least until she was nearly

finished with The Making of Americans, to shore up the
boundaries.

Jayne Walker has examined, by reading passages

from A Long Gav Book and The Making of Americans. Stein's
next two enterprises

after completing Three Lives. how

Stein

broken

connected

a

sense

of

self

epistemological and ontological anxieties,

to

deep

feelings that

led directly to her efforts to develop a "totalizing system
of classification"

of human character

(Walker 70).

As

Walker argues, Stein sought to clarify identity and restore
her sense of its synchronic continuity through a sort of
"complete" knowledge and definition of all the "types" of
human character--in a project that amounted to the complete
and definite "individualization" of everyone.

The impetus

of The Making of Americans, thus, was the quest for the
certainty of a "completely completed feeling"

that was

available through defining everyone as a type: "I have not
so much an afraid feeling in being living now when I am
certain, and I am knowing them, that there are a number of
kinds in men and women"

(Making 581).

Like Jeff Campbell,
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Stein was demanding that all identities resolve themselves
into singular,
that

she

definable,

could

categorizable individuals,

secure

the

boundaries

of

her

so
own

individuality, and with them, her sense of meaning in life.
While

Stein's

obsessive

effort

to

categorize

psychological types may have peaked as she worked on The
Making

of

Americans.

characterological

inspired

theories

of

by

the

schematic

Otto Weininger

(as both

Walker and Leon Katz argue) , it was not limited to this
time period.

Bridgman notes the numerous

instances of

Stein's tendency to characterize and classify people by
"bottom nature," beginning in her college days, including
her psychological experiments at Harvard,
through her portraits of 1912.

and extending

Katz, similarly, contends

that "the concept of the completed individual...became in
fact the unifying locus of her thought from the beginning
to

the end of her writing"

(146) .

As

Katz

observes,

Stein's passion for Weininger's "science of the individual"
was inspired both by her own discomfiting intimations of
dissociation and by contemporary theories of identity as a
bundle

"of

'factors'

and

causative

patterns"

which

undermined one's sense of unified individuality (Katz 146).
It would be imprudent to be too reductive about Stein's
quest to reassert some satisfactory conception of identity
as

unified,

whole,

convincingly that,

and

complete.

Walker

has

argued

in the later stages of The Making of
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A m e r i c a n s . Stein discarded her

emphasis

on

subjective

wholeness and unity in favor of an appreciation of the
fragments

and

experience.33

difference

that

actually

constitute

However, even if we acknowledge that Stein

abandoned the search for a satisfactory characterological
system, and that the techniques of Tender Buttons and the
portraits

that

fragmentation,
writing

followed evoke an evolving comfort with
it

between

is
1900

clear
and

that her
1910

thinking

revolved

and her

around

the

disintegration/wholeness axis and the anxieties it caused
her.

"Stein

definition

of

freely
types

confesses
will

her

fail,

fears"

Walker

that

the

notes,

"her

increasingly desperate need for an orderly system to unify
the

disconnected

Certainly,

'pieces'

of

her

experience"

(54).

at the time Stein created Melanctha she was

still deeply concerned

to find a totalizing

system of

classification that would define identities as unified and
categorical, as was evidenced by her passionate response to
reading Weininger two years later.

We should read the

system

the

of

racial

stereotyping,

classification,

and the

theme

M e l a n c t h a , I am suggesting,

of the

comprehensive

fragmented self

as a gloss on Stein's

tortured encounter with unmanageable identity.

in
own

We should,

in other words, politicize Bridgman's contention that Stein
was

"externalizing psychological dilemmas that laughter

could not dissolve"

(Pieces 14) by restating it in terms of
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the

racial

dynamic

externalizing
personality,
presence

that

conflicts

Ellison
at

the

and she was using

to do it.

In this

describes:
very

Stein was

base

of

her

a misshapen Africanist

instance,

she ascribed the

multiplicity of identity, and the laughter, to the "bloated
images of the Negro" that floated up from the depths of her
unconscious.
We can trace much of this anxiety about psychic disorder
and plurality to the disciplinary class context I have
earlier alluded to, a perspective that more clearly reveals
how Stein uses Melanetha to assign what she experienced as
the immoralities of her "identity" to that "black" other as
well.

Just as we can read in Melanctha Stein's consuming

struggle

with

the

axis

of

psychological

fragmentation/wholeness--now sensing the impingement of the
former, now reasserting the security of the latter--we can
read there her struggle with the related axis of normative
conformity/unique "individuality"

(using the latter in a

very different sense than heretofore).
Stein realized,

Related because, as

the parameters of the self are written in

the discourse of social norms and assumptions.

During the

years 1900 to 1910, as she used her fiction to work out a
satisfactory relationship of "pieces"

to unity,

she was

simultaneously straining for a satisfactory combination of
the moral conventionality that structured identity, on the
one hand,

and the ability to be,

as she put it in The
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Making of Americans, "free inside" and "singular," on the
other.
Stein indicates in the latter text that she felt herself
to be an eccentric,

one of those

"queer"

or

"singular"

individuals who is both deeply attracted to and unhappily
constrained by what she alludes to as a massive cultural
system of homogenizing, indoctrinating normalization.

This

"machine" of middle-class moral conformity, she understood,
offered security of identity:
...there must be in a kind of ordinary way always there
inside us the sense of decent enough ways of living for
us. . . .1 believe in simple middle class monotonous
tradition...middle class is sordid material unillusioned
unaspiring and always monotonous.
(38)
But

within

this

tradition

of

middle-class

"decency"

individual uniqueness risked effacement by the cultural and
familial

enforcement

of

a monotonous

sameness,

which

becomes
our only way of thinking, our way of educating, our way
of learning, all always the same way of doing, all the
way down as far as there is any way down inside to .us.
We are all the same all through us, we never have it to
be free inside us. No brother singulars, it is sad here
for us, there is no place in an adolescent world for
anything eccentric like us, machine making does not turn
out queer things like us.
(47)
Describing the machine of cultural normalization in terms
suggestive of Foucault's
universal
herself

reign
as

a

of

the

product

disciplinary regime,
norm,
of

Stein

with

alternately

normalization

and

its

poses

as

the

"eccentric" in conflict with U.S. middle-class conformity.
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We might

read M e l a n c t h a . too,

in

terms

of

Stein's

contradictory feelings about the machine of middle-class
decency--its appeal for her reflected in Jeff's pose of
regularity,

and her sense of its constraint reflected in

Melanctha‘s wrenching collision with the machine.

It is

impossible to do so, however, without taking note of the
earlier

story

which

M e l anc tha . Things

was
As

eventually
They

Are.

to

evolve

In

this

into

story,

autobiographically based on Stein's brief and frustrated
1903

love

affair

with

a

Baltimore

woman

named

May

Bookstaver, the pull of conventionality is reflected in the
internalized

bourgeois

decency

of

Adele,

an

almost

autobiographical stand-in for Stein who struggles with the
indecent passions illicited in her by the eccentric and
convention-flouting

Helen.

The moralism

of

Adele

is

clearly Stein's own, and would become that of Jeff Campbell
when

the

story

Melanctha.34

was

rewritten

a

few

years

jn that rewriting process,

later

as

indeed, Adele's

phrase "the middle-class ideal" is directly translated into
Jeff's

"living

regular."

While

Things

As

They

Are

ostensibly concerns itself with Adele/Stein1s morality and
regularity in conflict with more passionate,
modes

of

experiencing,

the fact

that

"excited"

the novel's plot

revolves around a lesbian romance points to the heart of
that conflict

for Stein:

the clash between the lesbian

sexuality to which she increasingly felt drawn and the
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compulsory

heterosexuality

cultural dictates

of

the Victorian

bourgeois

that informed her identity as social

subject.
Indeed,

the

initiation

of

the

conventionality-

eccentricity (or conformity-"singularity") struggle in this
early novel based on Stein's

first protracted

lesbian

involvement suggests that what was really at stake in most
of the first decade of Stein's writing was her effort to
reconcile her internalized sense of middle-class "decency"
with

the lesbianism which it categorically censured.^

Catherine Stimpson has presented an extensive discussion,
for example,
Stein

of the methods of "encoding"

managed

tendencies

and

to

write

about

relationships

her

forbidden

throughout

refers to as Stein's "decade of choice"

through which

what

(495).

lesbian
Stimpson

While it is

not my purpose to extend this reading into Stein's career
after that decade, I do want to suggest that Stein's stillconflicted feelings about her lesbian inclinations at the
time she wrote Melanctha are as crucial to understanding
its deployment of Africanism as are her anxieties about the
unity of identity.

It was not,

according to Bridgman,

until she was nearly finished with The Making of Americans
that Stein felt distanced enough from her early sense of
morality to "[announce] that she had become reconciled to
the nature of her affections"

(Pieces 105).

By then, of

course,

her

around

Stein

had

realigned

sexuality

her
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relationship with Alice

Toklas, initiating what

become a permanent redefinition of her code of

would
sexual

"normalcy. "
When she wrote Melanc t h a . however,

Stein was

still

struggling to bring what she felt to be the illicit sexual
impulses of her psyche into line with the normative codes
of her society, and an elaborate metaphor of race provided
her

a

medium

for

both

encoding

and

proi ectinct

the

forbidden. Here, Lott's understanding of the minstrel show
as social symbolic is perhaps the most pertinent analogy,
suggesting a masculine precedent
bohemianism

for

Stein's

in nineteenth-century

maneuver

of

lesbian

"class

abdication" through "cross-racial immersion" in twentiethcentury expatriacy (Lott 51).

Like the antebellum minstrel

performers Lott describes, Stein evokes the personally and
politically liberatory possibilities of sexuality by making
"blackness"

sexuality's

"virtual

condition--that

fascinating imaginary space of fun and license outside (but
structured by) Victorian bourgeois norms"
Campbell's

"living regular"

"middle-class

ideal"

taking

(51).

As Jeff

takes the place of Adele's
the place

of

Stein's

own

youthful moral imperative, then, and as Melanctha takes the
place of Helen

taking

the place of May Bookstaver and

Stein's "queer" eccentricity, Stein replaces a profoundly
personal story of forbidden, lesbian romance with an oddly
distanced,

highly

artificed

story

of

"black"

167

heterosexuality.

In the transformation from Things As They

Are to Melanctha. Stein literally mapped a narrative of
lesbian desire with a "white" cast of characters onto a
contrived metaphor of racial existence,

refiguring the

sexual dynamic that Lott descries on the blackface stage,
where homosexual interests were engaged but were "deflected
or

remained unacknowledged"

visually

mapped

"b l a c k " desire

onto
(54,

a

by

virtue

spectral

166) .

show

of
of

their being
heterosexual

In Me lane t h a . in

short,

"problematic passion among whites is transferred to blacks,
as if they might embody that which the dominant culture
feared" (Stimpson 501).
Indeed, it is in the enormity of this transformation of
lesbianism into racialism that we can glimpse both the
psychocultural

function of

"race"

as ideology,

and the

larger significance of every discrete, idiomatic inflection
of the discursive network of "race."

When Stein refers in

a notebook entry to her unconventional, uncivilized, bodily
tendencies as the "Rabelaisian, nigger abandonment" side of
herself, she is not simply using the common phrases of her
culture

to

communicate;

she

is

defining

her

moral

subjectivity in terms of the racial subjectivity of someone
else, a maneuver of self-fortification that is as old as
Hume,

Kant,

and Hegel

(Goldberg,

"Modernity") .

In the

process of fortifying her own identity as "moral, " Stein
uses

the

middle-class

definition

of morality

to both
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legitimate

and

"immoralization"

justify
of

that

the

other.

racialization

and

As

has

Lisa

Ruddick

commented,
That she associates her bodily gusto, or everything
Rabelaisian in herself, with something she calls "nigger
abandonment" suggests that the extreme racism she
expresses in "Melanctha"... served (among other things)
her own need to distance a part of herself about which
she was ambivalent.
She had her own sensuous side,
which she projected in racial terms.
(33)
In working out her attitudes toward her own lesbianism,
Stein may have been moving toward a new, less disciplinary
conception of moral identity for the "white" subject, but
in doing so she was extending the discursive disciplinarity
that constrained the possibilities of moral identity for
the

"black."

Like the themes of many of the blackface

songs Lott analyzes, the plot of Melanctha "is to be sure,
antibourgeois, but it is again black people, black women.
who are the world's body" (Lott 146).

The

background

Within

of

the

word-system

framework

disciplinarity,

the

criticism shifts

focus

of
of

such
a

a

discursive

racially

politicized

from Stein's personal morality to the

extensive racialization of the culture which shaped her
consciousness.

It is precisely as an illustration of how

that culture transmits racialist assumptions through a set
of discursive agreements,

and how those assumptions then

shape the consciousness and the perceptions of those in
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communication with the linguistic circuit,

that Melanctha

takes on its greatest value for my analysis.

That value as

an illustration of the mechanisms of racial subjectivity
and racialist language is accentuated by the fact that
Stein's aesthetic strategy--her intention in composing the
work--apparently was,
argued,

as Jayne Walker has

not to represent

convincingly

"reality" but to "realize" her

object as she perceived it. allowing the elements already
present in her own consciousness to become a manifest part
of what she "perceived," rather than imposing a veneer of
"realism.

So

attuned was

Stein

to

the mediating

features of language between any empirical "reality" and
the linguistic representation of it, she. elected to forego
the

epistemologically

naive

project

of

illusionistic

realism and allow the material surface of her medium--the
very letters, words, phrases, and other discrete linguistic
units which constituted the "palette"
art--to

manifest

itself

as

a

of her discursive

legitimate

part

of

the

conposition.
Although William James's psychological theory of how
acquired perceptions shape present visual sensation into
knowable objects was

surely an influence,

Stein's most

important model for this compositional method was the art
of Paul Cezanne.
traditional
impressionist

Discarding the illusionary techniques of

realism

and

dramatically

modifying

early

experiments with registering only direct
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visual sensation, Cezanne instead embarked on a project of,
as. he called it,
Walker 3).

"realizing one's sensations"

(quoted in

Rather than attempting to represent some "real"

object, that is, Cezanne was interested in representing the
discrete "signs" that bring such objects to the eye--points
of light and shadings of color, for example--along with the
actual

material

elements

of his

medium

that were

the

instruments of that representation--the one-dimensional
surface, spots of color, brush strokes, interacting planes
and so on.

While illusionary painting had attempted to

disguise

obscure

or

these

"materials"

of

the artist's

craft, that is, Cezanne made them a distinct and "visible"
part

of

the

represented

object,

much

as,

in

James's

formulation, each perceived object is necessarily a conplex
of

acquired

impressions.

mental

contents

and

Thus,

in Cezanne's

immediate

visual

"Chocquet Seated,"

as

Meyer Schapiro describes it, "The texture of the pigment is
more

pronounced

objects,

and

than

the

texture

the painted pattern

of
is

the

represented

clearer

than

the

structure of things," so that "through the texture of the
painting,

the latter has become almost as distinct

object as any of the things it represents"
Walker

summarizes,

"because

of

the

an

(62) . Or, as

intensity

of

his

commitment to 'realizing' his sensations, Cezanne was aware
that seeing was 'reading,' through a grid determined by the
concrete resources of his medium"

(11).
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This artistic analogue is instructive, not least because
Stein,

a passionate Cezanne enthusiast between 1903 and

1905, later claimed that his "Portrait of Madame Cezanne"
was the model for Three Lives.

Stein self-consciously

adapted Cezanne's painting methodology to the writing of
fiction, creating "a new mode of realism that inheres in
the material patterning of the composition, not merely re
presenting the objects of completed conception but modeling
the processes
emphasis

of perception and cognition" (Walker 13,

mine).

As

Stein

articulated this principle,

herself

retrospectively

"It was not solely the realism

of the characters but the realism of the composition which
was the important thing, the realism of the composition of
my thoughts."37

for Cezanne, representing the "realism

of the composition of
focusing

on

necessarily

the

[her]

acquired

"read"

the

thoughts"
"grid"

represented

meant

through
object

for Stein
which

and

on

she
the

material elements of her medium--in this case, the elements
of her

linguistic

system.

Crucially,

then,

as

Stein

herself described the specific instance of Melanctha. her
interest in the composition itself took the form of an
interest

in what

she called

"this background

of word-

svstem. which had come to me from this reading I had done.
I was obsessed by this idea of composition, and the Negro
story was the quintessence of it" (emphasis mine).
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Stein's conception of a "background of word-system" that
informed the composition of her story about U.S. "Negroes"
draws direct attention to what I have outlined in chapter 1
as a system or field of racial discourse made up of the
culturally circulating terms, idioms, images,
linguistic "agreements" about "blackness."
her story,

it seems,

tropes, and
In composing

Stein subordinated theme,

realistic

portrayal, plot, and other traditional artistic concerns to
the racial discursive structure that she had internalized
and

that

organized,

shaped,

and,

indeed,

limited her

thoughts about her object, the southern "black" community.
She was

not

trying

to

represent

the

southern

"black"

community, we could say, she was trying to represent the
southern

"black"

community as

it

intersected with

the

acquired grid of concepts in her mind.
Having observed that this discursive structure, and by
extension the
[Stein's]

"black"

community of the

"composition of

thoughts," was present in the form of a set of

repeatable,

discrete

phrases, idioms,
culture about

linguistic

units--the

metaphors,

images, and words in circulation in U.S.

"blackness"--it is important to note that

part of this "background of word-system" overlaps with the
cultural discourse of a "real" African American community
that

Stein

was

representing.

Specifically,

Stein

apparently culled at least some of the linguistic fragments
that inform the narrative texture of Melanctha from the

songs of an African American musical tradition that she
experienced first-hand while living in Baltimore from 1897
to 1902.

As Carla Peterson argues, Stein lived in close

proximity to African American neighborhoods, not the German
or middle-class communities,

and became familiar with an

active black music scene that included the performance and
development

of

black

minstrel

and

vaudeville

shows,

ragtime, and blues. According to Peterson, the lyrics that
Stein heard in blues tunes and in the "coon" songs of the
minstrel and ragtime traditions, often derived in part from
the

"white"

minstrel

stage

and

infused

with

negative

stereotypes and racial perjoratives reinflected by black
entertainers, were an important influence on the textual
elements of Melanctha. If Peterson is indeed correct, we
might

read

"phrases"

the

rhythmic

repetitions

of

"verses"

and some of the thcematic elements

and

of Stein's

story in the context of the form and content of such music:
blues songs that often featured strong, sexualized female
figures wandering outside male control,

and "coon" songs

like the popular one featuring "coal black Rose"

(Lott 117-

18) .
As Peterson's research suggests,

the linguistic units

that make up the "background of word-system" can be loaded
with political ambivalence and interracial heritage, making
Stein's artistic manipulation of them almost indecipherably
equivocal.

What

is

less

equivocal

is

the

discursive

disciplinarity of the culture of racialism itself, which,
as

Stein's

method

makes

eminently

clear,

makes

it

impossible to "see" the "racial" object without "reading"
it

through

fragments.

the

grid

of

those

internalized

discursive

The intermittent recurrence of phrases like

"the wide broad laughter of negro sunshine" and "the simple
unmorality of the black people,"

then,

suggest

Stein's

foregrounding of the material elements of her linguistic
medium--her

inclusion

of

the

grid

that

perceptions in the representation itself.
the

composition

of

[her]

thoughts"

shapes

her

This "realism of
was

an

enduring

principle for.Stein, and continued to demonstrate a certain
racial

significance.

In

the

stories

of

As

Fine

As

Melanctha. which feature an even more radical style that
allows unstructured phrases circulating in the writer's
mind

to

be

incorporated

into

the

composition,

the

inpingement of the racial discursive structure is similarly
clear:

"eeney meeney miney mo catch a nigger by the toe"

(275); "Nigger, nigger never die black face and china eye"
(268).
Cezanne emphasized the set of basic shapes, colors, and
brush

techniques

traditional

that

realism

in

he

was

order

working
to

with,

allow

giving up

those

material

elements of the medium to become visible components of his
artistic compositions, literally making "the texture of the
painting... almost

as distinct

an object

as

any of the

things it represents"

(Schapiro 62).

Similarly, Melanctha

repetitively and rhythmically reproduces linguistic units
like those above as a means of accurately recording how
"blackness" appeared to Stein's consciousness.
Stein's racial,

socioeconomic,

No one in

and intellectual position

could see an African American without certain associations
being

amalgamated

abandonment,"
When

we

read

into

"childlike"
of

the

the

perception:

"eeney meeney miney mo..." etc.

"wide

broad

laughter

sunshine," we are seeing Stein's brushstrokes.
is

not

so

racialism,

much

an

though

illustration
demonstrating

of

it

illustration
is

"race"

its

active

"nigger

in
as

part
a

of

of

Melanctha

Stein's

that,

as

discursive

penetration

to

romantic
it

shape

and

"habits of attention"

constrain

perception.

In

is

an

discipline,
the

corners of society and of the individual psyche,
creation there of

negro

minutest
and its

that literally
formulating

a

Cezannesque approach to written composition for her "Negro
story" by refusing to suppress the material surface of the
linguistic medium itself,

Stein stripped the racialized

discursive network--the "background of word-system" which
she had internalized--of its guise of realism.

It is as

profound an illustration of Africanism as we have.
In drawing on

"blackness"--including the themes of a

genuine African American blues culture--to express her own
felt sense of difference, as Peterson notes, Stein found a
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way to represent radical femininity that did not exist in
middle-class culture and a means to simultaneously distance
that radicalness as alien.

Stein's use of "blackness" as

an "idiom of class dissent," to borrow Lott's phrase for
one aspect of the minstrel show, including, as it does, a
genuine instance of the "cross-racial identification" that
he finds there

(84), must finally be read as profoundly

contradictory, achieving its liberatory moments by way of
oppressive

racial

caricature.

It

is,

perhaps,

a

contradictoriness held in play by Stein's more or less
conscious

representation

representation itself.
system,

of

the

process

of

racial

The racialism of the discursive

however, which Stein in part--and ambivalently--

manipulates to resolve her own sense of class-disciplined
"pulverization," becomes

the

very

force

of

psychic

pulverization for the "blacks" that it, in turn, culturally
disciplines.

It is to Ralph Ellison's own figurations of

this disintegration anxiety that I now want to turn.
Notes
1. As reported in Brinnin 120-21. Wright's comments, part
of a review of Stein's "Wars I Have Seen," appeared in PM
Magazine. March 11, 1945.
2. See, for example, Stimpson 489-506, and Ruddick,
Reading. Stimpson notes the presence of racial stereotypes
but demurs on their ramifications for the interpretation of
the story, either hers or anyone else's . Moreover, she
rather unanalytically presents Wright's words of praise as
a counterbalance to the possibility of Stein's racism.
3 . Morrison herself hints at the need for just such an
approach to Three Lives (Playing 14).
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4. Peterson's unpublished remarks are taken from her talk
"The Making of Black Americans. Gertrude Stein's Melanctha
and African-American Musical Traditions," delivered at the
conference "The Question of Race in the Americas,"
University of Pennsylvania, October 1, 1994. Although the
author has agreed to furnish me with a copy of the paper
resulting from that talk (personal correspondence, March 6,
1995), which will also be published in the forthcoming
volume, Criticism on the Color Line. I was unable to obtain
the paper in time to include it
in my preparation of this
chapter.
Hence, my references
to her approach to Stein
will draw on informal notes from her talk. Although this
circumstance requires my usage
of her ideas to be less
specific than I would like,the inclusion
of
her
perspective seemed vital to my argument.
5. Lott provides an excellent and penetrating discussion of
the complex, "mulatto" cultural background of minstrelsy
itself (38-49, 94).
On the political ambiguities of
minstrelsy's reappropriation as a "black" cultural form see
Lott 103-4, and Ellison's essay "Change the Joke and Slip
the Yoke" in Shadow and Act.
6 . Lott's description of how members of a nascent working
class worked out the psychological constrictions of the new
industrial morality through blackface performance provides
an accurate gloss to my argument about Stein: "The
blackface body figured the traditional, 'preindustrial'
joys that social and economic pressures had begun to
marginalize. . . .The tortured and racist form of this
pleasure indicates the ambivalent attitude toward enjoyment
itself that industrial morality encouraged" (148). Stein's
representation of "blackness" can be read in part, I would
suggest, as a similar effort to manage the anxieties
produced by middle-class morality.
7 . Foucault locates an increasing emphasis on and
proliferation of disciplinary mechanisms in Western
societies toward the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries.
The extension of
individualization through conformity and penality is
particularly related to the evolution of the "panoptic" and
carceral sciences, and the birth of the modern prison.
Foucault cites dates circa 1840-1850 as the key milestones
in the emergence of the fully developed, society-wide
"carceral" system (Discipline 293-97). The key discussions
of the "pyramidal" distribution of surveillance, penality,
and normalization which inform the following analysis can

178

be found in "The means of correct training"
170-194).

(Discipline

8 . Foucault suggested that there are two "images" of
discipline: "the enclosed institution," like the prison,
and "the discipline-mechanism," which might be extended
generally throughout society. The Benthamite plan for the
"panopticon," for example, provided the structural layout
for the prison, but it was also the basis for "a network of
mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert,
running through society without interruption in space or in
time" (Discipline 209) . In this instance, the movement
"from a schema of exceptional discipline to one of a
generalized
surveillance,
rests
on
a historical
transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of
discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body,
the formation of what might be called in general the
disciplinary society" (209).
9. According to Foucault, the development of "continuous"
surveillance and supervision was crucial to the extension
of disciplinary power as an integrated social "system" or
"network": "this network 'holds' the whole together and
traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that
derive from one another:
supervisors,
perpetually
supervised....And, although it is true that its pyramidal
organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a
whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in
this permanent and continuous field" (Discipline 176-77).
10. "The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an
'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a
reality fabricated by this specific technology of power
that I have called 'discipline' .. . [PJower produces; it
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth.
The individual and the knowledge that
may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault,
Discipline 194).
11. As Foucault argued, one of the most specific methods of
discipline is to control an axis of conformity and
normality: "What is specific to the disciplinary penality
is non-observance, that which does not measure up to the
rule, that departs from it. The whole indefinite domain of
the non-conforming is punishable" (Discipline 178-79).
12 The contrary mental make-up of the two lovers has been
well noted.
See, for example, Bridgman, Pieces 53-56,
Ruddick, Reading 19-20, and Weinstein 19.

179

13. In the article, published in the Psychological Review.
Stein "broke her subjects down into two basic types. Type
One were 'nervous, high-strung, very imaginative.' She
found them 'easily aroused and intensely interested. '...
Type Two were blonde, pale, phlegmatic with weak powers of
attention and concentration" (Bridgman, Pieces 33).
14. As Ruddick notes, "Melanctha" is "so close, in its
characterizations, to James's theory of the mind as to
approach psychological allegory" (15).
Others who have
commented on elements of Jamesian psychology in Stein's
work include Bridgman (20-22, 75, 133-34), Weinstein (1214. 104-105), Donald Sutherland (6-8), and Walker (14-15).
15. See Ruddick 16-22.
Ruddick bases her summary on
James's Psychology: The Briefer Course, ed. Gordon Allport
(New York: Harper and Row, 1961) . For the heart of the
"habits of attention" discussion, see pp. 37-90.
16. Quoted in Ruddick, p. 19.
See James, Psychology: The
Briefer Course 196.
As Ruddick summarizes, "words and
stock concepts, besides determining what objects we will
select for notice, distort our perceptions of those objects
that we do observe" (19).
17. A comment that Ruddick also notes in connection with
her discussion of James and Stein. See "The Gradual Making
of The Making of Americans, " in Lectures in America, p.
138.
18. Modifying Lacan slightly, we might say that the massive
disparity between the fiction of ego unity (taking the
specific form, here, of a socially formed "moral subject"),
on the one hand, and the intimations of the desiring,
multiplicitous, linguistic "unconscious," on the other,
produce an anxiety of the fragmentation of the subject.
19. That the person who serves this function in the text is
a doctor bears significance beyond its reference to the
facts that Stein herself once studied to become one and
that Jeff, to some extent, serves as a surrogate for Stein
in the story.
As Foucault observes, originally, "the
supervision of normality was firmly encased in a medicine
or a psychiatry that provided
it with a sort of
's c i e n t i f i c i t y '"
and
this
s u p e r vision
quickly
“proliferated" outside the prison, the school, the specific
institution,
spreading through
a vast network of
apparatuses, services, and "agents" (Discipline 296). Of
course, it might also be argued that Stein's extensive
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training in psychology, medicine, and psychiatry left her
with an unusual familiarity and expertise with the
procedures and methodologies of the very human sciences
that, Foucault argues, were intimately linked to the spread
of
disciplinary
individuality.
Whatever
Stein's
"intentions" in making Jeff a doctor, the fact that he is
one adds considerable depth to the reading of Melanctha as
a text about discipline.
20. The depiction of a dual personality in terms of that
personality's relationship to "proper conduct"
is
strikingly similar to a historical instance used by
Foucault as an illustration of the operation of one of the
earliest disciplinary mechanisms: the institution of the
asylum and the disciplinary constitution of "madness." In
Madness and Civilization. Foucault refers to the treatment
of a "young girl" who was deemed mentally ill because she
was "torn between 'the inclinations of her heart and the
severe principles of her conduct.'"
The asylum sought a
cure for such "madness" by creating for the girl a "domain
of pure morality, of ethical uniformity" (Reader 148).
In
terms of her society's similar obsession with ethical
uniformity, Melanctha's dual inclinations are also so
perplexing as to place her on the edge of what that society
would define as "madness."
21. Said describes this dynamic for Orientalist discourse:
"[the Westerner] could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he
could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic
m y s t e r y . . . .Yet what has,
I think,
been previously
overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a
privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a
vision" (Orientalism 44).
22. See Foucault, Discipline 26 and 138, for descriptions
of the "multiform instrumentation" of the "political
technology of the body" and the "micro-physics of power"
(26) .
23. McKay
reporting
review of
11, 1945,

248.
I am indebted to Nielsen for locating and
this quote (21) . Wright's remark is from his
Stein's "Wars I Have Seen," PM Magazine. March
as quoted in Stein, Selected Writings 338.

24. For the tradition of stereotypes about "black"
"nothingness," see Gossett 42-65.
For the tradition of
rationalization of African Americans' social position by
way of the fatalist argument see Nielsen 23, Gossett 28286, and Fredrickson 228-55.
As Fredrickson makes clear,
the period during which Stein was growing to intellectual
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maturity was a period of unprecedented formalization of the
doctrine that the American black was fated to inferiority
and eventual extinction: "...the 1890's saw an unparalleled
outburst
of racist
speculation
on the
impending
disappearance of the American Negro.
From the most
reputable sources came confident predictions of black
extinction through natural processes, and few who thus
consigned an entire race to oblivion could conceal their
satisfaction" (246-47).
25. Ruddick, Reading 33. Ruddick cites notebook DB, p. 47
of Leon Katz 1s transcriptions.
26. Stein's conception of the "unmorality of the black
people" has deep roots in the tradition of Euro-white
theorizations of moral subjectivity. Kant reasoned his way
to a causal relationship between black skin and immorality
and stupidity, as Goldberg argues ("Modernity" 212), while
Nielsen has referenced Stein's remarks with Hegel's
formulation: "it is manifest that want of self-control
distinguishes the character of Negroes. This condition is
capable of no development or culture" (Quoted in Nielsen
28) .
27. The classic instance of this tradition is, of course,
Stowe's Uncle
Tom's
C a b i n . with
its articulate,
dissatisfied and resourceful "mixed race" characters and
its simple, docile, and unrelentingly cheerful "blacks."
Similar examples are to be found in Metta V. Victor's
antislavery novel Maum Guinea.
and Her Plantation
"Children" (1862) which, as Fredrickson notes, "contains a
similar cast of docile blacks and restive browns," and in
William Dean Howells An Imperative Duty (1892), a text
Stein probably read, which also ponders the confused and
melancholic disposition of a woman of "mixed race."
28. The material reproduced here and following from Hoffman
is quoted in Fredrickson 250-51.
29. Bridgman 27.
For Bridgman's assessment of Stein's
anxieties about self, especially as they are thematized in
her Radcliffe essays, see 5-27.
30. See especially chapters 1 and 2. As Bridgman remarks
in assessing Stein's Radcliffe themes, the college-aged
Stein "sought relief from her inner torment by dramatizing
it in her college prose" (24). The first of these themes,
"In The Red Deeps," includes intimations of sado-masochism,
multiple identity,
and a "tumultuous sexual motif,
involving both father and brother" (25).
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31. The intensity of the image might be read in- its
endurance in Stein's consciousness.
As late as 1943, in
the whimsical play "Look and Long," Stein was rewriting the
struggle to concretize identity and the body. In the play,
which thematizes bodily splitting and shifting identity,
one of the characters attempts to piece his body together
with sticking plaster and string: "Oh oh, I am in two oh in
two in two.
It is only the string holds me together."
Stein, "Look and Long," in Gertrude Stein First Reader and
Three Plavs 79. For commentary on the continuingly related
themes of twinning, multiple or lost identity, bodily
injury, and illicit sexuality in Stein's work during the
1930s, see Bridgman 301-8.
32 . For an account of the autobiographical aspects of
Things As They A r e . originally titled Quod
Erat
Demonstrandum. see Bridgman 40-45, and Stimpson, 495-500.
Bridgman, Ruddick,
and Stimpson all provide useful
descriptions of the connections between Things As They Are
and Melanctha (Bridgman 52-55, Ruddick 15, 18-30, Stimpson
499-502) .
33. Stein's view that the wholeness of a personality was
built out of a series of fragments was, in fact, explicit
in The Making of Americans: "Sometime then each one I am
ever knowing comes to be to me a completed being, and then
always they are always repeating always the whole of
them....it has to be told as it has been learned by me very
slowly, each one only slowly can know it, each one must
wait for little pieces of it, always there will be coming
more and more of it...always I am telling pieces of it"
(305, 350).
34. As Bridgman argues (Pieces 44).
35. Indeed, it is difficult not to read many of Stein's
comments about the struggle between "singularity" and
middle-class conventionality, between "eccentricity" and
the homogenizing "machine," in The Making of Americans, as
being more specifically about her culture's denigration of
lesbianism: "Or you like something that is a dirty thing
and no one can really like that thing" (485); "It takes
time to make queer people....Brother Singulars, we are
misplaced in a generation that knows not Joseph. We flee
before the disapproval of our cousins, the courageous
condescension of our friends who gallantly sometimes agree
to walk the streets with us, from all them who never any
way can understand why such ways and not the others are so
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dear to us, we fly to the kindly comfort of an older world
accustomed to take all manner of strange forms into its
bosom" (21).
36. See Walker's "Preface" and chapter 1.
Walker
insightfully applies Cezanne's painting aesthetic to
Stein's fictional approach. Norman Weinstein has made
similar observations about Stein's approach to the
linguistic medium, though with a less detailed analysis of
the Cezannesque aesthetic on which it may have been based
(44-45, 60-61).
37. I am indebted to Walker for locating and pointing out
the significance of this and the following Stein comments,
which are taken from "A Transatlantic Interview 1946" and
quoted in Walker 13.
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Chapter Three
The Opened Shackle:
Discipline, Disintegration, and Freedom of the
"Black" Self in Ellison's Invisible Man
In chapter 2 I outlined how a newly expatriated Gertrude
Stein manipulated a "discourse"

of cultural assumptions

about "blacks" to artistically secure the boundaries of her
own subjectivity or, more accurately, to both register the
psychological

impression of discursive

"blackness"

and

simultaneously avail herself of that discursive network's
ego-reinforcing functions.

In recapitulating images of the

"black" as sexually immoral (Rose), physical and carefree
(the "free abandoned laughter of negro sushine"),

child-

abusing (Rose and James Herbert) and even as well-behaved
race spokesman (Jeff Canpbell), Stein was managing a range
of disruptive forces within her own psyche: anxieties about
illicit sexuality,

disintegrating identity,

and familial

and social violence. The artistic reconstruction of such
images of otherness allowed her to shape the coherence and
purity of her own self by means of what we might call a
psychodiscursive racial mirror stage.

In effect, Melanctha

provides a racially politicized psychoanalytic criticism
with a detailed illustration of how the unified, moralized,
"white"

subject

is created and sustained,

at both the

personal and cultural levels, as a highly individualistic
model for identity.
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The cultural effect of such ritualistic repetitions of
U.S.

culture's imagistic and idiomatic agreements about

"blackness," however,

is not only the fortification of a

"white" subject but also the articulation of a definitive,
constrictive,
racial mirror

and individualizing

"black"

subject.

The

stage produces not only a narcissism of

"white" identity, as Frantz Fanon argued in discussing the
colonial situation, but a "dual narcissism" in which "the
white man is sealed in his whiteness" and "the black man in
his

blackness"

(Fanon

9-10).

In

the

discussion

that

follows, I want to turn to Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man.
published the same year (1952) as Fanon's Black Skin. White
Masks. as a text that thematizes how "race" functions both
as

a

psychological

apparatus

for

"whites"

and

as

a

correlative disciplinary apparatus for "blacks"--sealing
"black" identity in its "blackness."

As Ellison's novel

delineates, the racial mirror stage structured by "white"
discourse

about

"blacks"

is in no way reciprocal:

the

image-system through which "whites" see "blackness" as notself, facilitating the structuring of the "white" subject,
inevitably destructures the identity schema of the psyche
objectified by that gaze.

The eyes/I's,

in the complex

symbology of Invisible Man. are always stacked against the
"black"

subject:

it

is

invisible

as

the

nexus

of

a

multidimensional consciousness, hypervisible as a signifier
of the "non-white," and blinded by the very structure that
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allows the "white" subject to represent it as the latter
"sees" fit.

Moreover,

Ellison's novel suggests that the

real psychological violence -of the

"white"

image-system

inheres in its role as an instrument of a disciplinary
individualization that parallels Fanon's perception of the
compulsory "narcissism" of race. Ellison's insistent theme
is not only his protagonist's invisibility, but the network
of coercive "disciplines" and unitary self-fictions that
render him so.

In his quest for a satisfactory identity,

Ellison's nameless protagonist repeatedly confronts the
psychological dilemma structured by every invocation of
U.S. racial imagery: conform to the "black" image in the
"white" mind, or experience a progressive fragmentation of
identity.
Among the myriad symbols that organize Ellison's vision
of African American life, the iron shackle is perhaps most
emblematic of the novel's concern with the discipline of
the

"black"

self.

Incorporating

nuances

disciplinary aspects of slavery and chain gangs,

of

the

of the

behavioral codes of Reconstruction, of Booker T. Washington
accommodationism and its educational modes, and even of the
iron-clad

(and ironic)

images of blacks emanating from

"white" culture--like the iron "darky" bank the protagonist
finds in his room--it has,

as Brother Tarp says of the

specific chain link he gives to IM,
wrapped up in it"

(379).

"a heap of signifying

As a closed loop of solid iron,

figuring wholeness and unity,

the shackle signifies the

autonomous and rigidly ordered self: invoking the need for
"discipline,"

the

president

of

the

protagonist's

accommodationist college raps on his desk with "an old leg
shackle

from

slavery"

and

expels

the

protagonist

for

exceeding the defined role of the good southern "nigger"
(137-39).

The

expelled

student

thus

embarks

on what

critics have commonly viewed as an identity quest, carrying
with him yet another image of the well-wrought ego, his
briefcase.

Given to him by the "white" leaders of his home

community,

it

accumulation
eventually,

serves
of

as

written

the

container

vouchers

for

of

a

identity

various haphazardly collected icons

"black" self.

growing
and,

of the

The subsequent episodes of Invisible Man

elaborate a series of encounters with constrictive and
enclosing identity constructs (often symbolized by tokens
that the main character adds to his briefcase collection
and carries with him)
network

of

and with an increasingly widening

discipline.

Indeed,

it

is

largely

by

representing this far-reaching network that Ellison effects
the extension of his critique from the question of "race"
as

a

specific

question
modality.
about

of

apparatus

of

individualization

individualization
as

a generalized

Invisible Man stubbornly refuses

racial

existence--just

as

Ellison

to

the

social

to be only

rejected

the

epithet "protest novel"--insisting instead on registering
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its social critique according to what Kenneth Burke has
called its "two methods of bookkeeping"

(357), one specific

to black culture, the other referable to all U.S. citizens.
As

the application
the

of the
slave

term

extended

from

absolute

communitarianism

"discipline"

shackle
in

to

the

the

itself

is

standards

of

Brotherhood

to

a

comprehensive cultural machinery that evokes the components
of

Foucault's

asylum,

disciplinary

the hospital,

regime--the

the school,

workplace,

the

the military--the full

scope of Ellison's vision unfolds.
When the iron shackle makes its second appearance in
Invisible Man. joining its precursor in what Robert Stepto
has referred to as the text's "museum" of "artifacts" which
are "prototypes for the self-in-motion"
a

symbolic

resolution

of

the

(186), it connotes

protagonist's

struggles

against both disciplinary "blackness" and the networks of
institutional

and

interpersonal

protagonist's

central

quest

is

discipline.
for

a

If

the

satisfactory

conception of his own identity, the leg iron that Brother
Tarp filed open to escape the chain gang provides a key
symbol of how such a self might be configured.
link that Brother Tarp gives
critical

juncture,

The chain

the main character--at a

significantly,

in

the

latter's

engagement with the "discipline" of the Brotherhood--bears
a

"signifying"

Bledsoe's desk:

difference

from the museum piece on Dr.

while Bledsoe's

shackle was smooth and
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closed, Tarp1s has been violently marked and opened (379).
The

difference

between
the

these

contrast

two

pieces

between

I

the

take

as

figurative

of

ordered,

disciplined,

ego-bound self and a model of the self that

more flexibly allows for the interpersonal and historical
contingencies

of

subjectivity:

an

externally

derived

structure. but one with a critical opening or marginal
space

as

the

nexus

intersubjectivity,

of

continuous

and possibility.

self-creation,

In this sense,

"the

reforming of the shackle is finally the trope before the
questing narrator for a viable pattern of mobility and a
viable system of authorial control" over his own life and
self (Stepto 190).
The opened shackle,

I will argue,

inscribes Ellison's

unique vision of "radical black subjectivity"

(hooks 26), a

dynamic, complex, and plural racial identity that becomes a
persistent

emphasis

of his

nonfiction

essays. In his

crucial assessment of U.S. culture in "The Little Man at
Chehaw Station," for example, Ellison observed that each of
us

is

"representative

not

only

of

one but

of

several

overlapping and constantly shifting social categories" and
questioned our tendency to hide that plurality behind the
security of reductive "symbols of identity"
His

own

however,

conception

of

"radical

black

(Going 19-20) .
subjectivity,"

finds its fit liberatory strategy not in simply

annihilating such symbols,

or the racial mechanism that
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idealizes

them,

but

"transformations"

in

of

the

all

individual1s improvisatory

such historical

determinants of identity (Going 20).

and

cultural

If Ellison ultimately

casts Invisible Man as the poetry of the "blues" self,

I

want to read that poetry as a chronicle of what happens to
the

plural

psyche

in

the

individualizing society.

crucible

of

a

racializing,

The plural "blues" self, I argue,

wrenches the disciplinary force of the iron shackle into an
opened structure, creating a critical,

interstitial space

for the psychic freedom of continuing change,
contradiction,

and

a

plurality

interconnections

with

social,

of

historical,

irreducible
"invisible"
and

racial

otherness.

Mirror

stage

I have suggested that the process by which the "white"
subject materializes itself as a coherent, normative, and
autonomous ego-construct might be formulated as a sort of
ongoing racial mirror stage.
F anon1s germinal

This formulation is based on

speculations

about

the

formation

of

personal racial identity, but the racial mirror stage also
has a broader,

cultural application.

The psychocultural

"white" fiction of ego unity, as Nielsen elaborates it, is
not

produced

positively,

through

the

definition

and

reification of "whiteness" per se. but negatively, through
an ongoing individual and cultural

(largely discursive)

definition and reiteration of " b l a c k n e s s ^

In Chapter 2

of Invisible Man. Ellison develops a subtle but provocative
parable of the personal moment of this construction of
"whiteness," capturing both the self-securing, self-knowing
production of the "white" subject and the fragmentation and
obscuration of "black" identity that results.
"mirror staging"

of racial

Thus,

the

identification provides

the

predominant metaphor of the fateful car ride that leads to
the expulsion of the invisible man from his dreamy southern
black college where everyone's sense of history, mission,
and proper racial roles are so clearly, yet so evasively,
defined.

While the wealthy "white" banker and scientist,

Mr. Norton, confidently pontificates about his own destiny
and identity during the first segment of the ride,

the

narrator focuses suggestively on the white line that splits
the divided highway he will be driving for the rest of his
life, stealing furtive glances back through the rear-view
mirror

to

gauge

Norton's

satisfaction

and

approval.

Although these visual dynamics in the car of "white" power,
like the college's "white"-endorsed "up-from-slavery" myth,
seem pleasant and well-intentioned on the surface, the ride
into the southern countryside soon exposes the unpleasant,
repressed underside of both the stories "whites" tell about
"blacks" and the story the college tells about itself.
In the "powerful" (37) machine of "white" privilege that
takes the narrator for a ride with the rich college patron,

we are immediately alerted to a play of glances through the
vehicle's rear-view mirror, during which Norton's knowledge
of his own identity is emphasized but the narrator becomes
increasingly muddled precisely as a result of Norton's
assertions of self-knowledge.

As the ride begins, Norton

instructs the narrator to drive him away from campus, for
"The campus is part of my life and I know my life rather
well"

(38).

Norton's concrete sense of self,

however,

elicits immediate confusion from the young student, who has
no

similar

himself

sense

two

of

questions

subsequent events:
wondered.
(38) .

self-knowledge
that

and who

suggest

the

then asks

meaning

of

"How was the campus part of his life, I

And how did one learn his life 'rather well'?"

Applying Lacan's mirror stage

suggests

that

the

rich

"white"

man

to

the situation

has

acquired

coherent sense of self precisely by. making the
college a part

of his own life.

materialized his
knowability

own

through

That

is,

his

"black"

Norton has

"white"

subject position

a process

of projective

and its

othering:

Norton's act of looking at the "black" college enacts the
process

that

individual

"projects

into

the

history"

['white']

subject"

a

"totality"

(Lacan, Ecrits 4).

formation of
and

the

"manufactures

"succession

of

['white']
for

phantasies"

the
of

Norton not only directs his

financial beneficence toward the economic dependence and
social inferiority of southern blacks, we might say, but he
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also needs their dependence and inferiority as the negative
terms

against which his

autonomy

can

be

own wealth,

staged.

The

independence,

"white"

and

philanthropist

literally knows himself "rather well" because the "black"
campus is a part of his life.
In correspondence with the dialectic of Lacan's mirror
stage,

then,

Norton's

claim

to knowledge

of

his

self

"symbolizes the mental permanence of [his] X/ at the same
time as it prefigures its alienating destination" (Ecrits
2,

latter emphasis mine) .

That is to say that we may

interpret Norton's use of "blackness" in this scene as a
racial reiteration of the
developmental

mirror

stage

"fictional direction"
that becomes

of the

the perpetual

fictional direction of the function of the "I" (Ecrits 2):
the "Ideal-I" the baby derives from its reflection has, of
course, not been formulated in terms of any interior world,
but in terms of what is distinctly exterior to itself.
Indeed,

Lacan

emphasizes

several

dimensions

fundamental "otherness" of this projection:

of

the

the baby has

looked away from its own body, at a reflected image; the
baby recognizes its "self" negatively, by distinguishing
its own movements
reflection;

the

from the surrounding not-self
image

in

the

mirror

is,

in the

moreover,

oversized,

a

manifold

distortion--one-dimensional,

and

inverted.

Thus, the primordial fantasy of unified identity

has a distorted, oppositional "otherness" implicit in its
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constitution,

leading Lacan to observe

that the mirror

stage prefigures the alienation and anxiety of even the
mature subject's relationships to the images and fantasies
through which it knows itself.

It is this crucial aspect

of the mirror stage--what it suggests about how otherness
defines

the self--that

suggested

by

Fanon,

lends

that

itself to the hypothesis,

in

a

racialized

milieu

one

component of identity might be a racial self, constituted
against a racial other.
fictional

Norton, indeed, provides a pointed

illustration

of

how

the

mature,

socialized

subject in U.S. society might project its "self" by way of
an image of racial otherness.
Norton's assertion of "white" self-certainty, Ellison
suggests, produces complete bewilderment for the "black"
subject:

"How did

one

learn his

life

‘rather

Clearly,

being positioned as the "dependent"

someone

e l s e 's

self-constituting

gaze

well?'"

"other" by

scrambles

the

invisible man's attempts to stage and to know his own self.
While

Norton's

fiction

of

("white")

ego

unity

is

so

achieved that he hardly need do more than gesture at the
campus to reiterate it, the car episode suggests that the
narrator's sense of a meaningful self is reduced to so
archaic a state by Norton's presence as to require the
constant recapitulation of a literal mirror stage--glancing
at the actual bodily image of "whiteness" in the rear-view
mirror--for reinforcement.

Hence his repeated peeks at the

"white" man's reflection:
could see him..."

(37),

"Through the rear-view mirror I
"Through the glass I saw him..."

(41), "When I took a quick glance into the mirror..." (44).
Due to the politics of the psychological mirror staging
going

on

in the

car,

Phillip Brian Harper notes,

the

protagonist can view only the reflected "whiteness" as the
basis of his self-staging, and hence is

"thwarted from

glimpsing his own image--from experiencing a successful
mirror phase--and thus
conception"
how

the

(118).

"white"

from achieving a workable self

Perhaps the most pointed indication of
mirror

stage

at work

at

the

college

obscures "black" identity (and of its economic dimensions,
as well) are the historical photographs, displayed in the
college library, that flash through the protagonist's mind
as Norton begins to speak of the role the black college has
played in producing the "white" man's "pleasant fate" (39).
These

photographs

impoverished
individuality,

of

"black"

the

school’s

"people who

early

days

depict

seemed almost without

a black mob" with "blank faces," in stark

contrast to their "white" benefactors "in smiles, clear of
features, striking, elegant and confident"

(39).

Indeed,

these pictures almost suggest a spectral rendering of the
contrast

between

the

power

of

the

subject

and

its

constitutive imagos, "whose veiled faces," Lacan comments,
"it

is

our privilege

to

see

in outline

in

our

daily
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experience and in the penumbra of symbolic efficacity"

( E c r i f s . 3) .
Although the protagonist at first tries
"with

the

immediately

rich

man"

stymied

in
by

the
the

back

seat

to identify
(39),

he

latter's possession

is

of

a

"pleasant fate," an idea almost unfathomable to a young
southerner whose grandfather was
proceeds

to make

a slave.

the protagonist's

But Norton

attempts

at

self

definition even more difficult by directing the "gaze" of
his

ego-reinforcing

personally.

at

the

youth

even more

As Norton repeatedly presses the point that

"your people"
himself,

mechanism

and,

more

specifically,

the protagonist

are "closely connected to my destiny"

(41),

the

protagonist registers only embarrassment at not being able
to understand the point Norton is making:
"I had a feeling that your people were somehow
connected with my destiny. That what happened to you
was connected with what would happen to me."
I slowed the car, trying to understand. Through
.the glass I saw him gazing at the long ash of his
cigar...
"Yes, you are my fate, young man. Only you can
tell me what it really is."
(41)
In the race-creating mirror stage through which Norton
establishes a clear sense of himself as "white," "blacks"
are intimately connected with his identity, but only in the
form of a collectivity

("your people")

whose

supposed

characteristics serve above all as signifiers of the "non
white ."

To formulate the point in the terms of what I have
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called racial discipline, Norton's identity as a wealthy,
independent,

authoritative

"organizer of human life"

is

sustained by and dependent upon his continuing activity as
an organizer of

"black"

life

(42) .

Namely,

he assigns

himself the authority to circumscribe "blacks'" potential
economic and social roles according to the list of possible
careers he suggests
chef,

a preacher,

to the narrator--"a good farmer,

doctor,

a

singer, mechanic"--and to give

them the "necessary" helping hand of "white" philanthropy
(43).

Indeed,

assumption

Norton

to his

list

adds

another

common

"white"

of probable potentialities

for

"blacks"--the probability of failure--when he concludes,
"whatever you become,
fate"

(43).

and even if you fail,

you are my

Thus, whether the protagonist becomes a good

farmer or whether he fails, he will be fulfilling Norton's
story not about "black" progress, but about Norton himself.
Again,

we

might

apply

Lacan's

formulations

of

the

otherness of the mirror stage to Norton's "you are my fate"
claim, in which it is the invisible man who is reduced to
"the automaton in which,
world of

in an ambiguous relation,

the

[Norton's] own making tends to find completion"

(Ecrits 3).

While Norton's pronouncements leave him deeply

self-assured, then, "smiling through the mirror" at what he
has

identified

reflection

(43),

as,

in

being

effect,
on

the

"you

people"

receiving

end

in
of

the
such

organizational maneuvers continues to cause the narrator
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immense psychic confusion: "My feelings were mixed.
kidding me?

Was he

Was he talking to me like someone in a book

just to see how I would take it?"
embarrassment"

(43). He stumbles "with

(44) at Norton's insistence that he can tell

the older man his

fate,

then

is completely unable

to

verbalize his own hopes, dreams, or identity: "I don't know
now,

sir.

This is only my junior year. . ." (44) .

The

"white" mirror stage, so effective at producing coherence
and security
humiliating,

for

"whites,"

is profoundly disorienting,

and self-disrupting for the "blacks" it not

only objectifies but creates as "black."

What the narrator

does vaguely recognize is that in this mirror stage moment,
as in the broad historical situation starkly outlined in
the

school

irrelevant:

photographs,

his

personal

identity

"But you don't even know my name,

wondering what it was all about"
does depend,

as he insists,

(45).

is

I thought,

Norton's identity

on the narrator,

but only

insomuch as the latter's darker skin signals his membership
in a "black mob" characterized by a set of generalizable
economic

and

social

signifiers

of

"nonwhiteness,"

in

opposition to which Norton can stage his own self-image.
The narrator's notice that the "white"

subject needs no

particular, nameable subjectivities for this process is a
crucial first reckoning of the alienation that will leave
him nameless, objectified and scrambling to reconstruct an
identity throughout the remainder of the novel.
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Ellison's rendering of the
racial

mirror

stage begins

full

to come

implications

of the

clear when Norton

introduces his own daughter as the real explanation for his
philanthropy, a gesture that is still more alienating for
the narrator.

As Norton begins

to speak of her,

the

narrator realizes that Norton is talking while "no longer
seeming to see me, but speaking to himself alone" (42). The
description captures not only the occlusion of
subjectivity
entails,

that

Norton's

"white"

"black"

self-constitution

couched in the novel's predominant metaphor of

invisibility,

but also Nielsen's

cogent summary of the

autodiscursive dimension of what he refers to as the U.S.
"racial-mirror stage":
itself,

"The white subject has spoken to

and in so speaking has created its

consciousness"

(5).

More

own racial

significantly,

Norton's

introduction of his daughter's sanctified image at this
point

provides

Ellison's

first

hint

of

the

crucial

psychosexual dimensions of the racial mirror stage.

While

Harper

self

is quite

right

to read

the

imbalance

certainty in the car as a largely economic
incongruity,

of

and social

through which the privileged Norton's

"very

success at self-definition sets [him] up as an impediment
to the self-constitutive effohts of those less fortunate"
(119), Norton's excited emphasis on and desire for his own
daughter in the same context, reveals the equally important
sexual

and

biological

dim e n s i o n s

of

racial
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subjectification.
"intensity"

at

By stressing Norton's sudden increase in
the

college's connection
daughter

he

is

moment

he

to his

begins

identity

memorializing,

speaking

of

the

in

of

the

Ellison

terms

suggests

that

Norton's focus on the college as an economic device is also
a screen for the secret management of more carnal anxieties
(42).

Norton's use of the "black" campus for his own ego

functions begins

to resolve itself here into a massive

displacement of a bizarre, hyper-romanticized desire for
his own daughter onto his efforts to improve the economic
and cultural status of "blacks."
The protagonist, on the other hand, attempts to read his
self-disruption and struggle to concretize an acceptable
self in terms of the overt issue of economic identity: "You
have yours,

and you got it yourself,

ourselves up the same way"

(44).

and we have to lift

Fanon's speculations on

the "mirror stage" dynamic of the racial situation suggest
how

these

very

different

languages

of

identity

are

determined by the "white" and "black" mirror stages:
When one has grasped the mechanism described by Lacan,
one can have no further doubt that the real Other for
the white man is and will continue to be the black man.
And conversely.
Only for the white man The Other is
perceived on the level of the body image, absolutely as
the not-self--that
is,
the unidentifiable,
the
unassimilable. For the black man, as we have shown,
historical and economic realities come into the picture.
(Fanon 161, n.25)
The

full extent of Norton's dependence on a corporeal

"black" imago as his Other, suggested by his presentation
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of the photograph of his "too pure" daughter as the real
motivation for making "blacks" the key to his "fate," is
about to explode in the second segment of chapter 2, the
Trueblood episode.

Meanwhile,

we have already seen the

"picture" of historical and economic struggle through which
the invisible man is forced to conceptualize the obscuring
of "black" identity and the struggle to constitute it.
Suddenly, as if to shock the invisible man as well as
his readers, Ellison plunges his narrative from the coded
surface of polite U.S. racial discourse to the underside of
ugly and unspeakable realities it represses.

As the car of

"white" privilege takes a hill and is "swept by a wave of
scorching air" (45), Ellison reveals with one deft maneuver
the lewd tale of incest beneath the two interlocutors'
courteous chat about destiny,

the

"wasteland"

of broken

fountains and raw sewage beneath their image of a sylvan
campus

(36-37),

the

culture

of poverty

and

folk ways

repressed by the college's sanitized myth of progress (47),
the "cripples" and the "asylums" covered over by "white"
philanthropy (35) , and, above all, the sexual and corporeal
mirror stage beneath the overt discourse about economic and
intellectual identities. Although Norton says and thinks
the

"black"

Other

functions

in the

fulfillment

of his

destiny (as the great philanthropist) and his construction
of a memorial

(to his daughter), what we discover in the

countryside is the magnitude of Norton's hidden use of the
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"black" Other in a fundamentally sexual dimension— to quell
sexual self-revulsion.
As their vehicle passes into this revealed landscape,
the

protagonist

and

Norton

encounter

the

"disgraced"

sharecropper Jim Trueblood, who, we learn, has impregnated
his own daughter.

While Trueblood's elaborate narration of

his incest and its consequences are crucial to the novel's
vision of "black" self-expression,
notably, has explained,
reactions

to

I want here to focus on Norton's

the Trueblood saga,

typify what Fanon called the
"white"

racial

mirror

as Houston Baker, most

particularly as

"biological"

stage

(165) .2

they

cycle of the
in

Norton's

fascination with Trueblood's "incestuous" relationship with
his daughter, Matty Lou, we can read a projection of his
own repressed desires, a projection facilitated by the same
system

of

stereotypes

hypersexuality

and

about

immorality

“black"
elaborated

physicality,
in

Stein's

Melanctha.
The protagonist is doubly reluctant to expose Norton to
Trueblood.

The college had always been embarrassed by the

elements of poverty and the cottonpatch in its backyard, a
"peasant" life of "earthy harmonies" which do not square
with its myth of civilizing progress for southern "blacks":
"We were trying to lift them up and they, like Trueblood,
did everything it seemed to pull us down" (47). Trueblood's
sexual

indiscretion,

according

to the protagonist,

has
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turned this blunted "contempt'' for his earthiness into open
"hate"

for

his

apparent

depravity

(47).

But

the

protagonist is unable to deflect the interest piqued in the
"white" man by the sight of the two pregnant women, mother
and daughter,

at Trueblood's

cabin.

As

the protagonist

explains that the daughter has no husband, Norton lets slip
the first indication of his real assumptions about the
"black"

Other,

assumptions

quite

different

from

the

pleasant fiction that his gifts to the college can help
them to become farmers and mechanics:
be so strange.
Is that all?"

"But that shouldn't

I understand that your people--Never mind!
(49) .

Norton is a member of the

"white"

discursive community well-versed in the same stereotypes of
"black" promiscuity and immorality that pervade Stein's
text.
But that is, of course, not all.

Once the invisible man

has disclosed the incest behind the pregnancy, Norton is a
man transformed, expressing shock, horror, pain, but above
all wanting more--hastily and energetically moving to get
closer to Trueblood and his story:
'I must

talk with him.

. . Hurry! '" (50) .

listens with a mixture of
Trueblood unravels his

" 'Get out!' he cried.
As Norton

"envy and indignation"

(51),

long narrative of dire economic

straits; of fatherly anxiety about potential suitors; of
his dream of entering the house of "white" wealth and the
bedroom of

"white"

sexuality;

and of awakening

in his
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daughter's arms, with no way to "keep from sinnin'" except
with a knife (59).
situation

seems

Norton's fascination with Trueblood's
a

direct

gloss

on

his

bizarrely

romanticized relationship with his own daughter, related to
the

invisible

man

only

minutes

before

the

Trueblood

encounter:
Her beauty was a well-spring of purest water-of-life,
and to look upon her was to drink and drink and drink
again....She was too pure for life...too pure and too
good and too beautiful.
We were sailing together,
touring the world, just she and I, when she became ill
....Everything I've done since her passing has been a
monument to her memory.
(43)
Reading

Norton's

connected

to

the

reaction

to

Trueblood

previous

scene,

in

as

fact,

directly
clarifies

Ellison's continuing representation of the "white" mirror
stage.

The analogy here between the similar projects of

self-unification executed in "white" discourse like Stein's
and

in

Ellison's

portrayal

Norton's is an apt one.

of

"white"

behavior

like

In Melanctha. as I suggested in

chapter 2, Stein transferred internal anxieties and guilts
about

class

identity

and

socially

proscribed

sexual

tendencies onto a hypersexualized "black" stereotype.

In

these pages of Invisible Man. the "white" subject is shown
barely able to suppress the sexual tendencies that would
unleash chaos in its sense of self,

first displacing them

with a fiction about memorializing the object of desire by
improving the lot of an economically
Other,

inferior

"black"

then feverishly embracing what it takes to be the
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very incarnation of a sexually and morally inferior "black"
Other— one through which Norton can vicariously live out
the exact fantasy he has suppressed.
Hence Norton1s query to Trueblood: "You have looked upon
chaos and are not destroyed!...You feel no inner turmoil,
no need to cast out

the offending eye?"

(51) . For the

"white" subject, the creation of an orderly fiction of ego
unity, and the creation of a "black" subject through which
it is effected, is precisely about the suppression of inner
chaos and turmoil--a particularly compelling source of
which are forbidden sexual tendencies. As Fanon explained,
this sexualized inner turmoil is suppressed through an
imaginative projection onto "blackness"--or rather, through
a projection that creates "blackness" as the very condition
of inner turmoil

(Melanctha)

and hypersexuality

(Rose).

This projection lies at the foundation of the "biological"
cycle of Fanon's racial mirror stage:
Granted that unconscious tendencies toward incest exist,
why should these tendencies emerge more particularly
with respect to the Negro?...The civilized white man
retains an irrational longing for unusual eras of sexual
license, of orgiastic scenes, of unpunished rapes, of
unrepressed incest.... Projecting his own desires onto
the Negro, the white man behaves ‘as if' the Negro
really had them. . . . [T]he Negro is fixated at the
genital; or at any rate he has been fixated there.
(Fanon 165)
Projecting his

own

incestuous

desires

onto

Trueblood,

Norton is transfixed by the opportunity to behave as if the
"black" man really had them.

The fact that Trueblood does
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not act on such desires (while he acknowledges Matty Lou's
womanliness and beauty, his story makes it clear that the
intercourse was an accident of unconscious dream activity
facilitated by the conditions of extreme poverty)
little

significance

situation

as

a

to

the

"white"

verification

of

man's

use

is of
of

"blackness"

the

and

a

reinforcement of his own civilized, “white" subject.
Ellison connects the two scenes in this chapter, then,
as two "moments"
positioning

of Norton's mirror stage--his economic

next

to

the

college

and his

positioning next to Trueblood--by

sexual/moral

juxtaposing Norton's

veiled but discernible desire for his daughter,
first,

with Trueblood's

openly discussed but

spurious desire for Matty Lou, in the second.
while Norton

is

focusing

on

this

living

in the

actually
Moreover,

signifier

of

"nonwhiteness"--incest personified--all other forms and
indicators of black subjectivity become invisible to him.
As in the moment in the car when Norton introduced his own
daughter's photograph, the main character again "vanishes"
while

the

"white"

man

listens

to

Trueblood:

"he was

listening to Trueblood so intensely he didn't see me" (57).
When the "white" subject "stages"
"black"

image--in this case

itself it sees only a

the luridly sexual

"black"

stereotype--which is really a mirror-distortion of a part
of its own identity.
various

forms

This is the phenomenon, repeated in

throughout

the novel,

that

informs

the
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central

"invisibility"

entire experience.

discovery of the invisible man's

As he tells us in his "Prologue,"

"it

is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard,
distorting glass.

When they approach me they see only my

surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-indeed, everything and anything except me" (3).
As Norton finally prepares to leave, and the invisible
man again notes that "[h]e looked at me with unseeing eyes"
(68),

Ellison

plays

cultural-economic

out

and

the

the

connection

between

sexual-biological

phases

the
of

"white" self-constitution by foregrounding the inevitable
bioeconomic

transaction

that

hierarchy.

Pulling

his

out

structures
wallet--and

the
with

racial
it

the

telltale "platinum-framed miniature" of his daughter (68)—
Norton compensates Trueblood for so effectively embodying
the essential corporeality of "blackness"--for effectively
"symbolizing the biological"

(Fanon 167) so that Norton can

deny it in himself--with a hundred-dollar bill.

It is a

token that refers directly to Norton's more coded use of
the "black" image, his economic support of the college and
its young upwardly mobile

"blacks,"

signals with considerable chagrin:

as the protagonist

"You no-good bastard!

You get a hundred-dollar bill!" (69).

The money, in other

words, might have gone to the protagonist instead, had he
not been,

as it were,

"out-blacked" by the sharecropper.

(As the car ride began,

the protagonist had hoped for "a
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large tip, or a suit, or a scholarship next year"
token of Norton's appreciation.)
his assurances of

"nonwhiteness"

(3 8) as a

But whether Norton gets
from the image of the

well-behaved mechanic-to-be or the image of uninhibited
sexuality,

the

effect

for him,

the

text

suggests,

is

whitening. When Trueblood has finished his story, Norton's
face has "drained of color"

(68), and as he stumbles back

into his car the protagonist notes that his face is "still
chalk white" (69).3
The invisible man's ill-fated car ride illustrates the
mechanism of a racial mirror stage that fictionalizes a
coherent "white" identity by positing a "black personality"
that

is

equally

"disciplinary."
soul,"

is

identity.

an

unitary

what

I

will

call

In reality, I am suggesting, this "black

extension

The

and

"white"

or part-object
subject that

of

"seals"

the

"white"

itself,

to

borrow Fanon's term, in intellectuality and moral purity,
does so by manipulating the symbolic order to "seal" its
imagined Other within a "black" subject of corporeality and
immorality.

The educated-craftsman-Booker T. Washington

"black" and the hypersexual "black" that populate Norton's
mind in this episode of Invisible Man are only two of the
disciplinary identity configurations which constitute the
"black soul"; the novel describes several others and the
main character is knocked on the head by most of them more
than once.

The

image

of the

sexual

"black, "

here

forced on

Trueblood, is one that the invisible man has been forced to
take on himself before and will be forced to confront again
later.

The opening "Battle Royal" episode chronicles the

first in a series of attempts by "whites"
"black"

image

as a pornography of the

forcing "blacks" to
illicit

act

sexualbehavior.^

out what

is

to set up the

"white"

self, by

considered

to be

As we have seen in the case

of

Norton, reiterating this image sanitizes "white" identity
of

chaotic

impulses,

while

still

allowing

it

voyeuristically consume the pleasure of the forbidden.

to
The

opening sequence, for example, is a structural inversion of
the car ride episode, during which we see "whites" imposing
first the stereotype of hypersexuality then the educatedbut-knows-his-place
gratification.

image,

both

to

their

immense

In this scene, ten young African Americans

are forced to watch a titillating nude dance by a "white"
woman, while a collection of "white" social leaders view
their mixture

of pleasure,

discomfort,

and erections.

After a blindfolded "battle royal" and a mad scramble for
"tips" from the "whites," a bloodied invisible man crawls
back

into

the other,

equally

"white"-imposed

image

of

himself, delivering a speech spiced with the Washingtonian
rhetoric of social responsibility and "casting down buckets
where you are."

Much later in his career, he encounters

the "black sexual brute" stereotype when he meets a woman
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at a Brotherhood meeting who envisions him as her personal
living pornography: Sybil wants to play-act her own rape at
the hands
bruiser"

of

a man

(511).

she can only see as

Indeed,

a

"big black

the Norton and Sybil scenes are

subtly linked by a joke that both refuses the imposition of
the "black"-as-rapist image and pointedly identifies the
real source of such pornographies.

Refusing to comply with

the pleas of the drunken Sybil, the invisible man instead
scrawls

the following message on her stomach in purple

lipstick:

"SYBIL,

YOU WERE RAPED / BY / SANTA CLAUS

/

SURPRISE"

(511); a much younger invisible man had twice

identified Norton with "St. Nicholas" (37, 105).
All three episodes, then, evoke what Fanon described as
the

intensive

specifically,

biologization, sexualization,

and,

most

aenitalization of the "black" imaao.

For

Fanon, this mechanism, which he formulates as one aspect of
the racial mirror stage, functions like a blunt instrument
in the symbolic and psychological oppression of "blacks":
"Whoever says rape says Negro"

(166) .

Even more specific

is Fanon's observation that, in the presence of this imaao.
"one is no longer aware of the Negro but only of a penis;
the Negro is eclipsed.
penis"

(170) .5

acculturated U.S.

if

He is turned into a penis.
for

Sybil,

as

for

He is a

millions

of

"white" women, the word "rape" bears an

at least connotative relationship to the concept

"black

man," it is equally true that for Norton, as for the men at
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the battle royal, to see a "black mem" is to "see" a penis.
If this is the most compelling of all "black" stereotypes,
finally,

it is so perhaps,

as Fanon's analysis suggests,

because it is so profoundly linked to the bodily-schema
psychology of the mirror stage.®

Discipline
When the narrator returns from his carnival ride with
Norton

on

the

south's

racial

back

roads--a

ride

that

includes stops at both Trueblood's "slave quarters" and at
the combined asylum and tavern known as The Golden Day--he
faces an iron-fisted retrenchment of the college's more
"polite" racial myths and identity frameworks,

suggesting

how the college has itself become implicated in an urgent
project of identity management.

While the racial mirror

stage is anything but reciprocal, it does produce coercive
definitions

and parameters

reductively

unitary

of

and

"blackness"

that

individualistic

are as
as

the

configurations of "whiteness" they are meant to support,
and it is these parameters that the college's president,
Dr. Bledsoe, invokes as he "disciplines" the narrator upon
his

return.

features
then,
refer

One

of

the

most

prominent

dehumanizing

of the racialized society Ellison represents,

is what a Foucauldian theoretical paradigm might
to

as

individualism,

a

prevailing

culture

of

disciplinary

here centered around what Fanon calls a
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"dual narcissism" of race (9-10).

Much of the subsequent

social critique of Invisible Man is devoted to exposing the
operations of the various disciplines that seek to fix
complex subjectivities within clearly defined,
categorized,

interpersonally

isolated,

socially

politically

manageable identities--to create, combining both meanings
of the word, sub-iects.
Ellison

focuses,

it seems

to me,

on how the racial

discipline surrounding the "white" mirror stage is at once
a product

of,

complicit with,

and productive

of other

disciplinary technologies which overlap to form a fabric of
disciplinary

individualism

narrative illustrates,

broadly

conceived.^

His

for example, how both "whites" and

"blacks" are seduced by the idea of racial individuality
(Norton/Bledsoe), how that racial discipline intersects
with the discipline of capital, workplace and asylum (the
paint factory and its hospital) , how even opposition to
capitalism and racism reproduce an ideological (and racial)
discipline
racism
(Ras) .

(the Brotherhood),

reproduces

racial

Ellison places

(and

and how even reversal of
ideological)

the racial

discipline

discipline within a

larger cultural regime in which individualizing disciplines
reinforce individualizing disciplines.
that

"race"

"white"

ego

originates

While he suggests

in the self-constitution of the

(Norton providing

a case

study) , he

also

suggests that "race" is a particular strategy in a more
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comprehensive pattern of dehumanization.

In the following

section, I want to examine Ellison's representation of how
"race"

is

embedded

within

our

"government of individualization"
12), of which

culture's
(Foucault,

pervasive

"Power" 211-

"race" might be viewed as a particularly

efficient and effective tool.®

Thus, as George E. Kent

observes, the story of the invisible man's victimization by
a "cultural machinery that would reduce him to negative
sign"

is inseparable from his story

"as an allegory of

black struggle in American history" (97).
The mythology of the accommodationist college itself
becomes the first derivative of the race-driven extension
of

individualization

targeted

by

Ellison.

Bledsoe's

reaction to the narrator's "wrong turn" suggests how the
culture of "white" supremacy evidenced in Norton's mirror
stage forces a southern "black" college to reproduce the
system

of

racial

individualization,

no

matter

how

vigorously the latter resists the "white" representations
of itself.
tactic

of

advantage

Hence, though Bledsoe advocates the subversive
"lying"

to

"whites"

("My God, boy!

for economic

You're black and living in the

South--did you forget how to lie?"
its

zeal

to

forward

and social

the

(136)), the college, in

"black"

cause,

is

almost

unwittingly complicit in a system of disciplinary power and
racial

individualization.

Bledsoe refuses

some of the

culturally imposed identity configurations of "blackness,"
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in other words— like the image of the hypersexual "black"-but he believes in and fosters the "black" subject. Though
the college fights to keep Norton's unspoken image of the
hypersexualized "black" suppressed, it assumes as its only
realistic path to economic survival his expressly endorsed
image

of

the

"black."

educated-craftsman-Booker

This,

of

course,

T.

is precisely

Washington

the

identity

structure with which the narrator left home, rehearsed in
his speech on "social responsibility" to the "white" men at
the smoker.
Just as he was aggressively threatened on that occasion
for substituting the phrase "social equality" for "social
responsibility," the invisible man finds that the college
reinforces with equal discipline its own version of this
self-image,

what

I

will

call

the

southern-nigger-

struggling-upward, after the invisible man has endangered
its coherence and uniformity by exposing Norton to the
chaotic underside of

"black" existence in the south--an

underside which includes, significantly, the "crazy" vet's
open questioning of the racial hierarchy
invisible

man

himself

has

already

(92-94).

remarked

on

The
the

embarrassment caused to the college and its students by
elements

of African American history and identity that

contradict

the

preferred

"story"

of

the

educated,

civilized, and economically viable African American, noting
the college's

"contempt"

for the "primitive"

culture of

"peasants" like Trueblood, with their "earthy harmonies"
and "animal sounds," not to mention its contempt for his
"disgraceful"

sexual history

(46-47).

The invisible man

worries that his ride with Norton has opened the coherence
of his very self to the chaos of primitive,

sexual,

and

discontented elements at the "quarters" and The Golden Day:
"Here within this quiet greenness I possessed the only
identity I had ever known, and I was losing it"
reintegrate
expressing

himself
to

with

Norton

unprogressive elements,

the

his

college,

total

he

disavowal

(97).

To

considers
of

these

"to assure him that far from being

like any of the people we had seen,

I hated them,

that I

believed in the principles of the Founder with all my heart
and soul"

(97) .

To Norton,

of course, no great violence

has been done to the racial scheme of things,
quite willing
student.

to forgive and excuse

and he is

the young

college

For Bledsoe, however, everything has changed; the

image of "blackness" he is trying to build has suffered
"incalculable damage.

Instead of uplifting the race,

[the

protagonist has] dragged the entire race into the slime"
(138) .

It

is

Bledsoe,

then,

who

enforces

the

iron

discipline of the college's carefully delimited definition
of "black" identity, moving swiftly and finally to extrude
the disorder that the invisible man now represents.
Bledsoe

promises

Norton,

severely disciplined" (101).

" [H]e

shall

be

As

disciplined,

It

is

important

"discipline"

to

note

that,

while

the

word

has a common enough usage in reference

to

punishment, Ellison presents an extensive depiction of the
campus as a militarized camp or manufactory where behavior
is rigidly controlled and identity is rigidly patterned.
Ellison's description of the invisible man's expulsion from
the college is meant as a critique, I would argue, not of
the idea of the southern "black" college per se nor of its
Washingtonian

mission

of

economic

development

within

segregational constraints, but precisely of the discipline
of the idealized self-constructs fostered by that mission's
particular myths of progress and civilizing acculturation.
Thus, he depicts a college riddled with minor rituals of
discipline
carefully

and

codes

orchestrate

of

acceptable

the

behavior

meant

to

struggling-upward

model

of

"black" identity.

Looking back on his experience, a more

"open-eyed"

invisible

(35)

man

can

see

not

only

the

cesspools of sewage on the idyllic landscape of the campus
(36), but also the almost military disciplining of behavior
that was actually taking place there:
we drilled four-abreast down the smooth asphalt and
pivoted and entered the chapel on Sundays, our uniforms
pressed, shoes shined, minds laced up, eyes blind like
those of robots.... Oh, bugle that called in the morning,
Oh, drum that marched us militarily at noon.
(3 6)
The

college's

manufacture

of

blinded

mechanical

"individuals" with "laced up" minds is linked, moreover,
not only to the Founder's and Bledsoe's delimitation of a
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certain type of

"black identity"

but also

to a larger

structure of "white" power which works through them.

As

the students walk to Founder's Day chapel,

to hear the

school's

mythic

the

trustees,

they move "with rigid motions,

history

rehearsed

before

"white"

limbs stiff and

voices now silent, as though on exhibit even in the dark,
and the moon a white man's bloodshot eye"

(108).

chapel,

the

the

invisible

man

walks

past

At the

"rows

of

puritanical benches straight and torturous, finding that to
which [he is] assigned and bending [his] body to its agony"
(108).

The military marching,

implements,

the puritanical

the rigid control of movement,

seating

the "firm and

formal design" thrust upon them by the sermons they hear,
and even the sense of omnipresent "white" surveillance all
are part of a method for churning out carefully patterned
and defined identities (109).
The identity "demanded" by this design is, of course,
that of the southern-nigger-struggling-upward,

dramatized

by the "black rite of Horatio Alger" that is performed upon
the

chapel's

crucially,

stage

(109).

Ellison's

description,

connects this identity model not only to the

mythology of "black" economic progress overtly endorsed by
the

"white"

trustees,

but

all

the

way

back

to

the

segregatory racial definitions of the "whites" in the main
character's hometown,
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those who had set me here in this Eden. . .who trailed
their words to us through blood and violence and
ridicule and condescension with drawling smiles, and who
exhorted and threatened, intimidated with innocent words
as they descibed to us the limitations of our
lives...and this we must accept...even when those were
absent, and the men who made the railroads and ships and
towers of stone, were before our eyes, in the flesh,
their voices different, unweighted with recognizable
danger.
(109-10)
In the structure of power outlined on these pages,

the

school's production of "black" robots is a disciplining of
identity

that

has

authorization but

a

degree

of

"black"

control

and

that is nevertheless governed by the

project of racial discipline begun with the strip tease and
continued by Norton's self-satisfying glances at the campus
and at Trueblood.

In each case,

"black"

identity

is

structured by the "white" gaze.
It is within the context of such a campus that Bledsoe
acts to restore order by expelling the invisible man for
allowing

the

"blackness"
reiterates
personally

college's
to

become

the dynamics
enacts

structured by

the

"white"

carefully

composed

disordered.

image

Bledsoe

of

himself

of such a composition when he
"black"

mirror

expectations.

stage

Before

that

is

they enter

Norton's room to assess the damage of the car ride,

the

protagonist notices that "as we approached a mirror Dr.
Bledsoe
sculptor,

stopped
making

and
it

composed

his

a bland mask"

angry

face

(100) .

like

a

Bledsoe's

miniature mirror stage constructs not so much his idea of
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himself as his idea of the "white" idea of himself; it is
fraught,

as

Phillip

intervention of
fashioning

of

"whiteness"

Harper

suggests,

with

the white man. . .in the process
the

protagonist's

Brian

black

frequent

in

the

self"
glances

earlier

car

(120) .
into

As
the

scene,

"the

of the

with

the

mirror

of

Bledsoe's

act

connotes the repeated need of the alienated "black" subject
to literally recapitulate a mirror stage that will make
sense of itself in terms of the "bland mask" the "white"
observer expects to see.
As we learn from the narrator's descriptions of Bledsoe
in the following pages, moreover, the identity Bledsoe here
composes

for

"white"

consumption

is

a version

of

the

Washingtonian accommodationist, organized by a rhetoric of
progress and of resourcefulness within assigned roles.
musing

on

Bledsoe's

narrator recalls,

"Live-a-Humble" philosophy,

In
the

"Hadn't he refused to eat in the dining

hall with white guests of the school... .Hadn't he always
taught

us

to

live

content

in our places?"

(103-104) .

Indeed, Bledsoe espouses covert advantage-taking within a
framework of acting

"black" and stresses

the value of

showing the rich "whites" "what we want them to see" (100)
and of lying to them as needed to preserve

the proper

"black" image and the influx of economic support (137). The
"white" intervention in this "black" image, however--and
the

magnitude

of

Bledsoe's

complicity

with

"white"
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management of the southern "black" population--are revealed
in his unqualified use of what Nielsen has described as the
very

"organizing principle"

racial discursive structure:

(6)

of

the entire

the term "nigger."

"white"
He uses

it, tellingly, both in summarizing his own enactment of the
college's prevailing

identity construct,

nigger-struggling-upward

("I had

to

the southern-

act

the

nigger!"

(141)), and in chastising the invisible man for endangering
the integrity of that construct:
"Nigger, this isn't the time to lie.
I'm no white
man. Tell me the truth!"
It was as though he'd struck me. I stared across the
desk thinking, He called me that.
(137)
The

failing

protagonist

for

which

Bledsoe

from the school,

is

about

it becomes

to

expel

the

clear in these

pages, is one of not acting "black"--more specifically, of
not acting the southern-nigger-struggling-upward.
It is in this specific moment of discipline,
that

the

college's

disciplinary

project

most

finally,
clearly

resolves itself into that of sealing its students within
their

"blackness,"

to borrow Fanon's description of the

"narcissistic" nature of the racializing hierarchy.

Not

only is Bledsoe furious with the protagonist for failing to
"act

the

nigger"

appropriately,

he

is

appalled

by

a

specific occurrence on the Norton field trip that unsettled
the uniform mask of "blackness" he wants Norton to see.

As

if the idea threatened to shatter the very identity he had
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earlier composed in the mirror, Bledsoe's

"face twitched

and cracked like the surface of dark water" at the news
that the "crazy" vet at The Golden Day opened to question
the

proposition

seriously,
racial

that

"white

is

right"

(137).

More

the vet did not act "black" ; he brought both

discontent and a confusion of the racial

endorsed by Norton

(and Bledsoe)

into the

roles

"white" man's

view, creating a dangerous roiling of the smooth surface of
"blackness."
reports;

"He talked like a white man," the protagonist

"A Negro like that should be under lock and key,"

Bledsoe replies, emphasizing his concern, determined by the
power of the "white" gaze, with keeping "whiteness" and
"blackness"

clarified and separate as mirror-stage ego-

ideal s .
It is, then, as an agent of discord in the coherence of
the accommodationist "black" self that the invisible man is
sentenced to immediate expulsion: his failure to properly
act

"black,"

disgusting to Bledsoe in itself,

allowed the elements of "black" sexuality,
and

cultural

backwardness,

the

has also

"black" poverty

economics

of

slavery

(Bledsoe refers to the entire sharecropper section as "the
slave

quarters"),

contaminate

the

and

"black"

college's

social

preferred

discontent

self-image

educated-but-in-his-place-farmer-craftsman.

of

to
the

As he passes

sentence, Bledsoe wields, with great symbolic significance,
a token that at once figures both the accommodationist myth
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of racial "progress" and the sealed, unitary, well-ordered
"black personality" it privileges:
Suddenly he reached for something beneath a pile of
papers, an old leg shackle from slavery which he proudly
called a "symbol of our progress."
"You've got to be disciplined, boy," he said.
"There's no if's and and's about it."
(138)
In having Bledsoe reach for the iron-circle of the leg
shackle at the moment he "disciplines" the invisible man,
Ellison suggests both the sealed unity and the unchangeable
rigidity of the "black personality" configuration Bledsoe
mandates.

The

disciplinary

"black"

self

can

quarter to the "if's" of possibility nor the
multiple

otherness

which

are

give

"and's" of

fundamental

experiential reality of the plural psyche.

no

to

the

Bledsoe's iron

shackle stands as Ellison's most salient symbol of the
"black" .subject..

With a good deal of irony, Ellison makes

the shackle both Bledsoe's symbol of what, in his limited
vision, progress away from slavery can be and a symbol of
the fiction of "black" ego boundaries Bledsoe's vision of
progress demands.
the

"white"

If Bledsoe responds to being defined by

mirror

stage

by

initiating

a

reactionary

"black" mirror stage of his own,

the iron shackle is an

appropriate

of

alienating
structure"

physical
identity,

figuration
which

will

mark

the subject that emerges

stage (Lacan, Ecrits 4).

the

"armour
with

its

of

an

rigid

from such a mirror
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One of Ellison's many nonfiction allusions to the racial
plurality of personal identity and of U.S. culture itself
serves as an effective gloss on this moment in Invisible
Man.

In meditating upon the powerful role of what Kenneth

Burke termed "symbolic action" in the construction of human
identity,

Ellison refers to the tendency to repress the

plurality and fluidity of the self beneath symbolically
articulated fictions of self-definition:
We repress an underlying anxiety aroused by the
awareness that we are representative not only of one but
of several overlapping and constantly shifting social
categories; and we stress our affiliation with that
segment of the corporate culture which has emerged out
of our parents' past--racial, cultural, religious--and
which we assume, on the basis of such magical talismans
as our mother's milk or father's beard, that we "know."
Grounding our sense of identity in such primary and
affect-charaed symbols, we seek to avoid the mysteries
and pathologies of the democratic process.
(Going 19-20, emphasis mine)
If we

take

Bledsoe's

"shackle"

to be

such

a

"magical

talisman," we might read it as not only a figuration of ego
unity

(the completed circle),

but also a symbol of the

particularized racial self which Bledsoe has been shown to
effect throughout the preceding pages.

In Bledsoe's hands

the "shackle" connotes not only the identificatory racial
"segment" of the broader culture delimited by the common
experience of slavery, but the even smaller segment of that
segment which he intends by associating the iron with the
college's version of "progress."

Clearly, he does not mean

for the latter segment to include either Trueblood or the
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"crazy" vet.
it

Moreover, in this moment we find him waving

talismanically

at

a veritable

force

of

racial

and

cultural self-image disunity, which is what the protagonist
has become for the college.
"knowable"

sense of

In Bledsoe's mirror stage, a

"black"

identity is established by

manipulating "symbolic action" to fend off "anxiety" about
an

uncontrollable

experience.

plurality

of

influences

on

self

Bledsoe's "shackle," like his removal of the

protagonist from the school, produce a racial version of
what Anthony Wilden has called, in his concise summary of
Lacan's mirror stage, a "vision of harmony by a being in
discord" (174) .
As Ellison continues, however, the "security" offered by
such "symbols of identity" is "equivocal" for their user,
for "an overdependence on them as points of orientation
leads him to become bemused, gazing backward at a swiftly
receding--if

not

quasi-mythical--past"

(20) .

Since

Bledsoe's rigid control of the school seems to be organized
around the shackle as a "symbol of our progress" and around
the quasi-mythical history enunciated in the chapel sermon
of Homer A. Barbee (the blind historian), we might read in
his attitude a similar pattern of over-dependence on the
shackle as a point

of orientation.

But where

Ellison

locates the force of psychological dehumanization here, I
would argue,

is not in the psychic function of "symbolic

action," or in any misuse of history,

or in the school's
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circumscribed

sense

of

racial

"progress,"

but

in

the

unrealistic rigidity and wholeness of Bledsoe's vision of
"blackness."
role

as,

His use of the shackle here gives away his

above

all,

a

disciplinarian

of

the

self--a

producer of the "black subject."
Indeed,

Bledsoe's

deployment

of

an

individualizing

"blackness" both resembles, and is determined by, that of
"white" men like Norton,

a relationship that is perhaps

best elucidated by shifting from a psychoanalytic
Foucauldian

v o c a b u l a r y .

^

to a

Bledsoe himself admits that the

"power" he exerts is coextensive with a systemic power that
resembles

Foucault's

"pyramidal

organization"

"distributes
field"

model

individuals

(Discipline 177).10

of a diffused

of

"network"

"disciplinary power"

in a permanent

or

that

and continuous

Bledsoe explicitly admits that

his role in the application of what I have referred to as a
racial discipline is enmeshed in such a larger structure:
"'This is a power set-up,
You think about that.
bucking
nation's

against

power,

power--which

emphasis mine).

son,

and I'm at the controls.

When you buck against me, you're
rich
means

white

folk's

government

power.

power'"

the
(140,

As the statement makes clear, Bledsoe is

"at the controls" only in the sense of his institutional
operation of what Foucault called the
power" (Discipline 26).

"microphvsics

of

The power does not originate with

him and, despite Bledsoe's belief to the contrary, he is
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actually controlled bv it. and by both the
folks"

and

the

larger

"rich white

national-governmental-economic

complex which looms above him in the hierarchy.H

As such,

Bledsoe's reproduction of racial discipline reflects the
reproduction
dominates.

of

disciplinary

power

As Foucault observes,

even

by

those

it

"this power is exercised

rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege,' acquired
or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect
of its strategic positions--an effect that is manifested
and sometimes extended by the position of those who are
dominated" (Discipline 26-27) .
Bledsoe's

"shackle"

confronts

the

invisible

man

simultaneously with the rigidly defined identity construct
of

the

southern-nigger-struggling-upward

apparent difference from it.
sort of innocent

honesty,

bluntly puts

"how to

it,

His failure seems to be a

his not

knowing,

lie" (13 6) .

causes the invisible man to feel,
Norton,

and with his

as Bledsoe

This incongruity

as he did in the car with

a sudden liquidization of his self structure,

as

Ellison suggests by having him vomit upon exiting Bledsoe's
office--"almost a total disembowelment" (143). It is also
significant, however, that the invisible man is unable to
see around the individualizing logic of racial discipline;
he believes

that

he has

only two

choices: conform to

Bledsoe's/Norton's vision of "black" identity or succumb to
a chaos of uncertainty about racial identity in "the world
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of Trueblood and the Golden Day"

(145)--a world where race

"progress" is meaningless, where "white" may not be right,
and where a "black" man can talk like a "white" man.

Still

seduced by the ego-security offered by the shackle,

he

"convinces" himself that he has erred by "violat[ing] the
code" of racial existence set forth by Bledsoe (145), that
he

can

only

construct

a

self-image

within

Bledsoe's

disciplinary code.
When he returns to the president's office the next day
to accept the "shackle," as it were,

Bledsoe's personal

icon of the unified "black" self is rhetorically passed on
to the protagonist in the form of the seven letters of
introduction the president writes to identify the expelled
student

to possible

northern

employers:

"touching

the

shackle gently with his index finger" (147), Bledsoe agrees
to provide these additions to what Robert Stepto has called
the

collection

of

"cultural

signs,

mostly

written

'protections' or 'passes'...that supposedly identify" the
protagonist (173).

Like the diploma and scholarship papers

he has already received, these letters serve as discursive
elements
identity.

of what

he believes

Despite

identificatory

his

to be

continued

a clearly defined

efforts

to use

such

"signs"--symbols of identity--to achieve

conformity with society's "code" of identity, however, the
invisible man repeatedly finds his "honest" self-experience
to be incommensurate with the systems of discipline that
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surround him.

As in the moments with Norton and Bledsoe,

his confrontations with discipline and unitary self-images
continue

to

render

his

more

complex,

more

multiply

determined experience invisible: believing in the former,
he can only experience the disordered tendencies of his
"honest" self as "disemboweling"; finally refusing one such
system (Bledsoeist southern niggerism), he stumbles blindly
toward

others

(northern

w orkplace

capitalism,

anticapitalist historical materialism).
In thus

tracing out

the various

components

of what

Ellison elsewhere referred to as "that feverish industry
dedicated to telling Negroes who and what they are,

and

which can usually be counted on to deprive both humanity
and culture of their complexity"

(Shadow xx) , the novel

takes on a cyclical, intrareferential quality which renders
virtually impossible anything approaching a "full" reading.
Indeed, Ellison's subtle development of intricate networks
of symbols and terminologies that convey the meaning of his
main

character's

experiences

create

a

textual

inexhaustibility suggestive of the psychic inexhaustibility
which "that feverish industry" aims to reduce: each symbol
and each episodic experience opens out into a larger system
to which it adds, and through which it has, significance.
It is by tracing the repetitive, crossreferential nature of
the

invisible man's

narrative,

then,

that

the deeper,

"disciplinary" structures of his existence become evident,
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yet any reading must necessarily be limited to a selection
of representative passages.
points

out how

Invisible

Man

the

Joseph R. Urgo,

thematic

highlights

for example,

and repetitive
Ellison's

nature

concern

of

with

"discipline" and its imposition of objectifying self-images
onto what Urgo defines as the multidimensional
self"

(xvi).12

From this perspective,

"anarchic

it is a set of

externally imposed disciplinary categories that insistently
produce the "invisibility" thematized in the novel:
The actual plot of Invisible Man is repetitive; it
continually "boomerangs" back to the same point, that IM
is invisible because he refuses categorization.
He
won't sacrifice his undisciplined, creative, and rather
messy self to the rigidities of any system, whether it
be the blindfolded boxer, the black college boy, the
factory assistant, the Brotherhood spokesman, or the
virile Negro lover.
(Urgo 24)
Though

none

of

these

self-conceptions

have

quite

the

symbolic terseness of the iron shackle, which I take as
figurative of "the black college boy," the invisible man
encounters

a series

of

these

templates

for

the

personality" during the rest of his adventures:

"black

to those

listed by Urgo we might add the text's various minstrel
figures,

like

the musical

"nigger-with-rhythm"

persona

attached to the invisible man by a drunk at a Brotherhood
cocktail party,

and Clifton's

dancing

Sambo

doll;

the

grinning, begging "field darky" figured by the iron bank he
finds

in

"blackness"

his

room;

and

the

essentialized

asserted by Ras the Exhorter.

African

Kimberly W.
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Benston has also usefully discussed these templates as a
series of delimiting "names," among which we might group
both Norton's farmer-craftsman and Bledsoe's "nigger."
Benston argues,

"the hero's

tale evolves

As

from his very

inability to decipher such depotentiating naming; seeking
notability as a stamp of incorporation by authority,

he

becomes the instrument of a long series of authoritarian
namers"
the

(Benston 159-61).

"disintegrative"

While I will return shortly to

effects

produced

by

the

racial

individualization of such names or unifying self-images, a
closer look at the expelled student's northern industrial
phase will suggest Ellison's connection of the disciplinary
mode of these patterns to other aspects of economic and
political life.
Like the social discipline articulated by Foucault, the
"disciplinary regime" in Invisible Man uses surveillance
and

confinement

as

its

implements

of

application,

emphasizes the clear definition.and coercive management of
identity, and aims primarily at increasing the raw economic
utility or productivity of the individuals
What

the

invisible

man

discovers,

so defined.

in moving

from

an

educational institution to an industrial worksite, is that
he has really only moved to a different locus in what he
will

gradually

recognize

as

an

expanding

regime

of

discipline, albeit a locus where the capitalist motivation
of the entire system is more evident than at his college.
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By

transplanting his hero to the northern, urban center of

industry,

Ellison

reveals

mechanisms

of disciplinary

the

linkage

of

the

basic

individualization--including

racial individualization--to the capitalist project;
how, citing Foucault,
of

men

and

the

or

"the two processes— the accumulation

accumulation

of

capital--cannot

be

separated"

(Discipline 221).

Thus, as Phillip Brian Harper

observes,

Ellison suggests

that

literally continuous with

the

college

campus

is

"the site at which industrial

capitalism

operates,"

where

a

"rationalized

mode

of

production"

causes the alienation of the subject we see

expressed primarily as a question of racial identity at the
college.13
Upon

acquiescing

to

the

definitions

of

the

Bledsoe/Norton scheme of things and plunging into a search
for employment structured by Norton's economic power and
Bledsoe's

letters

of

identification,

the invisible man

immediately feels alienated by a regime of monitoring and
control

in

the northern

urban world

he now

"Armored cars with alert guards" roll past;

inhabits.

the streets

swarm with automatons who seem "directed by some unseen
control"

(161).

Moreover,

he senses that

"blacks"

are

marked as particular subjects of control.

Carrying the

briefcase that "contains" his own identity,

including the

letters that are a rhetorical extension of Bledsoe's leg
iron, the invisible man worries that the African American
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couriers he sees carrying their own "leather pouches
"like

prisoners

carrying

their

leg

irons"--are

monitored by an unseen police force (161-62).

being

Just as life

at the southern college seemed monitored by an omniscient
"white" man's "eye," evidenced by the "white" trustees who
visit to observe the operations of the college and figured
in the moon which looms over the chapel sequence

(108),

this new economic world seems riddled with surveillance:
This was Wall Street. Perhaps it was guarded, as I had
been told post offices were guarded, by men who looked
down at you through peepholes in the ceiling and walls,
watching you constantly, silently waiting for a wrong
m o v e . Perhaps even now an eye had picked me up and
watched my every movement.
(162)
Reformulating his sense that he is being watched as

"a

queer feeling that I was playing a part in some scheme"
being orchestrated by Bledsoe and Norton,

the protagonist

begins to monitor his own behavior to ensure he commits no
infractions,
conduct"

becoming

(167).

"inhibited

Surrounded

surveillance and control,

in

by

both

such

speech

and

specters

of

he strains to conform to the

self-image of the sophisticated, urbanized "black college
boy"

through

disciplinary

what

he

management

literally
of

conceives

personality:

of

as

the

stopping

for

breakfast on the way to one of his bogus job interviews, he
deliberately

avoids

ordering

the

southern,

agrarian

identified "pork chop and grits," noting that it "was an
act of discipline. a sign of the change that was coming
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over

me

and which would

experienced

man"

(175,

return me
emphasis

to

mine).

subjected to a field of visibility,
Foucault

remarked

surveillance,
of

power;

of

the

college
"He

a more
who

is

and who knows it, "

disciplinary

value

of

total

"assumes responsibility for the constraints
he

makes

them

play

spontaneously

upon

himself....he becomes the principle of his own subjection"
(Discipline 202-203).
The invisible man is, of course, totally unsuccessful in
his quest for work from Bledsoe's contacts, but does manage
to secure a place in the manufactories of industry thanks
to a kind gesture by young Emerson, after the latter strips
him of the illusion that Bledsoe's letters "identify" him
as the urbanized

"black college boy."

Ellison,

however,

places his protagonist--now bent on avenging Bledsoe's
discipline--at

Liberty

Paints

only

to

ruthlessly

demonstrate the extension of individualizing discipline
from

Bledsoe's

subsequently,

school

to

Liberty's

workshop

and,

to a bizarre asylum/hospital where useful

personalities are manufactured for the industrial machine.
The

invisible

pursuing

man,

honestly

his

own

agenda,

of

the

Liberty

operation
attempting

to think on his

but

uncomprehendingly

totally

disrupts

the

Paints

factory,

usually

own,

rather

smooth

than being

by
the

totally docile worker--limited to robotlike efficiency and
the

execution

of

specific

orders--that

industry would

prefer.

Having been expressly ordered not to think (196),

he

his

uses

own

initiative

in

deciding

substances he needs to refill a container.

which

of

two

In doing so, he

destroys the perfect "whiteness" of an entire batch of the
factory's signature product,

"Optic White" paint, causing

it to become "diffused with gray"

(201).

He is reassigned

to the basement of Lucius Brockway, the "machine inside the
machine" of both "race" (the production of "whiteness") and
industry

(212).

Here, however, he continuingly fails to

conform to the clearly defined versions of "blackness" that
industry can understand.
loyal

"black"

beginning

of

unionizing,

"scabs"
the

Neither one of the management-

defined by the office boy at the

episode

ungrateful

nor

"young

one

of

the

colored

rebellious,

fellers"

(224)

excoriated by the management-loyal Brockway, the invisible
man only manages to serve as a muddler of clear race/labor
categories: his failure to follow orders or time schedules
repeatedly gets him into trouble, culminating in a massive
explosion in this basement of industry.
disciplines of race,

labor,

Ellison's

to

allegory,

a

Confounding the

and individuality leads,
critical

heightening

systemic pressure in the valve of "white" power.

of

in
the

Unable to

manipulate the "white" valve indicated by Brockway as a
pressure release quickly enough, the invisible man causes
the basement of the factory to explode into a "wet blast of
black emptiness

that was

somehow a bath

of whiteness"
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(225), violently restoring the dynamic by which "whiteness"
was

constituted

college

in Norton's

historical

"mirror

photographs.

stage"

The

and in the

"right"

kind

of

"blackness" and labor keeps the business of the plant-largely the production of "whiteness“--operating smoothly;
the

"wrong"

kind

of

"blackness"

and

protagonist's honest but uncategorized,

labor--the

untrained self--

causes the industrial process to run amok.
During his brief employment with Brockway, the invisible
man

seems

on

the

verge

of

tunneling

through

the

disciplinary "names" that are throwing constraints around
his

subjectivity.

Enraged by

the rapid succession of

moments in which he is unceremoniously defined, tried, and
condemned without so much as being allowed to speak for
himself,

he begins to vaguely understand that what keeps

happening

in

his

life

is

the

assignment

to

him

of

"identity" with blatant disregard for his own ideas about
who he "is."
union meeting
"association"
their

At the factory,
convict

him as

with Brockway;

decision without

myself"

(218),

the

even

a group of ideologues at a
a

"fink"

because

aware that
allowing

invisible

man

of his

"they had made

me

to

senses

disembowelment of his meeting with Bledsoe,
though my bowels had been flooded with acid"

speak
the

for
same

"feeling as
(219) . After

Brockway, with equally abrupt judgment, convicts him as a
labor "trouble-maker" because of his "association" with the

union,

the invisible man finally erupts into a diatribe

that both questions these definitions and foregrounds his
own self-experience:

"I came down here because I was sent.

I didn't know anything about you or the union either....Are
you

people

crazy?

Does

head?. . .What's going on?

this

paint

go

to

your

What have you got against me?

What did I do?" (222) . He is on the verge of comprehending
that none of these ideologues recognize him as a unique
person, but only as a representative of various ideas in
their own heads, and hence of comprehending a much larger
machine of ideological individualization in which they are
merely gears.

It is indeed the "paint" that has gone to

their heads, insomuch as the paint represents textually the
disciplines

of both race

("whiteness as ideology") and

economic production. But as if simply becoming aware of the
disciplinary machine
enough

to

threaten

occurs

and the

and questioning
its

its categories

destructuration,

invisible man's

"understanding something fully"

the

realization

is

explosion
that he

(225) slips away.

that he has "lost irrevocably an important victory"

is

Sensing
(225),

he is bustled off to the factory's asylum/hospital

for

corrective re-individualization.
As the protagonist is moved from the plant basement to
the factory hospital,

the

"discipline of the workshop"

flows almost seamlessly into the disciplinary system's more
overt

function

as

a

"technique

for

making

useful

individuals"

(Foucault, Discipline 210, 211).

Indeed, we

might view the disciplinary response to the color-confusion
the protagonist unleashes in the halls of industry in much
the

same

terms

response to the
century.

as

Foucault

"plague"

analyzes

the

disciplinary

at the end of the seventeenth

Like Foucault's "plague," the gray color that the

protagonist

precipitates

by

evincing

an

undefined,

unmanageable version of "blackness" (specifically, in these
scenes, of "black" labor) represents "mixture," which, as
"a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder ha[s] as
its medical and political correlative discipline" (198,
emphasis mine).

In this instance, Foucault describes the

evolution of discipline
"confusion and disorder"
that

most

as a specific response

(199) of the "plague," a response

prominently

"individualizing

to the

includes

distribution"

what

(198):

he

"the

calls

ultimate

determination of the individual, of what characterizes him,
of what belongs to him...the assignment to each individual
of his 'true' name, his 'true' place, his 'true' body, his
'true'

disease"

(Discipline

197-98).

Just as Foucault

treats the historical techniques of plague management as a
"conpact model of the disciplinary mechanism"

(197), I want

to

as

present

the

factory

hospital

episode

my

final

example--and the most compact model in the text--of the
government of individualization which is inscribed in scene
after scene of Invisible Man.

I suggest

this connection not only because Foucault

provides here one of his clearest descriptions of what he
means by "making individuals"

(certainly there are others

relevant to the correction of personality, particularly in
Madness and Civilization), but also because of intriguing
similarities in the details of these respective compact
models: just as

the protagonist

is placed into a box-

machine where he can barely move but can be perpetually
observed while doctors create a corpus of charts and notes
regarding his case, the disorder of the plague was managed
through the creation of an
observed at every point,

"enclosed,

in which the

segmented space,
individuals

are

inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements
are

supervised,

(Discipline 197).

in

which

all

events

are

recorded"

Moreover, by placing the protagonist in

this machine and jolting him with numbing electricity, the
doctors at the hospital hope to create a "new man"

(239),

one without contradictory desires, feeling, or memories--a
"complete change of personality"

(231).

provide the protagonist with his
pleased

that

(as

they

are

led

Though eager to

"true" name,
to believe)

they are

he

has

no

memories about subversive "black" cultural icons like the
trickster

Buckeye/Brer

Rabbit

(237) .

The process

individualization in the industrial machine,
intended to destroy the rebellious,

of

in short, is

ambiguous,

confused,

emotional, tricksterish, and even "criminal" components of

the protagonist's
"gray"

identity--his

areas--producing

coherent

sub j ec t .

As

in

racial

and

their place

industrial

a unified

the doctor notes,

comparing the

effect of his "treatment" to a prefrontal lobotomy,
patient will live as he has to live,
integrity.

and

"'The

and with absolute

Who could ask more? He'll experience no manor

conflict of motives, and what is even better, society will
suffer no traumata on his account'"
If one is to live as a "nigger"
rationalized

subject

operation

U.S.

of

without

society,

(231, emphasis mine).
or as an industrially

disrupting

the

experience must be suppressed.

full

the

range

smooth

of

human

The invisible man has

full command of his physical senses, and full feeling on
the

"surface

internally

of

This)

(230) .

b o d y . " but

Ellison

tragically describing racial

is

can

feel

nothing

half-comically, half-

individualization and the

industrial rationalization of subjectivity as attempts to
"lobotomize" full human experience, leaving a creature with
full

functional

ability

and

"absolute

integrity"

but

without the affect or the complexity of motivation that
constitutes full humanity.

Such is the intent,

Ellison

suggests, when the psyche is defined according to a surface
effect

of

production,

the

body;

or

when,

in

the

interests

of

"the body is reduced as a 'political' force at

the least cost and maximized as a useful force" (Discipline
221) .

Within

the

context

of

a prevailing

industrial
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capitalism, the "political technologies of the body" have
evolved as a treatment for the "plague" of "major conflict
of motives."

Thus the hospital Director, representing at

once psychiatrist and capitalist--Was he doctor, factory
official, or both?1" the protagonist wonders

(241)--tries

to convince the protagonist that he is "cured"
disease: psychic plurality.

(240).

The

The new subject: the American

"black" man.
As the invisible man strongly suspects, he has seen this
doctor

and

this

machine

before.

Norton?'" he queries the Director.
Bled?'"

(242).

a piece

of

"'Do

you

know

Mr.

"'Do you happen to know

In the machine, with his head "encircled by

cold metal

like

the

iron

cap worn by

the

occupant of an electric chair" (227) and unable to feel his
stomach at all, he has boomeranged back to the disciplinary
moment in Bledsoe's office with its iron shackle and its
"total disembowelment."

Indeed,

we may take these two

scenes, with their associated symbologies, as figurative of
a continuously repeating experience in his life, perhaps
the central organizing feature of the entire novel:
moment of

"discipline" when the

inconsistent self"

(Urgo 21)

"honest,

the

contradictory,

is placed in a "box"

that

removes a fundamental part of its constitution, supposedly
producing a "new" well-defined identity.
indeed,

may

be

correlated

with

the

These "boxes,"
objectifying

categorizations delineated by Urgo and the "names" referred

to

by

Benston,

distilled,

of

course,

application of the key name "nigger."

in

Bledsoe's

Within the cyclical

structure of Ellison's work, the machine-box of the factory
hospital is a reiteration of the boxing ring of the battle
royal, where (electric)

"power" was applied to the bodies

of young "blacks" to produce the kind of well-disciplined
"black"

identities

structure:
and

determined

oversexualized,

"hot" with rhythmic

man's

body

dance

"white"

image

the

(watching the invisible
electrical

machine, one of the doctors comments,
rhythm, don't they?

the

scrambling for small coinage,

energy

between

by

Get hot, boy!"

nodes

of

the

"They really do have
(232)). Similarly, in

the search for the job that will transform him into the
young-urban-professional black,

the invisible mam walks

through Wall Street's grid of surveillance and steps into
an elevator that shoots him upward,

"creating a sensation

in my crotch as though an important part of myself had been
left below"

(162).

Later,

he again passes

through an

elevator on his way to joining the Brotherhood, noting a
sense that he "had been through it all before"

(292).

The

elevator takes him to a party where he is assigned a new
name

and

a

"new

identity"

as

Brotherhood

spokesman.

Clearly given the job because of his skin color, he is told
he will be a "new Booker T. Washington" who nevertheless
represents

not

"blacks"

but

"the poor"

(300,

298)--an

identity which will be constantly and rigidly managed by
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the ideological constraints of what the Brothers repeatedly
refer to as "discipline."
The "cure" of the machine, however, never quite takes;
always there are rough edges, past selves,

contradictory

desires, conflicted motivations, multiple determinations of
character that make it impossible for the invisible man to
conform completely to the self-image molded by the "box" or
by his new

"name."

Spouting

the

rhetoric

of

"social

responsibility" that the "white" men of his.hometown love,
he lets
(31) .

slip

the antithetical phrase

"social equality"

Trying to conform to the role of order-following

factory

assistant,

he

is

unable

to

suppress

spontaneous affective and analytical outbursts.
deny

his

deference

racial
to

Brotherhood,

culture

the
he

is

pure

and

his

class

enticed

by

personal

powerful

own

Asked to

history

consciousness
the

his

of

in
the

racial

significance of Frederick Douglass and Brother Tarp's chain
gang leg iron, feels the pull of personal memory (381), and
finally infuriates the Brotherhood leadership by insisting
on the reality of racial identity (458).

In this "model"

hospital episode too, what Houston Baker refers to as the
tricksterish Homo ludens elements of the invisible man's
personality somehow escape the suppressions of the machine
(Journey 161). Though he does not at this stage understand
it himself, the invisible man is aware that his personality
is connected to "many names...as though I was somehow a
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part of all of them" (235, emphasis mine); aware, too, that
one of his names, one of his past selves, is the trickster
of "black" culture that the hospital officials hope they
have annihilated:
I laughed, deep, deep inside me, giddy with the delight
of self-discovery and the desire to hide it. Somehow I
was Buckeye the Rabbit...or had been....Yes, I could not
bring myself to admit it, it was too ridiculous — and
somehow too dangerous. It was annoying that he had hit
upon an old identity.
(236)
What Ellison referred to as "the mysterious,

underground

aspect of human personality" survives even the most violent
disciplining

of

the

self,

production of the subject.

even

the

most

high-tech

"Homo ludens is hidden at the

margins and is yet to be discovered by the technological
' d e t e c t i v e s , B a k e r observes,

"The expectation of those

who control society's machinery is characterized by their
refusal to explore the margins" (Journey 161).
Disintegration
Though Invisible Man is riddled with indications that
the "lobotomization" of racial subjectification fails in
its attempt to annihilate the "anarchic self"

(Urgo xvi),

it also thematizes a peculiar psychological havoc that is
wrought
hospital,

by

the
the

"discipline"
invisible

"disembowelment" grow

of

man's

into

an

the

machine:

earlier

at

sensations

increasingly

the
of

dramatic

experience of bodily disintegration and an outright crisis
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of the self.

Baker is quite right to note that it is a

"playful, ironic" tricksterish invisible man who walks out
of the factory hospital

(Journev 161), but it is also an

invisible man utterly disoriented by what he feels to be
this "alien personality lodged deep within" him (243). The
immediate effect of the hospital machine on Ellison's antihero is, more specifically than the internal numbness he
first describes,

a sensation that parts of himself have

been literally cut away and that,

as a result,

he must

struggle to reconstruct a sense of self dependent on his
bodily schema:
I lay beneath the slab of glass, feeling deflated. All
my limbs seemed amputated.... I lay experiencing the
vague processes of my body.
I seemed to have lost all
sense of proportion.
Where did my body end and the
crystal and white world begin?...I was laved with warm
liquids, felt gentle hands move through the indefinite
limits of my flesh.
(233)
The invisible man's struggle here to reconstruct his sense
of the limits of his own body gives Ellison's obvious use
of a birth motif

for

the hospital

additional level of meaning.
intended by

the hospital

scene

an

important

The birthing of a "new man"
officials

is

fused with

the

invisible man's reversion to a Lacanian, infantile state of
psychosomatic disorganization, indicated by his groping for
the lost

finitude and coherence of his body.

Like the

infant of Lacan's mirror stage, the invisible man seeks to
(re )constitute a fiction of ego unity through a complete
integration with

the

"processes

of his

body"

and

the
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"limits" of his physical being.
his bodily schema,
sensation

of

he hopes

quasiphysical

By retracing the form of

to overcome
"amputation"

the nightmare
caused by

the

"prefrontal lobotomy" of the machine and, in doing so, to
find an answer

to the question of

"identity"

that now

plagues him (237).
The disillusioning manipulations of Bledsoe's letters,
of the factory workshops, and of the hospital machine have
opened the invisible man's eyes to the social disciplines
that have hitherto forced him to suppress his true feelings
(243), unleashing the rebellious, trickster self that quips
sarcastically with the hospital Director and overturns a
spittoon on the head of a man he believes to be Bledsoe.
But the protagonist is still consumed with the idea of a
unified

self--disenchanted,

perhaps,

with

some

of

the

"names"

he has tried but still living out what Benston

refers to as "the comedy of his vain desire to achieve an
empowering name"
presence,

he

(159).

Caught up in the romance of self-

is unable,

as he leaves

the hospital and

begins a new life on the streets of Harlem,

to cope with

the confusion of identity engendered by his regression to a
sort of pre-mirror stage condition in which he has become
aware of

the

"many names"

of which he partakes

(235).

Thus, he can only conceive of these newly released elements
as parts of an "alien personality lodged deep within" him
(243, emphasis mine).

As the hospital episode ends he is
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still trying to solve the problem of a fragmented, multiple
self,

and

still

associating

reintegration of his body:

this

quest

with

-the

"We, he, him--my mind and I--

were no longer getting around in the same circles. Nor my
body

either"

(244).

In

this

remarkably

overburdened

statement of self-fracture, we might read the "I" as the
perceived center
linked

to

the

(ego) of invisible man's sense of self,
"circular"

configuration

of

Bledsoe's

"shackle" and to the body imago, but now experiencing an
internal

plurality

suppressed"

(243)

("we")

emanations

based

on

from

other

the

"hitherto

regions

of

a

larger, more complex, more multiply determined "mind."
In the transitional Chapter 12, the invisible man links
this new condition of fragmented identity directly to his
loss of the specific illusionary self-constructs which had
governed

his

previous

life.

The

self-images

of

the

"college boy working to return to school down South," the
accommodationist,

and

the

well-dressed-black-urban-

professional are among the "illusions that had just been
boomeranged out of my head" (250), he notes while observing
others who are still performing these roles. Moreover, he
is

now

capable

psychological
parameters
self-images

of

a

critical

condition:

he

has

reassessment
survived

of such illusions--parameters
imposed

by

the

segregation

of

his

within

the

laid down and
of

society,

certainly, but also by the disciplines of society,

as we
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have seen— only by numbing the parts of himself that exceed
or contradict such boundaries.

Though long buried "beneath

the emotion-freezing ice which [his] life had conditioned
his brain to produce"

(253),

those parts were there all

along.

Defining these now thawing portions of his psyche

partly

as

an

emotional/spiritual

element

heretofore

"frozen," partly as a "new, painful, contradictory voice"
(253), partly as the angry "demands for revengeful action"
which we might
figure,

associate with Baker's

ludic

trickster

the invisible man vaguely links their release to

the key moments in his developing awareness of how others
are

"defining"

"nigger,"

his identity--Bledsoe's use of the term

young

Emerson's

unveiling

of

Bledsoe's

manipulations, the combined moment of self-realization and
self-explosion at the paint factory:
A remote explosion had occurred somewhere, perhaps back
at Emerson's or that night in Bledsoe's office, and it
had caused the ice cap to melt and shift the slightest
bit....Coming to New York had perhaps been an attempt to
keep the old freezing unit going, but it hadn't worked;
hot water had gotten into the coils.
(253)
Instead

of

a

liberation,

however,

the

protagonist

experiences the collapse of the self-disciplinary "freezing
unit"

and

components

the release
as

an

of his

contradictory,

anxiety-producing

loss

of

emotional
coherent

identity.

He now suffers from an "obsession with

identity"

(253)

narcissistic

not

unlike

personality

the

condition

disorders

have

[his]

analysts

of

described

as
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"identity confusion"
( K o h u t ) ! ^ :

(Samuels) or "disintegration anxiety"

"who was I [?]....If only all the contradictory

voices shouting inside my head would calm down and sing a
song in unison, whatever it was I wouldn't care as long as
they

sang

uncertain

without

dissonance;

extremes

of

the

yes,

and

scale"

avoided

(253) .

It

the
is,

significantly, precisely his internalization of the ideal
of a unified, controlled, and "certain" self that prevents
the

invisible

man

from

either

fully

expressing

his

resentment of the (racial) "names" he has been called or of
living comfortably with the "many names" he is beginning to
realize are implicated in his identity.
the

"ice

cap"--now

become

the

The producer of

producer

of

his

disintegration anxiety--is none other than the discipline
of the self, or what he calls "'self-control,' that frozen
virtue, that freezing vice" (253).
In

the pages

that

follow

the protagonist

struggles

repeatedly with this anguished borderline condition, caught
between

his

newfound

sense

of

the

fluidity

of

his

"blackness" and the freedom of his self-experience and his
old,

deeply

internalized allegiance

to one-dimensional

versions of the self like the accommodating,
"black college boy."
vendor,

"progressive"

Purchasing hot yams from a street

the protagonist is overcome with memories of his

previously repressed southern, agrarian,

folkish past and

experiences "an intense feeling of freedom"

(258) at being
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able to enjoy that aspect of his identity openly, with no
regard for the culture of discipline--"I no longer had to
worry about who saw me or what was proper" (258, emphasis
mine).

While eating his yam, he meditates further on the

profoundly
identity
nothing

unpredictable,

filled with
whatsoever

contradictory

"likes"
to

do

and

with

patterns or "accepted attitudes"
new belief in doing
(259).

nature

"dislikes"
externally

of

that

an

have

proscribed

(260), and proclaims his

"what you liked":

"I am what I am"

Indeed, a few lines later he incorporates both his

folk roots and

(perhaps

intersubjectivity

less intentionally)

into his

new

statement

of

his plural
selfhood,

announcing "I yam what I am" (260)--I y(ou) am/we are what
I am.

We might read this scene as a fictional rendering of

a new attitude toward African American folk culture which
Ellison described in his own life as a "discipline toward
affirming that which felt desirable to [him]," regardless
of

the

extent

to

which

civilization (Shadow 9).
unable

to integrate

it

demonstrated

education

or

Yet the invisible man is markedly

this new multidimensional or fluid

"blackness" with comfort, much like he could only refer to
the talkative,

tricksterish voice of the hospital episode

as an "alien personality lodged deep within": "now that I
no longer felt ashamed of the things I had always loved, I
probably could no longer digest very many of them"

(260).

Indeed, the next yam brings him only an "unpleasant taste,"
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as he realizes it is "frostbitten"

(261).

His internal

freezing unit is still working, making the experience of
internal contradiction and manifold desire distasteful,
rather than empowering.
The narrator is almost uncontrollably fluctuating,
this stage

in his narrative,

at

between the romance of a

complete and autonomous identity and the lived experience
of a plural psyche, mixing memory and desire, which resists
totalization.

On the one hand, he seeks a new "name"/ego-

construct to replace the Nortonist/Bledsoist one he has
exploded— and finds one in short order when,
economic

exigency,

he attends

party and receives a literal
spokesman.

On

the

other

pressed by

the Brotherhood cocktail
"new name"

hand,

however,

as Brotherhood
he

expresses

distaste for the Brotherhood's manipulation of his racial
identity: he recognizes that they are treating his skin
color as a "natural resource"
career after the Founder,

(296) and elects to model his

not as the deraced "Booker T.

Washington" of the "poor" that Brother Jack prescribes.

It

is indicative of the protagonist's new "I am what I am"
ethos that, in opposition to the Brotherhood members' raceerasing ideology and Brother Jack's preemptive assertion
that "The brother does not sina!" (304), he wishes at the
party that

there were a way for him to be asked--as a

"black" man from the south--to sing spirituals (307).

But

the ideology of the Brotherhood, which Jack first refers to
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at this party as "our discipline"

(301), demands that the

invisible man set aside not only such racially determined
facets of his identity as an appreciation for black music,
but also his "past," his family (301), and his relationship
to the folksy landlady, Mary Rambo.

"So long as he seeks a

name as prescribed social role," Benston notes,

"the hero

discovers only the limitation of exogenous delimitation"
(160).

The Brotherhood is really only another box-machine

in which he will be given an "unconflicted" racial identity
and "name," at the price of amputating precious parts of
his contradictory racial identity.
The complex motivations and implications of this self
disintegration are reiterated in the comedic episode which
intervenes between the cocktail party and the invisible
man's

first

spokesman.

speech as

the Brotherhood's

token

Returning home after the party,

"black"

he makes a

conscious determination that the remedy to his identity
confusion lies,

in part,

in re-establishing himself as a

unified, autonomous ego; he decides, therefore, to separate
himself from Mary, his past, and their mutual connection to
a racial, southern identity: "they seldom know where their
personalities end and yours begins; they usually think in
terms of 'we' while I have always tended to think in terms
of 'm e '" (309, emphasis mine).
identity

is,

predictably,

(His attraction to the new
as

much

economic

as

psychological: as these thoughts run through his head, his
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pockets are filled with the crisp new bills the Brotherhood
has paid him for taking on the name they assign.)

Upon

awaking the next morning, Ellison has his anti-hero reenact
the explosion of the old rigid mold for his self in a
sequence that tellingly alludes to the versions of the
"black" self forwarded by Bledsoe, Brockway, and Mary, and
to the protagonist's
binding.

rejection of all of

these as too

In a violent outburst against the uncivilized,

"cottonpatch ways"

(312) of tenants beating on the heating

pipes in Mary's building, IM takes up a "cast-iron figure
of a very black, red-lipped and wide-mouthed Negro" with
"white eyes" and an "enormous grin"

(311), and retaliates

by striking the pipe with it until he feels "the iron head
crumble and fly apart in [his] hand" (312).
A caricature of various exaggerated "Negroid" features,
perhaps

a representation of

the

combined minstrel

and

"field nigger" figure in the American racial imagination,
this iron bank is also linked to the "white" version of
"black" identity transmitted to young "blacks" by Bledsoe
through

the

discipline

"white"

version

of

of

"black"

the

iron

"shackle"

identity

which,

and

the

initially

imposed upon, unavoidably becomes a genuine part of "black"
identities

through

the

process

of

folk

acculturation

represented by the likes of Mary and the Provos.

The

invisible man's description of and reaction to the bank are
crucial to an understanding of its signification:
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It was a bank, a piece of early Americana, the kind of
bank which, if a coin is placed in the hand and a lever
pressed upon the the back, will raise its arm and flip
the coin into the grinning mouth. ... [I] grabbed it,
suddenly as enraged by the tolerance or lack of
discrimination, or whatever, that allowed Mary to keep
such a self-mocking image around, as by the knocking.
(311)
We might remember here that, upon advising the invisible
man to leave "pride and dignity" to "white folks" and just
do his best in his socially assigned role as a "black" man,
Bledsoe "looked at [him] like a man about to flip a coin"
(142) and that, in his subsequent rage of "disembowelment"
the invisible man struggled to

"keep from bursting out

[his] brain" against something.

Now, dramatically picking

up

selves

this

icon of

the

"nigger"

of his past

(the

accommodating Bledsoe nigger, the uncivilized field nigger,
the leering minstrel nigger),
head

to

explode,

he indeed causes its iron

destroying

with

great

symbolic

significance its grinning mechanism for gathering small
change:

"The figure had gone to pieces

scattering

jagged

coins" (313).
home

of painted

iron among

the

Connected by literal possession to the down-

"blackness"

Primus

fragments

like a grenade,

Provo's

of Mary Rambo,
role

as

the bank also suggests

minstrel

performer,

and

its

"explosion" is of course a reenactment of the explosion in
Brockway's basement when the constraining definitions of
the "old-fashioned, slavery-time, mammy-made, handkerchief
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headed"

(222) Brockway had caused the invisible man to "fly

apart" for the first time.
The disintegration of the iron bank is representative of
the protagonist's

conscious

decision

to put

these

old

selves behind him, but Ellison doubly iron-izes his effort
to forge a new "identity," suggesting how the protagonist's
own

overly

respect

narcissistic,

for

the

"cottonpatch"

"me"-centered

individual,"

tenants

banging

he
on

paradigm

grumbles
the

("No

at

pipes

the

[313])

contributes to his continued alienation and psychological
fragmentation.15
"identity"

only

First, he smashes one iron-cast racial
to move

immediately

into

another:

the

Brotherhood, too, expects him to act out a particular image
of "blackness"— playing the part of "black" spokesman for
the dispossessed but denying the "black" aspects of his
existence while doing so--for which they are willing to
compensate him with a patz'onizing income (flipping him more
coins) but no power or agency in the organization.

More

comically, the invisible man finds that it is impossible to
dispose

of

these

junked versions

of

the

"black"

self.

Attempting to discard the fragments of the shattered bank
along Harlem's streets, he is thwarted twice,

first by a

woman who identifies him as a southern "field nigger" and
demands that he retrieve the package from her trash can,
then by a man who identifies him as a type of the "young
New York Negro"

con man or drug dealer

(322)

and who
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helpfully

returns

the

package

intentionally

dropped

on

tragicomically

difficult,

the

the

in

invisible

man

has

It

is

sidewalk.

the

psychological

world

depicted by Ellison, to walk away from past versions of the
self or from distasteful components of one's psychic make
up; as we have seen in earlier episodes, the cost of a "new
name" can only be some version of psychological amputation-even when the part-or past-selves derive from the racist
distortions of the "white" imagination.
in

other

words,

cannot

even

unwanted psychic components.
identity that will

The invisible man,

"dispossess"

himsel f of

Despite his desire for an

"sing a song in unison"

(253), he is

forced to carry the broken image along with him as part of
the dissonant "psychic" contents of his

"ego"-briefcase:

unwittingly reflecting the couriers with pouches he earlier
observed

on

"package"

Wall

Street,

he

walks

now

self--a jumble of dissonant

with

his

own

elements--at his

side.
The meaning of the disintegrated iron "darky" bank must
be read,
scenes

finally,

in

in the context of three other crucial

Invisible

Man.

To

explode

the

atomistic,

exogenously imposed, disciplinary "black" self--the "black
subject"--as a meaningful paradigm for self-experience, is,
in effect,

to reverse

the mirror

stage

by which

one

conceptualizes oneself through the constitution of an image
of

self-unity.

Thus,

when

his

consciousness

of

the

"nigger" identities being imposed upon him reaches critical
mass at the paint factory,
invisible man
infantile,

is

left

causing him to "explode, " the

in what

pre-mirror

stage

I have

described as an

condition

of

subjective

disorder, which he schematizes physically as a sense of
being both "deflated" and fragmented or "amputated" (232) .
(The

"white"

reconstruct

hospital

the

workers,

unconflicted

of

course,

"nigger"

self,

try
but

to
his

"contradictory voices" have been permanently unleashed).
This image of "deflating"
construct

recurs

flirtation

the disciplinary "black" ego-

later during

with

another

his

more

similarly

fluid

conscious

conception

"blackness"--the mental state he refers to as the
level" (261).

of
"yam

Rejecting the shame imposed on the eating of

down-home food by the Bledsoist "progress" version of the
"black"

self,

the protagonist

imagines humiliating the

college administrator by publicly accusing him of eating
chitterlings.

With his refined image compromised by the

charge of "field niggerism, " the protagonist fantasizes,
"Bledsoe

would

disintegrate,

disinflate"

(259) .

smashing of the bank, viewed in this context,
material

enactment

of

this

earlier

"disinflating" the Bledsoean "ego."
protagonist's
determined

"yam

identity

level"
is

reverie

interrupted

The

is also a

fantasy

of

However, just as the
of

a

when

fluid,
he

self-

literally

stumbles over the full complexity of the plural psyche--the
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contradictory "jumble" of an evicted couples' possessions
scattered

like

junk upon

the

street

(an image

of

the

multiplicity of African American identity that he finds
nauseating)--he finds that, after smashing the signifier of
all of the past "black" selves (including the "cottonpatch
field nigger")

that do not fit into his new Brotherhood

identity, he cannot. try as he may, discard them like junk
along the street.

Caught up in the cult of the "me," as

the protagonist admits he

is,

and in the quest

for an

"empowering name," as Benston puts it (159), he shuttles
between the anxiety-ridden

(yet liberatory) plurality on

one side of the racial mirror stage,

and the security-

granting (yet imprisoning) illusion of self-presence on the
other.
We first saw the characteristic imagery of fragmentation
of this borderline state, along with the correlative effort
to reestablish integrity according to the outline of the
bodily schema, as a prominent part of the invisible man's
experience
argued,

in

the

hospital

which,

as

I have

stands as a model for a series of box-machine-

individualizing-naming

contraptions

throughout his narrative.
course,

machine,

the

central

that he

encounters

The Brotherhood becomes,

example

of

such

a

of

disciplinary

"machine" in the latter third of Ellison's novel, so it is
no coincidence that, on the occasion of the invisible man's
first public appearance as Brotherhood spokesperson,

the

fragmented, pre-mirror stage sensations of the hospital-and,

by

extension,

the

disembowelment

of

being

named

"nigger" by Bledsoe— replay before his eyes like an uncanny
vision.

That Ellison

intends

this scene

to evoke

the

alienation that anyone might feel at the prospect of being
confronted with a "new identity"
that

he

has

in

mind

the

seems undeniable.

particular

Yet

psychological

extremities of the racial situation is indicated by the
invisible man's explicit connection of the occasion of his
first speech to several of the more overtly racializing
"boxes" of his career: the "canvas-covered platform"

(332)

of the arena, formerly the site of boxing matches where a
famous

boxer

"had lost his

sight

in

the

ring"

(326),

recreates the blind battle royal of the young black boys;
the

spotlight

surrounds

stainless steel"

him

"like

a

seamless

cage

of

(332), reminiscent of Bledsoe's shackle

and habit of "making a cage of his fingers"

(143); standing

before the crowd, visible to thousands but unable to see
them, he feels again the "hard, mechanical isolation of the
hospital machine"

(333).

Similarly,

according to Fanon,

the effect of having one's consciousness of self mediated
through the eyes of others--the effect,

as he concisely

puts it, of the words "Look, a Negro!"--is simultaneously a
"crushing objecthood" and a feeling of being "burst apart"
into fragments (Fanon 109).
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The racial psychology of the colonial situation provides
an instructive parallel to the invisible man's experience
as he prepares to "become" his new identity publicly for
the

first

time.

Almost

immediately upon entering

the

arena, he experiences the effort to conform absolutely to a
new name and a new identity as a literal splintering of
himself as a center of cognition,
across

multiple

connected,

subject

moreover,

a dispersal of himself

positions.

This

sensation

is

to a psychological effect which is

puzzling without the explanatory framework of the mirror
stage: he begins to deliberately observe and operate his
own body and motions as if from another perspective, not
only as if somehow separated from himself, but also as if
trying to reintegrate his sense of identity by carefully
reintegrating the parameters of his physical form:
I bent forward, suddenly conscious of my legs in new
blue trousers.
But how do you know they're your legs?
What's your name?...For it was as though I were looking
at my own legs for the first time--independent objects
that could of their own volition lead me to safety or
danger... Then it was as though I stood simultaneously at
opposite ends of a tunnel. I seemed to view myself from
the distance of the campus while yet sitting there on a
bench in the old arena.
(326-27)
Disoriented

by

"manufactured"

the

process

of

having

a new

identity

for him by the Brotherhood's disciplinary

"box"/"machine," the protagonist is placed in the position,
as in the car with Norton, of having to literally reiterate
his own mirror stage to reconstitute subjective integrity.
Thus, he becomes unusually conscious--as in the hospital
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machine--of

the limits

and movements

of his own body,

feeling his disintegration as a dissection of the bodily
schema,

and schematizing his

unusually

deliberate

reintegration

emphasis

on

the

through

an

organization

and

manipulation of that bodily schema. The mirror stage,

to

use Lacan's own phrasing of this relatioship,

"manufactures

for

of

the

subject,

caught

up

in

the

lure

spa t i a l

identification, the succession of phantasies that extends
from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that
I shall call orthopaedic" (Ecrits 4, emphasis mine).
Similarly,

the invisible man conceptualizes his status

in-between the anxiety of fragmentation and (what he hopes
will be) the formation of a new, unified identity through
the trope of looking at a picture or reflection of himself:
"I seemed aware of it all from a point deep within me, yet
there was

a disturbing vagueness

about what

I saw,

a

disturbing unformed quality, as when you see yourself in a
photo exposed during adolescence; the expression empty, the
grin

without

character."

(327,

emphasis

mine).

The

description suggests another moment of mirror staging in
his life, the experience with Norton that made him think of
a college historical photo,

showing "blacks" with blank,

characterless expressions as if their subjectivity has been
disrupted/interrupted by the clearly defined "whites" who
surround them.
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As

in

that

earlier

instance,

the

"photo"

conceptualization represents a sort of mental micro-mirror
stage whose intended outcome is a more "formed" reflection
of the self; the invisible man hopes that the photo will
resolve into his new,

unified identity,

one without the

internal multiplicity of a split point of consciousness, of
the "contradictory voices," or of the alien, tricksterish
part selves he has been feeling.

Indeed,

he summarizes

this multiplicity, the disintegration anxiety it illicits,
the discipline of his new, unitary self that must suppress
it, and the overt consciousness of the body engendered by
this whole psychodynamic in a passage I quote at length
because it so concisely emphasizes the racial mirror stage
components of the invisible man's experience:
This was a new phase, I realized, a new beginning, and I
would have to take that part of myself that looked on
with remote eyes and keep it always at the distance of
the campus, the hospital machine, the battle royal--all
now far behind.
Perhaps the part of me that observed
listlessly but saw all, missing nothing, was still the
malicious, arguing part; the dissenting voice, my
grandfather part; the cynical, disbelieving part--the
traitor self that always threatened internal discord.
Whatever it was, I knew that I'd have to keep it pressed
d o w n . .. .No more fIvina apart at the seams, no more
remembering forgotten pains....No, I thought, shifting
mv body, they're the same leas on which I've come so far
from home.
And yet they were somehow new. . ..1 was
becoming someone else.
(327, emphasis mine)
The enticing security of this new sense of self, however,
ironically implies the very splitting that the invisible
man

seeks

to

"manufactures"

escape.

If

the

Brotherhood

for him a new identity,

"machine"

that is--just as

Norton,

the college,

the factory,

the hospital machine

intended to do--it will do so at the cost of "amputating"
parts of his psychological experience.

Indeed,

we can

trace this irony back to the fact that the anxieties of
splitting and disintegration are structured by the mirror
stage of subjectivity in the first place.

It is only the

artificial constitution of a unified self-image, as Lacan
would have it, that creates the potential for that "ego" to
splinter back along the chains of signification out of
which it was tentatively crystallized.

In taking on the

"manufactured name" of "another personality," the invisible
man admits in the next paragraph, he submits himself to a
second type of psychological splitting: he must cut away
all past versions of his self if he is to maintain the
purity and coherence of the new self.

The new orientation

of being "the focal point of so many concentrating eyes"
might perhaps "transform" him into an entirely new "someone
else,"

he thinks,

"But what if someone from the campus

wandered into the audience? Or someone from Mary's?"

(328).

Because such contacts would threaten his new "personality"
with disillusion,

he realizes, he would have to suppress

them, pretending not to recognize Mary even if he saw her.
As

I have

suggested,

we might gloss

the experience

Ellison is so richly depicting in these pages with the
contemporaneous
Fanon.

racially politicized psychoanalysis

of

So long as the "black" subject lives only "among
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his own," according to Fanon, even though conscious of the
politics of race,

there is no problem in maintaining the

integrity of self-experience.

The first encounter with the

hierarchization and objectification of the "white" gaze— or
the name "nigger"— however, creates in the "black" psyche a
self-consciousness

that

has

the

form

of--as

for

the

invisible man--a "third-person consciousness" of the self.
Fanon describes precisely the sense of vagueness and the
concentration on the bodily schema that the invisible man
experiences in his "machines":
In the white world the man of color encounters
difficulties in the development of his bodily schema.
Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity.
It is a third-person consciousness.
The body is
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty.
I
know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out
my right arm...[etc.] And all these movements are made
not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge. A slow
composition of my self as a body in the middle of a
spatial and temporal world--such seems to be the
schema.
(110-11)
Precisely as if, we might say,

the addition of an-Other

perspective on the self has so shattered the coherence of
one's self-experience that one must reproduce a mirrorstage-like understanding of the unity of the bodily schema
in order to reconstitute the fiction of psychic self-unity.
This

bodily

schema,

in

Fanon's

formulation,

is

also

insufficient, because the "black" self must also account
for a massive discursive structure of assumptions about
"blacknessthe

white

m a n . . .had

thousand details, anecdotes,

stories"

woven

me

out

of

a

(111)--which brings
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to bear another, racial, cultural, historical perspective
on its identity and which undercuts
self"

(111).

historicity,

Taking

into

the

account

"physiological

this

discursive

Fanon says, he had to replace his corporeal

schema with a "racial epidermal schema";

"whites" looking

at him not only saw him as objectifiable difference, which
he had to account for in his sense of' himself, they thought
him as difference according to an internalized discourse
about "blackness," which he again, and separately, had to
account

for

in his

sense

of himself.

Combining

these

exogenous perspectives with the self-experience the "black"
person brings with him or her to the situation of racial
objectification

produces

what

Fanon

describes

as

a

nauseating, triple existence (112). "What else could it be
for me but an amputation,

an excision,

a hemorrhage that

spattered my whole body with black blood?" (Fanon 112).
The objectification the invisible man faces at the arena
is not merely that of a new identity imposed by a new set
of peers, but clearly also the racial objectification of an
established network of discursive agreements
emotive "black" orator.

about

the

(Brother Jack, it might be noted,

selected him as the new "Booker T. Washington" on the basis
of a speech which had virtually no substantive content and
virtually no effect on the mob it was directed to; in other
words, Brother Jack did not see Invisible Man, he saw only
the emotive

"black"

orator).

Experiencing a splitting

which is simultaneously a division into multiple points of
self-consciousness and into present and past versions of
his

self,

the

invisible

man's

response

is

first

an

increased focus on his bodily schema, then a vision of the
amputation of

the

"black"

self

that has been present,

either explicitly or implicitly, on each previous occasion
of his being disciplined into "blackness."

At the battle

royal, he was forced to play both the "black" orator and
the sexual "black"; handed his new briefcase-ego for the
first time after his speech, he splattered it with blood
from an injury incurred while boxing blind on a canvas like
the one he stands on to give his speech here. Disciplined
by the "bleeder" of "souls" (Bledsoe) for not conforming to
the image of the "nigger," he vomits.
iron bank

incarnation of

the

After smashing the

"nigger"

image,

and just

before making his futile attempt to discard this part of
himself, he notices a "trickle of blood" from a cut on his
hand (313).
been

The discipline of racial identity has indeed

experienced

as

"an

amputation,

an

excision,

a

hemorrhage."
The

images

of

corporeal mutilation which haunt

invisible man's boomeranging pilgrimage

the

through racial

society, then, are direct derivatives of the racial mirror
stage, symptoms of the fundamental psychological function
of

race.

When

"white"

identity

defines

itself,

by

gesturing visually, verbally, imagistically, financially (a

266

la Norton) , or even literarily

(a la Stein)

toward the

difference of "blackness" in a self-constituting "white"
mirror stage, the self-experience of whoever is so defined
is violently disrupted.

Because this disruption has the

effect of reversing the self-staging mirror processes of
the self so objectified,

or of initiating a scrambled,

compensatory attempt to reenact them,
some

form of bodily dismemberment

it precipitates in
imagery.

As

Fanon

describes the effect of being defined as "black" for the
first time,
only real

"I am being dissected under white eyes,
eyes.

microtomes,

I am f i x e d .

they

objectively

Having
cut

away

adjusted
slices

the

their
of

my

reality... it is not a new man who has come in, but a new
kind of man,
Similarly,
being

a new genus.

Why,

it's a Negro!"

it is in his moments of jolting awareness of

defined

by

others

as

"black"

protagonist feels by turns "disemboweled"
"amputated"

(116) .

that

Ellison's

(with Bledsoe),

(in the hospital machine), and "torn to shreds"

(at the arena).
As Fanon's emphasis on the production of a "new kind of
man" makes clear,
exist

this

"whiteness" and "blackness" do not pre

psychocultural

process

as

empirical--or

epidermal--realities; they are produced by it as entities
of a purely symbolic,

or metaphysical order.

In their

derivation from the mirror stage's production of a fiction
of personal autonomy and ego unity, moreover, these racial

identities tend to encourage narcissistic habits of being,
"sealing," as Fanon puts

it,

"whiteness" or "blackness"

(Fanon 9-10).

narcissism"

racial

selves

into

their

Given this "dual

(Fanon 10) of racial identity, we might expect

a similar manifestation of disintegration when the "white"
mirror stage is disrupted as we see for the invisible man;
and indeed,

Fanon later outlines the disruption of the

"white" mirror stage as an anxiety fraught with visions of
"blacks" and of "the liberation of the body image"
the corps

morcele. ^

speculation

with

an

Combining

(162)--

Fanon1s mirror

object-relations

stage

perspective

on

narcissistic personality disorders, finally, we might read
the invisible man's disintegration anxieties and "obsession
with [his] identity" as results not of the complexity of
his self-experience, as he seems to believe,
experienced disparity between his

but of the

hyperindividualistic

dependence on ego unity and autonomy, on the one hand, and
the contradictory voices

of what

Ellison depicts

as a

psyche of complex, multiple determinations, on the other.
If the invisible man's first instinct in the novel is to
throw off the shackle of Bledsoe's and Norton's
subject," whose "racial identity certainty"
the

fluidity of his

own lived

"black"

"black

"disembowels"

experience,

the

Brotherhood segment shows him trying to conform to the
shape

of

an

equally

identity--albeit

one

narcissistic,
he

conceives

equally
of

as

"certain"

significantly
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"deraced."

It is the individualistic tendency of his self

conception in both cases--his belief
"sealed"

identity--I am suggesting,

invisible man to

in a unified and

that encourages the

"amputate" parts of himself,

and that

keeps him stewing about the plurality of voices, emotions,
and memories

(many--but not all--of them derived from his

distinctly African American experience) he actually hears
within.
It is as a "solution" to his experience of this internal
dissonance that the protagonist turns to the Brotherhood,
which

beckons

identity.

with

the

possibility

of

a

new,

clear

One of the fine ironies of this section of the

novel, however, is the protagonist's failure to recognize
until much later--when the coded racism of Brother Jack's
"anti-race" ideology becomes evident--that his efforts to
conform to his new name constitute a mere repetition of the
inhuman "disciplines" of previous episodes.

Not only does

the Brotherhood turn out to be yet another institution in
which African Americans are allowed to be transmitters, but
not agents, of power, but its "disciplines" of identity and
politics

constitute

a denial

of

the

complexities

and

vicissitudes of human experience--precisely the repression
that IM has been revulsed by in the past.

The Brotherhood

promises the "certainty" of identity he seeks--he calls the
time before he begins

to sense the limitations

Brotherhood identity his

"days of certainty"

of his

(371)--but

only

at

the

price

of

suppressing

determinations,

especially

determinations,

of his

certainty

of

identity

the racial

the

and

self-experience.
is

also

another

multiple

[processual]
That his new

discipline

of

identity is most clearly evidenced by the Brotherhood's
demands that he forget his past, his family, his African
American culture, and his status as a racially categorized
human being.

Indeed, the invisible man's own formulation

of the new sense of vitality and identity the organization
gives

him

ironically recalls

Bledsoe

and

the hospital

machine: "The organization had given the world a new shape,
and

me

a

vital

role.

We

recognized

no

loose

ends,

everything could be controlled by our science. Life was all
pattern and discipline;

and the beauty of discipline is

when it works. And it was working very well"

(373).

The

beauty of the mirror stage is the pattern and certainty it
gives to identity; the horror of the mirror stage is its
suppression of the plural psyche.

We are made of loose

ends.

the

Still,

narcissistic
"wholely"

confronted

racialization

to one of

together

constitute

identity

as

the
the

with
of

"names"
"black

persistently

U.S.
for

dilemma

the

society--conform
"blackness"

subject"

fragmented,

of

or

which

experience

dissonant,

and

invisible--the invisible man grasps at the concreteness of
the role offered to him by the Brotherhood as the only
means he can conceive of for completing his mirror stage
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and

preserving

objectifying

self-unity

definitions

without

of

recourse

race.

During

to

the

the

night

following his first speech as Brotherhood spokesman,
invisible man sits up in bed,
gathering

to

"orthopaedic"

himself

the

the

"grasping [his] knees" as if
scattered

fantasy of totality,

parts

of

his

and decides to accept

the new role given to him by an audience that "was mixed,
their claims broader than race....How else could I save
myself from disintegration?"

Coda;

The Opened

Within

(345).

Shackle and the Freedom of

the dynamics

I have

outlined of

the

Self

an axis

of

disciplinary identity certainty (narcissistic egoism) and
identity confusion
Invisible

Man

(or fluidity),

implicitly

the identity quest in

becomes

a

search

for

a

conceptualization of the self that adequately allows for
its

inherent

fluidity.

One possible

revision

of

the

narcissistic individual along more fluid lines is suggested
by the protean Harlemite B. P. Rinehart, a veritable living
example of the

"exploded"

parts who got around"

"black"

self.

"the man of

(487), the man who willingly plays a

whole series of "multiple personalities"
preacher,

As

numbers runner,

gambler,

(488)--storefront

ladies' man--Rinehart

figures the absolute fragmentation at the extreme pole from
the

staged unity

manipulates

this

of

self-presence.

disintegration

What

for

his

is more,
own

he

ends,

suggesting

the

potential

for

reveling

in

identity

"confusion," converting it into social power and economic
profit.

Momentarily

living

the life of Rinehart,

the

invisible man realizes for the first time the possibility
of

a

new

orientation

to

the

plurality

he

has

been

experiencing all along, the possibility of recognizing and
accenting that experience is a "vast seething, hot world of
fluidity"

(487),

and making

oneself

at

home

in

that

possibility just as "Rine the rascal was at home in it"
(487).
for

Still, there is a dark side to Rinehart's technique

undermining

disciplinary

the

society.

unifying,
His

"naming"

tendencies

profit-taking

is,

of

finally,

cynically self-promoting and self-interested, a defacement
of "communal reality"

(Benston 162).

Moreover,

the price

he pays for the liberated possibility of his existence is
the sacrifice of any center of consciousness whatever;
anyone, as the invisible man proves, can take on Rinehart's
various roles, and the narrative itself reduces him to the
signifiers

he

pamphlets,

the

Rinehart

manipulates--the
words

himself

other

is never

hat

and

characters
seen.

As

glasses,

say

about

the
him:

Kimberly Benston

observes, Rinehart's strange combination of name-refusing
agility

and

asociality

"awaken

the

hero

to

an

improvisational freedom but offer no stable theme off which
a coherent identity could be riffed" (162).

While Benston contrasts the model presented by Rinehart
with the novel's invocation of Frederick Douglass as its
uplifted model of a more positive fluidity of the self, I
want to conclude by focusing on two other textual figures
which

might

be

seen

to

stand

alongside

Douglass

in

Ellison's pantheon of icons of what Benston calls "selfcreating transformation"

(162).

Foremost among these is

the chain gang leg iron passed on to the invisible man by
his African American confidante in the Brotherhood, Brother
Tarp--the man who, significantly, also gives the invisible
man a portrait of Douglass

in an earlier scene.

As he

symbolically hands the protagonist the leg iron he filed
open to escape the chain gang, Tarp associates the piece of
steel

both with his

quest

for

"freedom"

and with

his

precious preservation of the memory of his time in chains.
This

token

of

T a r p 's

identity

thus

reinscribes

ontological messages of the hospital machine,
possessions,

and the iron bank

limitations of the mold,

the

the Provos'

(you must say no to the

but you c a n 't leave it behind

without destroying yourself), while also signifying on the
ahistorical "smoothness" of Bledsoe's "progressive" version
of the "black self":-^
I took it in my hand, a thick dark, oily piece of filed
steel that had been twisted open and forced partly back
into place. . ..It was such a link as I had seen on
Bledsoe's desk, only while that one had been smooth,
Tarp's bore the marks of haste and violence, looking as
though it had been attacked and conquered before it
stubbornly yielded.
(379)
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This revision of the novel's shackle image signals what
Robert

Stepto

has

formulated

as

a

transition

from

"rhetoric of progress" to a "rhetoric of liberation"

a

(193),

positing a fluidity of identity (including, but not only,
"black" identity) that includes both a historically derived
structure and an "exquisitely rude aperture that 'defiles'
the

otherwise

completed

iron. . .a void

to be

(or

filled,

closed)
not

form

once and

of

the

leg

for all but

continually... To fill the space is less to close the form
than to shape the form; and, to be sure, there can never be
only

one

form"

approach
signals
static

(189) .

I have

outlined,

the shift
egoism

Translating

to

the revision of

from a rhetoric
a

this

rhetoric

of

of

idea
the

to

the

shackle

individualistic,

identity

f luidi t v .

precariously balanced between certainty and confusion,
between the fixity of one "name" and the plurality of many.
Tarp's opened leg iron represents his decision to forge
an identity that, rather than annihilating its tragic past
or

being

simply

structure
component.

of

defined by

his

violent

it,

maintains

history

as

a

the partial
fundamental

It would be entirely in the spirit of both

Ellison's nomenclatural tricksterism and the traditional
African American "disruption at the level of the signifier"
(Gates,

Monkey

47),

to say

that

Tarp has

executed a

revision within the "trap" of racial identity, transforming
his

trap/shackle

by

opening

it,

revising

to

insert

a
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pluralistic

form

of

"to be"

(ar [e] ) forcing

it

back

together, and bearing it with him into the future as "part"
of his new identity as

T a r p . 1

8

The structure of the past,

that is, exists in a profound tension with the formlessness
of individual freedom suggested by Tarp's hard-won opening,
deforming,

and personal

marking

of

the

link,

just

as

Douglass "seems to exemplify the heroic modulation of form
and chaos,

convention and invention"

(Benston 163).

In

this creatively sustained tension between fixed past and
ongoing renewal, between conventional structure and selfexpressive riff, Ellison locates the true freedom of the
plural

self

(and true

"individuality")--a freedom that

escapes both the order of discipline and the disintegration
of multiplicity, both the violence of history and the chaos
of historylessness.^
tension between chaos
profound ambivalence,
work"

c.W.E. Bigsby has remarked,
and form,

"This

this recognition of a

is a fundamental trope of Ellison's

(174), and Bigsby goes on to read this tension as the

essence of Ellison's cultural pluralism, African American
existentialism,

and improvisatory jazz aesthetic.

Tarp's

leg iron is only one of numerous thematizations of such a
tension

in

Invisible

M a n . but

perhaps

the

one

most

evocative of its hero's quest for a sense of self that
neither seals the plural psyche within the closed circle of
unitary (racial) ego-constructs nor dissipates it across a
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politically and personally meaningless array of multiple
determinations.
Though often obscured at the narrative margins and never
comprehensively apprehended by the protagonist, a series of
related images of the possibilities located literally in
the "break" created in the "shackle," located between the
rigidity of order and the creative potentials of chaos,
recur: when he momentarily reaches the self-accepting "yam
level" of existence and announces,

"I yam what I am" (260),

there is a hint of the reality of tensional, pluralistic
intersubjectivity in the subconscious reading of the line
as "I you am (we are) what I am"; in the name and seemingly
contradictory existence of Tod Clifton,
enclosure

(cleft-tun),

the

theme

another

opened

of T a r p 's shackle

is

reiterated; so too, the zoot-suiters whom the invisible man
sees in the (underground) subway after Clifton's death and
whom he associates with Clifton,
Douglass,
"[B]irds

exist

with himself,

"outside the groove

of passage

who

were

too

of history"
obscure

classification. .. of natures too ambiguous
ambiguous

words"

(429),

reductive

identification,

they
yet

and with

for

(433).
learned

for the most

simultaneously
manage

to

thwart

craft

stylized, distinctive identities for themselves.

highly
They do

not have a conventional, historical, above-ground, visible
(in the sense of objectifiable) self-presence, that is,
"yet

they

are

undeniably

p r e s e n t ." as

Houston

Baker
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comments,

"in the

fastidiousness of their style"

(Blues

61) .
Behind all these images lurks the recurrent figure of
the

"blues"

after

(the next thing the invisible man notices,

seeing

the

zoot-suiters,

is the

sound

of

blues

music), what Baker has defined as the "blues matrix"
Invisible Man (Blues 14).

of

This figure is thematized most

fully in the sharecropper Jim Trueblood, whose remarkable
narrative of his own tragedy evidences his bending of the
"shackle" of the "genitalized" identity imposed upon him by
"whites" like Norton,
his

own

inescapable but not paralyzing,

self-authenticating purposes.

As

to

the novel's

primary example of what Baker calls the "blues singer par
excellence"

(188),

representation the

Trueblood

is perhaps

the

first

invisible manencounters of a possible

resolution to the problem of identity posed by the racial
mirror

stage.

Trueblood

represents

the

recognition--

recreated as the thematic of his own story as told to
Norton--that he can neither live within the constrictive
notions

of

"blackness"

imposed

on

him

by

the

social

structure nor deny their effects on his self structure
without suffering the psychic equivalent of amputation. At
his personal moment of truth,
commission of incest,

the moment of his apparent

this recognition is translated into

his realization that if he moves he will commit what the
social code defines as "sin," but that he is not willing to
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suffer the amputation involved in physically separating
himself from the situation:

"There was only one way I can

figger that I could git out: that was with a knife....you
know I knowed that that was too much to pay to keep from
sinnin’" (59).
situation

is

As Trueblood himself understands,
figurative

of

the

racial

and

this

economic

conditions of his entire life: "But once a man gits hisself
in a tight spot like that there ain't much he can do.

It

ain't up to him no longer.... That's just about been my
life"

(59). Trueblood's recognition that his "tight spot"

is not only a product of, but a metaphor for, the broader
context

of conditions

reading of his
social

a

"tale" as an allegory about economic and

identity,

certainly,

in the racialized south urges

a

subversive

subtext

that

Norton

and invisible man for the most part, does not

grasp.

Within the context of the episode's "white" sexual

mirror

staging,

we

might

say

that

Trueblood's

story

connotes his decision not to use a "knife" to remove the
thoroughly

"genitalized"

identity

construct

(the

"erection") being forced upon him by the racial structure,
nor to compromise his humanity by simply conforming to it.
Instead, he accepts the effectual realities of the incest,
the

"white"

insistence

conditions of his life,
self-expressive,

that

he

is

depraved,

the

but transforms them to his own

self-authenticating, and

empowering purposes.

and

economically

In the new life-story passed on in
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his own narrative, this transformation occurs at the moment
of his decision to return home despite the condemnation of
his preacher, his wife, and the nearby black college (which
finds him embarassing and offers him money to move away).
That night,

Trueblood's improvisatory conversion of the

acquired form of a "church song" into some blues
never been sang before"
self-affirmation:

(65-66)

"ain't

signals his epiphany of

"I makes up my mind that I ain't nobody

but myself and ain't nothin' I can do but let whatever is
gonna happen, happen" (66).

As Baker comments,

In translating his tragedy into the vocabulary and
semantics of the blues and, subsequently, into the
electrifying expression of his narrative, Trueblood
realizes that he is not so changed by catastrophe that
he must condemn, mortify, or redefine his essential
self. This self. ..is in many ways the obverse of the
stable, predictable, puritanical, productive, lawabiding ideal self of the American industrial-capitalist
society.
(Blues 190)
It is such a version of the self--what might be called,
following Baker's supple explications of the blues motif
here and in other African American literary identities, the
plural blues self--that is always hauntingly present as the
invisible

man pursues

identity.

Taking the rejected unitary self-images of its

tragic past

along with

his

struggle

for

an

acceptable

it into a renewable present as

components of an affirmative,

improvisatory identity,

plural

Tarp's opened

blues

disciplinary

self

is,

structure

like

wrenched

marked, but not discarded.

open,

and

leg

iron,

the
a

personally

As Baker suggests, such a self
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is

opposed

in

Invisible

industrial-capitalist,
enforce

the

"ideal

puritanical,

Man

by

a network

of

racial,

and ideological disciplines that
self":

productive,

"stable,

predictable,

and law-abiding."

Though the

invisible man, still intent on conforming to the "shackles"
of

his

society's

individualizing

disciplines,

seems

oblivious to the blues meanings of Trueblood's story when
he

hears

it,

he

is,

by

the

time

he

has

retreated

underground with Tarp's leg iron and prepared to write his
own story,

fully cognizant of the value of, as Trueblood

puts it, "movin1 without movin," of revising the self from
within rather than leaving old selves behind.
Between the absolute discipline of "white" or "black"
determined self-images that "Ble(e)d" your "soe(l)" and the
absolute

liberation

innumerable masks

of

self-dispersal

that makes

your

("rind") your only soul ("hart"), then,

Ellison locates the creative tension of the blues self-that psychoexistential nexus where you take the music that
has been given to you and make of it your own "True-blood."
For

Ellison

the

ideal

of

democratic

subjectivity

is

represented by the blues consciousness of Trueblood, who
recognizes,

in his personal moment of truth, that to deny

the determining conditions and constraints

of his life

would be to amputate, to hemorrhage, a profoundly essential
part of his self.

Indeed, it is an experienced and blues-

wise invisible man who,

in his "Prologue," is capable of
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combining Trueblood's blues with Tarp's opened shackle in
the single,
Armstrong,

radiant image of Louis Armstrong's trumpet.
he

tells

us,

"bends"

the

discipline

of

a

"military instrument into a beam of lyrical sound," making
"a poetry out of being invisible"

(8) .

True freedom for

the self, Ellison suggests, can only be won through bending
the

"military instrument"

of cultural individualization

into a structure with an opening or gap. Such an aperture
might

serve

not

only

as

the

free

space

of

continued

restyling of the self, but also as the crucial interstice
where

"underground,"

social,

historical,

shattering,

"invisible"

interconnections

with

and racial otherness might obtain--

among other destructive dualisms,

the

"dual

narcissism" of race (Fanon 10).
As Homi Bhabha argues,

"Private and public,

past and

present, the psyche and the social develop an interstitial
intimacy... that questions binary divisions through which
such

spheres

opposed"

of social

(Culture 13).

experience

are

often

spatially

Anticipating Bhabha's postcolonial

critique, Invisible Man similarly formulates a subject that
imports "a hybridity, a difference 'within', a subject that
inhabits the rim of an 'in-between' reality"

(Culture 13).

To become

relationship

between

conscious

psyche

and

of

this

social,

interstitial
past

and

present,

is

to

decolonize--and de-individualize--the racial self, turning
its

inherent

fissuring

and

fragmentation

to

positive
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political and ontological effect.

Thus, the invisible man

begins to truly hear Louis Armstrong's blues only when he
recognizes the off-beat, nodular, and "invisible" quality
of his experience,

reaching that state where "Instead of

the swift and imperceptible flowing of time, you are aware
of its nodes....And you slip into the breaks
around"

(8).

Similarly,

and look

the "breaks" in the subject,

the

"interstices" where the psyche and the social communicate,
inform the contradiction and internal division that the
invisible

man,

in

his

epilogue,

recognizes

as

the

inevitable reality of self-experience: "Now I know men are
different and that all life is divided and that only in
division is there true health"

(563).

It is the sickness

of a society characterized by

"an increasing passion to

make men conform to a pattern," he notes, that has finally
forced his complex,

unpatternable existence underground.

Though the novel ends ambivalently with this "patterning"
passion still in force as the prevailing

"trend of the

times" (563), Ellison is profoundly clear about the path to
both psychological and social health:
word.

"[D]iversity is the

Let man keep his many parts and you'll have no

tyrant states" (563).
Notes
1. See chapter 1, 60-70; Nielsen 5-11; and Fanon 160-65.
2. For Baker's interpretation of the economic and
performative dimensions of the Trueblood episode,
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especially as they relate to his conception of an African
American "blues" identity, see pp. 172-199 in B l u e s .
Ideology, and Afro-American Literature.
3. It might also be noted that Norton is shaken, drained
and weak because he is, so to speak, sexually "spent." One
of the hilarious jokes of this episode is the veiled
metaphor of sexual satisfaction that Ellison is applying to
what I have framed as Norton's self-constitution.
To
understand the blues motif which informs the chapter (the
blues is also the mode of self-sustaining and self-creating
affirmation at the heart of Trueblood's story) is to
understand that Norton is "getting off" by having his ego
stroked by "blacks."
With classic blues subversion and
indirection, Ellison riffs on the sexual components of
Norton's need for "blacks" by placing the narrator in the
situation of being a "driver" for the "white" man, "gazing
at the long ash of his cigar" (41) as he "smokes."
We
might gloss this image, for example, with the sexual
metaphors in the following set of blues lyrics from,
respectively, Bo Carter and Memphis Minnie:
I come over here, sweet baby, just to get my ashes
hauled...Won't you draw on my cigaret, smoke it there all
night long, / Just draw on my cigaret, baby, until you
make my good ashes come.
Won't you be my chauffeur, won't you be my chauffeur? / I
want someone to drive me, I want someone to drive me
downtown.
For these and other blues sexual metaphors, see Levine 24243 .
4. My phrasing is indebted to George P. Rawick's discussion
of the historical formation of "whiteness."
As Roediger
summarizes, "Rawick‘s argument that the typical early
bourgeois racist constructed whiteness by imagining 'a
pornography of his former life' and projecting it onto
Blacks might be expanded in order to consider the racism of
working class Irish-American Catholics who at times created
a pornography of their present lives and at other times of
their past" (153). I am suggesting a similar expansion to
consider the racial postures of twentieth-century bourgeois
subjects like Stein and (in Ellison's fictional portrayal)
Norton.
See Rawick 132-33.
Similarly, Joseph R. Urgo
describes these scenes in Invisible Man as a "white, staged
pornography" (29) .
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5. Fanon's entire discussion of this "genitalization" (160180) is relevant to the scenes elaborated in Invisible Man.
encompassing both the "Sybil" fantasy (17 8) and the
Norton/Stein projection: "For the majority of white men the
Negro represents the sexual instinct (in its raw state).
The Negro is the incarnation of a genital potency beyond
all moralities and prohibitions" (177).
6. "[T]he Negro, because of his body, impedes the closing
of the postural schema of the white man--at the point,
naturally, at which the black man makes his entry into the
phenomenal world of the white man" (Fanon 160) .
7. As in chapter 2, I am using the terms "disciplinary
technology" and "individual" in the particular senses
elaborated by Foucault in, for example, Discipline and
Punish and The History of Sexuality: Volume O n e : "The
individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an
'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a
reality fabricated by this specific technology of power
that I have called 'discipline'....The individual and the
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this
production [of power]" (Discipline 194) .
8. Thus, as Kenneth Burke has observed, Invisible Man
illustrates how "technology," including the "technology" of
"symbolic action," supersedes "race" as the object of
Ellison's social critique: "Technology transcends race, not
in the sense that it solves the problem of racial
discrimination, but in the sense that technology itself is.
the problem. . . .With the current terrific flowering of
technology the problem of self-control takes on a possibly
fatal, and certainly ironic, dimension.
We must all
conspire together, in a truly universal siblinghood, to
help us all help one another to get enough control over our
invented technologic servants to keep them from controlling
us" (Burke 3 58) . I want to examine here, with specific
attention to Foucault's "disciplinary technologies" that
manage and organize life itself, how Invisible Man
illustrates the extent and the effects of a pervasive
flowering of methods of controlling and atomizing human
identity.
9. Bledsoe's role as an enforcer of the "black subject" is
linked to Norton's by several metaphors in the novel, the
most telling of which may be the cross-referencing of
spiritual and physical mutilation images.
That Bledsoe's
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name suggests "bleeder" of "souls" connects him directly to
the crazy vet's description of Norton as a "lyncher of
souls" (92).
10. Through the technique of surveillance, Foucault argues,
"disciplinary power became an 'integrated' system, linked
from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the
mechanism in which it was practised. It was also organized
as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for although
surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that
of a network of relations from top to bottom" (Discipline
176-77) .
Power, according to Foucault,
"cannot be
localized in a particular type of institution or
apparatus," though they operate what he refers to as the
"microphysics of power" (26).
11. As Harper comments, Bledsoe's insistence on his own
"power" in the same speech that alludes to its real source
is "beautifully self-consuming" (120).
12. See also Urgo's "Introduction" to Novel Frames for a
concise
but
useful
summary
of
the
"postmodern"
understanding of identity which he uses as a basis for
reading Ellison's critique of the objectified, "individual"
self.
Citing theorists such as Paul Smith and Clifford
Geertz, who critique the "integral, autonomous self" as a
vestige of "a defunct ideological system" (xiii), Urgo
argues for a reading of Ellison's novel as a "literary
attempt to interrogate the idea of an autonomous self"
(xvi). Although, as my own approach to individualization
is meant to suggest, that ideological system is anything
but "defunct," U r g o 's presentation of the issues of self
and racial objectification in Invisible Man is the best I
have seen.
13. Harper 121-22.
While Harper draws his framework here
from the Marxist perspective of Lukacs, the Foucauldian
approach which is so useful for unraveling the politics of
identity control allows, I think, for a similar connection
between subjectification and capitalism: "At a less general
level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of
production, the division of labour and the elaboration of
the disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very
close relations.... Each makes the other possible and
necessary; each provides a model for the other" (Discipline
2 21) .
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14. The invisible man's self-recognized "obsession with
[his] identity" (253) might thus be viewed in terms of what
Kohut identified as the distinguishing anxiety of cases of
"narcissistic personality disorder": a "dysfunctional
hypervigilance"
(Sussman 66) concerning the multiple
manifestations of the self.
See Sussman 66; and Kohut,
Analysis 19-20, and Restoration 102-105.
According to
Kohut,
"The core of disintegration anxiety is the
anticipation of the breakup of the self, not the fear of
the [oedipal] drive" (Restoration 104). The invisible man
thus experiences a predictable "dread of the loss of his
self--the fragmentation of and the estrangement from his
body and mind in space, the breakup of the sense of his
continuity in time" (Restoration 105).
15. That the invisible man remarks upon his sense of utter
loneliness and isolation as he walks the streets of Harlem
trying to rid himself of the pieces of "blackness" that are
unacceptable to his new self (321), indeed, evokes the
"alienated individualism" that bell hooks associates with
"internalized racism" (39). The dehumanizing practices of
a "colonized" society, hooks argues, encourage African
Americans--even as they reject overt racism--to internalize
an individualistic ethic that restricts the liberatory
possibilities of "radical black subjectivity" and "black
community."
16. "This is what is clinically called heautophany or
heautoscopy," images of internal organs removed from the
body (Fanon 162).
17. Recall here that, entrapped in the hospital machine
which sought to convert him into the "unconflicted" black
subject, IM realized that to destroy the machine in an
escape effort would be futile, for it would destroy
himself: "I wanted freedom, not destruction... .There was no
getting around it.
I could no more escape than I could
think of my identity.
Perhaps, I thought, the two things
are involved with each other.
When I discover who I am,
I '11 be free" (237) .
18. That the tropological revision of the shackle from its
first appearance in the novel to its second, along with its
apparent status as a trope for the revision of T a r p 's
identity and his name, refers to the tradition of
"signifying" seems overtly signaled by Tarp's remark to IM
that the leg iron has "a heap of signifying wrapped up in
it"
(379) .
Henry
Louis
Gates's
definition
of
"Signifyin(g)" as a revision or critique of the "nature of
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the sign itself" is the basis of my reading of Tarp1s name
(Monkey 45-47) . As Gates comments, "Signifyin(g)" is not
only a rhetorical but an ontological "guerrilla action"
(46), an "act of self-definition, implicit in a (re)naming
ritual, [undertaken] within the process of signification
that the English language had inscribed for itself" (47).
19. As Stepto observes, this tension also informs Ellison's
understanding of the appropriate relation between the
artist and tradition, a thematic that overlaps, of course,
with the invisible man's quest for a workable schema of
identity.
In T a r p 's opened leg iron we have, indeed,
something like a master trope for Ellison's visions of the
dynamic interactions of self and other(s), self and
developmental past, African American culture and slavery,
"black" and "white," "individual" and society, form and
chaos.

Chapter Four
Things Are Going to Pieces: The Psychology of
Blackface in Berryman's Dream Songs
During his thirteen years of work on the poetic sequence
that would eventually be published as The Dream Soncrs. John
Berryman frequently telephoned his long-time acquaintance
Ralph Ellison for consultation, concerning the blackface
minstrel devices that Berryman was incorporating in his
poems.

These long-distance colloquies evoke a confused

jumble of United States cultural hybridization:
twentieth-century white man,

a mid-

intent on articulating the

racialized other within his own identity,

turning to a

contemporary African American as an authority on what was
originally

a

mid-nineteenth-century

whi te

representation of "black" cultural forms.

cultural

Ellison later

recalled these conversations:
During the period he was writing Dream Sonas I grew to
expect his drunken (sometimes) telephone calls. Usually
he wanted my reaction to his uses of dialect. My
preference is for idiomatic rendering, but I wasn't
about to let the poetry of what he was saying be
interrupted by the dictates of my ear for Afro-American
speech. Besides, watching him transform elements of the
minstrel show into poetry was too fascinating.
(Mariani, Life 3 87)
Far from clarifying the situation, Ellison's recollection
increases

the number

of

intriguing

questions

around the cultural dynamic in play here.

swirling

Ellison was

certainly a significant authority on the minstrel show,
particularly in its later manifestation as a reappropriated
287

performance of blackface by blacks, but what might be the
relevance

of any actual

distorted,

"Afro-American speech"

exaggerated version

represented

in minstrelsy?

of black

Was

it

to

the

verbal

styles

Berryman's

rather

puzzling intention to use certain devices from blackface,
but

to make

the

linguistic

style authentically

American, " rather than authentically blackface?
what would authentic

"Afro-American speech"

"Afro-

Moreover,
be,

in the

context of both geographical and historical variability,
and what are the politics of a white poet turning to an
African American intellectual to provide verification of
how uneducated

"blacks"

really sound?

Finally,

if we

consider that Berryman may have been most interested in
Ellison's erudite input on his use in several of the poems
of genuine twentieth-century blues voices and culture--both
influenced,

it is true,

through an almost untangleable

process of cultural miscegenation,

by the minstrel show

itself--we are confronted with Ellison's statement that he
elected not to hold Berryman's poems to the standard of
"idiomatic rendering," and that he did not,

in fact,

so

that the poet could freely utilize elements of the minstrel
show.

Was Berryman simply uncritically equating, as most

nineteenth-century Americans
with

"black"?

Ellison?

More

certainly did,

implausibly,

in his

"blackface"
comment,

was
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Such questions,

and the complexities

of U.S.

racial

subjectivity evoked by Berryman's effort to represent a
racialized component of white identity,

finally, become

even more intriguing in the light of Ellison's
comment about those
"Fascinating
Berryman

too,

was

further

(sometimes) drunken telephone calls:
and

casting

amusing,
me

as

was
a

my

suspicion

long-distant

that

Mister

Interlocutor— or was it Mister Tambo?--whose ad lib role
was that of responding critically to his Mister Bones and
Huffy Henry"
on which

(Mariani, Life 387).

Ellison's

nameless

The "lower frequencies"

African

American,

in

the

haunting closing line of Invisible Man. purported to "speak
for"--and out of--the consciousness of his (white?) reader
in this instance appear to have been the frequencies of the
telephone line.
While

Ellison's

remark

is

amusing

in

the

light

of

Berryman's decision to leave his protagonist's interlocutor
nameless,

not to mention his delight at the whimsically

expressed idea that "some assistant professor will become
an associate professor by learning the name of Henry's
friend" (Plotz 3), it is also of striking critical interest
as an illustration of

the cultural dynamics

subjectivity that are crucial

of racial

to The Dream Songs. The

tangle of representational issues evoked by those phone
calls--the ambivalence, the contradictions that seem to be
strung

on

Ellison's

synopsis

of

the

situation--speak
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volumes about the presence of a "black" other within the
white subject that Berryman was straining to articulate.
If,

in

the

personal

terms

of

a

unique

literary

relationship, Berryman posed Ralph Ellison himself as his
internal "black" voice, we might further conceptualize that
other

as,

in

general

terms,

the

sound

and

style

of

"blackness," or, in cultural terms, as the minstrel show.
The ambivalence and strangeness flavoring Ellison's own
comments about Berryman's artistic method are magnified in
The

Dream

difficult

Soncrs

themselves,

where

it

to decipher precisely how

is

notoriously

the minstrel

show

device and the black(face) voices are being employed.

If

on certain occasions the poems bemoan the failures of civil
rights and social equality for African Americans, on others
they utilize the suffering of racial persecution as a crude
metaphor for Henry's metaphysical struggle with a cruel and
dominating God; if in some poems the coon show device is
used to counterpoint,
self-absorption
dialogue

and

of

as Ellison's comment suggests,
a

traditional

self-criticism,

hero

in others

with
it

the

internal

is used

to

articulate little more than a rampant and self-disgusting
sexuality.

Critical assessments of the blackface elements

in the Songs,

incomplete and marginal in any case,

reflected this ambiguity.

have

William Wasserstrom's early

laudatory assessment was that the poems sympathetically
"recreate" the "downs and ups" of "mutilated men, American
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Negroes"

(172)--that

the

poems

even

self-consciously

reproduce the coded linguistic subversions of various black
cultural modes and ironize the original white version of
minstrelsy (a view that would at least begin to make sense
of

Ellison's

project).

apparently

supportive

interest

in

the

But Wasserstrom's opinion is balanced by views,

like those of Joel Conarroe, which have taken into account
the

obviously

racist

impulses

of white

minstrelsy

in

categorizing Berryman's reproduction as naive, ignorant of
the black experience,

and exploitative

(Conarroe 104).

Perhaps the poet Michael Harper's indignant verse rejoinder
best illustrates the potential for insult in Berryman's
extensive use of a degenerative "black" voice: "[Y]ou wrote
in that needful black idiom / offending me, for only your
inner voices / spoke such tongues . . ./ That slave in you
was white blood forced to derision."1
My own contention is that the most productive approach
to Berryman's minstrel

technique lies somewhere between

these two extremes of response,
only

the

strength

identification

of

with

taking into account not

the p o e t 's genuinely sympathetic
victims

of

racism,

not

only

the

exploitation inherent in his assumption that he could adopt
"blackness"

as the fit expression for his own sense of

alienation,

but

also

the

irresolvably

ambivalent

and

contradictory impulses of the minstrel show itself. Indeed,
Eric Lott has recently used an astute blend of historicist

methodology and cultural theory to show that the minstrel
show was always a cultural phenomenon riven with unclear
racial

antecedents,

flatly

contradictory

motivations,

equivocal subject matter, and;ambiguous political effects.
The most popular--and hence most powerful--entertainment
mode

of

the nineteenth century in the U.S.,

minstrelsy

was

capable

of

projecting

blackface

anti-slavery

sentimentalism and anti-abolitionist derision,
cross-racial

identification

and

liberatory

oppressive

racial

distancing, from the same stage, effecting, for example, an
ambivalently
blackness"
argues,

"derisive

(Lott

29) .

"merely

minstrelsy's
blackface

It

read

is

if

a

thus

off

inauthenticity"

was

undeniable,

to

celebration

culturally

of

the

insufficient,

racial

oppression

(100-101),
creolized

unquantifiable,

power

both
form

measure

of

of
Lott
from

because
with

an

"black"

involvement and because the racist tendencies of blackface
production were

rooted

in a thoroughly

"contradictory

structure" of racial feeling in society, a structure also
capable of evoking cross-racial solidarity and affection on
the

same

stage

(29) .2

a

century

later,

Berryman's

reproduction of blackface performance was fraught with many
of the same contradictions, and it is this slipperiness— of
both

psychological

"a u t h e n t i c i t y "--that

motivation
is

and

registered

representational
in

Ellison's
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noncommittal

description of

those remarkable

telephone

calls.
Lott's

explanations

of

the

ambivalent

minstrelsy ..are particularly

valuable

attention

political,

to

psychological

not

only

the

contradictions

that were

nature

because
but

of

of

his

also

the

at play

in

its

production, and it is on the latter that I want to focus in
approaching The Dream Soncrs.

The condensed and displaced

themes of the blackface act, Lott suggests, functioned as a
sort of "theatrical dream work" of both the social

(13 5)

and the personal (147), working to symbolically resolve a
whole range of anxiety-ridden economic, sexual, moral, and
identity conflicts. Berryman's rather derivative minstrel
effects,

as I will

symbolic ends,

show,

are orchestrated to analogous

forming a critical dimension of what he

explicitly conceptualized as a contemporary social and
psychic

"dream work."

The

representation

of race,

in

Berryman's dream version of the coon show as much as in its
prototype,
of

is above all a way of playing with intimations

disorder,

sexuality,

and

corporeality--enacting

a

subversion of the "white" social subject that is at once
desired and feared--by identifying with a "blackness" that
can be simultaneously distanced, ridiculed, and controlled.
By slipping into and out of the blackface mask at will,
momentarily impersonating the hell-raising "black" and then
just as quickly returning to the security of "whiteness,"
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Berryman engages in precisely what Lott refers to as the
"disappearing

act

in which blackface

made

'blackness'

flicker on and off so as simultaneously to produce and
disintegrate the body" (117).3
In what

follows,

Berryman's

own

I read

the

simultaneous

seeming

ambivalence

identification

with

of
and

degradation of "blackness," every bit as consumed with the
body

and

its

transgressive

nineteenth-century model,

libidinality

as

yet often gesturing

was

his

toward a

rhetoric of social anti-racism, in terms of what I view as
Berryman's profound crisis of the subject.

The precise

emotional configuration of this crisis might be formulated
psychopathologically

in

personality disorders,

terms

of

the

narcissistic

and even borderline

conditions,

outlined in Kohut's "self psychology" and various objectrelations

approaches

to

subjectivity.

Indeed,

the

persistent symbolization of orality, threatening authority
figures, and states of physical disintegration in Henry's
"dream-work"

is

suggestive

of

associates with such disorders.

content Kohut

The theme of the contrast

between

coherent

however,

becomes so pervasive in The Dream Songs as to

become

identity

the dream

implicated

in

and

the much

extreme

broader,

identity

less

loss,

clinical

concerns which can be and have been read as central to
Berryman's work:
postmodern

the proliferation of voices,

attention

to

the

self

as

a proto

a construct,

his
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donning of Yeatsian "masks"

to mediate between self and

nonself, and his overriding concern with the very nature of
the poet, defined--in a fashion indebted to both Whitman
and

Keats--as

identities.4

a

mere

vessel

for

transmitting

other

What I want to suggest here, specifically, is

the way in which Berryman resolves the anxieties associated
with fragmented identity precisely through poetry--through
the manipulation of various poetic masks

that

include

minstrelsy.
The minstrel show device itself, that is, becomes one of
Berryman's most ingenious methods for inflecting his text
with masks,

voices,

and personae,

condensing as it does

into a single form his own aesthetic and personal needs and
the most politically overburdened signifier of the racial
construction of the subject in his culture. Ultimately,

I

propose, we might read The Dream Sonas as Berryman's effort
to depict in verse a basic structure of subjectivity: the
constant tension or,

in the case of the extremities of

narcissistic disorder, alternation between an autonomous,
egoistic--and well-disciplined--self, on the one hand, and
its

dispersal

into

a

fragmented,

intersubjective--and

transgressive--plurality of connections, pieces, or masks,
on the other.
names

One of these masks, and one of Berryman's

for the slippage of

the subject

they imply,

was

blackface minstrelsy, a discourse that, like the (racial)
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mirror stage itself,

inescapably casts the body as the

template for the unity and disintegration of the self.

A

case

of

disintegration

anxiety

Berryman links the crisis of the subject at the core of
his

long poem

outlining

it

to a complex
as

a product

set

of causative

of his

factors,

protagonist

Henry's

personal, psychological, narcissistic injuries and of the
perceived loss of structure in the social environment of
the late twentieth century.
personal

and

social

As even Kohut would agree,

factors

in

the

pathogenesis

of

narcissistic disorders can never be entirely untangled:
reading

ego

crisis

in

a different,

but

instructively

parallel, literary example, he notes that "Hamlet's psyche
is 'out of joint' because it has to confront the fact that
the world in which he had believed has become
joint'"

(Analysis 236).

Similarly,

'out of

Berryman's Henry is

"the poor man" who "is coming to pieces joint by joint" not
only because of a catastrophic childhood paternal loss but
also

because

of

"c o n d i t i o n s &
Unions"

economic,

the

(Song 140).

faceless

moral,
monsters

and
of

political
the

Soviet

Thus, the death by suicide of Henry's

father during Henry's childhood and the equally devastating
"death" or absence of the heavenly Father
causes

Henry's

metaphysical

(the loss that

consuming preoccupation with

status)

blend

almost

seamlessly

his

dicey

into

the
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deaths

of

critical

social

values--love,

compassion,

equality, honesty— that characterize the nuclear, cold war,
hyperindustrialized age in which Henry finds himself.
Elsewhere,

I have examined in more detail Berryman's

extended development of Henry as a case of what Kohut calls
"disintegration anxiety," focusing on poems like Song 137,
where Henry glibly observes

that

pieces,"

where

and

Song

311,

"things
the

are going to
function

of

Henry1s/Berryman1s poetry in the symbolic resolution of
that anxiety is suggested by the line, "The pieces sat up &
wrote."

Here, I want to refer briefly to those causative

factors in Henry's disintegration complex that might be
conceptualized in terms of the increasing disciplinarity of
twentieth-century
disciplinary
pathology.

culture,

forces

to

eventually

the

Kohutian

relating
model

those

of

self

While Henry is unnerved by the threats of a

militarized, nuclear, and ecologically deteriorating age,
his

dream-work

also

reflects

a

sort

of

grim

unease

precipitated by the more insidious forces of alienation in
society. ^

There

is,

for

example,

the

pervasive

disciplinarity evidenced by Henry's frequent paranoia about
a carceral network in which he is always at risk of being
criminalized— caught,

tried,

imprisoned,

executed--and a

surveillance network in which there is always the threat of
being watched, often by the police.

What Henry feels as

the pressures of an intense effort to control the modern
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subject, I would argue, are manifested in distorted dream
form

in

poems

like

Song

12,

intimations of surveillance,

which

weaves

illegality,

together

and execution;

Song 101, a dream in which a vague police presence combines
with a vision of universal insanity and incarceration to
evoke

a

sense

of

"total

LOSS"

and

of

the

"absolute

disappearance of continuity and love"; and Song 95, where
such

themes

converge

in the

shape

of

a single police

officer whose surly gaze reduces Henry to a Kafkaesque
insect and provokes his most psychotic criminal fantasies.
The atmosphere of disciplinary order and morality is
perhaps only a function of the culture of commodification
and technologization that persistently threatens to reduce
full human

identity and erode spirituality.

particularly irked by his complete subjection,
poet,

to the labor, wage,

system.

Henry is
even as a

and production-driven economic

He articulates the threat of what Marxist theory

might call the modern rationalization of the subject--and
what Kohut noted as the effects

of

"industrialization"

(Restoration 270)--with images like the "pinched chest" and
the "thinky death" of Song 10, the implied "rat race" and
the hypertechnical social science that reduces human beings
to

machines

in

Song

13,

and

the

strange

forces

of

mechanization that threaten spirituality when they invade
the "Temples" of Songs 73 and 99.

So too,

the intensive

labors and economic imperatives of a rampant capitalism
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leave Henry sweating throughout the book to earn enough
money,

pay bills,

consume goods,

and shell out

taxes;

noncommodifiable matters of the "fathomless heart"
like the writing of poetry,

(10)

for which he is paid nothing

(67), must take a back seat to the pecuniary exigency of
teaching: he "taught & taught & taught / ...to mollify one
creditor / or another... // [mostly]...the grindstone & the
nose / had it, & him..." (211).
Though the profound racialization of U.S.
not,

finally,

society is

a central concern of the poems,

it recurs

often enough to be considered an important feature of the
social "conditions"

that are putting Henry out of joint.

The "race bigotry"

(24), segregationism (60 and 68), and

ultimate commodification of humanity of which they are a
legacy

(273),

decried

in

several

Songs,

are,

indeed,

closely tied to the tendencies toward criminalization and
economic rationalization mentioned above.

Of course, as I

suggested in chapter 1, the tendencies of a disciplinary
society to criminalize and to commodify the bodies of (to
convert into pure labor) certain segments of the population
probably

played

a

critical

historical

role

in

the

racialization of the U.S. population, but Henry tends to
reproduce this channel for the production of "race" rather
than subvert it, frequently adopting a mask of "blackness"
for his own sense of himself as a moral transgressor and as
a purely economic subject.

It is precisely this ambivalent
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relation

to

"race"

that

I want

to

examine

in greater

detail— along with the Songs that critique bigotry— below.
In

any

case,

this

sense

of

racialization

is

only

a

particularly violent— and visible— component of the social
context of alienation underlying what we might think of as
Henry's narcissistic personality disorder.

For Henry, as

for "tragic man"--Kohut's iconic modern sufferer of the
narcissistic

disorder--a

comprehensive

environment

of

empathic and relational disjunctures is experienced as an
outright

fragmentation

desperate,

of

the

self

and

results

in

a

compensatory need to "perform" one's own self

presence .6
At

the

core

of

the

narcissistically

damaged

configuration that includes Henry's well-remarked rage,
paranoia,

hypochondria and compulsive oral and phallic

preoccupations,

I am suggesting,

deficiency of the self.
condition,
formulation

is a basic

structural

Eventually, I want to read Henry's

and

his

minstrelsy,

in

of

the

fragmentation

terms
of

of

the

K o h u t 's

self

as

a

"splitting off" of fundamental libidinal and narcissistic
sectors

of

the

self

(Analysis 183-85).
on his

condition

from

the

"central"

personality

I want to begin, however, by focusing
as

disorganization and

an

instance

of

"precariousness"

the

comprehensive

of self-experience

that Kohut also describes (Restoration 103-5), a total loss
of

the

self

that

can

result

in

the

former

splitting
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tendency

as

a

defensive

mechanism.

Henry,

with

recurrent dreams that "things are going to pieces"
137),

suffers

anxiety":

from

"the

what

dread

of

Kohut
the

terms
loss

his
(Song

"disintegration

of

his

self--the

fragmentation of and estrangement from his body and mind in
space, the breakup of the sense of his continuity in time"
(Restoration 105).
Henry's tendency to "come to pieces joint by joint,"
already noted in Song 140, first manifests itself in Song
8 , which describes a similar progressive fragmentation of
the self and the body. Here, as with the analytical social
science

of

(which,

appropriately,

"they"

Song

destroy

13,

the

which

reduces

falls

spiritual

Henry

apart),
levels

an

to a machine
indeterminate

of experience

and

reduce identity solely to its bodily manifestation:
They blew out his loves, his interests. 'Underneath,'
(they called in iron voices) 'understand,
is nothing. So there.'
...They lifted off
his covers till he showed, and cringed &. pled
to see himself less.
They installed mirrors till he flowed...
The sense of extreme objectification registered here is
linked to a literal disintegration of the body,

for not

only does Henry "flow" when surrounded by the mirrors which
force him to objectify himself, but the "they" also engage
in a progressive removal of Henry's teeth, hair, eyes, and
"crotch."

While the "iron" voices certainly evoke forces
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of technologization, most signifiers in Berryman's "dreamwork" are overdetermined and, within the context of the
book as a whole, I would read the cryptic "they" in Song 8
as a figure of authority in general;

it encompasses not

only the enforcement of the industrialized body-as-subject
and the threat of total surveillance, but also,

to place

such social forces within Kohut's post-Freudian paradigm,
the interpellative power of the superego.

Indeed,

in a

discussion of how both workplace and parental denials of
the "total self" can destroy one's sense of self-cohesion,
Kohut suggests a direct link between the fragmentation of
the

self

and

the

kind

of

threatening

but

indistinct

"voices" of authority that Berryman evokes here:
The cold voices...which the paranoiac often reports as
commenting on aspects of his behavior, details of his
looks, etc., are perhaps to be understood not only as
the criticism of a projected superego but also as the
projected expression of a feeling of fragmentation which
arose as a result of the patient's insufficiently
developed or declining psychic capacity to maintain a
solid cathexis of the self.
(Analysis 121-22)
Henry's own crisis of subjectivity,

as we shall see,

is

consistently played out within a disciplinary context set
by such projected voices of authority.
Throughout The Dream Songs. Henry seems

inordinately

obsessed with damage to his bodily integrity.

In Songs 42

and 65 the focus of this anxiety is a damaged ankle, while
Songs

163-7 0 bemoan

a broken arm

breaking body in general.

in particular

and a

Elsewhere, Henry has nightmare

visions of being pursued and bitten by the dentist's drill
(Song 185) and of having his left leg "sawed off / at the
knee, " leaving him to continue life as a "peg-leg"
319).
as

(Song

Many of these references conflate bodily mutilation

a

concrete

"verbalization"

for

an

otherwise

indescribable state of identity anxiety (Restoration 103)
with the more specific anxiety of bodily deterioration
leading toward death,

as in the Opus Posthumous Songs of

Book 4, where Henry actually imagines himself to be dead
and buried.

In the first of these,

bizarre about Henry":

there is "something

portions of his

"subject body"

(a

phrase that correlates well with Kohut's references to what
we experience as a "body-self") are being "slowly sheared /
off" as he becomes "smaller & smaller": "Henry's parts were
fleeing"

(Song 78).

removing

various

Finally,

In Song 81, "they" are again at work,
pieces

of

Henry's

now

buried

body.

imagining the worms of the grave to be at hand,

Henry alludes to a perceived failure or lack which lies at
the heart of his fragmentation:

"I am--I should be held

together by-- / but I am breaking up" (Song 85).
In these and similar references to the absence of some
outside agent as a structuring device, the role of personal
and developmental narcissistic injuries in the etiology of
Henry's disintegration anxiety become more evident, taking
their place alongside the social factors I have focused on
so far.

At the foundation of Kohutian self psychology is

the

theory

that

the

development

of

a

balanced

and

realistically structured sense of self is dependent on the
presence of-properly empathic

"self-objects" which serve

both

for

as

approving

mirrors

the

self's

inherent

narcissism and as idealized images of identity which the
self can internalize as the basis for its own structure.
If these self-objects— particularly in the case of parental
self-objects during the crucial developmental years--are
unempathic, unrealistically admiring, or absent altogether,
and

the

mirroring

disrupted,
fragment

and

idealizing

functions

are

thus

there is a tendency for the self to split or
resulting

in

disintegration anxiety.

narcissistic

disorders

like

This framework has considerable

explanatory value for The Dream Songs. in which Henry's
representations of both his maternal and paternal imagos
are deeply troubled.

Much of his anxiety clearly revolves

around a single traumatic failure of paternity: the suicide
of his

father,

Florida dawn"
(Song 143).
complaint,

who,

when he

(Song 384),

"shot his

heart

out

in a

"wiped out [Henry's] childhood"

This abandonment is Henry's most insistent
and is often directly associated,

as when he

links the broken ankle of Song 42 directly to the memory of
his

father's corpse,

with his anxiety about a decaying

bodily structure. And though, in one instance, Henry makes
a somewhat

forced effort

to idealize

the image of his

mother (Song 100), even then the homage is confusedly and
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tellingly interfused with the orality of his alcoholism; in
its

other

appearances

ambivalent,

the

maternal

imago

at

best

at worst extremely threatening--she is

"the

armed mother" of the night, "with her knives"
The

identity

crisis

precipitated

conditions and "self-object failures"

is

(212) .

by

both

modern

(Kohut, Restoration

190) is represented in The Dream Sonas as a tension between
grandiose
captured

assertions
in

constructions

Henry's

of

autonomy

repeated

beginning

with

and

self-presence--

recourse
an

to

emphatic

rhetorical
"I

am"--and

anxiety-ridden meditations on the fragmentation of that
"I "--literalized
pieces."

In

in his

song

195

recurrent
Henry

idiom

evokes

of

"going

to

the psychological

paradigm I have outlined in connecting his disintegration
directly to his father's critical absence:

"I stalk my

mirror down this corridor / my pieces litter.
sore / from my great loss leaves me."

Oklahoma,

Shattered by the

loss of his father (who lived and was buried in Oklahoma),
Henry seeks the mirror--the self-object--that might keep
his tenuous self-structure from "breaking up."
concludes,

however,

The poem

with a desperate effort to deny the

reality of his father's suicide and a hopeful vision of the
reconstruction of the self and the body:

"All my pieces

kneel and we all scream: / History's Two-legs [the father's
corpse] was a heartless dream."

Instead, Henry imagines,

"reality is [feasts] // & reskinned knuckles & forgiveness
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& toys

/ unbreakable. .." and

"the growing again of the

right arm / ... & the popping back in of eyes."^

This

poetic symbolization of a reconstituted self is crucial
because, as I want to show, it is precisely through poetry,
and through manipulation of the various poetic masks that
include minstrelsy, that Henry quiets his screaming pieces
by making

them sing:

the

songs

themselves

become

the

"dreams," the mirror--a sort of artistic self-object— that
symbolically resolve the horror of identity fragmentation.
In these lines, where Henry dreams himself whole, we see
literalized the process by which Henry the poet--long noted
as an autobiographical simulacrum of Berryman the poet-experiences

through representation the solace of moving

from "I am in pieces" to "I am."8
Indeed,

Henry's ability to work toward such symbolic

reconstitutions

of

his

psychological health;

"I"

suggests

a

modicum

the condition represented in The

Dream Songs. even if we consider Henry's alcoholism,
perhaps

not

of

so uncontrolled

or debilitating

as

is

to be

categorized as "diseased" along the lines of some of the
more serious cases discussed by Kohut.

In this regard, it

is important to note that Kohut views the continuum between
a narcissistic cathexis of the self (Henry's "I am"), on
the

one

(drives,

hand,

and

sectors,

a

tendency

to

imagos of others,

experience

fragments

archaic versions)

of

the self in isolation (Henry's "going to pieces"), on the
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other,

not

only

as

a

clinical

paradigm

psychother ^ipeutic analysis but also as the
structure cf everyday psychological

life

for

fundamental

(Sussman 66).

While Berryman's poems gesture toward a restoration of
wholeness through creative, narcissistic performances of
the self, then, it is nevertheless Berryman's evocation of
a fragmenting self in a fragmenting world that is perhaps
his most lasting contribution to modern poetry.

In Song

137, in the midst of a horrific sequence of songs (134-45)
that evoke oral and anal obsession, environmental disaster,
bodily disintegration, violent rage, massive failures of
paternal and divine nurturing, and--repeatedly--the suicide
of his

father,

"tragic man":

Henry

sounds

the

definitive

"I don't understand

things are going to pieces."

this

lament

of

dream...why,

/

Henry in pieces is Henry at

his most representative of the modern condition and at his
most poetic,

but I am most interested in the fact that

Henry in pieces is also Henry at his most "black."
outlined a Kohutian model
subject,

I

now

representation
strategies,

of

want

for Berryman's

to

examine

"blackness"

with profoundly

crisis of the

exactly

functions

Having

as

contradictory

how

one

of

results,

the
the
in

H e nry's/Berryman's symbolic resolution of the conflicts
inherent in that crisis.
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"I am the blackt-out

man 11

We can begin to see the psychic function of Berryman's
minstrel mask by examining Dream Song 22, which seems to
depict in particularly explicit fashion what Kohut referred
to as the "crucial psychological oscillations between the
cohesive and the fragmented self" (Restoration 77):
I
I
I
I
I
I

am
am
am
am
am
am

the little man who smokes & smokes.
the girl who does know better bu t .
the king of the pool.
so wise I had my mouth sewn shut.
a government official & a goddamned fool.
a lady who takes jokes.

I
I
I
I
I
I

am
am
am
am
am
am

the enemy of the mind.
the auto salesman and love you.
a teenage cancer, with a plan.
the blackt-out man.
the woman powerful as a zoo.
two eyes screwed to my set, whose blind—

It is the Fourth of July.
Collect: while the dying man,
forgone by you creator, who forgives,
is gasping 'Thomas Jefferson still lives'
in vain, in vain, in vain.
I am Henry Pussy-cat! My whiskers fly.
There are several possibilities for making sense of what is
going on in this typically wry and cryptic Dream Song.
Following Denis Donoghue's emphasis, in one of the earliest
critical

approaches

to The Dream Songs, on Berryman's

technique of breaking the "egotistical sublimity" of his
poet's voice into various "voices" or "fragments," we might
think of the first twelve lines of the poem as the voices
of the others, especially "victims," for whom Henry is so
fond of speaking (Donoghue 24).

Donoghue also noted the

similarity of this "voicing" to the Yeatsian "mask," and
Jerome Mazzaro has more schematically outlined Berryman's
use

of

such

negatively,

"masks"
by

assuming

Mazzaro suggests,
various

masks

tenuously,

as

versions

in a Lacanian,

and

the

a means

"I."

roles

for defining
of

self

the nonself.

As

relational world these

literally

From

the

constitute,

this perspective,

though

we might

formulate Song 22 as a construction, through the assumption
of

a

series

of

"masks"

or

"identifications

with

or

oppositions to another," of a "never fully realized" "image
of the self"

(Mazzaro 131):

"I am Henry Pussy-cat!"

By

virtue of its very otherness, this "I am" already contains
the grounds of its own disintegration: "My whiskers fly."9
Similarly, Song 22 illustrates Paul Mariani's description
of the thoroughly Whitmanian "I" of The Dream Sonas: the
"I" as a conduit that fills up and then pours out, singing
with "the range of voices we have come to identify with
Henry"
lines

(Mariani,
of

the

"Lost" 223) .

song

evoke

In this view,

a modernized,

the opening

foreshortened,

Berrymanesque version of a Whitmanian catalogue, a listing
of what Berryman, in his own insightful essay on "Song of
Myself," called the poetic "'I's' identifications outward"
(Freedom 2 3 1 ) .
While this identificatory poetics is a crucial component
of Berryman's assumption of "blackness," I want to approach
that dynamic by first reading Song 22 in terms of the more
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psychoanalytic
outlined

structure

above.

disintegration

of

From

anxiety,

subjectivity

the
the

representation--in Henry's

viewpoint

poem

reads

typical

that
of
as

I have
Henry's

a

literal

dream idiom--of

the

oscillation between his regressive sense of nonidentity, or
at least splintered identity,
hypernarcissistic

assertion

on the one hand,
of

complete

and his
identity

(poetically, a sort of egotistical sublime), on the other.
Within the limits of this single poem, that is, the poetic
persona modulates from an undifferentiated series of selfimages

or

assumed

personae

to

the

single,

emphatic

declaration of self-presence and autonomy of "I am Henry
Pussy-cat!", and back again to the bodily fragmentation of
the closing image.
Song 22, we might say,
oscillations
disordered

Kohut

self:

grandiosity,

is indicative of the dramatic

ascribes

to

the

such personalities
overexcited

narcissistically
fluctuate

between

exhibitionism,

and

overidentification with an idealized imago, on the one hand
(the

posturing

of

"I

am

Henry

Pussycat!",

the

identification with "the king of the pool," the invocation
of

the

nation's

idealized

founding

"fathers"),

and

a

depressive, ashamed, hypochondriacal preoccupation with the
disintegration and

"deadness"

of the self and with its

isolated fragments, on the other (the "flying" off of body
parts,

the interest in the powerlessness stressed by the

311

deaths

of

Jefferson

and

Adams

preoccupation with orality).10
absent,

on

the

same

day,

the

With the authority of an

unforgiving God looming in the background;

the

persona incorporates a series of disconnected images of
"self" from the external environment ("objects") to prop up
or stand for its own faltering psychic structure.
imagos, moreover,
damage:

tellingly reemphasize the narcissistic

they are, by turns,

powerless,
manipulated.

These

ruthlessly
Indeed,

obsessively oral, grandiose,

manipulative,

and

helplessly

the series of voices that seem to

speak through Henry's voice in the first twelve lines of
Song

22

themselves

narcissistic

bespeak

disorder:

if

the

the

very

first

oscillations
sounds

of

helplessly

addictive and oral incorporative, the fourth pretends to a
self-sufficiency so total as to deny even the possibility
of incorporation or the disruption of the bodily schema by
closing off the oral orifice altogether; if the "king of
the pool" is positively regal in his sense of grandiosity,
the "woman powerful as a zoo" seems ironically disempowered
and caged; if "the enemy of the mind" and the disingenuous
auto salesman suggest ruthless refusal to recognize the
full humanity of others,

the disembodied eyes of line 12

seem helplessly manipulated by the unilateral power of a
television set that cannot acknowledge even the presence,
much less the humanity, of those it interpellates.

Following such a reading, we might well interpret "the
blackt-out man" of line 10 as a heavy drinker lapsed into
an alcoholic dead zone, an instance of the drunken memory
"blackout" noted elsewhere in The Dream Soncrs by critics,
like Lewis Hyde and George F. Wedge, who have written on
the significance of alcoholism in the b o o k . H
compelling

reading

within

the

context

of

An equally
the

themes

developed throughout the book, however, is to view this as
a reference to blackface and, thereby, to the "man" whose
full humanity has been most comprehensively "blackt-out" in
the U.S., the "man" with "black" skin.

In fact, a careful

analysis

"blacked up." man

of

the

role

played by

the

throughout The Dream Sonas suggests that these two readings
are not contradictory: my analysis of Berryman's deployment
of

"race"

alcoholic
man"

suggests precisely the complementarity of the
"blackt-out man"

in his

poetry,

and

and the minstrel
it

is

on

"blackt-out

the psychology

and

politics of this identification that the balance of my
study will focus.
Dream Song 22 provides a condensed figuration, then, of
one of the important structuring devices of the entire
book:

Henry's dual tendencies toward an overly unified,

autonomous, and grandiose identity and toward a looseness
of identity that allows him to indulge the libidinality of
the body,
identify

play multiple roles,
with

others

whom

he

don various masks,
views

as

damaged

and
or
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dispossessed.

One of Henry's

"roles"

is assuredly the

manic substance abuser; one of his masks, blackface; one of
his imagined identifications,

the racially oppressed. All

of these are encapsulated in "the blackt-out man" of line
10, but his placement within an undifferentiated series of
such

self-images

"minstrelsy"

helps

us

to

understand

how

Henry's

fits within what I have referred to as the

poem's larger crisis of the subject--how it relates,
is, to the "I am Henry Pussy-cat!" of line 18.

that

Blackface

is Henry's favorite mask for the "disintegration products"
of a fragmenting self (Kohut, Restoration 119): autoerotic
drive fixations,
deterioration

a preoccupation with the mutilation and
of

the

body,

and

exhibitionistic

"performances" of self-presence.
The phrase "I am Henry Pussy-cat!", which I am relating
to the grandiose pole of the narcissistically damaged self,
is one in a series of "I am" refrains enunciated by Henry.
John Haffenden has identified this construction as a major,
recurrent structuring device in the sequence as a whole,
relating it to Henry's desire for a self-sufficiency as
complete as that expressed by the "I am that I am" of the
Old Testament God of the Jews, and opposing it to Henry's
fears of psychic and bodily disintegration (Haffenden 9697).

If,

in Song 141,

for example,

Henry declares--in

admitted emulation of Yahweh--that a self-interested "I am"
shall be his credo, we might view it as a direct response

314

to the intense disintegration anxiety expressed in Song
140, where, the reader will remember, Henry was "coming to
pieces joint by joint."
The frequency of Berryman's references to this crisis of
the subject in his long sequence is perhaps obscured by his
oneiric method, which employs a sort of dream symbolism for
its elements: as often as Henry declares "I am" or dreams
of withdrawal to the stability of the confines of a tree
(9, 10), tower (140), citadel (372), house (163, 357, 376),
temple

(73,

"centre"

102),

cathedral

(161),

monastery

(370),

(221, 368), or body, he imagines his self swarming

with "others" or falling from the tree (9, 57), leaving the
house (376), flowing (8, 137), leaking (10), spilling (43),
pouring out

(131, 221), excreting

radioactively

decaying

(51),

(134), bleeding

or--in

a

(176),

plethora

of

nightmarish ways--disintegrating.

The dream imagery of

Song

representation

137

is

thus

typical

in

its

of

a

subject--symbolized by "heroes' bodies" and a temple--in
crisis:

the bodies are collapsing,

the temple is knocked

apart, Henry's "honey" is "flowing off," and "things are
going to pieces" generally.
makes The

Dream Sonas

plurality

of

voices

Indeed, almost everything that

so famously difficult,
to

the

fractured

syntax

from the
to

the

interruptions of minstrel dialogue itself, can be referred
to this disruption of the subject,

to Berryman's stated

sense of himself as "a strange man, not unitary like other
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people."

Yet, in the same journal entry, Berryman goes on

to declare,

"I am really Henry Pussycat."12

Song 22, we

might say, versifies this crisis as a tension between the
powerful, heroic stand of "I am Henry Pussy-cat!" and the
"pieces" of its first twelve lines.
It is through poetry, in short, that both Berryman and
his surrogate, Henry,

allay the anxieties associated with

their consciousness of impending disintegration.
is explicit,

Song 311

for example about the relationships

among

Henry's libidinal drive fixations, his disintegration, and
his art:
Hunger was constitutional with him,
women, cigarettes, liquor, need need need
until he went to pieces.
The pieces sat up & wrote. They did not heed
their piecedom but kept very quietly on
among the chaos.
While Denis Donoghue is quite right to find in these lines
an "ingenious" poetic technique in which the poet,

"living

in various degrees of chaos, dissociates himself; allowing
to each fragment its corresponding voice"

(27), I believe

that only a psychoanalytic model like Kohut's can explain
the strange association here of Henry's object hungers with
that poetic technique.

For Kohut, the intensification of

narcissistic and autoerotic drives
aggression,

exhibitionism,

etc.)

(orality,
is

a

sexuality,

"disintegration

product" released when broader configurations of experience
are destroyed (Restoration 119) .

Both the hypercathexis of
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fragments of the self and the exaggeration of assertiveness
through creative expression, in this view, are compensatory
modes

through which

a disintegrating

self

desperately

attempts to experience itself as whole.
We cannot fully comprehend how the use of blackface fits
into this psychopoetic dynamic,

however,

without taking

into account the moralizing and normalizing valuations that
are attached to such subjective states by the dictates of
the

social

corporeal

order.
conflicts

oscillations
nowhere

in

oscillation

between
greater
is

interpellative

The

ambivalent

that

are

"I am"

figured
imperative

tied

and

evidence
as

"I am

than
a

to

moral,

sexual,

up

in

polarity

43,

are

where

the

between

the

"Be... consist"

libidinal, fragmenting tendencies.

Henry's

in pieces"

Song

and

and

his

In the song, an intense

sense of transgression and criminality is attached to the
fragmentation of subjectivity when Henry imagines himself
to be on trial not only for his uncontrolled adultery,
smoking, and drinking, but also, literally, for his failure
to maintain proper masculine unity:
Be.
I warned him, of a summer night: consist,
consist. Ex-wives roar.
Further, the Crown holds that they spilt himself,
splitting his manward chances, to his shame,
my lords, & our horror.
Behind, oh worst lean backward them who bring
un-charges: hundreds & one, children,
the pillars & the sot.
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A

phalanx

lawyers,

of

social

authority

"the Crown,"

lords),

figures

(banks,

cops,

reinscribing the earlier

projected "iron" voices of the superego, bring charges here
against Henry for spilling or splitting his "manward" ego,
a dispersal of self doubly significative as his masking and
roleplaying (he is guilty of being both "hundreds & one,"
of the pronominal confusion of "they spilt himself") and as
his

spilling

his

seed

illegitimate children
several occasions,
follows

this

illicitly,

spawning

various

(a concern of Henry's expressed on

including in the song that immediately

one) .

His

other

transgressions

of

the

moralized, unified, economically functional subject are, of
course,
pillars")

his

libidinal

indulgences

and booze ("the sot").

of

cigarettes

("the

At the end of the poem

Henry admits his guilt and finds uncertain solace in using
his dissipation as the occasion for making poetry.
We

might

say

that

Henry's

"crisis,"

then,

is

not

reducible to a simple effort to secure the boundaries of
the

"I" and its bodily structure against the threat of

disruption:

clearly, he finds both a conflicted pleasure

and an ambivalent use in the disruptions of the subject.
The

pleasure

lies

in

finding

release

from

and/or

manipulating the strictures of an imposed social subject
position,

and has much

preoccupations--feasting,

to do with the sexual and oral
smoking, drinking--that surface

in these poems; the use is nothing less than poetry itself,
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through which, similarly, Henry gains both a symbolic power
over and a release from the static

s u b j e c t .

13

Indeed, the

voices of authority and the sense of transgression they
bring to the fragmented moment of Henry's

subjectivity

suggest we should read the odd confluence of themes located
there--excessive

indulgence

disintegration, mask wearing,

of

bodily

appetites,

the slipping in and out of

various identities--not only in terms of the mischanneled
narcissism of self-fragmentation, but also in terms of what
cultural critics Peter Stallybrass and Allon White have
outlined as the carnivalized transgression or subversion of
the socially disciplined subject.

Stallybrass and White

posit a historical repression of the "'grotesque body' of
carnival by the emergent middle and professional classes
from the Renaissance onwards"; thus, "a fundamental ritual
order of western culture came under attack--its feasting,
violence,
spectacle

drinking,
and

processions,

outrageous

fairs,

clamour

surveillance and repressive control"

wakes,

were

(176).

rowdy

subject

to

The outcome of

this social repression, they argue, was a dramatic return
in the discourse and psychology of the individual of a
wide-ranging "thematics of carnival pleasure"

(182): not

only the feasting, drinking, and "grotesque aspects of the
body"

(183), but also clownism, nursery behavior,

scenes, pantomiming (175), and masking (183).

sexual
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I would argue

that

a crucial--and much neglected--

component of Berryman's dream-work is a similar neurotic or
hysteric return of those carn(iv)al elements repressed from
the

"manward"

subject

of

the

twentieth century by

the

forces of social authority and surveillance who bring their
charges of dissipation against Henry in Song 43.15 Henry's
incessant concerns with the body, its fluids and orifices,
and

with

slipping

identities--the

in

and

out

of

a

series

"wide cast of characters"

Berryman in his 1968 prefatory note--are

of

poetic

mentioned by
thus not only

products of anxiety but also represent a earn(iv)alized
transgression of the well-disciplined subject.
half-comic,

Henry's

half-guilty revelries of fragmentation share

the function,

and many of the features,

of the carnival

impulse theorized by Stallybrass and White:
It attacks the authority of the ego (by rituals of
degradation and by the use of masks and costume) and
flaunts
the
material
body
as
a
pleasurable
grotesquerie....it denies with a laugh the ludicrous
pose of autonomy adopted by the subject...at the same
moment as it re-opens the body-boundary, the closed
orifices of which normally guarantee the repressive
mechanism itself.
(183-84)
The rationalized,

"wise" character of Song 22 may sew its

mouth shut to maintain the integrity of its body-boundary,
but the sheer number of masks that the "I am" is capable of
wearing--including the smoker and the alcoholic "blackt-out
man"--subverts the pose of egoistic self-sufficiency.

Centrally involved in the pleasures,

the terrors,

and

the symbolic resolutions of Henry's experiences of self
fragmentation,
man."

then,

is none other than "the blackt-out

As a racially oppressed Other in Song 22, he fits in

among Henry's series of Whitmanian identifications, located
in the gaps or disruptions of the subject; as an alcoholic
"blackt-out"

in

drunken

revelry,

carnivalized obliteration of

he

the ego

figures

the

through the total

opening of its body-boundary to pleasurable intake; and, as
Henry in blackface, he encompasses both the masking through
which Henry can be both "hundreds & one" and the pantomimic
acting out

through which Henry can safely

pleasures of the body.

indulge

the

The "minstrel" of Song 231,

for

example, seems directly connected to the smoking, drinking,
self-splitting transgressor and poet of Song 43, since he
is again on trial, about to be punished by "them," both, it
seems,

for doing

this later song,

"b a d " and for his poetic activity.

closely connected to Song 43--they were

written just weeks apart--Henry worries that,
for his transgressions,
I

am

In

suggesting

if punished

"He'll lose his minstrelsy

that

"blacking

up"

has

a

crucial

function in the larger crisis of the subject that pervades
these

poems:

it

is

one

of

Henry's

codes

for

the

fragmentation of the cohesive self, in Kohutian terms, or
the subversion of

the bourgeois

subject,

social approach of Stallybrass and White.

to apply

the

Berryman's use
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of blackface

thus

parallels

what

the

latter

theorists

describe as a
reconstruction of the idea of carnival as the culture of
the Other.
This act of disavowal on the part of the
emergent bourgeoisie, with its sentimentalism and
disgust, made carnival into the festival of the Other.
It encoded all that which the proper bourgeois must
strive not to be in order to preserve a stable and
'correct' sense of self.
(178)
Minstrel
analysis

performance
shows,

was

in

its

original

precisely

a

form,

as

production

Lott's
of

the

discipline-subverting pantomimic carnivalesque in the form
of such a "reconstruction of the idea of carnival as the
culture of the Other."

Berryman simply resurrects this

politically overdetermined,

racializing cultural mode as

the characteristic pose of his twentieth-century "tragic
man." That is, whether Henry is pleasurably transgressing
the parameters of his acceptable identity--white, adult,
law-abiding,

economically sound, family man— or agonizing

the possibility of its complete collapse,

and whether he

does so through the libidinal pursuits of sexuality and
substance consumption, or through the self-representations
and masked roleplaying of the poet,

he has

a distinct

tendency to do so in blackface.

"Find

out

about

the Mr.

Bones business”

In his crucial 1958 essay "Change the Joke and Slip the
Yoke," Ralph Ellison described precisely such a disavowal
of the negative and chaotic side of the "white folk mind"
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and a correlative

transference of

the carnival

to the

"black" Other as the cultural mechanism at the heart of
blackface performance in the United States:
Because these things are bound up with their notion of
chaos it is almost impossible for many whites to
consider questions of sex, women, economic opportunity,
the national identity, historic change, social justice—
even the "criminality" implicit in the broadening of
freedom itself--without summoning malignant images of
black men into consciousness....the Negro is reduced to
a negative sign that usually appears in a comedy of the
grotesque and the unacceptable. As Constance Rourke has
made us aware, the action of the early minstrel show-with its Negro-deprived choreography, its ringing of
banjos and rattling of bones, its voices cackling jokes
in pseudo-Negro dialect, with its nonsense songs, its
bright costumes and sweating performers--constituted a
ritual of exorcism.
(Shadow 48)
This

theory of a ritualistic

applied
sweating,

to

the

rampant

comedy might be directly

sexuality

grotesque body;

and drinking

the wild dancing,

of

the

music

and

costuming; the "pseudo-Negro" dialect; and the insinuations
of

economic

and

social transgression

that

characterize Henry's moments of blacking up,

tend

to

but before

examining this aspect of Berryman's work more closely I
want

to place

it

within the context

qualifying observation.

of

an

important

What I find most interesting about

the possible relevance of this passage to The Dream Songs
is

that

Berryman,

during the earliest

phase

of

their

composition, almost certainly must have read it.
Ellison's comments on minstrelsy, written in response to
Stanley Edgar Hyman's assertion of the African American
folkloric background of minstrel performance,

appeared in

the spring 1958 edition of Partisan Review, one of the
central

publishing

intellectual

organs

career.

in

Berryman's

Berryman's

literary

own

and

publishing

relationship with Partisan Review was long and involved,
including

the

1953

debut

of his

long poem Homage

to

Mistress Bradstreet in its pages and the publication of
several

of his

critical

essays

on modern poetry.

The

poetry editor of the review from 193 9 to 1953 was Delmore
Schwartz,

perhaps Berryman's closest friend and the man

whose death is elegized in almost messianic terms by the
"solid block of agony"
Most importantly,

(Song 157) of Dream Songs 146-159.

Berryman's own poem "American Lights,

Seen Off From Abroad"

appeared in the same spring 1958

issue that contained Ellison's essay.

Berryman was both a

regular reader of Partisan Review and, we can guess,
particularly

interested

reader

of

this

issue,

a

which

contained not only his own work but the essay by Ellison,
the long-time literary acquaintance whom he later called
"one of the best writers in the country" (Plotz 9).
My hunch that Berryman read "Change the Joke and Slip
the

Yoke"

when

it

appeared

and

found

it

to

be

of

significant interest for his own current creative project
seems to gain support from the fact that there is no record
of minstrelsy being a part of Berryman's evolving plans for
his long poem from 1955,

when the first Dream Song was

written, until late in 1958,

just a few months after the

324

discussion of minstrelsy in the Partisan Review appeared.
During the final months of 1958, John Haffenden's study of
Berryman's

notes

suggests,

the

first

poems

conversations between Henry and a murky
figure who calls Henry

"Mr.

employing

"interlocutor"

Bones" were composed;

they

would eventually become Dream Songs 26, 67, 75, 76, 77, and
217 (Haffenden 45-46, 158).
archive
remarks,

of

the

all

poet's

Indeed, despite a voluminous

manuscripts,

of which document

notes,

and

the remarkably

later

complex

process of shifting conceptualizations and strueturalizing
devices for the sequence that characterized these early
years

of composition,

we have no record

that Berryman

considered a minstrel show effect as such a structural
device until January.

195 9 . "a date from which it may be

inferred that Mr. Bones and his friend,
had not

before

figured very

(Haffenden 46).

the interlocutor,

consciously

in his plan"

Berryman's note to himself that month is

suggestive of the newness of the minstrel idea--"Find out
about the Mr. Bones business"--as is the next reference
recorded by Haffenden:

"where does

'Bones' stuff begin?"

(Haffenden 46-47).
This is not to deny the significance of other sources
and precursors
influences

which

have

been

suggested

on Berryman's minstrel

impulse.

as

critical
Arpin has

convincingly connected Berryman's deployment of

"black"

voices to his knowledge of the French Symbolists: for the
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revitalizing effect of infusing poetry with a racialized
"low" diction Berryman had the model of Rimbaud's "nigger"
persona and Corbiere's penchant for "talking negro"
7,

75-77) .

Much

closer

to

the

time

and

(Arpin

spirit

of

Berryman's own work is Conrad Aiken's Ushant. which,

as

Davis has suggested in her intriguing reading of Berryman's
copy of the work (and the notations he made in it in 1955),
contains a possible seed for the idea of using the minstrel
show as a representational

format

for the contrapuntal

"dance, dialogue or dialectic" of consciousness ("Ushant"
290-91).

And

of

course,

Berryman's

definite--though

apparently not very extensive--reliance on Carl Wittke's
Tambo

and Bones

for

information about

the history and

format of minstrelsy has been well-noted . ^

Whatever the

relative weight of such influences, however, only Ellison's
theory of blackface as "negative sign" could have stressed
to Berryman the actual historical psychological role of
blackface

imagery

in

U.S.

"white"

consciousness--"a

symbolic role basic," as Ellison put it, "to the underlying
drama of American society"
sense

of

this

basic

(Shadow 47) .

symbolic

role

may

Berryman's new
have

been

the

immediate spark to a decision, late in 1958, to develop the
minstrel theme as a way of staging the internal otherness-but especially carn(iv)al Otherness--within the identity of
what he intended to be a representative "white" American-and to revise even poems written before that decision to
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evoke

the new carnivalizing,

exorcizing,

masking Other

"bound up with [Henry's] notion of chaos": that lurked at
Henry's

fragmented

pole:

line 10

originally penned on July 4, 1958, as

of

Dream

Song

"I am the

22,

shuddering

man," would only later become "I am the blackt-out man"
(Haffenden 89).
If Berryman was

indeed

familiar with

the

ideas

in

"Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke," it certainly affects
how we assess his own subsequent creation of a sort of
derivative minstrel show and possibly clarifies Ellison's
recollections of the strange phone calls with which I began
this chapter.

It is hard to imagine a cultural scholar of

Berryman's thoroughness reading Ellison's essay and almost
immediately proceeding to unselfconsciously write poems
that trifle with the chaotic,
marginally

criminal

borders

sexual,
of

carnivalesque, and

"white"

middle-class

identity yet disavow them by, in part, "summoning malignant
images of black men into consciousness"
48) .

If Berryman knew the essay,

possible

(Ellison,

that is,

Shadow

it is also

that he intended his manipulation of minstrel

devices as a representation of minstrelsy, and how (he knew
Ellison, had said) it functioned in white culture, not, in
mere reenactment of the original minstrel show, as a naive
and racializing representation of "blackness."

Similarly,

it seems unlikely that Berryman would have called Ellison
with

the presumptuous

intention

of verifying

that

the
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styles he was incorporating sounded like "black" voices,
but rather more likely that he now conceptualized Ellison
as an authority on the "pseudo-Negro dialect" of minstrel
performance that Ellison mentions in the essay.

If this

indeed was the tenor of the phone calls about "dialect,"
then

Ellison's

description

of

those

conversations

may

reflect what both conversants acknowledged as the ambiguous
status

of a recorded cultural

language--"pseudo-Negro"

blackface--rather than the outright contradiction that his
shifting references to "dialect," "Afro-American speech,"
and "minstrelsy" seems at first to suggest.
The actual political
device will,
examples

I hope,

effects

of Berryman's minstrel

be better judged by looking at the

I discuss below,

but I am suggesting that the

"blackt-out man" and the "pseudo-Negro dialect" that erupt
within the fragmented consciousness of Berryman's typical
white U.S. citizen should not be viewed simply as instances
of naive racialism, romantic or otherwise.

At worst they

reflect what was, from the moment of their composition, the
racial ambivalence borne of a conscious questioning of the
meaning

of

the

"black"

image

in

the

"white"

mind.

Berryman's various, and ostensibly contradictory, uses of
racial content in The Dream Songs are more productively
viewed

in

Berryman's
subject.

terms

of

the

racial milieu

ambivalent

identifications

and of Henry's

crisis

of

of the
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"The blackt-out man," most indicatively, is not simply a
racialized figure of carnival but

the voice of one of

Henry's sympathetic identifications as well: the racially
oppressed.
"black"

As

voices

I noted above,

several Dream Songs use

to develop a social

critique

practices and segregationist policies.

of racist

In Song 60,

for

example, Henry convinces his unnamed friend that, despite
the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling, racial denial
of equal access remains the de facto law of the land.

The

poem also illustrates the typical format and diction of
Henry's blackface dialogues with his interlocutor:
After eight years, be less dan eight percent,
distinguish' friend, of coloured wif de whites
in de School, in de Souf.
--Is coloured gobs, is coloured officers,
Mr Bones. Dat's nuffin? --Uncle Tom,
sweep shut yo mouf,
is million blocking from de proper job,
de fairest houses & de churches eben.
Although

this

dialect

"bears

only

a

tangential

relationship" to any actual spoken black English

(Davis,

Honey 33) and is not an accurate reproduction of even the
language

of minstrelsy--not

even as

it is reported in

Berryman's ostensible source for such particulars, Wittke's
Tambo and Bones--one can see immediately from the content
here why early commentators like William Wasserstrom and J.
M. Linebarger suggested that the Songs bespeak "the lives
of mutilated men, American Negroes"

(Wasserstrom 172) and

suspected that they partake of political subversion and

329

even anti-racist .satire .• Wasserstrom went too far when he
assumed,

however,

on

the

basis

of

a

irregularities and slurred diphthongs,
somehow

reproduced

America's

few

grammatical

that Berryman had

"black"

voice

and

its

suffering and its linguistic subversions, for a "straight"
reading of this pseudo-dialect as "black, " as Aldon Lynn
Nielsen has noted, surely evinces more of demeaning racial
insult than of eiqpathetic interracial solidarity (141).
A reading that can begin to make sense of the ambiguous
political positioning of this poetic voice, however--and
here

it

is

surely

significant

that

sentimental

identification with black suffering and anti-oppressive
symbolism were integral parts of the linguistic distortions
of the historical coon show (see Lott, Ch. l)--is one that
takes into account Berryman's possible acknowledgement-vis-a-vis

the

Ellison essay--of minstrelsy as

representation of
discourse.

"blackness"

and even of

a white

"race"

as a

Berryman "is not attempting to represent black

speech," as Nielsen goes on to argue in distinguishing
Berryman's use of such language from that of the many other
modernist poets Nielsen critiques; rather,

"this dialect is

an enactment of the white mind playing at blackness within
its system of stereotypes" (Nielsen 141).
allows,
explicit

I think,

the content of Song 60, which bears an

critique

consonance

with

This perspective

of

its

social

oppression,

degenerative

style,

to

stand

which

in

bears
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(potentially) an implicit critique of the very discursive
racialization that makes such oppression possible.
was part of Berryman's approach,
defensible

If this

then Arpin is making a

claim when he asserts

that

the epigraph of

Wittke's nostalgic Tambo and Bones. "'Go in brack man, de
day's y o ' own,'" is ironized in its reappearance as one of
the

epigraphs

captures,

to

The

Dream

nonetheless--and

Soncrs.
perhaps

His

description

unintentionally--

precisely the confused ambivalence that characterizes this
nexus

of

Berryman's

understanding

of

minstrelsy,

his

expropriation of "blackness," and his racial sympathies:
"Wittke enjoyed this painful grotesque [Jim Crow] and all
the white men who imitated him in fun; Henry identifies
with him, and sees the desperate irony in the comedy,

for

to jump Jim Crow is to sing under torture" (Arpin 75).
In 1968 Berryman
blackface

device

tried to summarize his use of the
as

a

function

of

identification with victims of racism.
to employ "the Negro dialect"

just

such

an

Asked why he chose

in his sequence,

Berryman

clarified neither the definition of the dialect nor his
understanding of minstrelsy, but explained his inflection
of "blackness" as an extension of his effort, in his 1945
short story "The Imaginary Jew," to undermine the structure
of

racial

"imaginary

bigotry
Jew."

inescapability

of

by

recognizing

Tellingly,
racial

his

his

own

status

example

categorization

for

of
those

as
the
it
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victimizes was none other than his ostensible source for
blackface credibility, Ralph Ellison:
...the Negro business--the blackface--is related to
that. That is, I feel extremely lucky to be white, let
me put it that way, so that I don't have that problem.
Friends of mine--Ralph Ellison, for example, in my
opinion one of the best writers in the country--he has
the problem. He's black, and he and Fanny, wherever they
go, they are black.
(Plotz 9)
There is no reason to doubt either the sincerity or the
political value of Berryman's social engagement here, yet
his

words

also

evoke

all

over

again

the

ambiguity of

Ellison's descriptions of the telephone calls--an ambiguity
reiterated in many of the critical comments on the dialect-as to where "Negro" ends and "blackface" begins: does the
inserted term "blackface" supply a correction of "Negro,"
an alternative
conscious)

phrasing,

"white"

or

a notation

performance

of

of

"Negro"?18

his

(self-

j am not

suggesting that we can definitively answer this question,
but that Berryman was on some level problematizing
materiality
assume,

both

or
by

authenticity
recognizing

of
the

"race"
very

such

the

questions

discursivity

of

"blackness" and by using "Mr. Bones" to gesture toward its
emergence from his own construction of himself as "white."
This problematization provides much of the moral impetus of
that earlier story, where we might substitute "black" for
"Jew"

to better

Berryman's mind:

grasp

the meaning

of

"Mr.

Bones"

in

"The imaginary [black] I was was as real
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as the imaginary [black] hunted down, on other nights and
days, in a real [black]" (Freedom 366).
Song 68 returns to Henry's identification with blacks
who are victimized by a racist social order.

In this poem,

however, the minstrel format is gone and Henry has taken up
the

role

of black blues

literally performing
Smith.

Here

the

on

idiom

artist,

imagining

stage with blues
is

more

that he

great

understated

is

Bessie

and

the

evocation of a "blues" atmosphere is convincing, especially
when the rowdy tenor of the "performance" gives way to the
mournful blues lament of the final stanza, which recalls
that Smith died when denied admittance to a whites-only
emergency room after an auto accident.

In the closing

lines, Berryman ironically juxtaposes the rhetoric of love
specific to the Christmas season--when he wrote the poem-with the prevailing segregation by

"color"

that led to

Smith's death: "they all come hangin Christmas on some tree
/ after trees thrown out--sick-house's white birds' / black
to the birds instead."

In this instance,

at least,

it

seems entirely possible that Berryman did depend on Ellison
for verification

of

the blues

voice

and

sensibility:

Mariani reports that Berryman called Ellison about this
poem and, when he sent Ellison a copy of 77 Dream Soncrs.
inscribed it "Affectionally & with thanks for help on 68."
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"Or keep

so-called black

& raise

new hell"

Still, the social critique articulated in these lines is
an extremely limited theme in The Dream Songs. broached in
no more than five or six of the 385 songs (the blues theme
is even more rare), and a closer look at the situation of
Song 68--as it relates to other instances of "blacking up"
that do not end in the same kind of political indignation-reveals a regressive,
initially

comes

oppressive countervalence to what

across

as

a

politically

progressive

identification with "blackness." The ambience of Henry's
performance as a "blues artist"
shouts,

nightlife,

and

the

evokes

excitement

"strange horns,"
of

a hot

blues

session: "the house is givin hell / to Yellow D oct. I blowin
like it too / and Bessie always do..."
musical

scene,

that

is,

has

The stimulating

the distinct

flavor

of

a

carnivalesque atmosphere that banishes the usual stresses
and anxieties
mysef,

of work,

taxes & things

life and death:

"I feelin

fair

/ seem to be back in line,

like

everybody should / and nobody in the snow on call..."

Not

only is it unusual for the complaining Henry to be feeling
"fair," but here two of his most frequent gripes--taxes and
the

deaths

of

friends--are

in

abeyance.

Berryman's development of the theme of winter,
the snow" to be a reference to death.)

(Based

on

I take "in

The significant

point here is not that a night in a blues house would not
or should not have such associations,

for both the blacks
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and whites who might enjoy them, but that Henrv needs the
blues atmosphere and its "blackness" to achieve them.
His "masked" participation in the blues performance thus
hints at a tendency that is less benign in other Dream
Songs, the tendency to make "carnival into the festival of
the Other"

(Stallybrass and White

178).

Here,

musical

"blackness" "encode[s] all that which the proper bourgeois
[tax-paying, reserved, hard-working] must strive not to be
[loud, revelrous, free of social responsibilities] in order
to

preserve

(Stallybrass
"blackness,"

a

stable

and

and

White

'correct'

178).

By

sense

assuming

of

self"

imaginary

Henry transgresses the usual parameters of

white subjectivity and achieves imaginative resolution of
the anxieties normally associated with those (disciplinary)
parameters--without really endangering his sense of self.
The complement of this carnivalization of the Other is of
course

the

anxiety-ridden

encroachment

of

musical

"blackness" on the "white" subject, which both Stallybrass
and White and Toni Morrison have illustrated by referring
to a single incident involving a similar "black" musical
"form of the modern carnivalesque scene"

(Stallybrass and

White 181) in Marie Cardinal's autobiographical novel Les
Mots pour le Dire

(1976) .

In the passage they cite,

the

first hysteria attack of Cardinal's extended psychological
crisis is precipitated by a Louis Armstrong jazz concert
which

Cardinal perceives

as

so musically

frenzied,

so
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uncontrolled, so intersubjectively physical as to cause the
young French woman to be overcome with panic and a fear of
death.

As Morrison suggests Cardinal is using musical

"blackness"

for the literary "shorthand,

granted assumptions"

the taken-for-

(Plaving x) that make it figurative of

the structure of her own subjective crisis: rushing from
the concert in terror, she finds an objective correlative
for her internal disintegration in a vision of a white
camellia

"svelte

in appearance but

(quoted in Morrison,

Plavincr vii) .

torn apart
Like Henry,

inside"
she is

superficially unified, svelte and "white," but internally
torn apart--and carnivalized, musical

"blackness"

is the

signifier of her chaos.19
While Berryman's sympathetic use of a "blues" metaphor
in Song 68 may have been inoffensive to Ellison, then, we
must attend to the fact that the same musicality, dancing,
physicality, and revelry obtain in numerous songs where the
performance is explicitly minstrel in nature.

This is to

say that, despite Berryman's best intentions of both crossracial identification and/or self-conscious inflection of
the "sign" of minstrelsy within "white" U.S. identity, the
overall

effect

of

his

representations

carnivalization

of

the

Other

difference.

that

slips

reinforces

into

a

racial

As Nielsen puts it, "It is difficult to speak

in this dialect to a white audience without activating the
entire racial image structure of our language" (142-43).
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The psychology and politics

of Henry's

carnivalized

transgression of his "white" subject through minstrelsy are
perhaps

most

obvious

in

Dream

Song

2,

the

premiere

performance of blackface in the sequence and possibly the
only song that draws specifically on the Wittke text.
the poem,

titled

"Big Buttons,

Cornets:

the

In

advance,"

Henry, in blackface, is trying to resist the temptations of
sexuality and alcohol:
The jane is zoned! no nightspot here, no bar
there, no sweet freeway, and no premises
for business purposes...
Arrive a time when all coons lose dere grip,
but is he come? L e 1s do a hoedown, gal,
one blue, one shuffle,
if them is all you seem to require. Strip,
ol banger, skip us we, sugar; so hang on
one chaste evenin.
— Sir Bones, or Galahad: astonishin
yo legal & yo good. Is you feel well?
Honey dusk do sprawl.
— Hit's hard. Kinged or thinged, though, fling & wing.
Poll-cats are coming, hurrah, hurray.
I votes in my hole.
This

is slippery poetic

terrain to traverse,

not least

because there are several layers of reference structured
into the content.

The first level is Henry's present time,

a holiday in November (1962, when Berryman was writing the
poem)

on which Henry mulls the legal closure of drinking

establishments.

Davis and Haffenden have suggested it is

Thanksgiving (Davis, Honey 40), but the references to polls
and

voting

in

the

final

two

lines

strongly

indicate

Election Day, when bars are closed in reverence for that

crucial rite of U.S.
reference

civic life.

is the traditional

The second level of

carnival

trappings of the

minstrel show, as described in Wittke: both the title and
the holiday atmosphere of the first stanza refer, as Davis
has

shown,

"parade"

to Wittke's description

and costuming

that

of

the

signaled the

traditional
"advance"

of

traveling minstrels when they arrived at each new town.
The

third

level

of

reference,

more

internal

to

the

sequence, involves Henry's ongoing struggle to put off the
temptations of lust and drink in order to remain a "legal"
and

"good"

wage-earner,

householder,

family man,

and

citizen--the dynamic of the socially disciplined subject as
I have noted it with reference to Song 43.

And a fourth,

narrative level of meaning involves, as Davis again points
out, Henry's sexual "advance" on a "jane" who, however, is
"zoned"--off-limits to Henry's attentions and hence causing
him

to

"hang on"

evenin'1 instead.

to his morality

and spend a

Skipping the "strip"

"chaste

and "ol banger,"

Henry settles for a dance.
There is a remarkable degree of oneiric condensation and
displacement among these levels of reference,
precisely by attending to those entanglements
political reading I intend comes clear.
social

but it is
that the

The structure of

authority which I have noted in other poems

is

almost the reason for this poem's existence, personified
only by the "poll-cats"

("politicals"? poll monitors? poll
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tax collectors?) who are "coming" in line seventeen, but
implicit in the enforcement of legality and "zoning" that
make up the poem's matrix.

But condensed here into this

broader sense of legal and political authority
Henry on trial in Song 43) are the moral

"laws" against

Henry's abuses of both alcohol and sexuality,
of

bars

in

deference

to

governmental

(recall

the closing

processes,

the

foreclosure of the "nightspot"

revelry that prevails at

Henry's blues

social

appearance,

the

reserve

that

the

minstrels disrupted with their parade revelry, and even the
"zoning" of the Jim Crow system--especially its two most
powerful proscriptions, those preventing voting by "blacks"
and sexual contact between "black" men and "white" "janes."
The latter idea, of course,

imports the obtrusion of yet

another level of reference, what I have noted as Henry's
sympathetic identification with the racially oppressed.
The meaning on this level of social racial relations is, I
think,

fairly clear:

if the treed coon falls out of his

tree--enters either the voting booth or the preserve of
white womanhood--he will be lynched.
It is this intimation that Henry in blackface is Henry
speaking
surmise

for oppressed blacks
that

"Sir Bones

speaks

that

led Wasserstrom to

from behind his mask a

satiric language" taken from real black cultural forms like
rhyming slang, blues,

and black minstrelsy,

"the kind of

speech devised in order to hide true meaning from the Man"
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(175) .

It

is

a contention

with

which

other

critics

(Linebarger, Gustavsson) have concurred, though it seems to
be at odds with the fact that Berryman dedicated the poem
to T. D. "Daddy" Rice, the original "white" minstrel of the
183 0s, and I have already noted the troublesome nature of
identifying

this dialect

"minstrel."

More

identification

as

"blues,"

importantly,

in

the

coon

"black,"

to

trope

read
and

or even

interracial
the

semantic

obfuscations of the dialect is to read the metaphor of
blacking up in only one direction,

ignoring its movement

back in the other direction, a direction that is actually
far

more

dominant

in

The

Dream

S onas.

Here,

that

regressive movement is present as "white" Henry's recourse
to

blackface,

and

consciousness,

the

addressing

to

the

blackface

interlocutor,

libidinal,

carnal

as

desires

partner
the

of

his

format

for

and his

own--not

blacks 1--subversions of social authority.
In

this

view,

the

referential

levels

historical minstrels, Mr. Bones and his friend,

involving
election

day bar closures, and Jim Crow degradation are merely the
code, or the vehicle,

for the real "story" being told in

the poem/dream--the story of identity crisis that I have
already connected to the recurrent themes of role playing,
drinking and sex, played out in so many of the songs.

The

interlocutor

the

summarizes

the

two

poles

of

subjective/moral crisis here: is Henry the transgressive,
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blacked up

"Sir Bones"

"Galahad"?

It

interlocutor
impulse

of

is

is

or is he

significant

thoroughly

Henry's

a moral,
that

complicit

struggle

"white"

Sir

the

blackface

in the

libidinal

between

"legality"

and

transgression; he seems incredulous that Henry remains, for
the

moment,

"legal"

and

"good"

indulgence is lavishly available.

and

points

out

that

This contravenes the

theories presented by various commentators that Henry's
friend is either a minstrel show interlocutor who remains
"white" or a critical, ironizing counterbalance to Henry's
narcissistic extremes, and further connects Berryman's use
of the minstrel device to Henry's carnivalized subversions
of both subject and social authorities.
The latter,
seventeen as

of course,
the

make their appearance in line

"poll-cats"

who may be

enforcing

the

election laws, collecting taxes, or even, to return to the
foreclosure of Henry's sexuality and move from the social
to the personal content level, cutting off the pertinent
horn or head

(or bone) .

In any case,

the subversive,

hidden meanings of Mr. Bones's blackface discourse give him
the last word,

as he punningly converts these enforcers

into

When

skunks.

Mr.

Bones

flaunts

U.S.

political

authority with his sarcastic "I votes in my hole"

(I vote

by pouring down a shot), he also transgresses the civically
and

socially

"deny[ing]

disciplined

(white)

subject

by,

again,

with a laugh the ludicrous pose of autonomy
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adopted

by

the

subject"

and

"re-open[ing]

the

body-

boundary> the closed orifices of which normally guarantee
the
184

repressive
).20

mechanism

itself"

(Stallybrass

& White

by doing so emphatically in blackface, Henry

engages precisely that ambivalence--managing to elicit the
critical claims about subversive "black" content mentioned
above

and

to

attribute

the

"detested .qualities"

of

experience to "blackness"--with which, as Lott argues, the
original minstrel mask resonated:
of

the

power

of

blackness;

"a derisive celebration

blacks,

for

a

moment,

ambiguously, on top" (28-29).
The convergence of the carnivalesque "advance" of the
minstrels with Henry’s illicit sexual
desire

for

an

"illegal"

drink

"advance"

aptly

and his

summarizes

the

significance of Henry's minstrelsy throughout The Dream
Songs.

Henry on the verge of transgressing various social

and legal proscriptions,

of losing his grip and falling

from the "tree" of respectable identity, is generally Henry
in the role of Mr. Bones or coon--Henry in the guise of
"the blackt-out man."

A basic Freudian framework makes the

psychological dynamics of Henry's dream-work clear enough:
the

structure

of

authority

that

enforces

legality

corresponds to the superego; Henry in his narrowly defined,
socially disciplined sense of self is Henry in his tree, or
"in" his ego; and Henry falling from the tree, or indulging
his carnal impulses, is Henry under the sway of the id.

But

within

personality

the

Kohutian

disorders,

paradigm

this

of

narcissistic

macrostructural

view

of

psychology already implies a severe fragmentation of the
self, since Kohut's central adjustment of Freudian theory
was to posit a healthy "nuclear self" which includes both
the

object-based

ideals

and

limitations

of

authority

"imagos" and the self-assertive, narcissistic energies of
ambition and grandiosity,

rather than "splitting"

these

elements off as agencies oppositional to the experiential
center.

In Kohut's view, then, the more regressive forms

of such narcissistic

energies--fixations

on sexuality,

orality, anality, segmented body parts, aggression, etc.-are not

"primary biological

"disintegration
organization

of

products,"
the

drives"
results

self

but what he
of

damage

(Res t o r ation

128) .

calls

to

the
Such

tendencies are literally distorted forms, produced by lack
of empathic response to the "total self," of the normal and
healthy narcissistic impulse.

As a victim of just such

self-object failure and consequent "splitting" of the self,
Henry tends to experience his narcissistic energies in the
form of distorted sexualizations, object hungers, bodily
obsessions

and

grandiose

pretensions.

It

is

these

"vertically" split off--alternatively lived, not repressed-narcissistic energies that he so pervasively assigns to
his

"blacked up"

present

a

less

self.
severe

If Henry's
version

of

multiple personae
the

"side-by-side
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existence of cohesive personality attitudes with different
goal structures, different pleasure aims, different moral
and aesthetic values" that Kohut finds in certain of the
narcissistic personality disturbances, I am suggesting, the
particular manner in which he, "motivated by shame," denies
the "reality of the split-off sector" is by referring it to
"blackness"

(Analysis 183) .

ambiguity

and

indirectness"

narcissistically
describes

the

In this case,

disordered

through

personality

"perverse fantasies"

of its

the "veil of
which

the

distortedly
"other self"

(Analysis 184) is the blackface mask.
Applying

K o h u t 's

formulation

of

what

amounts

to

a

developmental mirror stage--but for the formation of the
"nuclear self," not the "ego"--we might think of Henry's
creation of Mr. Bones in terms of a racialized distortion
of the process by which "some archaic mental contents that
had been

experienced

as belonging

to

the

self

become

obliterated or are assigned to the area of the nonself..."
(Restoration
Henry,

1 7 7 ) .

both

na r c i ssistic

21

the

For the narcissistically disordered
excessive

sector

and

exhibitionisms
the

sense

of

of

his

complete

disintegration inflicted by the excessively limiting "iron
voices"

(Song

8)

are

consistently

assigned

to

his

"nonself," his alter ego, his racialized other.22
Hence,

in numerous poems Henry in burnt cork is Mr.

Bones hot with lust.

In the midst of the voyeuristic and

gustatory orgy of Song 4, Henry pauses from his salivations
long enough to note,
Henry,"

"There ought

to be a law against

and the interlocutor replies,

"Mr. Bones:

there

is," adding significant context to the "legality" matrix of
Song 2.

Placed within this context,

the treed or lynched

"coon" trope of Songs 9, 10, 57, and 66 becomes much less
Henry's way of identifying with the potential cruelties and
degradations of racism and much more his use of "blackness"
as

a metaphor

sexuality:

for his

own

transgressive, shame-ridden

in Song 57, yet another drinking poem,

Henry

imagines himself to be "a 'coon treed," but it is again in
the sense of wanting, but being kept from, sexual contact
(by his

target's

social rules).

refusal)

and an alcoholic bender

(by

The role of the minstrel dialogue format in

Henry's consciousness is clear enough, finally, in Book V,
which,

after it opens with a recuperative hospital stay,

concerns itself largely with Henry in his role as husband
and father and with themes of death and disintegration, and
almost

completely

eschews

the

illicit

sex

theme.

Crucially, then, Songs 142 and 143, at the very end of the
book, reintroduce Henry's lust and bring back the minstrel
format after an absence of nearly thirty songs.

In Song

142, Henry is musing upon an adulterous "rump session" but
decides he is glad to keep "chaste."

The interlocutor's

comment on this decision is notably equivocal:
you strong on moral these days,

hey?

"Mr Bones,

/ It's good to be
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faithful but it ain't natural..."

Song 143 continues the

dialogue, with the friend suggesting some sexual healing
for Mr. B o n e s 's despair over marital disputes:

"That's

enough of that, Mr Bones. Some lady you make. / Honour the
burnt

cork,

be

a

vaudeville

man. . .

Again,

it

is

impossible to distinguish here Berryman's toying with the
historical use of the minstrel mask in the "white" mind
from his enjoying the psychological dividends of that use
himself.

Lott aptly captures the contradictions already

implicit in such representations on the blackface stage:
" . . .in

a

real

sense

the

penis... invoking the power of
it,

minstrel

man

was

the

'blackness' while deriding

in an effort of cultural control,

through the very

convention that produced its power--the greasepaint and
burnt cork of blackface"

(25-26).

Then too, Berryman may

have been well aware of Ellison's wry comment in "Change
the Joke and Slip the Yoke":

"The mask was the thing (the

'thing' in more ways than one)" (Shadow 49).
Dream Song 72 deserves note in this regard,

since it

transforms the potential tree-hung lynching rope of Henry's
"illegal" sexual self into a "twine" on which Henry, in the
role of respectable father,

"is swinging his daughter."

Under the watchful monitoring of "The Elder Presences,"
which combine gods, Supreme Court justices, and "the high
statues

of

the

wise,"

Henry

strives

toward

family

respectability, but the almost parenthetical middle stanza
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of the poem seems

to suggest

identity must repress.

the sexuality which that

In the middle of this stanza, as

the justices threaten, Henry seems to speak to himself as
"negro"

and

beg

pardon

for

his

behavior.

When

the

suppressed, parenthetical middle stanza--what the "gods of
the garden" will not talk about--dissolves, Henry returns
to

the

present

moment,

with

his

daughter

respectability she gives him, and notes,
to break his burnt-cork luck."

and

the

"Henry's perhaps

Henry is negotiating in

these poems the slippery ground between the "white," adult,
"good,"

"legal,"

subject

position

toward

which

he

repeatedly aspires and the freedoms and transgressions of
that subject
driven.

He describes the former, as in Song 163, when the

"lust-quest

seems

"knighthood"
householder,
know,

toward which he feels himself continually

[briefly]

(Galahad?)

to be

and

child & all";

being

over,"

in

terms

"respectable,

he describes

of
/

the latter,

a
we

in terms of blacking up and talking to his friend.

Thus, as Lott claims,

"the assumption of dominant codes of

masculinity in the United States was (and still is) partly
negotiated through an imaginary black interlocutor"
Berryman literalizes Lott's conclusion that
fantasies

(53).

"white male

of black men undergird the subject positions

white men grow up to occupy."
Henry's

blackface moments

thus

tend

to combine

the

adolescently sexual, the infantilely oral, and the poet's
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masking, roleplaying freedom from a fixed subject position
in a weird combination of what Stallybrass and White have
referred to as the "carnival" and what Lott adduces,
nineteenth-century
preoccupation
amusement"

minstrelsy,

in minstrel

acts

as
with

in

the

"widespread

oral

and

genital

(Lott 145), a subversion of adult identity that

highlights the convergence of "blackness" figured as what
Lott calls

the

"world's body"--to

symbolically resolve

social and economic indignities--with the corporealizations
and maskings

of

carnival--to

autonomy of the ego.

subvert

the

suffocating

Frequently, for example, Henry blacks

up to get "blackt-out," as it were, or at least to have "a
drink or three."

In Song 232,

though Henry is "pigging"

down food (recall that this too can be read as compensation
for ego

crisis),

he

is trying

"stand...off the sauce."
the

spiritual

life

of

"waiting upon the Lord."

to give up

smoking

and

But he seems to become bored with
philosophizing

with

Pascal

and

Overwhelmed with the materiality

of the body, Henry, in a particularly egregious instance of
using blackface as shorthand for the corporeal,

calls for

both

you have

cigarettes

nothing

to

use

and booze:
but

your

"Negroes,
brains,

ignite!
/

which

let

bust

out...//...The decanter, pal! / Pascal, we free & loose."
Here,

it is clear, Henry is not blacking up to call for

black civil freedom in a gesture of interracial solidarity;
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he is doing so to get "free & loose" of the rationalized
and moralized subject.
Reference to a series of Dream Songs in which assumed
"blackness"

connotes

the

"world's

body,"

the

carnival

impulse, the poet's freedom from the "egotistical sublime,"
or some combination of the three,

suggests that Berryman

resorted to the device as a figure for the transgression of
the subject in general--or what I have earlier refered to
as both a Kohutian and a poetic crisis of the subject.
Henry overtly carnivalizes his sexual self in Song 97,
where

"Henry of Donnybrook bred like a pig."

The line

evokes both the carnal pleasures of the great English fairs
referenced

by

Stallybrass

and

White

and

the

central

oppositional role they ascribe to the "pig" trope in the
discursive formation of respectable identity (62-66, 14748).

Tellingly, then, Henry is forced by his indiscretions

to convert himself into the subjectified body of labor:
"how he's sweating to support them."

The primary agony of

the poem is, despite its reveries about Shakespeare and
death, once again the tension between the adult father as
responsible

social

and

economic

subject,

and

the

dissipation or dissolution of that subject through the
revelries of bodily pleasure.
enunciates

a paroxysm

of

In the third stanza, Henry

release

which,

predictably,

involves both brutalizing and blackening himself.

We might

note not only--once again--the open mouth of that release,
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but its focus on the nakedness, sexuality, and materiality
of the body: "Of brutal revelry gap your mouth to state: /
Front back & backside go bare!

/ Cats' blackness. booze,

blows, grunts, grand groans" (emphasis mine).24
If this poem figures the corporeal disruption of the
rationalized

"white"

subject

(see

Lott

147-49)

as

a

pleasurable yet shameful reversion to "blackness," in other
Dream Songs Henry blacks up to signify his more literally
internal division, as when his "performances" of the many
others that traverse his poetic "I" imply the disruption of
that subject through intersubjectivity.

In Song 179, the

interlocutor again returns after an extended absence

(a

hiatus remarked by Henry) , this time on the occasion of
Henry's dissolution, in the previous poem, into his poetic
identifications.
though critics

There,
will

look

Henry
for

the poet
the

suggests

"man actual"

that

in his

dreams/poems, he does not exist; instead, there is only "a
tumult of

seems"--not only,

perhaps,

an uncontrollable

cycle of Yeatsian masks, but a pieced-together subjectivity
riven

with

disruptions

and

fractures

as

well:

a

subjectivity therefore in danger of literally coming apart
at the "seems."

(Henry's equation of shaving with dreaming

in lines

and

three

four,

in

fact,

provides

a crucial

connection to the poetic identifications of Song 22.)

In

the next poem, Henry is on the verge of giving up his art
(and, possibly, his life), but the interlocutor suddenly
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reappears,

urging him to do

"more shows"

tomorrow,

for

which he must "rest & rehearse." Reluctantly, Henry agrees
to go back to the drudgery of

"work,

work,

work"--from

which he takes significant consolation in heading off to
the bar.

The incommensurability of the plural psyche to

the bourgeois fantasy of unified, proper identity is, in
both of these poems, too much for Henry to endure except as
spectacle— as blackface stage performance.
The most explicit connection of minstrelsy to the poetic
act, however, occurs in a poem which, by invoking Ellison,

once again casts these possible abuses of the "black" image
in the ambiguous light of Berryman's self-conscious plays
upon the "blackness" inside respectable "white" identity.
Song 119 clarifies, moreover,

the significance of shaving

and whiskers in Berryman's dream language.

It is the role-

playing, persona-switching poet who wears the beard, but he
is a transgressive presence who must shave to return to
white respectability:
Fresh-shaven, past months & a picture in New York
of Beard Two, I did have Three took off. Well..
Shadow & act, shadow & act,
Better get white or you' get whacked,
or keep so-called black
& raise new hell.
The fluctuation here is clearly between the clean-shaven,
proper,

"white"

subject and money-earning

"scholar"

(1.

17), whom Berryman sometimes felt it necessary to become,
and the bearded, blackface poet, the identity in which he
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would have posed for a picture in New York.

As the latter,

he is capable of "raising [political?, personal?] hell" but
also at risk of punishment by social authorities for his
transgressions.

The remarkable allusion of the lines,

however,

is to

Ellison's collection of nonfiction, Shadow and Ac t , which
included both "Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke" and a
much

older

(1949)

essay

on

cinematic

and

literary

representations of blacks,

entitled "The Shadow and the

Act."

establish

Indeed,

we

can

a

fairly

direct

chronological relationship between Dream Song 119, which
Berryman wrote in October, 1964, and Shadow and Act, which
had appeared earlier that year.

The allusive presence of

Ellisonian cultural theory within this poem puts a deeply
ambivalent but racially politicized spin on the personal
identity crisis

the lines ostensibly reference:

if the

ambiguously positioned, plural identity of the performing
poet

is mere

shadow

to a kind

of

social

"whiteness, "

"whiteness"--as Ellison's essay on "The Shadow and the Act"
of U.S. cultural identity formation suggests--is also an
act.

The fluctuation,

that is, as in Ellison's stunning

ironization of cultural "blackness," is not between unified
identity and a hellish chaos, but between what is already
nothing but an act, and the shadow of that act which makes
the

"act"

presence.

(whiteness)
Berryman

appear

to be

acknowledges

reality
by

or

allusion

self
the
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oppositional,

"hellish” role which

"black" plays in the

constitution of properly behaved "whiteness," and by direct
statement both the imaginary nature of "race"--it is, after
all,

"so-called black"--and the use he makes of it in his

own moral identity.
In the final stanza of the poem that moral role becomes
more explicit,

though it remains inextricably entangled

with the poetic function:
No tremor, no perspire: Heaven is here
now, in Minneapolis.
It's easier to vomit than it was,
beardless.
There's always the cruelty of scholarship.
I once was a slip.
Henry,

always

police,

in

danger

respectable

dissipative,

of

friends,

unproductive,

being

"whacked"

by

wives,

doctors and so on for his

alcoholic

indiscretions,

has

here passed to the momentary "heaven" of sobriety--where
the beard is gone and, with it, the identity-shifting role
of the poet.

As in Dream Song 2, where the minstrel format

first appeared,
dissolve

into

the possible racial meanings of the poem
the

single

enduring

refrain

of

Henry's

drinking problem and his crisis of the subject: better get
sober or you get whacked.

The enigmatic final line of Song

119, then, might be placed exactly at the conjunction of
two earlier, similarly disconnected parting shots.
votes in my hole"
rebuttal

to

(2) articulated a sarcastic,

the dictates

of

the

social

order,

If "I

revelrous
and

"My
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whiskers

fly"

(22)

was an initial

instance of the poet

recoiling from his maskwearing to the unity of "I am"--the
poet getting straight— I take this signature to mean
may have shaved now but")

"I once was a slip."

("I

To slip

from identity to identity, to slip from the tree of unified
morality by drinking until you wretch,
intersubjective

hell:

such

are

to raise social and

the

possibilities

of

Berryman's blackface coon.

"What

I am

looking

for

(I am)..."

While John Berryman's minstrel stage does allow him to
cast the "black" image in the role of what Eric Lott calls
the "world's body," I have suggested,

it also must be read

in the context of his conscious effort to deconstruct the
racial "mirror stage" by tunneling through the imaginary
nature of "race," as in the closing lines of "The Imaginary
Jew."

These lines and the interview remarks I have cited,

however, constitute virtually the entirety of his recorded
views

on

almost

"race,"

obligatory

intellectual
remarks

aside

that

from the wholly unanalytical and

liberal
shows

up

anti-racism
in

some

of

of
his

the

postwar

occasional

(a perfect example is Berryman's statement to the

effect that he would never take a job in the South, because
that is where "racism" is practiced) and poetry, including
The Dream Sonas.

What we have seen in the latter as the

occasional surfacing of vague arguments for equal rights
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and of indications of solidarity with black protest are
representative of both the tenor and the extent of the
"race"

content in much of Berryman's earlier and later

poetry, as well.
Taken together,
enough

or

this material is simply not extensive

developed

enough

to

constitute

an

achieved

political poetry of the "race" problem in the United States
or a "theory" of the effects,

causes,

manifestations or

psychology of "race" as a cultural discourse.
the minstrel

device

came

somewhat

Then too,

secondarily

to

the

compositional process that produced The Dream Sonas and
figures in only some eighty or eighty-five of them.

Race

issues seem to have been at best a marginal concern of
Berryman's philosophy and art.

Still, there are consistent

gestures in his life and poetry--early, middle, and late-to a kind of interracial identification that demand we take
seriously his

efforts

to represent

the

"black"

within twentieth-century U.S. "white" identity.
from Love

& Fame

(197 0)

captures

an

voices

An example

instance

of

this

tendency from both the later poetry and the earlier life.
In the poem "Nowhere" Berryman articulates both his love of
blues

culture and some

intriguing experiences

from his

Columbia University days:
More comfortable at the Apollo among blacks
than in Hartley Hall where I hung out.
A one named Brooks Johnson, with it in for Negroes,
I told one noon I'd some coon blood myself
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and he spread the word wide while the canpus laughed.
Magical mourning blues,
Victoria, Bessie. Teagarden. Pine-top Smith
the sightless passionate constructor.(Collected 180-81)
Indeed,

such gestures have the feel of what Lott

has

referred to as the "utopian or emancipatory moment" in the
bohemian romance with "blackness," which played no small
part in the evolution of the original minstrel show (Lott
51) .

Yet they also evince a kind of exoticization of

"black"

culture which aims at

"class abdication through

gendered cross-racial immersion"

(Lott 51), a tradition, as

Lott notes, that persists even today.
persistence,

I have

argued,

that

It is precisely this
is registered

in the

combination of Dream Song 68, with its bluesy but rowdy
identification with black suffering, and Dream Song 2, with
its blackface abdication of white, middle-class citizenship
through sexual and libational dalliance.25 Here too, we
find perhaps the most accurate way of assessing Berryman's
strange and drunken nocturnal phone calls to the black man
he

knew

best--and

of

assessing

equivocal recollection of them.

Ellison's

strange

and

The moment of cultural

interchange through which those earlier bohemians secured
the authenticity of their art had a tendency to involve not
mere observation or distant mimicry, but "a white man and a
black man becoming,
the

time

[as one of them] put it,

being' ... .it

shows

defining interest of these

up

often

'brothers for

enough

to

be

a

'white Negroes,' and we might
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pause over its enabling role in cultural theft"

(Lott 52).

These passing nineteenth-century artistic friendships find
a

ghostly

resurrection

in

the

strange

literary

collaboration through which, on the lower frequencies, as
it were, Ralph Ellison became the "blackness"--and perhaps
the interlocutor--within Henry the modern "white Negro."

A

degree of sincerity on both sides of the collaboration
seems probable, yet in Ellison's contradictory mixture of
"fascination," "amusement," and abdication of authenticity
(Mariani, Life 3 87) are captured both the emancipatory and
the expropriative impulses of Berryman's black(face) art.
Empathic identification and self-serving exploitation;
appreciative immersion in a liberating cultural style and
degrading representation of a biologized Other: as both the
original minstrel show and The Dream Sonas suggest, the two
strands are inextricable in American representations of
"blackness."

Though Berryman exploited blackface as the

designated mask

for

the ego-transgressing,

split-off elements of Henry's conflicted,

carnal,

and

"tragic," white

self, he also exploited the gaps in the "white subject,"
showing how its class, racial, and moral parameters reveal
its very constructedness--reveal

it to be literally in

pieces because constituted out of various
voices traverse its frequencies.

"others" whose

As Berryman elsewhere put

his definitive concern with the autonomy and alienation of
subjectivity,

"What

I am

looking

for

(I am) may be /
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Happening in the gaps of what I know."

In the U.S., it was

his singular but wrenchingly conflicted poetic insight to
recognize,

the

"white"

"I am"

could only be glimpsed,

though never known, by peering into the shadows of its own
act.
Notes
1. Qtd. in Nielsen, p. 123. From Michael S. Harper, Images
of Kin: New and Selected Poems (Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1977) .
2. As Lott notes, the questions of an "authentic" "black"
culture or cultural element or of an "accurate" or
"derivative" blackface imitation are hopelessly muddled,
reminding one of nothing so much as Ellison's idea of the
"mulatto" character of American culture.
According to
Lott, "The researches of Hans Nathan, Robert Toll, and
others suggest that the minstrel show's humor, songs, and
dances were so culturally mixed as, in effect, to make
their 'racial' origins quite undecidable....The creolized
character of black forms themselves, of course, not to
mention their casual and undocumentable influence on white
ones, muddies this whole question considerably and makes
all cultural labeling a provisional matter" (94).
3 . Thus Lott reads the sheer irrationality of the
linguistic, musical, corporeal, sexual, racial, and
infantile revelries common to the minstrel stage as the
regressive "dream" formations of an ever tenuous process of
self-staging by the rationalized white ego, a return of the
Other and a subversion of the subject both pleasurable and
revolting. His description of the contradictory tendencies
of minstrelsy for a working class facing an increasing
industrial discipline of the subject provide one example:
"Ascribing [corporeal excess] to the 'degraded' blackface
Other, and indulging it--by imagining, incorporating, or
impersonating the Other--workingmen confronting the demand
to be 'respectable' might at once take their enjoyment and
disavow it....All the standard elements in the repertoire
of inversion--filth, scatology, racial marking itself-returned here to assault the white subject whose selfpossession had been constituted by their disavowal" (148).
The ambivalence of this "dream-work" of the body is thus an
identification so powerful that it requires racism as its
counterbalance: see also p. 260, n. 13.
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4. On Berryman's use of voices, see Donoghue; for
Berryman's own remarks on the importance of the "ambiguous"
"I" of the poet in his work, see his "One Answer to a
Question: Changes" in The Freedom of the Poet: on his
understanding of the self as a construct see Davis, "The
Li(v)es of the Poet" and "The Freedom of John Berryman"; on
his use of Yeatsian masks, see Mazzaro; for Berryman's
explication of the Whitmanian and Keatsian conception of
the poet as a vessel, and its intersection with the
manipulation of voices and identity, see his "'Song of
Myself': Intention and Substance" in The Freedom of the
Poet.
5. In Song 23, Henry ridicules a U.S. political scene
dominated by Dwight Eisenhower--vacuous, unintellectual,
and a representative of both industrial-military hegemony
and spreading McCarthyism, whose minions destroy one of the
country's most valuable scientists when they "bile
Oppenheimer out of use." Song 162 criticizes the cynicism
and inhumanity of the Vietnam "war," instrument of a
disguised foreign policy that "kept us unaware / that we
were killing Asiatics, daily." And in Song 197, the only
imaginable response to the "bloody fucking news" and the
"nuclear devices H & A" that converge "on miserable Henry"
is to hide from them.
6 . The argument I am making here is analogous to that
forwarded by Gary Q. Arpin, who finds that Berryman,
beginning with his earlier work, demonstrates how "the
disruptions of the outer world produce their analogues in
the inner landscape" (25) . Just as, in Berryman's 1945
short story "The Imaginary Jew," the protagonist realizes
he personally bears "our general guilt" for bigotry when he
himself is mistaken for a Jew, in The Dream Soncrs various
modes of cultural violence become the violence of psychic
fragmentation--a dynamic nowhere more clear than when Henry
experiences interracial fracture as internal fracture
through his assumption of the role of "imaginary Negro"
(Arpin 75). On "tragic man," see Kohut, Restoration 206207, and Reflections 36-37.
7. Following John Haffenden's note on Berryman's manuscript
for Song 19 5, I have noted what seems to be the very
plausible restoration of the word "feasts," which is
omitted from the published version, to line 12.
See
Haffenden, p. 111.
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8 . For a more complete presentation of my understanding of
the psychological aspects of'Henry's' fragmentation, see my
"Things Are Going to Pieces: Disintegration Anxiety in The
Dream Songs" in Kelly and Lathrop 189-201.
9. Kathe Davis's assumption that Berryman treated the self
as an almost Derridean construct, always "under erasure"
even in the moment of the discursive act it makes possible,
also seems relevant here. See, especially, her comments on
the uncollected Dream Song in which Henry admits that
"Henry under construction was Henry indeed" ("Li(v)es" 50).
10. See Kohut, Analysis 9.
11. See the series of essays in Recovering Berrvman on
"Berryman and Alcoholism," especially Hyde, p. 217.
12. Haffenden records this statement from one of Berryman's
journals, and Mariani dates it to spring, 1957.
It
continues, "...and I am also a bastard, and I am hopeful
and good-natured, and I am a man insulted and injured"
(Haffenden 50, Mariani, Life 314). Later comments suggest
that Berryman came to view disunity less as abnormal and
more as the inevitable condition of personality.
In 1965,
as "a man nearing fifty," he wrote, "I am less impressed
than I used to be by the universal notion of a continuity
of individual personality" (Freedom 323).
13. Kohut, for example, discusses not only psychological
maneuvers intended to compensate for a faltering self
structure, but also those which provide pleasure by giving
the subject power over or the ability to "play" with the
loss of self: symbolization of the mutilation and
reconstruction of the self in both artistic and dream
material provide this outlet, as does the infantile "little
piggy" game Kohut describes in which the child takes
thrilling joy in the "removal" of its toes and fingers,
knowing that the "terror" of mutilation will be banished
when the game ends with the warmth and wholeness of a
parental hug (Analysis 118-19) .
14. Stallybrass and White borrow the term and the concept
"grotesque body"
from Bakhtin's discussion of the
carnivalesque.
15. It is certainly plausible, though not fundamental to my
argument, that Berryman's text seems exemplary of what
Stallybrass
and White
call modern
"transgressive
literature" because of a more direct link than the cultural
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context they describe. That link would be Freud's "Studies
of hysteria, " which'provide the spark for Stallybrass and
White’s theory of the return of the carnival repressed and
which Berryman, a careful reader of Freud, no doubt knew
well.
Freud's descriptions of the "clownism," "imitation
of animals and circus scenes," "nursery games and sexual
scenes,"
pantomimic
fantasy,
and
the
fragmented,
disconnected presentation of such elements in the discourse
of his hysterics might have been a significant influence on
the form and content of The Dream Sonas. In any case,
little has been written on the fair and carnival theme that
is developed in The Dream Sonas not only through Henry's
feasting and drinking but also through the regular
appearance of "holiday" poems and such references as "Henry
of Donnybrook bred like a pig" (97) and the "little fair"
of Song 109.
16. The chronological relationship between these poems is
suggested by John Haffenden's incomplete but invaluable
dating of many of The Dream Songs according to notations on
Berryman's original manuscripts. According to Haffenden,
Songs 231 and 43 were written on August 15 and November 1,
1961, respectively, despite their extreme separation in the
sequence of the book and in time of publication (Haffenden
158) .
17. William Wasserstrom was perhaps the first to note, in
1968, that one of the initial epigraphs to The Dream Sonas
was also the epigraph to Wittke's book: "'Go in, brack man,
de day's y o ' own'" (Wasserstrom 169). See also Arpin (75),
Haffenden (48, 51, and 82), and Gustavsson (80-82) . Kathe
Davis's reading of Berryman's own copy of Wittke, and his
marginal notes, is particularly interesting but, if
anything, suggests how little Berryman actually drew on the
1930 history of minstrelsy: outside of his striking use of
one passage as the basis for Song 2 (to be noted below),
"Berryman's own copy of the book is only lightly marked and
annotated" and the noted references do not seem to be
directly developed in The Dream Sonas (Davis, "Honey" 39).
18. Wasserstrom and Linebarger, to cite two egregious
examples, shift seamlessly back and forth between the idea
that Berryman is performing a "minstrel" show and the idea
that he is doing something "Negro."
See Wasserstrom 17280, and Linebarger 85-87.
19. As Stallybrass and White argue, the spectacle of the
carnival in its modern, "subjective articulation" can be
experienced as both a threat to the disciplined subject, as
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for Cardinal, and as a pleasurable release from it, as for
Henry: "these carnivalesgue fragments formed unstable
discursive compounds, sometimes disruptive, sometimes
therapeutic, within the very constitution of bourgeois
subjectivity" (182). As Lott points out in describing the
function of the minstrel show, of course, the "phobia and
fascination"
(Stallybrass
and White
182)
of
the
carnivalized Other are often inseparable.
20. My connection of the concept of carnival, which I have
borrowed from Stallybrass and White, to the minstrel
performances Berryman here commemorates is thoroughly
pertinent to Berryman's own source for the latter. On the
page immediately following his description of the minstrel
parade with its "gold cornet band" and "big brass buttons,"
Wittke notes, "The minstrel parade is another example of
the close relationship between the circus and minstrel
shows. It was borrowed directly from the circus parade, and
became an established part of every minstrel outfit in
America" (145-46).
21. Kohut defines the "nuclear self" as "the basis for our
sense of being an independent center of initiative and
perception" (Restoration 177).
I have drawn the terms of
this discussion from The Restoration of the Self, pp. 17791; from The Analysis of the Self, pp. 114-25, where Kohut
was still using the overtly post-Freudian terminology
"narcissistic libido" and "reality ego"; and from the
diagrams which appear on Restoration 213 and Analysis 185.
22. It is precisely in the assessment of this dynamic, I
want to argue, that Wasserstrom's argument for a solely
sympathetic reading of the racial content of Berryman's
sequence most clearly undercuts itself.
Analyzing the
minstrel device in terms of a Freudian "dramatis personae
of the inner life," but reading the metaphor only in its
liberatory direction, he notes, "Instead of Henry, read
ego. In place of id, visualize Bones, end man of minstrel
shows, unruly in the beat of tambourine and rattle of
bones.... Sometimes, like id, that olio of vulgar and
irrepressible want, Bones 1s black need bursts his own and
even, beyond disentangling, Berryman's bounds" (179-80).
23. We can further sense how Berryman was manipulating the
blackface material by noting that these two poems are
radically removed from their sequence of composition.
Written much later than the poems that immediately precede
them in Book V, written even after the majority of poems
that make up Books VI and VII, they were among the final
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Dream Songs written before publication of the second volume
but were inserted here when Berryman ordered the Songs for
publication, as if he sensed the need to reinvoke Henry's
sexual temptations--and his minstrelsy--before ending a
book in which Henry struggles toward respectable family-man
status (see Haffenden 164).
The blackface device allows
Berryman to direct a stage on which these figures of bodily
fun suddenly stand and speak, and just as abruptly sit down
as rationalized "whiteness" returns, reproducing the
"disappearing act in which blackface made "blackness"
flicker on and off so as simultaneously to produce and
disintegrate the body" (Lott 117).
24. For additional nuances of these meanings of the "burnt
cork" in Henry's life, see Songs 25, 194, 205, and 228.
25. Lott's description of the "bohemian" artisans who
created the minstrel phenomenon is an instructive gloss on
Berryman's resurrection of their art and his Columbia
memories: "Marginalized by temperament, by habit (often
alcoholism), by ethnicity, even by sexual orientation,
these artists immersed themselves in blackface to indulge
their felt sense of difference....if for men sexuality is
where freedom and play meet, "blackness" was for antebellum
bohemians its virtual condition--that fascinating imaginary
space of fun and license outside (but structured by)
Victorian bourgeois norms" (51).

The

Chapter Five
Crying Because She Has No Self:
Psychology of Slavery in Morrison's Beloved

In the preceding chapters, I have posited the presence
of two different mechanisms in the social order of the
United States

that

inhibit the abilities

of people

to

conceptualize their own psychic wholeness and that foster
profound anxieties of self-disintegration.

Taking Gertrude

Stein's literary response to middle-class conventionality
and

Ralph

Ellison's

literary

evocation

personality models as my starting points,
effects

of cultural

aspects

of psychic

suggested

how

disciplines
experience.

failures

of

lead to deep,

identity such

those

poetry.

racial

I outlined the

the self

In chapter

self-object

development might
as

of

of

that deny
4,

I then

empathy

during

structural deficits of

represented in John Berryman's

We might characterize the first of these dynamics

as cultural, with psychological effects, and the second as
psychological,

with cultural effects.

Thus

the racial

disciplinarity outlined by Ellison, which precipitates a
sense of non-identity that reads as nameless invisibility,
finds its counterpart in the anxieties of psychic disorder
that Berryman in part resolves by participating in the
cultural production of a particularly pervasive version of
"Africanism. "
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Moreover,

the Kohutian formulation that I found useful

for explaining the personal,
Berryman's

case

also

developmental mechanism in

rather

aptly

describes

the

experiential effect of the sociocultural disciplines of the
self:

if a child's need for empathic response from its

self-objects is not met, Kohut comments,

"then the broader

psychological configuration--the joyful experience of being
a whole, appropriately responded-to self--disintegrates and
the child retreats to a fragment of the larger experiential
unit"

(Restoration 81).

speak

of

the

ongoing

I am suggesting--and here we can
identity

formation processes

of

adults, as well as children--that if the empathic needs of
some parts of the broader psychological configuration are
denied by various cultural strategies of individualization,
we

can

similarly

expect

the

joyful,

"whole"

self

to

disintegrate and the person to retreat to a fragment of his
or her possible experience.
I want now to articulate a more intimate relationship
between these two mechanisms of fragmentation by suggesting
that they constitute different moments of a single process
of distorted identity formation, and proposing that each is
productive of the other in a sort of cyclical symbiosis of
psychocultural
strictly

pathology.

causal

Neither

relationship

precedes
to

the

or

bears

other,

a

but,

intertwining in the conduit of psychocultural transmission
through which narcissistically damaged psyches cause the
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development of narcissistic damage in the psyches that must
relate

to

them,

components

the

two

of a vicious

become

circle

almost

inextricable

of psychic

discontent.

Anxieties about the unity of the self are produced and
enhanced

by

rejections,

a

complex

combination

of

both

childhood

especially through the self-object

dynamic

elucidated by Kohut, and cultural subjections, especially
in the sense explored in historical contexts by Foucault.
But it is crucial to see as well how psyches so damaged
communicate

their damage

to others,

both

by becoming

parenting self-objects incapable of responding wholly to
their children and by turning for salvation from their
internal discord to the very cultural systems that enforce
such fragmented existences: disciplines of race, gender,
sexuality, health, productivity, and so on.
Within the problematic of racial discipline that I have
examined,

perhaps Stein's Three Lives most suggestively

collapses these concerns into a single text.
seemingly

It refers,

autobiographically, to both child abuse

and

disciplinary identity management as causative factors in
psychic pulverization,

encoding such concerns in a text

that reproduces wholesale a set of culturally circulating
racial

personality

models.

Forced

to

retreat

to

"a

fragment of the larger experiential unit" by both parental
mistreatment

and

cultural

subjectification,

I

am

suggesting, Stein responds by thematizing the psychological
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transmission of psychic damage from parent to child in a
text that enacts the cultural transmission of disciplinary
forms of racial identity.
shows,

the

latter

(racialized)

forms

In turn,
encourage

as Ellison's novel
similar

retreats

by

others to fragments of their broader self-

experience.
Toni Morrison's Beloved provides a fit conclusion to
this study of the meanings of disintegration within the
problematic

of

racial

identity,

since

it

traverses

an

imaginatively historiographical recreation of the terrain
of United States slavery and racism to explore precisely
how the two mechanisms of fragmentation alluded to here
work together.
ramifications

Examining the personal and developmental
of a social and economic system based on

white supremacy, Morrison focuses on the very instance of
disciplinary propagation: the parent-child relationship and
its formative significance for emergent consciousness. For
Morrison it is in the family structure itself that the two
mechanisms

I

have

described as operating coproductively or in tandem,

fuse

with

of

identity

and enhance

one

disfiguration,

another:

which

individuals

crippled by

disciplines of racial identity are both materially--because
of the brutal rupturing of family relationships in slavery-and psychologically--because of the brutal rupturing of
internal relationships among psychic components--unable to
provide the models of psychic wholeness and strength in
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relation to which healthy subjectivities might develop.
That

is,

the

process

that

Kohut

calls

"transmuting

internalization," through which healthy selves develop in
relationship to a "self-object's highly developed psychic
organization"

(Restoration 86), is inhibited by either the

self-object's own lack of healthy structures or by its
absence altogether.
This
psychic

is

the cruel

retreats

that

cycle

of relational

characterizes

the

failures

and

family at

the

center of Beloved. even years after the end of economic
slavery and the achievement of material freedom.

Indeed,

it is precisely in her exploration of this cycle and its
transmission from generation to generation that Morrison
develops what numerous critics have noted as her unique
emphasis

on

the

cataclysmic

psychological

impact

of

slavery, particularly in its extension into an indefinite
future after the Emancipation Proclamation,

and on the

therapeutic value--for both the characters she represents
and for the U.S. as a social group--of revising the way we
remember that horrifically damaged past as a means to re
membering our selves (Henderson).1
I want to continue the work that has been started on
this psychological aspect of Beloved, particularly in the
directions articulated by critics like Jennifer FitzGerald,
who notes

that

"psychoanalysis,

vigorously modified by

objects relations theory, can be explored as one of the set

of meanings which can be read into,
(685).

or onto,

B eloved"

The derivative version of object relations theory

Kohut calls self psychology,

specifically,

allows us to

apply the Kohutian concepts of self-object empathy and the
relational

self

to an analysis

of the kinds

of severe

narcissistic personality damage, especially disintegration
anxiety, depicted in Morrison's novel.
characters

whose

intensive

Morrison creates

hungers,

withdrawals,

dependencies, and fears of fragmentation suggestively evoke
the psychopathological considerations of self psychology.
Foremost among these characters are Denver,

the daughter

delivered during an escape from slavery, and Beloved, who
is

the incarnate ghost

killed

to

save

from

of not only the daughter Sethe

re-enslavement,

but

also

of

the

empathically deprived child-selves of almost every African
American character in the novel.

In her figurations of

wounded selfhood, Morrison suggests that the salient effect
of the violence of slavery on
formation

of what we might

anxieties and stunted,

"black"

read as

identity was

the

the disintegration

archaic self-object relationships

characteristic of narcissistic personality disorder.
The U.S. historical epoch of institutionalized slavery,
as Morrison rewrites it, wreaks its havoc on the "black"
self in two interrelated and mutually reinforcing ways,
imaging the two mechanisms of self-disintegration I alluded
to above:

its material practices

fragmented the larger
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experiential unit of the family,

initiating a cycle of

isolation and dysfunction; and its imaginative practices-the symbolic violence of discourses

of

"whiteness"

and

"blackness"--fragmented the larger experiential unit of the
psyche.

Kohut's self psychological perspective allows us

to view that psychic unit precisely as a function of the
kinds

of

empathic

relationships

structures like the family,

made

available

in

and thus to better grasp the

insidious reproductive effect of such practices to which
Morrison calls attention:

the self which develops in the

relational context of such diminished structures can only
reproduce the mutilation of its environment, retreating to
a fragment of the full psychological configuration.

The

ghost

The

of

most

slavery past;
marked

case

Beloved
of

such

stunted

emotional

development in the novel is, of course, the "ghost" Beloved
herself.

This is of far-reaching significance, for Beloved

represents the general psychological condition of "blacks"
under and after slavery as much as

she incarnates

the

particular sense of injury and abandonment of the infant
daughter killed by Morrison's maternal protagonist, Sethe.
Beloved embodies

not

only

the

"haint"

that

spitefully

terrorizes 124 Bluestone Road as the novel opens, but also
the primal

African

American

passage and the injured past

experience

of

the middle

selves of Paul D,

Sethe,
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Halle, and Denver, each damaged by slavery in related ways
despite differences of age, sex, and historical situation
(Denver,

for example,

is the child of another

passage"--Sethe's escape--and

grows

up

in

a

"middle
state

of

nominal "freedom").
As Deborah Horvitz astutely surmises, Beloved shares the
spirit

of

both

S e the's daughter

and

her mother,

who

survived the middle passage as a child but was apparently
abandoned when her mother— Sethe's grandmother--jumped into
the ocean to avoid bondage (Beloved 210-14; Horvitz 157-58,
163).

This historical connection establishes parental

abandonment, predicated on the inhumanities of slavery, as
a sort of familial primal scene for the novel and as the
context of Beloved's emotional state.

We must read her

condition not simply in terms of her enraged infantile
response to Sethe's act of aggression, that is, but in the
sense

that

she

represents

the

common

daughter

in

an

extended historical succession of such violent disruptions
of the mother-daughter relationship. Beloved's monologue in
Part 3 recalls the original African mother's leap into the
ocean,

the abandonment of Sethe's mother

(214) .

As a

child, Sethe learns from her nurse Nan how Sethe's mother
abandoned a series of children who were products of slaverapes (62), and as an adult she eventually pieces together
the central horror of her own childhood: that this mother
eventually abandoned her by trying to escape without her
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and

being

hung

for

the

attempt

(203) .

S e the1s

own

desperate resort to infanticide to put her child out of
reach of slavery, intelligible to the ghost-baby only as an
abandonment,

is

thus

literally

a

product

of

both

a

psychological legacy of emotional damage and the immediate
material cruelties of slavery.
But the matrilineal connections that Horvitz so fully
explicates do not mark the limits of Beloved's symbolic
import

in the novel.

In her fragmented recall of the

experience of the middle passage, she also is a figure for
the "Sixty Million and more" African people who died in
transit to the Americas, alluded to in Morrison's epigraph,
and

thus

an

Americans.
Sethe's

important

past

"self"

for

all

African

For Sethe, of course, she represents not only

violently

traumatized

daughter,

but

also

the

traumatized daughter that Sethe herself once was--the past
she

has

repressed

Beloved's influence.
deeply

and

only

begins

to

remember

under

In both ways, she is the image--of a

narcissistically

damaged

"dreaming" for years (132).

self--Sethe

has

been

Similarly, she functions as a

literal projection of the memory that Denver has repressed-the infanticide--a repression readable in Denver's twoyear period of deaf withdrawal from the world (103) and her
nightmarish fear of violence at Sethe's hands (103, 206).
And if Paul D has also retreated from the unimaginable
parts of his past to a fragment of his self-experience,
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locking away his memories of brutal abuse under slavery "in
that tobacco tin buried in his chest where a red heart used
to be"
own

(72-73), Beloved's seductions of him represent his

desire

to

recover

full

identity:

during

their

lovemaking he chants "'Red heart. Red heart,' over and over
again.

Softly and then so loud it woke Denver, then Paul D

himself"

(117).

Beloved is literally Paul D's dream of his

repressed, damaged self.
Indeed, at the end of the novel Beloved vanishes along
with the community members' memories of her, as if she were
nothing more than their "bad dream" as well: they "began to
believe

that,

other

than

what

they

themselves

thinking, she hadn't said anything at all"

were

(274). Beloved

is the damaged element of the consciousness of the African
American community and its novelistic representatives,

a

past "self" long "unspeakable" but suddenly emerging into
their

physical

world.

Morrison

does

not

settle

the

question of whether the ghost is a real agent in the story
or a mere figment of each character's psychic damage: she
is both.

As FitzGerald comments,

interview with Marsha Jean Darling,

citing Morrison's 1988
"[Beloved] can thus be

read in two ways, as Morrison herself suggests: both as a
psychically damaged real-life slavegirl and as a ghost
(fantasy object for the emotions of others)"
Specifically,

as

her

preeminent

(672-73).

role

as

S ethe's

literally mutilated--almost beheaded--daughter makes clear,
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Beloved is a projection of the narcissistically damaged
child within all of the victims of slavery, the embodiment
of their collective retreat from full self-experience in
the face of slavery's almost total denial of the empathic
responsiveness
necessary

to

identity.

and

proper

self-object

the development

"A wounded,

relationships

and sustenance

enraged baby,"

of mature

Barbara Schapiro

writes,

"is the central figure of the book, both literally,

in

character

the

struggles

of

beneath

characters"

(195).

Beloved,
the

and

surface

Indeed,

symbolically,
of

the

as

other

it

major

numerous commentators have

noted Morrison's extensive depiction of the psychology of
Sethe

and

her

family

as

a

condition

injured, infantile narcissism.

of

undeveloped,

The preoedipal, preverbal,

or narcissistic state lived out by Sethe and Beloved--and
by

Beloved

as

a part

of

Denver

and

variously characterized in Kleinian
Winnicottian

(Mathieson,

Wyatt),

Paul

D--has

(Fitzgerald,

Benjaminian

Wyatt),

(Schapiro),

Freudian (Mathieson) and Lacanian (Wyatt) terms.
framework

for

contribution

narcissistic

to

this

damage

already

makes

productive

been

Kohut's
a

useful

discussion,

particularly in the light of his sensitivity to the very
empirical

or,

to borrow

one

of

his

favorite

phrases,

"experience-near" qualities of empathic relations and the
intersubjective context of the self.
many

of

the

interests

of

the

His outlook shares

modification

of

object
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relations theory Jessica Benjamin calls

"intersubjective

theory," but it also presents what we might think of as an
empathically revised version of the psychoanalytic legacy
of

Freud

argues,

and

L a c a n .

2

if,

as Jean Wyatt

convincingly

Morrison revises the Lacanian symbolic model of

social identity into a vision of healthy subjectivity that
combines nurturing with intersubjectivity, bodily contact
with language

(Wyatt 475,

484),

Kohut1s revision of the

analytic situation (subject relating to subject by way of
mutual,

discursively

mediated

empathy)

provides

one

possible explanatory device for a text that also "teaches
[us] that caring is 'what language was made for'"

(Beloved

252, Wyatt 475).3
The

intense

hungers,

the

extreme

dependencies

and

transgressions of self-boundaries, and the general loss of
selfhood that Morrison thematizes at 124 Bluestone Road,
then,

might all be referred to the archaic

relationships
preoedipal

characteristic of,

childhood

and

self-object

in Kohut's view,

the narcissistic

both

personality

disorders precipitated by the traumas of early self-object
failure

(Res tora t ion

28) .

That

is,

we

can

better

understand how Morrison is depicting the emotional damage
of the culture of slavery if we treat Sethe and Beloved's
relationship not
preoedipal
qualities,

simply as

relationship,
but

also

a Kleinian or Winnicottian

though it certainly has
as

a

representation

of

those
the
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narcissistically damaged modes of adult identity that can
arise

from

childhood

self-object

trauma.

Morrison's

ingenious device for representing this connection is, of
course,

to make

st r a n d e d - -cut

Beloved both
off--at

the

the

undifferentiated, preverbal,

ghost

phase

of

of

an

infant

hungering,

and preoedipal relationship

with its mother, and the twenty-year-old, narcissistically
disordered
result,

result

of

infantile

empathic

failure;

the

that is, of being treated by its mother not as a

full self

(a subject,

in Benjamin's parlance),

but as a

mere extension of that mother's own self.
Almost

from

the

moment

of

her

appearance

Beloved

"hungers" for anything that Sethe can give her: stories,
company,

looks, games,

sweets,

foods.

Both metaphorical

and material, this is the "bottomless" longing that Denver
immediately notices in Beloved's eyes (58), observing both
the young woman's lust for sweet foods (55) and "how greedy
she

was

to

hear

Sethe

talk"

storytelling and the sweets
(58).

(63) .

Both

Sethe's

"became a way to feed her"

Beloved's reliance on Sethe becomes so constant,

demanding, and possessive that she gradually maneuvers Paul
D out of the household so that Sethe's attention will be
devoted exclusively to her.

Ultimately, the two become so

entwined in what Wyatt describes as a bodily connected,
"maternal continuity"

(477)

that both withdraw into the

house, neglect the outside world, and continue a "feeding"
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relationship so intense

that Sethe begins

to waste away

physically while Beloved whines for sweets and grows bigger
"by the day"

(239-43).4

Morrison thus creates a nuanced representation of the
condition

Kohut

response.

In the passage I have earlier used to summarize

the

child's

associates

retreat

to

with

"a

failures

fragment

of

in

empathic

the

larger

experiential unit," the specific retreat being discussed
is,

in

fact,

a

retreat

“to

stimulation...o r , expressed
eating," potentially
(Restoration 81).

pleasur e - s e e k i n g

clinically,

resulting

in

her

depressive

"addiction

to

food"

(242)

Indeed, Beloved's temper tantrums

and accelerated desire and demandingness
3 of the novel,

to

oral

(240) during part

together with the insistent depiction of

explicitly

oral,

incorporative,

and

hungering

relationship to Sethe throughout evokes nothing so much as
the "unusually great demandingness vis-a-vis the mother,"
"the

intensified oral

greed,"

and

the

"tendency

toward

violent temper tantrums" Kohut observes in certain children
who have "suffered severe traumatizations in early infancy"
(Restoration 27-28) .

If we view Sethe's infanticide both

as such a severely traumatizing act for the baby that has
"survived"

it

(as a ghost)

and as indicative of a larger

inability

on

her

respond

part

to

empathically

to

her

children--to treat them as whole and separate selves--we
can understand Beloved's characteristics as part of what

377

Kohut calls a "depressive-disintegrative reaction to the
unempathic self-object milieu"
Beloved's

initial

(Restoration 81).

"hungry"

dependence

on Sethe--she

begins to wait longingly for Sethe to come home from work,
"as though every afternoon she doubted anew
woman's

return"

(57)--is

"frighteningly boundless

only

a

the older

precursor

narcissism"

(Schapiro

to
203)

the
of

their withdrawal into the house and of the later pages of
the novel.

As the novel moves on we discover the full

extent of Beloved's hungers for Sethe's smile, her gaze,
her face:

like the preoedipal infant she was when Sethe

first left her,
adult

and like the narcissistically disordered

that might result

from such abandonment

trauma,

Beloved has trouble recognizing any boundary between Sethe
and herself, a "breakdown of the borders between self and
other...that

is bound up with incorporative

fantasies"

(Schapiro 202).
It

is

in the

series

of monologues

that

immediately

follows the withdrawal of Sethe, Denver, and Beloved from
the outside world that the boundaries between self and
other in Beloved's experience are shown to be completely
soluble--and so, too, are the boundaries between Beloved as
the "crawling-already?" baby and Beloved as the survivor of
the middle passage.
the

very

narcissism,

essence

In Beloved's monologue, she expresses
of

predifferentiated,

infantile

placing both Sethe and a woman on the slave
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ship in the position of mother,

yet as part of her own

self: "I am not separate from her

there is no place where

I stop
me

her face is my own...Sethe's is the face that left
Sethe sees me see her and I see the smile

smiling face is the place for me"

her

(210-13). Beloved's own

identity is utterly dependent on, is literally coextensive
with,

S e the's presence

responsive face.

and

her

smiling,

empathically

Correlative to Beloved's more and more

complete merger with Sethe is her growing inability to
tolerate any failure in Sethe's responses to her,
learn

in a passage

as we

that again implicitly connects

the

smiling--but abandoning— woman of the middle passage to the
smiling--but

abandoning--Sethe

who

sent

Beloved

ahead

during her escape from Sweet Home:
Beloved accused her of leaving her behind.
Of not
being nice to her, not smiling at her.
She said they
were the same, had the same face, how could she have
left her? And Sethe cried, saying she never did, or
meant to--that she had to get them out, away....Beloved
wasn't interested.
She said when she cried there was
no one. That dead men lay on top of her....Sethe never
came to her, never said a word to her, never smiled and
worst of all never waved goodbye or even looked her way
before running away from her.
(241-42)
This

remarkable

moments

of

passage

perceived

unresponsiveness

conflates

no

parental

precipitated

by

less

than

three

abandonment
the

extremities

or
of

slavery, articulating them from the enraged, narcissistic
viewpoint of the child who experiences them (or from the
viewpoint of the narcissistically damaged adult that child
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will become): the original African mother's leap into the
sea, Sethe1s (and her mother's) flight from plantation and
children,

and

Eloquently,

S ethe's

desperate

and realistically,

act

it

of

also

infanticide.

emphasizes

the

preoedipal child's all-important visual dependence on its
mother and on her face and smile--the "mirroring" through
which the child sees its own self-worth reflected back to
it in the face and smile of the self-object, in "the gleam
in the mother's eye," thus building its own strong sense of
self

(Kohut,

Analysis

116-17).

These are

the

"visual

interactions" that can become--and indeed seem for Beloved
to have become--"hypercathected" as a result of traumatic
empathic failures, the "gaze" that can be "the carrier of
the wish
mother"

to be held and carried

[and suckled]

by

the

(Kohut, Analysis 117; see also Restoration 8-9).

Not only does the archaic emotional state pursuant to
what Kohut calls "self-object failure"

(Restoration 190)

involve a retreat to a fragment of the experiential unit-frequently to an excessive orality like Beloved's--it also
often

eventuates

fragmentation.

in

the

conscious

experience

of

that

"After the self has broken into fragments,"

Kohut observes, there is still a "residual part of the self
that experiences its own fragmentation" and "attach[es] its
anxieties and complaints to this or that fragment of the
body"

(Restoration 156-57).

When the child-woman Beloved
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loses

a tooth,

we

learn how

intensely

she

feels

this

"disintegration anxiety":
Beloved looked at the tooth and thought, This is it.
Next would be her arm, her hand, a toe. Pieces of her
would drop maybe one at a time, maybe all at once. Or
one of those mornings before Denver woke and after
Sethe left she would fly apart. It is difficult keeping
her head on her neck, her legs attached to her hips
when she is by herself. Among the things she could not
remember was when she first knew that she could wake up
any day and find herself in pieces. She had two dreams:
exploding, and being swallowed.
(133)
In

K o h u t 's

clinical

terms,

we

might

read

Beloved's

imputation of her condition to her bodily structure as
paralleling the disintegration anxiety "patient's attempt
to give a circumscribed content to a deeper unnamable dread
experienced when a person feels that his self is becoming
seriously enfeebled or is disintegrating," often actualized
with

a

"clearly

hypochondriacal

(Restoration 105).

and

phobic

cast"

Like the self psychological framework I

am foregrounding, Morrison emphasizes the absence of selfobjects, when the fabric of relationship that structures
the self is not visibly present, as the situation when this
threat

of bodily

Beloved's

fragmentation

feelings

evoke

both

is most
the

acute.5

specific

Thus,

shocking

experience at the core of her fragmentation and a general
condition of archaic overdependence on self-object empathy:
her difficulty

"keeping her head on her neck" links her

fragmentation

to

the

crucial

incident

when

violent

aggression came from the expected source of caring empathy,

381

and her inability to maintain her sense of self in the
absence

of

others

bespeaks

the

lack

of

mature

self

functioning produced by an environment of developmental
self-object failure.

In this case, that environment is a

culture of slavery where, as for Sethe and for her mother
before her, parents are always running away, sold away, or
too emotionally crippled themselves to be effective models.
As a particularly concretized description of the literal
fragmentation
disintegration
Morrison's

of

identity,

I

take

this

anxiety

to

be

absolutely

articulation

of

the psychology

evocation

of

central

to

of

slavery.

Beloved is both the preoedipal infant for whom the absence
of the parent's mirroring gaze precipitates an existential
crisis and the victim of slave culture for whom adult life
is a constant,
for an

infantlike quest to establish firm grounds

identity.

In normal

Kohut's formulation,

maturation,

according

to

"the mother's exultant response to the

total child (calling him by name as she enjoys his presence
and activity)

supports,

at

the appropriate phase,

the

development from autoerotism to narcissism--from the stage
of the fragmented self...to the stage of the cohesive self"
(Analysis 118).

Having experienced the traumatic loss of

her mother's responsive smile and affirmative naming--on
several historical levels at once--Beloved is stranded in
the immature emotional state of disintegration anxiety,
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experiencing only various autoeroticized

(oral,

sexual,

tactile) fragments of the self.
When Beloved makes her ghostly visitation to Paul D in
the

cold house,

intent

on her

narcissistic

removing a distraction from Sethe's purview,

design

of

she is also

engaging in a furtive, eroticized attempt to fill her eirpty
sense

of

self.

But

what

is

most

revealing

is

her

connection of that eroticism to the crucial lack in her
past--the lack of having her total self acknowledged by
being called by name by a joyful parent.

She tells Paul D,

"I want you to touch me on the inside part and call me my
name"

(116).

Homi Bhabha, indeed, emphasizes this request

as the crucial moment of "Beloved's naming of her desire
for identity."
is the very

That "inward and intimate desire," he adds,
"'inscape'

of the memory

of slavery"

that

Morrison is recreating (Bhabha, Culture 16).
Historically,

we might trace this destruction of the

African American

self

to

the violent

deterritorializations, and familial

disorientations,

separations

of

the

abduction from Africa, as Morrison suggests by making the
disintegration

theme

a

critical

aforementioned monologue section,

presence

in

the

when Beloved's middle

passage life is literally contiguous with her "lives" as
Sethe's baby and as the ghost at Bluestone Road. Beloved's
fragmented discourse in the monologue, as Wyatt observes,
"robs

the

reader

of

known

demarcations,

creating

a
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linguistic

equivalent

differentiation
cultural

in

an

of

that

Africans'

'oceanic'

i d e ntities."^

recollection

the

combines

In

space
a

that

broken,

geographical

loss

of

'unmade'

unattached

displacement,

maternal abandonment, child sexual abuse, and brutal racial
persecution into a single,

horrific psychology of self

disruption, Beloved remembers
I watch him eat
inside I am crouching to keep from
falling with the rain
I am going to be in pieces he
hurts where I sleep
he puts his finger there
I drop
the food and break into pieces
she took my face away
there is no one to want me
to say me my name.
(212)
It is unclear whether the sexual abuse "Beloved" recalls
here (and on 215) occurred on the slave ship (the place of
"crouching"), after her mother jumped overboard, or after
enslavement, since the immediately preceding statement that
"the others are taken
auction.

I am not taken" may refer to an

We do know that Sethe's mother--the woman who

came from the sea--bore several children,

the progeny of

rapes at the hands both of crew members during the Middle
Passage

("many times")

and of later white slavemasters—

children whom she abandoned (62).

What is clear is that

these lines recount the primal psychic cataclysm when the
self-experience

of

Sethe's

mother

broke

into pieces,

expressing that

fragmentation in the crucial

infantile

discourse of hunger for a parent's self-mirroring,
naming presence.

self

Historically generated and generationally descended,
represented by the child who is a victim of both the Middle
Passage and Sethe1s desperate act of violence, a product of
geographical, cultural, physical, and parental violations
of the total self,

this disintegration is fundamental to

the postslavery African American consciousness, as Morrison
reemphasizes in the novel's closing pages.
forgotten by

the community members whose

Here, Beloved,
consciousness

created her, returns to "the place where long grass opens"-Africa,

where

separate parts"

the

story

(274).

began--and

"erupts

into

her

Here, Beloved becomes a historical

version of the wounded "baby" who "struggles beneath the
surface" of all of the novel's major characters
195) .

Here,

(Schapiro

Morrison takes us back to their ancestral

infancy,

to the infancy of

"African American"

identity

itself.

In the archetypical moment when Sethe's mother,

picking flowers in the "long grass" with her mother, was
abducted and removed into
African American
fragmentation

the galley of a slave ship,

identity was

that

images

"born, " and born

the preoedipal

into a

fragmentation

theorized by Klein, Lacan, Kohut, and others.
As the preoedipal, pre-mirror stage, predifferentiated
child occupies no coherent subject position (and here I am
using the term "subject" not in a Foucauldian sense but in
its Benjaminian,

intersubjective

sense), so the native

African removed to the galley of the slave ship had her
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subjecthood revoked.

Indeed, this systematic displacement

of a racialized other represents perhaps the most complete
annihilation of

full subjecthood in world history:

the

complete "unmaking," as Hortense Spillers has described it,
of cultural identities in their historical, geographical,
and relational

specificity

(72).

Like Ralph Ellison's

hospital machine--perhaps this was its first incarnation-the

slave

ship was

(re)birth,
enforced

a

the

reduction

retreat

to

a

scene
to

of a violently

racialized

fragment

of

coercive

objecthood,

one's

full

an

psychic

configuration, and--in all these senses— a disintegration
of the body-self. ”7

Through the single figure of Beloved,

Morrison accomplishes nothing less than a stunning revision
of

the

often

racistly

recapitulates-phylogeny.

deployed

concept

of

ontology-

In Morrison's revision, however,

personal ontology recapitulates ethnic phylogeny because of
the generation-to-generation transmission of narcissistic
damage that made the culture of slavery so devastating.
Beloved's "archaic" disintegration anxiety in the novel's
"present" time recapitulates the disintegration inflicted
during

the

most

archaic

phase

of

African

American

ethnicity.8

The

ghost

of

slavery

future:

Denver

By focusing on Sethe's less ghostly daughter, Denver, we
can move this discussion of U.S. racial psychopathology to

more material grounds and from the historical epoch of
preslavery to that of postslavery,

for, as Mae Henderson

writes, "The connection of Sethe's present with her past is
figuratively embodied in her relationship to Beloved while
the connection with her future is figuratively embodied in
her relationship with Denver"
of violence

against

her

(75).

own

For Denver Sethe's act

flesh and blood

is not a

personally experienced memory of parental aggression but
only a collection of "certain odd and terrifying feelings
about her mother"

that conglomerate around the horrible

truth she has blocked from her consciousness

(102).

Yet

she suffers from a variation of the same gnawing hunger
that characterizes Beloved and from the same intense need
to be responded to as a total self.

Her psychological

journey to that archaic state might be traced through her
passages

from

preverbal

infancy

to

a

normal,

early

childhood development of a linguistically socialized self,
characterized by her acquisition of "the little i." at Lady
Jones’s school, and then to the destructuring moment when
Nelson Lord enunciates her mother's past to her, bringing
its violence momentarily to consciousness and putting "the
little _i and all the rest that those afternoons held out of
reach

forever"

(102) .

It

is at

this moment

that her

formative "little i." evaporates and she retreats, first to
two years of isolated silence and deafness,
"green bush house"

in the woods,

then to her

an enclosed,

withdrawn
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subjectivity she can rigidly control while

she

"keeps

watch" for the only object of desire and relationship she
feels she can safely allow herself, the ghost-baby (105).
Denver's reaction to Beloved when she appears,

then,

indicates that Beloved is that object— or, more accurately,
that self-object:
Denver

begins

to

Beloved is not only
look

to

for

the self-ob~i ec t

company,

empathy,

and

mirroring appreciation, she is also the self-ob~iect that is
a projection--as I have suggested in the case of Paul D--of
Denver's own injured past and her desire to restore it to
wholeness.9

Her own ungovernable need for Beloved thus

mimics Beloved's ungoverned need for Sethe,

encompassing

both a similarly intense hunger and a similar desperation
for full empathic response.
end of the

For Denver the catastrophic

"wonderful little i." brought about what she

thinks of as

"the original hunger"

(121),

an orally and

visually hypercathected desire that only Beloved satisfies:
To go back to the original hunger was impossible.
Luckily for Denver, looking was food enough to last.
But to be looked at in turn was beyond appetite; it was
breaking through her own skin to a place where hunger
hadn't been discovered.... It was lovely.
Not to be
stared at, not seen, but being pulled into view by the
interested, uncritical eyes of the other. Having her
hair examined as a part of her self, not as material or
a style. Having her lips, nose, chin caressed as they
might be if she were a moss rose a gardener paused to
admire.
(118)
That

is,

the

disintegration

of

her

fragile

"i,"

precipitated by her unnameable fear of her own mother as a
threatening, rather than nurturing presence, has catapulted

388

Denver into an archaic mode of self-object relationship,
characterized by similar hungers, similar infantile merger
fantasies, and, above all in this passage, a similar need
to be responded to appreciatively as a full self.^0

Again

notable here is the hypercathexis of these desires onto the
"visual interactions"

through which,

mother and by being looked at by her,

"by looking at the
the child attempts

not only to obtain the narcissistic gratifications that are
in tune with the visual sensory modality but also strives
to substitute for the failures that had occurred in the
realm of physical (oral and tactile) contact or closeness"
(Kohut, Analysis 117).

Instead of directing it toward her

mother, however, Denver has displaced this needy, injured,
infantile self-object relationship onto Beloved--both her
long-lost sister and a version of that common childhood
compensatory mechanism, the imaginary friend.
Denver's own version of the "depressive-disintegrative
reaction to the unempathic
Restoration 81), then,
tendency toward

self-object milieu"

like Beloved's,

(Kohut,

involves a marked

"depressive eating," oral-incorporative

fantasies, and a vulnerability of the self structure that
threatens its complete dissolution in the absence of the
mirroring self-object.

The novel's opening chapter,

for

example, emphasizes Denver's weight problem and her eating
binge

in

attention

response
(19) .

to

Paul

D's

preemption

of

Sethe's

Denver only has a "little i., " we might
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say, in the context of Beloved's gaze and presence; without
Beloved,

Denver

literally has

no

self.

When

Beloved

momentarily vanishes one day in the darkened cold house,
the

portrait

of

Denver,

too,

as

a

chronic

case

of

disintegration anxiety is completed: without Beloved "she
does not know where her body stops, which part of her is an
arm, a foot or a knee.

She feels like an ice cake torn

away from the solid surface of the stream. ... Breakable,
meltable and cold"

(123) .

If Paul D's arrival

at 124

Bluestone Road threatened the carefully controlled self she
had managed to retreat to within the green walls of her
boxwood "bower" (28), causing Denver to cry "for herself
really, as the Kohut framework suggests, a fragment of her
self--Beloved's

seeming

disappearance

is

far

devastating, erasing Denver's identity altogether:

more

"Now she

is crying because she has no self" (123, my emphases).H
The fact that Beloved is stranded in an immature psychic
state of narcissistic personality disorder that borders on
psychosis

can be

traced to her dual

embodiment

of the

infant itself--which never got a chance to grow out of
primary narcissism--and of the "adult" who is responding in
enraged,

narcissistically

damaged

experienced as childhood abandonment
physical

violence

(at Bluestone

ways

to

what

she

(at Sweet Home) and

Road).

Denver's

less

severe case cannot be understood in quite the same way,
however,

since she was born during the escape from Sweet

Home,

did not feel the direct violence of her mother's

handsaw, and seems only subconsciously aware of what Sethe
did that day, experiencing "odd and terrifying feelings"
(102) and recurrent nightmares about her mother:
my head off every night" (206) .

"She cut

Indeed, it is the obscure

rather than direct presence of Sethe1s particular, isolated
act in Denver's pathogenesis that allows Morrison to focus
attention

on

a

broader

context

of

dysfunctional

intersubjective relations and familial disruptions that are
precipitated
practices.

by

and

its

associated

racist

In one of his signal modifications of Freudian

psychoanalysis,
childhood

slavery

Kohut theorizes

memory

"often

turn

that

out

"gross events"

to

be

no

more

in

than

crystallization points" for the child's experience of "the
specific

pathogenic

personality

of

the

parent(s)

and

specific pathogenic features of the atmosphere in which the
child grows up," a matrix of empathic response failure that
is actually far more important in the genesis of later
psychological
events"

disturbances

than

any particular

(Restoration 187, my emphasis).

If the shock of

Sethe's infanticide is such a "gross event"
childhood,

Morrison

nevertheless

"gross

creates

in Denver's
a

vision

of

Denver's disturbance that urges us to view the moment in
the shed--and/or Nelson Lord's enunciation of it--as a mere
"crystallization point"

for

a much more

comprehensive
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"atmosphere" of faulty responsiveness that actually leads
to her damaged state.
Correlatively, it is the portrait of Denver that invites
us to disregard the seemingly important,
of

Sethe's

but profoundly

misguided,

question

maternal

competence,

"morality,"

"guilt," or "innocence" in her commission of

this particular act of violence--or rather that permits us
to avoid falling into the trap of asking that question--and
to focus our attention instead on an entire culture of
slavery that has produced both Denver's and Sethe1s psychic
deficiencies.

Denver

is damaged,

that

is,

not by the

memory of her mother's commission of a subhuman murder,
though

even

Paul

D

and

other members

of

the

African

American community in the novel attempt to read Sethe's act
as

such,

but

"pathogenic
formative

by

the

broader

personalities"

relational

absence
in

matrices.

of

Denver's
The

anything
and

but

S ethe's

Kohutian paradigm

suggests that it is Sethe's "disturbed empathic capacity,"
not her moment of defensive violence,
[Denver]
chain

of

of maturation-promoting responses,
events

leading

(Restoration 188) .^2
relations

"that, by depriving

approach

to

psychological

Even more importantly,
helps

us

sets up the
illness"
the object

to position both

Sethe's

infanticide and the "disturbed empathic capacity" of which
it is a manifestation within a larger cycle of emotional
damage, for, as Kohut observes,

"a mother's faulty empathy

392

can rarely be judged in isolation....it has to be evaluated
as

a

failure

vis-a-vis

an

unusually

difficult

task"

(Restoration 29).
The

case

of Denver,

attention from the
emotional

vortex

I am suggesting,

"gross event"

of

the

novel

redirects

that seems
to

the

our

to be the

atmosphere

of

relational failures and pathogenic personalities that was
the condition of the postslavery African American family.
This

atmosphere,

degradations,

Morrison

and violences

suggests--the
that have

abandonments,

already,

by

the

present time of the novel, wrought their havoc on Sethe's
own

sense

of

self--make

her parental

difficult, but very nearly impossible.

"task"

not

only

If the depiction of

Beloved connects that "gross event" to the disintegrations
of the African American past, then, it is in the depiction
of Denver that Morrison most clearly connects slavery's
disintegration

of

the

African

disintegration

of

the

African

thereby,

American
American

to the postslavery future) .

self
family

to

its
(and,

In the cold house,

when Beloved vanishes and Denver is overcome with panic
that she is both psychically and physically disintegrating,
that she literally has "no self," she immediately connects
her loss of identity to what she has experienced as an
extended,

familial atmosphere of abandonments:

"She won't

put up with another leaving, another trick.

Waking up to

find one brother

foot of

then another not

at

the

the
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bed..."; then the loss of her grandmother, Baby Suggs, and
now,

Beloved,

the

"dream-come-true"

replacement for two

losses— her sister and the baby-ghost— "comes true just to
leave her on a pile of newspaper in the dark"
while the brothers,

Howard and Buglar,

(123).

And

left the family

ostensibly to escape the ghosts of Sethe's violence, their
choice of isolated wandering,

too, must be read in the

context of a family network, devastated by the practices of
slavery,

that

fails

to provide

the necessary

empathic

support.
The two gaping holes at the center of that network, of
course, are Sethe's own damaged,

"pathogenic personality"

and the more absolute absence of the father, Halle, whose
redemptive return is another of Denver's dreams.

Halle not

only failed to rejoin the family after the escape from
Sweet Home, he did so because, as Paul D explains to Sethe,
his witnessing of Sethe's rape at the hands of her youthful
white masters was
structure,

too,

the

final blow that caused his

to disintegrate.

If,

in

self

the Kohutian

framework, every psyche has two opportunities to develop a
healthy self structure through empathic relationship to
first one parent,

then the other,

Denver has suffered a

double self-object failure: her father has not been present
at all and her physically present mother has virtually no
self to internalize.

As Schapiro puts it, less clinically,

"The 'other‘--whether represented by mother or father--is
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always untrustworthy in Morrison's world, rendered thus by
the

social

environment"

(205).

It

is

this

untrustworthiness of the crucial familial relations that
structure the self, enforced by an environment of slavery
that

ruptures

both

the

family

and

the

subject,

that

Morrison pinpoints as the intersubjective mechanism of her
characters' disintegration.
This emphasis is explicit in the case of Baby Suggs,
Halle's mother and the family's matriarch,

who,

before

Halle buys her into freedom and she recovers enough of an
identity to begin her career of inspirational preaching,
records her lack of identity as a sadness "at her center,
the desolated center where the self that was no self made
its home"

(140).

If the rhetoric of this sadness echoes

Denver's "crying because she has no self," its cause also
has much in common with the disruption of familial bonds at
the root of Denver's lack of a self.

"White" slaveholders

separated Baby Suggs from all of her children but Halle:
"it wasn't worth the trouble to try to learn features you
would never see change into adulthood anyway. Seven times
she had done that. ...All seven were gone or dead.

What

would be the point of looking too hard at that youngest
one?"

(139).

This

passage

dramatically

inverts

language of Denver's hungering for a maternal
notice her in all her physical detail,

"look"

the
to

pointing to the

critical cycle, the transmission of self-fragmentation from
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generation to generation,
enables

us

to

which the Kohutian

understand:

Baby

Suggs,

her

framework
own

self-

structure eradicated by the continuing destruction of her
family relationships

(she has also lost a husband who,

given the opportunity,
without her),

had to make an escape to freedom

is unable to give the crucial

"looks" that

recognize and affirm the total child; Denver has no self-or at best a fragmented and tenuous self--because she has
not received the "looks" that were essential to moving from
the infantile "stage of the fragmented self...to the stage
of the cohesive self"
has

(Analysis 118) and because she, too,

found every one of her crucial relationships

to be

untrustworthy.13
It is Sethe,

of course, who "looks" both ways in this

dynamic, having been separated from the "looks" of, and, as
she perceived it, abandoned by, her mother, thus developing
the "pathogenic personality" that is incapable--much like
Baby

Suggs--of

Denver.
the

lack

giving

the

appropriate

recognition

to

Indeed, the text emphasizes Sethe1s experience of
of

the

smile

of

her

mother,

who

was

both

physically separated from Sethe and facially deformed from
being forced to wear a bit on the plantation where Sethe
grew up (203).

The consequent destruction of Sethe's own

self is written as a profound emptiness of the eyes (9)-signalling also her inability to look at Denver with true
empathic responsiveness--and as a lack of self-boundaries:
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like Beloved in the

role of preoedipal

infant,

"Sethe

didn't know where the world stopped and she began"

(164).

Such boundaries can only be developed, according to Kohut,
in empathic relationship to an appropriately structured
self-object.

The

ghost

of

slavery

present;

In B e l o v e d . however,

this

Schoolteacher
destruction

of

through the disruption of familial relations

the

self

is both a

direct product of and cofunctionary with the debasements of
a racist system of oppression, or, as FitzGerald puts it,
"the responsibility for Sethe's confusion lies in slavery,
which

positioned

her

as

object

and

denied

her

the

experience of bonding with her own mother through which she
could

arrive

at

emphasis).

a

separate

Significantly,

subjectivity"
the

two

(678,

strands

of

my
the

destruction of the African American self which FitzGerald
gestures toward here correspond to the two mechanisms of
fragmentation with which I began this chapter.
my

interest

in how

the

admittedly

In pursuing

depoliticized

self

psychological view I have presented can be modified to
include a consciousness of how racial politics impinge upon
the (mis)construction of subjectivity, I want to separate
out

the

first

strand

of

Fitzgerald's

formulation--the

positioning of slavery's victims as objects— as a component
of the slavery system Morrison represents that is worthy of
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specific study in its own right.

In the case of Paul D,

for example, Morrison's focus is much less on the severance
of familial bonds and much more on the dehumanizing effects
of

racist

objectification.

The

lack

of

empathic

recognition or responsiveness that causes him to "retreat
to a fragment of [his] larger experiential unit"

(Kohut,

Restoration 81), we might say, takes the form of his being
treated

as

an ob-iect

rather

than as a subi e c t .

tortures inflicted on him at Sweet Home,

The

which make him

feel like even less of a subject than the rooster he must
look at eye-to-eye (72), and the disciplinary enforcement
of the identification "nigger" on the chain gang (107-8),
are the cultural strategies of individualization that deny
the

empathic

configuration"

needs

of

his

"broader

psychological

(Kohut, Restoration 81), causing his "whole"

self to disintegrate.

More explicitly than any of the

other characters in Beloved. Paul D has survived the idea
of "nigger" in his symbolic world, and the literal box in
the

ground

that

physically

enforced

it

on

him,

by

retreating to a fragment of his "larger experiential unit":
"After [the chain gang] he had shut down a generous portion
of his head, operating on the part that helped him walk,
eat, sleep,

sing....The box had done what Sweet Home had

not, what working like an ass and living like a dog had
not: drove him crazy so he would not lose his mind"

(41).

The subterranean box in which he is forced to sleep on the
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chain gang,

I am suggesting,

is only the disciplinary

instrument through which is executed his individualization
in the symbolic box

"nigger"--the sexual,

economic,

and

psychological servitude to which he returns each morning at
the utterance of the words "Hungry, nigger?" (108).
Contemplating another degradation a few pages later,
Paul D reiterates this retreat to a fragment of experience
as the enclosure of part of himself within a "tobacco tin
buried in his chest where a red heart used to be"
The

unthinkable

memory

in

question

here

(72-73).
involves

Schoolteacher, the slavemaster who replaced the marginally
more humane Mr. Garner at Sweet Home, and who becomes the
crucial figure in Morrison's depiction of this second, more
symbolic strand of slavery's annihilation of the "black"
self.

Forced to wear a bit in his mouth by Schoolteacher,

Paul D realizes

that

the barnyard rooster,

Mister,

is

allowed more of a self than he is: "wasn't no way I'd ever
be Paul D again, living or dead. Schoolteacher changed me.
I was something else and that something was less than a
chicken

sitting

in

the

sun"

(72) .

This

recollection

provides our first glimpse of Morrison's recreation of the
fact that racism was an integral part of slavery.

That is,

Schoolteacher as a "white" man is after more than just the
material benefits

of physical

domination

and

economic

exploitation; he has an equal if not greater investment in
this reduction of Paul D to less than subject status,

to
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less

than human

object.

What

status--to,
we

see

in

in

fact,

this

the position

torture

session

of
is

Schoolteacher short-circuiting the intersubjective matrix
to position himself
position

Paul D as

thereby,

as object.

as

"white"

"black"--as

and as

subject

racialized

and

other,

to

and,

I am not saying that Schoolteacher

does this to Paul D because of the power invested in him as
a "white" man, or because Paul D is "black"; I am saying
that Schoolteacher here creates himself as "white" by, in
fact, reducing Paul D to the position of object.
The

disciplinary

passage

session

D

remembers

is really only a material practice

actually Schoolteacher's
discursive,
tion.

Paul

in

this

in what

is

far more extensive systematic,

and rationalized methodology of objectifica

Schoolteacher

is

a

sort

of

pseudoscientific

disciplinarian, bent on inscribing the African Americans on
his

farm

in

segmentation,

a discourse

of

biologization,

and taxonomical differentiation.

biological
Arriving

with a supply of notebooks and papers, his intention is not
only to work his slaves--to exploit their bodily labor for
profit--but also to (rationally) study them as bodies, thus
doubly concretizing his own autonomy as rational, thinking,
and knowing subject.

Engaging a practice of slavery that

is far more devastating to the self-experiences

of the

Sweet Home residents than the simple denial of freedom they
were accustomed to under the previous owner, both because
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of its more draconian methods of torture and because of its
positioning of them as objects of study,
begins

observing,

notetaking,

measuring,

Schoolteacher

quantifying,

testing,

and classifying his human chattel.

In doing

so, as Mae Henderson phrases it, "he divides or dismembers
the indivisibility of the slaves' humanity to reconstruct
(or perhaps deconstruct) the slave in his text" (70).
It

isn't

the

"measuring string"

that he

applies

to

Sethe's head, nose, and behind (191) that devastates her
self so much as it is her textualization as subhuman object
of study, signified by two particular recollections in her
gallery of horror.
as

The first, which she relates to Beloved

justification

for

the

infanticide,

is

the

day

she

overhears Schoolteacher instructing his pupils on how to
"do" Sethe as a write-up in their notebooks:

"'I told you

to put her human characteristics on the left; her animal
ones on the right.

And don't forget to line them up. '"

(193) .

which occurs the day of the escape

The, second,

attempt, is Schoolteacher's instigation of an "experiment"
in which Sethe is "milked"/raped by his pupils,
with mossy

teeth,

holding me down,
writing it up"
preferable
sexualized,

one

sucking on my breast

"two boys
the

other

their book-reading teacher watching and
(70) .

Inferring that physical death is

to the psychic death of being reduced
biologized,

and bestialized

object

in

to a
the
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scientific discourse of another, Sethe swears,

"No notebook

for my babies and no measuring string neither"

(198) .

"The dismemberment of Schoolteacher's method," then, as
Henderson

notes,

"is

the

dismemberment of slavery"

discursive

(70).

analog

to

the

Indeed, Sethe identifies

Schoolteacher's manipulation of discursive objectification
as more

destructive

than his physical

abuses.

As

she

describes his effect on another of the Sweet Home slaves,
"'He commenced to carry round a notebook and write down
what we said.
tore Sixo up.

I still think it was them questions that
Tore him up for all time'"

(37).

As Sethe's

rhetoric here suggests, moreover, the psychic death imposed
by Schoolteacher's objectifying disciplines is indeed an
exact,

discursive

analog

slavery's

material

familial

relationships,

to

the

practices:

fragmentation of the self.

it

like

"dismemberments"
the

imports

disruption
the

of
of

complete

Schoolteacher's notebooks form

a critical symbolic link in his total system of discipline
for "the dis-memberina of slaves from their families, their
labor, their selves" (Henderson 71).
Schoolteacher, no less than the fabricators of literary
"Africanism," is engaged in the practice of writing "race"
here,

though

his

methodology,

as

Barbara

Christian

suggests, is probably meant to evoke that of the legion of
nineteenth-century "white" "scientists" and ethnographers
who tried to establish physiological justifications

for

race differentiation and for slavery. That is,
aspires

to

empiricism,

the

scholarly

objectivity

studying a "thing"

of

though he
scientific

that is already "there,"

Morrison shows him to be actually creating "race" in his
objects of study as he studies them.

His method of inquiry

is not intersubjective or empathic, to use the terms of my
psychoanalytic perspective,

but is structured,

like his

physical humiliation of Paul D, to confirm his own position
as

knowing,

objects.

thinking

subject,

fey. defining

others

as

His "study" of "race" thus takes the form, as his

anatomical segmentation of Sethe suggests, of a creation of
"race"

that constitutes his subjectivity as culture and

civilization, hers as nature and body; his as human, hers
as animal.
cogent

His writing of "race," to borrow Henderson's

summary,

"espouses

a concept

of difference

and

'otherness' as a form of subhumanity that serves, through a
process of negative self-identification, to confirm his own
sense of

superiority.

confirms Schoolteacher's

It

is Sethe's

'savagery'

which

'civilization,' her 'bestiality'

which confirms his 'humanity'" (70).
Morrison's

fictional portrayal of Schoolteacher thus

dramatizes her critical assertion, in Plavincr in the Dark,
about the psychological instrumentality of "black slavery":
"in that construction of blackness and enslavement could be
found not only the not-free but also, with the dramatic
polarity created by skin color, the projection of the not
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me"

(38) .

From

forcing

observing, questioning,

Paul

D

to

wear

the

bit

to

and "writing" his slaves, we can

see Schoolteacher constructing a system of both "race" and
enslavement that projects his

"not-me," allowing him to

self-legitimatingly clear his own subject of "savagery."
Morrison

thus

represents

fictionally

how

it

is

this

psychological function— what she calls, in Plaving in the
Dark, "ego-reinforcement"--that made the practice of racial
objectification itself--especially the deployment of "race"
as a discursive discipline--essential to the practice of
slavery.
This constitution of "blackness" as "savage," "sexual,"
and "bodily" as a means of reinforcing the subjecthood of a
"white"

ego,

of course,

is what I have been describing

throughout this study as a racial mirror stage.
tried

to

show--as

response

to

the

"black"

object

Fanon

epithet
to

the

so

poignantly

As I have

represents

"nigger"--being positioned
"white"

subject

in

such

his
as
a

constitution of subjectivity is inherently fragmenting for
the "black" self, a fragmentation Morrison captures in the
images of both Sixo,

torn up by the discursive discipline

of Schoolteacher's notebooks, and Paul D, who shuts down a
portion of his head to survive the bodily discipline of
Schoolteacher's bit and collar. The symbolic, imaginative,
and discursive destruction of the "black" self articulated
by Schoolteacher's modes of racial individualization, then,
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are the novel's particular instances of a larger, cultural
mirror
"white"

stage
and

that

implements

"black."

the

Indeed,

symbolic

Morrison

violence

thematizes

this

cultural mechanism in a crucial passage

that seems

forego,

voice

for

the moment,

implied consciousness

both

narrative

and

of

to
the

of her character--Stamp Paid--in

order to engage in a bit of blunt cultural analysis.

In

effect, her description of the constitution of "whiteness"
as a process by which "whites" project onto "blackness" a
"jungle" that actually "lived under their own white skin"
(199), provides the interpretation of what she has shown
Schoolteacher

doing

with

Schoolteacher,

"whites"

at

his
large

notebooks.
have

Like

created

the

"savagery," disorder, and subhumanity that they claim only
to observe or respond to in "blacks":
Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners, under
every dark skin was a jungle.
Swift unnavigable
waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping snakes,
red gums ready for their sweet white blood....But it
wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this
place from the other (livable) place.
It was the
jungle whitefolks planted in them.
And it grew.
It
spread.
(198)
Moreover, Morrison's cultural mirror stage, like that of
Fanon, is powerful and destructive: those positioned by it
as

"black"

object cannot help but engage a desperate,

disordered effort

to regain

the position

of

subject--

"human," in the mirror stage's own symbolic code--which is
a necessity for the experience of total selfhood: "The more
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coloredpeople spent their strength trying to convince them
how gentle they were, how clever and loving, how human, the
more

they

used

themselves

up

to

persuade

whites

something Negroes believed could not be questioned,

of
the

deeper and more tangled the jungle grew inside" (198).
The

inevitable

corresponds

to

growth

the

of

profound

this

disordered

sense

of

"jungle"

objectification

experienced at Schoolteacher's hands by Paul D and Sethe.
Not

only

does

impossible,

it

mandate

struggle

a perpetual,

to

reconnect

and

with

the

virtually
"human,"

"rational," and "emotional" components of self-experience,
as Stamp Paid here suggests, but that very struggle also
implies

a

segmentation

of

the

total

self.

We

might

understand the denial of full self experience implicit in
objectification

in

terms

of

Jessica

Benjamin's

intersubjective theory, which argues that the splitting of
the intersubjective field into subject and object can only
be experienced as fragmenting for human psyches that are
inherently relational and intersubjective (63).
have

suggested,

we

might

understand

Schoolteacher's

objectifying

disciplines

as

recognition,

forcing

paradigmatic

fragment

of

the

the

"broader

(Kohut, Restoration 81).

denials

Or, as I

of

psychological

full

empathic

"retreat"

to

a

configuration"

Or, as Sethe herself describes

the objectifying force of the racial mirror stage, "anybody
white could take your whole self for anything that came to
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mind.

Not just work, kill,

or maim you, but dirty you.

Dirty you so bad you forgot who you were and couldn1t think
it up anymore" (251).
This symbolic strand of slavery's destruction of the
"black" self, then, reinforces the familial and relational
destruction

of

the

slave

identity.

Insomuch

as

it

functions as a more insidious symbolic structure within the
African American psyche,
into

the

postslavery

it propagates that destruction
future

correlatively

(and

overlappingly, as I have noted) with the intergenerational
transmission

of

self-object

damage

that Morrison most

notably thematizes as a sort of matrilineal dysfunction.
But

what

I

have

tried

to

suggest,

in

bringing

the

intersubjective and object-relational perspectives to bear
on the racial mirror stage, is that these two mechanisms of
slavery's fragmentation of the African American self are
not

only related and similar,

but

related and similar

because they are versions of the same process of identity
formation; more accurately, of the same process of identity
distortion.
context

From the perspective of an intersubjective

in which the experience of a whole,

total,

or

integrated self has its being through "mutual recognition"
with other "subjects"

(Benjamin), or in relationship with

others that are experienced as "self-objects" through the
mediation of

"empathic response"

(Kohut),

that is,

the

racial mirror stage is understandable as a form of self

object failure.

The racial mirror stage, like its Lacanian

antecedent, relies on a denial of intersubjectivity and its
empathy,

postulates

experiential
object,

and,

world

an

"I" by violently

into

knowing

thereby,

closes

splitting

subject

off

the

internalizing position of self-object.

and

the

external

intermediate,

When the current

flowing through empathy flickers off, entire sectors of the
self disappear, as Paul D discovers when he loses his "red
heart"

and shuts down a portion of his head.

Both the

perpetrators and the victims of the racial mirror stage,
then, will experience a fragmentation analogous to those
who,

robbed in development of the empathic response and

internalizability of healthy parental
stranded

in

a perpetual

experience of identity.

quest

for

self-objects, are
a more

integrated

Psyches struggling to survive in

the absences of "mutual recognition" pursuant to either the
cultural

or the personal process

I have outlined here,

Morrison's novel illustrates, will retreat to fragments of
their

experience.

Her

"'inscape'

of

the

memory

of

slavery," a product of both processes working together,
provides

a

racially

politicized

analog

to

K o h u t 's

understanding of the psychic misery of "Tragic Man": "The
deepest horror man can experience is that of feeling that
he is exposed to circumstances in which he is no longer
regarded as human by others; i.e.,

in a milieu that does
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not even respond with faulty or distorted empathy to his
presence"

(Reflections).

The pieces

I am.

she

gather them

When Denver walks out of the boundaried structure of the
house at 124 Bluestone Road, which has become a site of
"consuming narcissism"
outside world,

(Schapiro 204)

she makes a first,

isolated from the

tentative step toward

reinstating mutually supportive, empathically communicative
relations with a community of self-objects
response

to

Denver's

attempt

at

(248-49).

connection,

In
the

narcissistically disordered structure of her life suddenly
inverts as her requests for help, her offerings of service,
and her efforts at conversation are rewarded with food,
education,

and friendship.

When Paul D finally overcomes

the blindness of a white-derived rhetoric

that defines

Sethe as beast, part of his own internalized "jungle," he
is able to reach out to her with a gesture of affirming,
bodily, empathic responsiveness, converting his discourse
about the number of her feet to an offer to rub her feet
(272) .

Both

instances point

to the possibility

that,

despite the formidable replicative capacity of slavery's
mutilations
narcissistic

of

the

damage

self,
nor

neither
its

objectification are impenetrable.

its

cultural

infliction

of

disciplines

of
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Sethe is still, as Paul D offers to bathe her, only able
to imagine the kind of attention, the kind of looking, that
segments her as a body--"If he bathes her in sections, will
the parts hold?"--but it is precisely his offer of close,
loving attention to her as a total self, almost as a "total
child, " that

initiates

the process by which

recover a sense of her own,

she might

still tentative,

Though the novel provides no guarantees,

"Me? Me?"

that is, we are

invited to imagine that Paul D's "holding fingers" "holding
hers," together with his affirming response--"You your best
thing,

Sethe"--could

provide

the

structure--like

the

pathogenically missing mother's smile--for rebuilding her
self (273).

Sethe's closing "Me? Me?" suggests a possible

revision of not only the narcissistically damaged Sethe,
who can only think of her children as extensions of her
self

(and the "best" part of her self), but also of the

racially individualized Sethe, who is accustomed to being
sectioned, measured, and animalized.
The way out of the fragmentations of slavery, as Paul D
recalls in this scene while trying to cope with the "too
many things" he feels: about Sethe
S i x o 's

relationship

empathic

friendship

to
of

the

(272),

is suggested by

"Thirty-Mile

the mind

that

Woman."

involves

An

neither

making the other a part of oneself nor responding to only a
part of them, neither reducing the other to an object nor
exalting them as an ideal, this relationship offers a model
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for

the

reintegration

of

self-experience.

described it: "She is a friend of my mind.
man.

As

Sixo

She gather me,

The pieces I am, she gather them and give them back

to me in all the right order" (272-73).

In suggesting that

we take a lesson about empathic responsiveness from this
passage,

I do

not

want

"empathy"

to be

construed

as

anything as simple as "caring," "sympathy," or "closeness."
What

I

take

continual,

friendship

of

the

mind

to

mean

is

the

mutual attempt to recognize the full psychic

configuration

of

another

as

if

from within

it,

hence

enabling each party to sense the important "pieces" of the
other that they might be constantly reflecting that psychic
configuration back in "all the right order."
bell hooks has described this passage as "paradigmatic"
for a "transformed" notion of how black men and women can
bond

(214),

and,

given our similar need for transformed

modes of bonding across a multitude of identity modes,
would extend that application.

I

hooks is quite right to

note that the passage evokes the need of black women and
men for "that space of recognition and understanding, where
we know one another so well,

our histories,

that we can

take the bits and pieces, the fragments of who we are, and
put them back together, re-member them"

(214).

But it is

precisely in the significance of these historical pieces,
the past versions of the self, the "yesterday" that Paul D
gestures toward in beginning to think of building his and
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Sethe1s

"tomorrow"

(273),

that Sixo1s paradigm is most

applicable to additional, broader social dynamics.

As Mae

Henderson argues, Morrison's call for a "re-memberance" of
the

self

imports

not

only

Sethe1s need

to

"claim and

surrender the past in order to refigure the future, " but
also the reader's need to do likewise (82).
"white"

readers

like myself,

then,

For culturally

Beloved provides

a

critical first opportunity to become empathically immersed
in the full psychology of the African American past, that
we

might

avert

what

Henderson

refers

to

as

the

"continuation of a 'national amnesia'" about the "personal
aspects of the story of slavery"

(83).-*-5

in rereading

Morrison's story of my own historical and racial "others"
from an empathic perspective,

I am most interested in how

such a friendship of the minds across the cultural and
psychic boundaries of the U.S. racial mirror stage could
contribute to an interracial restoration of the self.
Notes
1. The work of reading the psychological implications of
Beloved has already been initiated in productive, and
productively different, ways by Schapiro, Henderson,
Fitzgerald, Wyatt, and Mathieson, among others.
As
Morrison has commented in comparing her fiction to the
histories of slave life contained in the slave narratives,
the impulse of her artistic effort was to "find and expose
a truth about the interior life of people who didn't write
it" ("Site" 113, emphasis mine).
2. Although Benjamin's focus on the "self who suffers the
lack of recognition" (19) has much in common with Kohut's
emphasis on the self damaged by failures of empathic
response, she explicitly distances her conception of
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intersubjectivity from K o h u t 's idea of self-object
relationships,
arguing that the latter
"fails to
distinguish between using others as 'selfobjects' and
recognizing the other as an outside subject, missing the
key point of the intersubjective view" (251, n.16). While
this would seem to place Kohut midway between Klein's
strictly object-relations view and Benjamin's subjectsubject paradigm, I believe it somewhat mischaracterizes
self psychology, failing to take into account, for example,
the recognition of the other as sub-iect that is implicit in
the deep empathy of the healthy or therapeutic self-object
relationship.
3. In my reference to Wyatt, as in my discussion of Horvitz
above, I have somewhat deliberately avoided their emphasis
on the identity issues in Bel oved as questions of
specifically maternal, feminine, or African American
women's identity or recovery.
I do so not to deny the
validity of what critics like Wyatt, Horvitz, and Henderson
have interpreted as the novel's emphasis on women's
subjectivity, but to suggest how the validity of their
observations extends to the novel's concern with racial
subjectivity, across, for the moment, gender lines.
Morrison herself has insisted that she writes "without
gender focus" ("Interview" 54), suggesting a willingness to
think beyond the mother-daughter identity dynamic that
manifests itself in at least two textual details: Denver is
crippled not only by Sethe's inability to provide a healthy
"maternal" model, but also by Halle's equally significant
physical absence; and it is Paul D who eventually moves
into the role most evocative of what Wyatt calls the
"maternal symbolic," offering a caring, bodily, "mothering"
relationship to Sethe in the final scene.
4. Rick Moreland finds another useful psychoanalytic model
for this relationship in Julia Kristeva's descriptions of
the autoeroticism of the mother-child dyad.
Without the
crucial presence of what Kristeva calls the "Third Party,"
he notes,
"Sethe retreats again into this
'inside
loneliness' with Beloved.... this retreat functions in the
way Kristeva describes the mother-infant romance that from
two into an indistinguishable one threatens to collapse
into abjection and devouring" (519).
5. Beloved's disintegration, FitzGerald suggests, can also
be read as a version of what Klein called "the feeling that
the ego is in bits, " a result of infantile ambivalence
about or splitting of a maternal imago that the infant,
still preoedipally unseparated from the mother, can only
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perceive as totally nurturing or totally abandoning (674).
Barbara Mathieson, meanwhile, finds both Freud and the
object
relationalist
D.
W.
Winnicott
useful
in
understanding the distinctly narcissistic and preoedipal
identity (mal)formations of characters in the novel,
especially Beloved (2-3).
The ghost-baby1s fear of
disintegration, Mathieson notes, can also be referred to
Winnicott's observation of anxieties of self-disintegration
in young children as a response to maternal absence
(Mathieson 17).
6 . Wyatt 480.
Wyatt draws her characterization of the
middle passage from the remarks of Hortense Spillers in her
essay "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar
Book."
7. In Invisible Man. the protagonist, his head encircled by
a piece of iron like the iron collar worn by the smiling
woman in Beloved's recollection of the Middle Passage,
experiences the hospital machine not only as a place where
he "had just begun to live" but also as an amputation of
his limbs and a dissolution of his bodily boundaries, and
as a desperate guest to name himself (228, 232-35).
8 . In other words, a psychoanalytic recovery of the past
that would be therapeutic for victims of racialization like
Sethe would have to include retelling and repossessing not
only her personal past, but some recovery of the history of
slavery as well, like the retelling Morrison herself is
engaged in here. See Henderson 72-75 and n. 30, especially
her
observations
on
the
concept
of
ontology's
recapitulation of phylogeny that Morrison may be revising
to her own purposes.
9. Rick Moreland has argued, somewhat differently from my
own formulation,
that Beloved serves as a sort of
Kristevian "Third Party" for Denver, facilitating her
emergence from an isolated, abject relationship to Sethe
and enabling her to revise and retell her "story" about
herself in a way that gives her an interactive, "different
role than that of either the hero or the powerless victim"
(514).
While I find Moreland's reading of Denver's
condition in terms of the isolation and polarization forced
on her by the "romance" discourse of either "heroism" or
"helplessness" a useful addition to the psychoanalytic
framework of infantile narcissism
(which similarly
polarizes possession and dependence), I think his view
idealizes the therapeutic nature of the Denver-Beloved
relationship in ways the text does not support, neglecting
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what seem to be the distinctly unhealthy, narcissistically
damaged aspects of their interaction after Denver's
"retelling" of her story/self: for example, Denver's panic
of total disintegration (123) and the threesome's later
withdrawal inside the isolating boundaries of their house.
10. See also Kohut's description of such relationships, in
an analytical context, as involving "editions of a child's
demands for attention, approval, and for the confirmatory
echoing of its presence," and "an admixture of the tyranny
and overpossessiveness which betrays a heightening of oralsadistic and anal-sadistic drive elements" (Analysis 12425) .
11. The cold house where Denver's disintegration panic
occurs seems to be an important locus in the novel for the
associations of the characters' disintegration anxieties.
It is, of course, where Paul D and Beloved enact their
eroticized quest for wholeness, but it is also where
Beloved becomes transfixed by the "sunlit cracks" in the
ceiling, causing her to curl into a fetal position (124),
and where Paul D lives among "old newspapers gnawed at the
edges by mice" and "moonlight seeping through the cracks"
(263-64). Such images evoke the way Kohut's patients link
"the dread of the loss of [the] self" to the structural
integrity of their living quarters: "a negligible crack in
the plaster in one room might indicate the presence of a
serious structural defect of the patient's house....or, in
dreams, the frightening infestation of the living quarters
with spreading vermin" (Restoration 105).
12. We might include in such a characterization of Sethe
her hyperprotective refusal to consider Denver as a full,
separate subject in -her own right (44-45), what Paul D
refers to as her "too-thick" love (164), and the fact that,
at the moment of crisis, she can only think of her children
as "parts" of her own self that she "collects" (163),
which, indeed, is the mental configuration that enables her
to think in terms of killing the "crawling-already?" baby
to protect it from slavery, as FitzGerald points out (678).
13. In a parallel and productive interpretation, Schapiro
reads the "looking" dynamic I am emphasizing here in terms
of Benjamin's concept of "recognition," equally critical to
the development of the self as an experiential whole--the
subject, in Benjamin's framework. Noting that "empathize"
is one of the possible "near-synonyms" for what she means
by "recognize," Benjamin observes, "The idea of mutual
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recognition seems to me an ever more crucial category of
early experience" (16).
14. Characterizing Schoolteacher as a "disciplinary"
"ethnographer-as-historian," Henderson claims that Morrison
uses his portrayal as "an indictment of the kind of
'scholarly' and 'scientific' discourse and representation
in which the preconceptions and presuppositions of the
inquirer subject the results of the inquiry to gross
distortions" (84, n.18).
15. Citing Morrison's 1989 interview in Time magazine,
Henderson reports, "Morrison tells us that Beloved is a
book 'about something that the characters don't want to
remember, I don't want to remember, black people don't want
to remember, white people don't want to remember.' The
author's remarks speak to a public desire to repress the
personal aspects of the story of slavery."
See Morrison,
"The Pain of Being Black," Time (May 22, 1989): 120.
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